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The War in Ukraine

KevinB said:
Do both. But some of the ‘Stan’s are terrible violators of Sanctions against Russian
Click to expand...
How much of that is driven by straightforward greed, and how much would disappear if those nations didn't feel a need to appease Moscow?
 
Hopefully we don't see Stormtrooper aim manifest into reality as well. Neat piece of hardware though.

euromaidanpress.com

France’s new laser rifle silently melts electronics at 500 meters — and Ukrainian infantry could really use it - Euromaidan Press

France’s new HELMA-LP laser rifle disables electronics from 500m away—quietly. A battlefield tool Ukrainian infantry may need sooner than later.
euromaidanpress.com euromaidanpress.com
Alt: France’s new laser rifle silently melts electronics at 500 meters — and Ukrainian infantry could really use it - Euromaidan Press | Ghostarchive
 
daftandbarmy said:
What they really need is the ability to excel at maneuver warfare, which is a little more complicated than just using bigger/ better bombs unfortunately...
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For that to be viable they need air supremacy. They have drone parity but not superiority let alone supremacy or dominance. And a suitable robust western style air force capable of local air dominance? 2 years from reality at best.

Without air cover, mechanized maneuver warfare is a recipe for huge losses. The old doctrines will not work the same way they used to.
 
Skysix said:
For that to be viable they need air supremacy. They have drone parity but not superiority let alone supremacy or dominance. And a suitable robust western style air force capable of local air dominance? 2 years from reality at best.

Without air cover, mechanized maneuver warfare is a recipe for huge losses. The old doctrines will not work the same way they used to.
Click to expand...
Depends on where you attack. Kursk was a example of it working without air dominance.
 
Skysix said:
For that to be viable they need air supremacy. They have drone parity but not superiority let alone supremacy or dominance. And a suitable robust western style air force capable of local air dominance? 2 years from reality at best.

Without air cover, mechanized maneuver warfare is a recipe for huge losses. The old doctrines will not work the same way they used to.
Click to expand...


One area that I think the changes to AirLand Battle are causing harm is with rotary aviation.

AirLand was all about the offensive use of helicopters (Apaches and Cobras). Logistics didn't get the same attention. (Hawks and Hooks) even with grandiose schemes for Vertical Envelopment.

These days, I perceive a strong, if not stronger, case for maintaining and even expanding the rotary wing fleet, in order to sustain dispersed operations. That doesn't mean pushing helicopters forwards to FEBA/FLOT. It means the opposite. Using helicopters behind the lines, well behind the lines, to rapidly support dispersed Hubs and FOBs.

They may be vulnerable to UAVs and Aircraft but are they any more vulnerable than ground vehicles that are slower and constrained by terrain?

The work of the Kiowas and Apaches has largely been transferred to UAVs. On the other hand Apaches as rapidly relocating launch points for long range UAVs, effectively as flying artillery, should still make them useful in the field.

...

Dumping battalions of infanteers behind enemy lines doesn't seem like a winning proposition to me. But moving and sustaining own troops behind friendly lines to create blocks and channels does seem workable.


1747770522071.png

www.twz.com

Marine AH-1Z Attack Helicopter's Mystery Missiles Identified

The modular Red Wolf launched effects weapon could give Marine AH-1Zs a key new standoff strike tool and open the door to other capabilities.
www.twz.com www.twz.com

Is the chin turret still necessary if the aircraft is going to used in the stand-off role?
 
Kirkhill said:
One area that I think the changes to AirLand Battle are causing harm is with rotary aviation.

AirLand was all about the offensive use of helicopters (Apaches and Cobras). Logistics didn't get the same attention. (Hawks and Hooks) even with grandiose schemes for Vertical Envelopment.

These days, I perceive a strong, if not stronger, case for maintaining and even expanding the rotary wing fleet, in order to sustain dispersed operations. That doesn't mean pushing helicopters forwards to FEBA/FLOT. It means the opposite. Using helicopters behind the lines, well behind the lines, to rapidly support dispersed Hubs and FOBs.

They may be vulnerable to UAVs and Aircraft but are they any more vulnerable than ground vehicles that are slower and constrained by terrain?

The work of the Kiowas and Apaches has largely been transferred to UAVs. On the other hand Apaches as rapidly relocating launch points for long range UAVs, effectively as flying artillery, should still make them useful in the field.

...

Dumping battalions of infanteers behind enemy lines doesn't seem like a winning proposition to me. But moving and sustaining own troops behind friendly lines to create blocks and channels does seem workable.


View attachment 93397

www.twz.com

Marine AH-1Z Attack Helicopter's Mystery Missiles Identified

The modular Red Wolf launched effects weapon could give Marine AH-1Zs a key new standoff strike tool and open the door to other capabilities.
www.twz.com www.twz.com

Is the chin turret still necessary if the aircraft is going to used in the stand-off role?
Click to expand...
The same argument was used in the 70s: jets with missiles didn't need guns, until they did.
 
YZT580 said:
The same argument was used in the 70s: jets with missiles didn't need guns, until they did.
Click to expand...

Perhaps less of the gun on the Phantom and more of the ball turret on the B17?

A defensive capability?
 
Kirkhill said:
One area that I think the changes to AirLand Battle are causing harm is with rotary aviation.

AirLand was all about the offensive use of helicopters (Apaches and Cobras). Logistics didn't get the same attention. (Hawks and Hooks) even with grandiose schemes for Vertical Envelopment.

These days, I perceive a strong, if not stronger, case for maintaining and even expanding the rotary wing fleet, in order to sustain dispersed operations. That doesn't mean pushing helicopters forwards to FEBA/FLOT. It means the opposite. Using helicopters behind the lines, well behind the lines, to rapidly support dispersed Hubs and FOBs.

They may be vulnerable to UAVs and Aircraft but are they any more vulnerable than ground vehicles that are slower and constrained by terrain?

The work of the Kiowas and Apaches has largely been transferred to UAVs. On the other hand Apaches as rapidly relocating launch points for long range UAVs, effectively as flying artillery, should still make them useful in the field.

...

Dumping battalions of infanteers behind enemy lines doesn't seem like a winning proposition to me. But moving and sustaining own troops behind friendly lines to create blocks and channels does seem workable.


View attachment 93397

www.twz.com

Marine AH-1Z Attack Helicopter's Mystery Missiles Identified

The modular Red Wolf launched effects weapon could give Marine AH-1Zs a key new standoff strike tool and open the door to other capabilities.
www.twz.com www.twz.com

Is the chin turret still necessary if the aircraft is going to used in the stand-off role?
Click to expand...

This may be pedantic, but "AirLand Battle" was not a doctrine developed to emphasize rotary wing assets in either the offense or defense. It was about the collaboration of the Air Force (the "Air" part of the title) and the Army (the "Land" part). The term "Air-Land Battle" was first used in the US Army's FM 100-5, Operations, in 1976.

1747790080052.png


The subsequent editions ('82 & '86) of FM 100-5 developed the doctrine somewhat, but it was concisely expressed in this 1981 TRADOC Pam.
1747799711752.png

The modern battlefield demands close and continuous Army-Air Force coordination. Yet, the 1982 edition did not specifically link the Air Force’s theaterwide view of air support with the Army’s operational-level perspective of the AirLand Battle. The new edition recognizes that future campaigns and major operations will be joint undertakings with mutually supporting air and ground functions. Consequently, those functions—air interdiction, counterair operations, reconnaissance and ground maneuver—are best directed from the theater, campaign and major operation perspectives. The theater commander must concentrate air power against objectives critical to the success of the campaign or major operation.

The new manual does not resolve the dilemma of the corps commander who plans for air interdiction to his front and then fails to get it. However, it does point out that, if planning is done properly, the corps commander will know well in advance whether he is or is not likely to get air support. If he is part of the major operation which is the main effort of the campaign (as the X Corps at Inchon), there is little doubt that he will. If he is in an economy-of-force sector, there is a high probability that his sortie allocation will be less than he wants.

The manual does not address Army/Air Force procedural issues, nor does it refer to specific Army/Air Force agreements which may be superseded in the future as the Army and Air Force resolve procedural issues and refine joint tactics, techniques and procedures. Such items will be covered in subordinate manuals which are updated more frequently.

In my judgment, the unmistakable conclusion remains that the 1982 edition of FM 100-5 was on target. Much to our delight, the concepts and ideas generated significant thought, reflection, investigation and resultant professional debate. In the midst of this legitimate and necessary dialogue, the 1986 version took shape. Challenging the applicability of the AirLand Battle to a variety of scenarios and environments bolstered the value of the new version. Questioning doctrinal principles strengthened their basic foundation.

The resultant doctrine has undergone extraordinary scrutiny and analysis from within the Army and from our allies. The new manual addresses these concerns and adapts to the needs of the Army worldwide.

The NATO review of the 1982 edition raised many significant issues. The crux of the NATO concerns, however, centered on an interpretation of AirLand Battle as US military strategy rather than doctrine. While written at the tactical and operational levels, FM 100-5 was often misinterpreted as a strategic concept rather than US Army doctrine. References to “defeating the enemy” and “decisive action” were misread as strategic rather than tactical and operational injunctions. That viewpoint generated serious questions regarding:
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But all good things come to an end.

This shared approach to solving the problem of defending NATO was more than a convergence of air and ground concepts: It resulted in new concepts, including the Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine, joint suppression of enemy air defenses, battlefield air interdiction, and clarifications of close air support. Indeed, the integration of Army and Air Force capabilities was fundamental to Airland Battle doctrine.
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The Unraveling of Army–Air Force Cooperation: Airland Battle Becomes Air and Land Battles
The interservice cooperation that undergirded the Army’s Airland Battle doctrine began fraying as service cultures and views about warfighting clashed during Operation Desert Storm. The Army's thinking and doctrine evolved in the 1970s and 1980s, with an increasing focus on the operational level of war. AirLand Battle was the final maturation of Army concepts and was reflected in the 1986 version of Field Manual 100-5, Operations. Although the manual recognized the value of air power against the Soviet heartland, a role that the Air Force believed was decisive, it argued that the best use of air power was against the enemy’s land forces. . . .
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Last edited:
Well we have definitely shifted topics , I'm really confused how ALB translates to Ukraine - as this most definitely is NOT in anyway a campaign being run like ALB would recommend.



Blackadder1916 said:
But all good things come to an end.
Click to expand...

I think it worth looking back what came after ALB and why. ALB was solely a war fighting endeavor - which can lead to a lot of incorrect assumptions on how to prosecute a campaign, as "winning" may not actually win...


www.ausa.org

Distinctly Different Doctrine: Why Multi-Domain Operations Isn’t AirLand Battle 2.0

Those who have watched the Army’s concept for Multi-Domain Operations evolve since the fall of 2017 have experienced an odd sense of d
www.ausa.org www.ausa.org
 
KevinB said:
Yes, but it’s been painfully obvious for years that is Putin’s goal.

Anyone who doesn’t admit that is either mentally challenged, or a Russian bot.
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Any remember the old Tom Clancy ghost recon game? Plot was ultra nationalists take control in Moscow and invade the former Soviet countries to reform the Soviet union. Fiction sure gets things right at weird times...
 
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