Medium Cavalry: Critical Capability or Poor Man’s MBT?

[McG]

So the armoured corps has been discussing medium cavalry for several years now. 12 RBC experimented with a cavalry concept on MAPLE RESOLVE 2018. Four years later, several articles in Canadian Army Journal 19.3 discussed modernization of the armoured corps by moving from tank and recce to just cavalry, and one of those articles advocated all recce squadrons be replaced with medium cavalry. By mid 2023, there was buzz about a medium cavalry project.

But the vision of medium cavalry seems also to have evolved over the years. Early years (2020 to 2023) describing a wheeled vehicle with a turreted 105 mm cannon. This vision of medium cavalry wanted something with a big punch that would be able to keep pace with LAVs on a highway; something like 105 mm LAV 700 or Centauro. By late 2024, much talk of medium cavalry seems to have shifted to tracked medium tanks like Booker, CV90105, or CV90120. These vehicles would no longer be able to keep pace with LAVs on a highway, but they would have firepower and mobility approaching that of an MBT.

I have no doubt a medium tank can do things that a wheeled vehicle cannot do. But, if CA is going to sacrifice all the benefits of wheels (and all the benefits of some commonality with other in service fleets) to get only some of advantage of a MBT, why not go for all the capability of a MBT - scrap the idea of medium cavalry and put all three Reg F armoured regiments in MBTs?

The shift from talking about medium cavalry as a wheeled capability to predominantly talking about medium cavalry as a tracked capability seems to have coincided with the firming of Canada’s commitment to meeting its defence expenditure promises. I can’t tell the CA vision for medium cavalry changed because of an analysis that determined there was a requirement for less capable tanks, or because the platform level ambition grew with the prospect of greater funding.

 

[OldSolduer]

So - put all three Armored Regiments in tanks-the same tank

FWIW and I am not expert but I do think the medium wheel Fire Support Vehicle bears looking at.

 

[KevinB]

I have a hard time with the concept of Calvary at this junction in time being with either the Armoured or Infantry exclusively.
While I see a hard MBT role for the Armoured Corps in Canada, as it is hard to function in a combined arms setting without a tank, I am not so set on what exactly Medium Calvary really is. For the Canadian aspect, I get concerned when I hear about wheeled vehicle with tank guns, as MGS rears it's ugly head, and I have Cougar AVGP PTSD...

When one talks about Light or Medium Cavalry, I tend to look to the US Cavalry of the Indian Wars as an example.
Use vehicle to do mobility stuff, but be prepared to fight dismounted as well, as the vehicles aren't generally protected to fight from the vehicle like a tank is. As such the 105mm and 120mm tracked systems like the M10 Booker or CV90 105/120 don't really do it for me. I see that role being more like a 40mm CV90 MkIV, with a punchy gun, and missiles for dealing with armored threats beyond gun ranges.

The MGS/LAV fire support vehicle is something like the M10 Booker to me, the answer to the question that no one should have asked.
What is the role for it? Few Armies plan on doctrinally fighting armored formations with Light/Medium Infantry in mobile warfare, when confronted with an Armored threat - one sits back and uses terrain to ones advantages, and FIRES then ones ATGM's.

If one is thinking of a fixed fortification "pillbox" issue, on the advance, (again one probably isn't using Light Infantry unless it's close complex terrain) you have tanks - and FIRES, use them, and left overs can be cleaned up by dismounted infantry using 84mm, M72's, or demo charges.
Loitering Munitions like the Switchblade can do a heck of a job on a bunker in forested areas - ideally without exposing anyone to direct fire like a DFSV would.

For Light roles, the DFSV can be a MRZR group with GAU-19 and GMG, using LM's if the issue is hardened enough that .50 and 40mm HV will not crack it easily.

 

[daftandbarmy]

So the armoured corps has been discussing medium cavalry for several years now. 12 RBC experimented with a cavalry concept on MAPLE RESOLVE 2018. Four years later, several articles in Canadian Army Journal 19.3 discussed modernization of the armoured corps by moving from tank and recce to just cavalry, and one of those articles advocated all recce squadrons be replaced with medium cavalry. By mid 2023, there was buzz about a medium cavalry project.

But the vision of medium cavalry seems also to have evolved over the years. Early years (2020 to 2023) describing a wheeled vehicle with a turreted 105 mm cannon. This vision of medium cavalry wanted something with a big punch that would be able to keep pace with LAVs on a highway; something like 105 mm LAV 700 or Centauro. By late 2024, much talk of medium cavalry seems to have shifted to tracked medium tanks like Booker, CV90105, or CV90120. These vehicles would no longer be able to keep pace with LAVs on a highway, but they would have firepower and mobility approaching that of an MBT.

I have no doubt a medium tank can do things that a wheeled vehicle cannot do. But, if CA is going to sacrifice all the benefits of wheels (and all the benefits of some commonality with other in service fleets) to get only some of advantage of a MBT, why not go for all the capability of a MBT - scrap the idea of medium cavalry and put all three Reg F armoured regiments in MBTs?

The shift from talking about medium cavalry as a wheeled capability to predominantly talking about medium cavalry as a tracked capability seems to have coincided with the firming of Canada’s commitment to meeting its defence expenditure promises. I can’t tell the CA vision for medium cavalry changed because of an analysis that determined there was a requirement for less capable tanks, or because the platform level ambition grew with the prospect of greater funding.

I get the difference between 'light' and 'heavy' cavalry, discussed here for example: Discussion Paper: Canadian Light Armoured Cavalry Concepts

But I struggle to understand what a medium cavalry role would add that was of any value.

 

[FJAG]

I've been reading an awful lot about this topic recently and there are a number of concepts for a modern army that make sense to me. So here goes:

1) as a starter its mass versus cost. It's not the drone that's killing the tank but its inordinate cost. Budgets are always political decisions and if I can get the same budget but buy twice as many lighter vehicles then so be it.

2) tanks are too big/tall and heavy which restricts their mobility. They need to be reduced in size and weight and made faster while leaving the firepower the same. WW2 lessons were that more enemy tanks were destroyed by lighter SP tank destroyers then tanks themselves - that's a tactice issue. Tanks that aren't highly mobile are merely targets. The much lighter Leo 1 did better surviving in LCSO wargames than its heavier counterparts. Pretty much any enemy tank gun and ATGM and now ATk drones can penetrate our heavier tanks. The key is using ground, lots of movement and avoid being hit - APS will help. Massive artillery suppression of enemy positions while tanks are manoeuvring is critical. Close, perhaps even organic, CUAV and AD systems are critical.

3) in order to manoeuvre rapidly in all terrain, tanks need tracks - the wheeled folks are living in a dream.

4) basic rule - infantry fight dismounted; cavalry fights mounted.

5) There are two types of cavalry - light and heavy. Tanks are the heavy boys and need to be able to close with the enemy - their role is the assault whether in the attack or counterattack. Defensive anti-armour work is the role of anti-armour systems employed by the infantry (dismounted) and the light cavalry (mounted, or more like dragoons, a mix of mounted and dismounted - you're welcome @Kirkhill).

6) light cavalry fights deep in the screen where its mobility and organization lets it cover a wide front. It's primary weapons are, in order, artillery (guns, rockets and loitering) and its organic anti-armour weapons aided by a wide variety of sensors. It must have its own organic AD / CUAV and EW. It too is best tracked in order to make best use of the terrain to stay concealed. - wheeled folks are still living in a dream.

7) In LSCO, infantry who try to fight while mounted in their IFVs will die while mounted in their IFVs. The trade off of a weapon turret and the people to man it negatively effects the number of available dismounts. Trying to use the IFV as a fire support vehicle puts the IFV at high risk of destruction. A point for consideration is heavier APCs with a variety of RWS self-defence weapons including a mix of CUAV, AD anti-armour and anti-pers while the dismounted assaulting force is accompanied by small Weasel-like support weapons carriers.

8) getting back to tanks. The triangle of firepower, manoeuverability and protection has never been an equilateral one. Firepower has always been the predominant factor coming out of the leadership after WW2. Survival through manoeuvrability came second and protection last. Weight and engine power ratios complicated the development of tanks throughout the Cold War. Survival can best be provided by getting the crew and ammo out of the turret, reducing overall vehicle height and much, much better use of close fire support.

That is all for now. Going for supper. Have at the gunner.

 

[GR66]

I've been reading an awful lot about this topic recently and there are a number of concepts for a modern army that make sense to me. So here goes:

1) as a starter its mass versus cost. It's not the drone that's killing the tank but its inordinate cost. Budgets are always political decisions and if I can get the same budget but buy twice as many lighter vehicles then so be it.

2) tanks are too big/tall and heavy which restricts their mobility. They need to be reduced in size and weight and made faster while leaving the firepower the same. WW2 lessons were that more enemy tanks were destroyed by lighter SP tank destroyers then tanks themselves - that's a tactice issue. Tanks that aren't highly mobile are merely targets. The much lighter Leo 1 did better surviving in LCSO wargames than its heavier counterparts. Pretty much any enemy tank gun and ATGM and now ATk drones can penetrate our heavier tanks. The key is using ground, lots of movement and avoid being hit - APS will help. Massive artillery suppression of enemy positions while tanks are manoeuvring is critical. Close, perhaps even organic, CUAV and AD systems are critical.

3) in order to manoeuvre rapidly in all terrain, tanks need tracks - the wheeled folks are living in a dream.

This I think is an important nut to crack. The traditional argument is that these light mobile gun systems (like the CV90120, etc.) can't replace a MBT because they don't have the armour to stand up against a real tank...."the best anti-tank weapon is a tank". But is that still true? Are we getting to a point where tanks will be taken out by non-LOS weapons before they ever get in site of the enemy's MBT's?

What does that mean for the role of armour in the combined arms fight? If big, heavy, expensive MBT's are going to be kept out of range of the front by systems like this (carrying 24 x N-LOS missiles):

or this:

then do tanks still require the heavy armour that allows them to fight each other? Will lighter, faster (and more plentiful) tanks that have APS (and accompanying C-RAM/C-UAV vehicles) rush the front to engage the dismounted enemy while they are suppressed by fires and our own N-LOS weapons and UAV's keep the enemy's armour from making it to the front?

I think this is where the "Cavalry" debate gets stuck because nobody is quite sure yet if warfare has shifted enough to change the role (and utility) of the traditional MBT.

 

[IKnowNothing]

Alternative perspective:

Poor man's MBT: A Critical Capability

That is to say, the RCAC is down to a wholly inadequate 74 track fleet of MBT's, (34 of which are right on the line between obsolscent and obsolete), a lemon of a security vehicle, and a surveillance vehicle that doesnt really fit new doctrine.

The clock is ticking.

 

[FJAG]

This I think is an important nut to crack. The traditional argument is that these light mobile gun systems (like the CV90120, etc.) can't replace a MBT because they don't have the armour to stand up against a real tank...."the best anti-tank weapon is a tank". But is that still true? Are we getting to a point where tanks will be taken out by non-LOS weapons before they ever get in site of the enemy's MBT's?

I don't think that it was ever true. I think if you look at it historically the best anti-tank weapon was anti-tank artillery including tank-destroyers. That would be abundantly true for the defence in Europe. And if you ever looked at the fights in North Africa in those days anti-tank guns - some on portees - moved right behind the tanks to set up fast defences for tanks to fall back behind if necessary.

Post WW2 the myth of the tank pushed anti-tank aside rather quickly.

What does that mean for the role of armour in the combined arms fight? If big, heavy, expensive MBT's are going to be kept out of range of the front by systems like this (carrying 24 x N-LOS missiles):
View attachment 95769
or this:
View attachment 95770
then do tanks still require the heavy armour that allows them to fight each other?

Neither of those systems will take ground. Combined arms-including a tank- are still needed. How they operate and what constitutes combined arms and what defensive systems are fielded will determine how well they will work. We in the Western world are still somewhat lulled into the belief that we can fight wars with minimal loses. The past thirty years have reinforced that belief because of the lopsided wars we were involved in.

Will lighter, faster (and more plentiful) tanks that have APS (and accompanying C-RAM/C-UAV vehicles) rush the front to engage the dismounted enemy while they are suppressed by fires and our own N-LOS weapons and UAV's keep the enemy's armour from making it to the front?

I think this is where the "Cavalry" debate gets stuck because nobody is quite sure yet if warfare has shifted enough to change the role (and utility) of the traditional MBT.

I'm sitting far on the outside of the best knowledge sources right now but my general understanding is that that wargaming outcomes support that lighter armour which is more manoeuvrable and less exposed to sensors is more survivable and is capable of keeping its lethality through the size of its weapon systems being equal to the MBT. Traditionalist tankers reject that argument.

Incidentally. I like the term cavalry to distinguish between those that fight mounted and those that fight dismounted. "Armour" is becoming a vague term with the amount of it in all sizes that proliferates on the battlefield.

I tend to agree with @KevinB in that I do not understand the role of medium cavalry. I see two categories - light and heavy - each with quite different roles. I can understand the term "medium" insofar as it means a lighter vehicle than the current MBTs but that still performs what an MBT is to do, IMHO that merely means something which is still a "heavy" cavalry vehicle performing the "heavy" role. And don't forget tracked - it's critical to manoeuvrability and lower exposure and therefore survivability due to height.

 

[Kirkhill]

JAGM-MR / Brimstone 2 unit cost is sub 1 million USD. Early versions are in the 250 to 300 kUSD range. New versions are assumed to cost more but recent contracts are geared to higher volumes. Some swings and roundabouts and I will set the unit cost at 500 kUSD.

Those little quadcopters are in the 5 to 50 kUSD range.

Both of them outrange the sensors and armaments of Leos and K2s which are on the 10 MUSD range.

Assume that the JAGM isn't 100% effective and instead is only 33 to 50 % effective. One truckload of JAGMs costing around 12 MUSD, or roughly the cost of a single modern tank, would render an entire Squadron (Canadian) ineffective in a single salvo.

Throw in a simultaneous swarm of quadcopters and other LAMs and decoys and you will be hard pressed tp concentrate anything.

I like the concept of the wheeled protected mobility vehicle as the basis for dominating large areas of the country side and inhibiting enemy movements and concentration. That I would call a medium force. One that can move and endure through dispersion and constant movement.

Light forces are fire and retire, single shot weapons that generally lack stamina unless special terrain and enemy conditions apply.

....

I believe that medium and light forces together can deny victory to an attacking force.

I can't find an easy path to victory for any force of any weight if it can't concentrate to generate sufficient applied mass.

Heavy tanks and/or APCs may be the least worst solution but I am not convinced they are a good solution let alone a winning solution.

 

[KevinB]

It is very easy to deny terrain to a wheeled vehicle…

 

[Kirkhill]

It is very easy to deny terrain to a wheeled vehicle…

How easy is it to deny the effect of a wheeled vehicle with its own aor force?

 

[Lumber]

I have no doubt a medium tank can do things that a wheeled vehicle cannot do. But, if CA is going to sacrifice all the benefits of wheels (and all the benefits of some commonality with other in service fleets) to get only some of advantage of a MBT, why not go for all the capability of a MBT - scrap the idea of medium cavalry and put all three Reg F armoured regiments in MBTs?

So I was today years old when I learned that RCD and 12th Armoured don't have MBTs....

So, excuse my ignorance, but if RCD and 12th Armoured use LAVs, and the mechanized infantry battalions use LAVs, then what is the difference between them?

 

[McG]

So, excuse my ignorance, but if RCD and 12th Armoured use LAVs, and the mechanized infantry battalions use LAVs, then what is the difference between them?

Doctrine and TTPs. Also, the TAPV with dual-wielding RWS (GPMG & AGL) was bought for recce squadrons and should not be in the rifle companies.

 

[dapaterson]

So I was today years old when I learned that RCD and 12th Armoured don't have MBTs....

So, excuse my ignorance, but if RCD and 12th Armoured use LAVs, and the mechanized infantry battalions use LAVs, then what is the difference between them?

Eventually those units will receive a LAV specifically configured as a surveillance platform.

 

[IKnowNothing]

Eventually those units will receive a LAV specifically configured as a surveillance platform.

Which uh, is going to fit Cavalry doctrine just perfectly. Not to mention stretching 66 of them between both of the regiments plus school needs.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I don't think that it was ever true. I think if you look at it historically the best anti-tank weapon was anti-tank artillery including tank-destroyers. That would be abundantly true for the defence in Europe. And if you ever looked at the fights in North Africa in those days anti-tank guns - some on portees - moved right behind the tanks to set up fast defences for tanks to fall back behind if necessary.

As I recall, medium artillery (5.5inch guns) proved the best anti-tank weapon, in Normandy and elsewhere, on a few critical occasions...

 

[Lumber]

Eventually those units will receive a LAV specifically configured as a surveillance platform.

It just seems odd that the unit called "Lord Strathcona's Horse" has MBTs, and yet the unit called 12th ARMOURED doesn't have, well, Armour.

 

[GR66]

Neither of those systems will take ground. Combined arms-including a tank- are still needed. How they operate and what constitutes combined arms and what defensive systems are fielded will determine how well they will work. We in the Western world are still somewhat lulled into the belief that we can fight wars with minimal loses. The past thirty years have reinforced that belief because of the lopsided wars we were involved in.

I'm not suggesting these systems will replace combined arms (or tanks) or be able to hold ground. What I'm suggesting is that like in Ukraine they are capable of creating a type of no-mans-land between and behind the front lines where armoured vehicles can't freely operate.

This will require fires to soften the front and interdict enemy armoured vehicles from the target area and then combined arms forces will quickly concentrate and move in for the assault. That would include tanks...but if speed, maneuverability and low signature are increasingly important to survivability (rather than the ability to survive against enemy armour) then is it possible that lighter tanks than our current generation of MBT's (available in greater numbers) might be more suitable.

I'm sitting far on the outside of the best knowledge sources right now but my general understanding is that that wargaming outcomes support that lighter armour which is more manoeuvrable and less exposed to sensors is more survivable and is capable of keeping its lethality through the size of its weapon systems being equal to the MBT. Traditionalist tankers reject that argument.

The above is what I'm suggesting as a possibility made viable through the in depth interdiction of enemy heavy armour from the front through UAV's and N-LOS weapons.

Incidentally. I like the term cavalry to distinguish between those that fight mounted and those that fight dismounted. "Armour" is becoming a vague term with the amount of it in all sizes that proliferates on the battlefield.

I tend to agree with @KevinB in that I do not understand the role of medium cavalry. I see two categories - light and heavy - each with quite different roles. I can understand the term "medium" insofar as it means a lighter vehicle than the current MBTs but that still performs what an MBT is to do, IMHO that merely means something which is still a "heavy" cavalry vehicle performing the "heavy" role. And don't forget tracked - it's critical to manoeuvrability and lower exposure and therefore survivability due to height.

Agreed on the above.

The one area where I'm almost certain that heavy armour will still be required is in the urban fight. As sensors and precision fires make concentration of forces increasingly difficult in open terrain will that lead forces to move into heavy urban terrain in order to hide from the omnipresent sensors?

Might we see forces split between Light and Heavy Cavalry forces working in open terrain, Light forces operating in complex (non-vehicle permissive) terrain and ultra-heavy forces in urban terrain?

 

[dapaterson]

Which uh, is going to fit Cavalry doctrine just perfectly. Not to mention stretching 66 of them between both of the regiments plus school needs.

Oriole is called a warship; the Cav can survive doing surveillance.

 

[Underway]

It seems that the army's modernization reoganization plans are to include both medium cavalry and MBT's.

From Noah, 1CMBG will be getting a second Heavy Cavalry Regiment. A new unit. The remainder (the other two) CMBG's will have one medium each. For those counting that's two heavy and two medium regiments. 8th Hussars return?

The army's Medium Cavalry vehicle project is in initial definition phase. I expect it to be expedited.