Medium Cavalry: Critical Capability or Poor Man’s MBT?

[Kirkhill]

Or if the infantry and other arms don't already have enough on their plate and the art of discovery is a full time job.

 

[FJAG]

Ah well if Jim Storr said it…

I’d question the value of that assertion from a man with very limited operational experience and who never would have seen concentrated artillery fire beyond a canned range. However I understand I have a largely dissenting opinion of Storr.

25 years in the British army including 5 in BAOR and an extensive researcher and commentator. I'd give him some benefit of the doubt. Others in the field tend to agree with this particular assertion.

I, and Storr, would concede that whatever shock artillery imparts is transitory and of limited, if any, value if not rapidly followed up by assaulting manoeuvre forces.

 

[KevinB]

We're diverting, but if even one horse battery had been rolled up and one square ripped apart by case, Waterloo would have ended differently.

Mais pourquoi?

A point is that shock is possible, and doesn't depend on tanks, nor is it or was it ever the sole purview of cavalry and its descendants.

Speed, surprise and violence of action.

What a well-established modern cavalry doctrine and force can do is mitigate enemy opportunities for shock by increasing knowledge (particularly of terrain and enemy) and frustrating enemy attempts to mass in space and time. A reason to do it this way is if the job is complicated enough that it shouldn't just be added to the lists of tasks for infantry and tank battalions to master.

I’ll be the contrarian this time, as what you described sounds like a Fires and ISR task.

So I’m left wondering WTF is Medium Calvary

 

[FJAG]

Quibbling.

But not much. We seem to be fairly close.

Now, do those lower HQs deal with their covering force-type and other traditional recce/cavalry ("light") tasks out of their manoeuvre assets, or do they need an established element ("cavalry"), and does a list of probable tasks for any given phase amount to more than a sub-unit can handle?

That's a question for me.

I'm currently of the mind that in a lighter, leaner division, the primary covering force - let's call it a robust screen - is provided across the front by a strong cavalry regiment. The manoeuvre brigades provide just light recce for themselves through their recce troops/platoons. In certain circumstances one of the manoeuvre brigades may be used as a divisional guard (or the whole division as a corps guard)

I find the terms light or medium or heavy cavalry unsatisfactory as I think in only in two classes - MBT as one and cavalry as the other.

I see MBTs (however light, medium or heavy they are) as the mounted armour component of the combined arms battle group.

I see cavalry as a comprehensive all arms force in its own right. To me the vehicles in the cavalry are less important than how it operates and what weapons it deploys either organically or through the fires brigade. Once you determine what you want for the latter, the vehicle selection follows.

 

[Brad Sallows]

I’ll be the contrarian this time, as what you described sounds like a Fires and ISR task.

Sure. The things I noted are not things "only" cavalry can or should do.

So I’m left wondering WTF is Medium Calvary

The insistence on the word "medium" is unnecessary; maybe so is the insistence on the word "cavalry". Is the covering force/security zone arena distinct enough to merit bespoke units and formations to execute whatever new/altered doctrine emerges from consideration of current events? Are the traditional ratios of tanks, infantry, artillery, engineers, comms, etc overdue for reconsideration, particularly at division and corps? Should we just keep the names recce/recon?

I'm inclined to answer "yes", "yes", and "no" (nomenclature being a way of making a point of some kind of change).

 

[Kirkhill]

How long is your line?

If your flanks are securely anchored and you can see your enemy across no-mans land then there is no room for manoeuvre and little opportunity tp generate surprise.

Where would any force manoeuvre? Infantry or Cavalry?

In those circumstances I could argue that the work of discovery and disruption of lines of communication, tasks being ascribed to cavalry but which could also be done by infantry, would more properly be handled by special forces, partisans and traitors.

What is the appropriate counter?

I can tell you that part of the British WW1 counter was my grandad and a bunch of his 18 year old mates with SMLEs pedalling up and down the coastal roads keeping an eye on movements.

Army Corps of Cyclists

Infantry or Cavalry? Mounted Infantry or Dragoons?

And does the mode of transport really matter?


....

The Brits answered it by giving the job to the infantry. Grandad joined a territorial battalion of 11th Devons when he was 15, the 7th (Cyclist) Battalion. He served with the cyclists in England and France until 1916 when he was transferred to a line battalion and after and sent to OCS and commissioned as an infantry officer in the Devons.

 

[Brad Sallows]

How long is your line?

Holland to Switzerland approximately anchored everywhere in Dec 1944, but the Germans still managed to pick a point. There are weaker and stronger areas from time-to-time, and someone has to fulfill the function of finding them (or masking and denying them).

 

[Kirkhill]

Holland to Switzerland approximately anchored everywhere in Dec 1944, but the Germans still managed to pick a point. There are weaker and stronger areas from time-to-time, and someone has to fulfill the function of finding them (or masking and denying them).

Same line, same anchors 1914 to 1918. No movement.

In 1944 there were fewer bodies covering the line and tactically they tended to cluster rather than spread out on the line.

1918 success happened when the line thinned.

 

[Infanteer]

Ah well if Jim Storr said it…

I’d question the value of that assertion from a man with very limited operational experience and who never would have seen concentrated artillery fire beyond a canned range. However I understand I have a largely dissenting opinion of Storr.

Why would you question the value of the assertion based on his exposure to an artillery range? It is either a valid assertion or it isn't, regardless of whether it was from Field Marshal Montgomery or Krusty the Clown.

As for definitions, how about:

• ‘Shock effect’ is a state where all or part of the enemy is rendered numb, lifeless, inactive or acting irrationally.
• ‘Shock action’ is the sudden, concentrated application of violence. It has been associated with rapid approach, such as a cavalry or bayonet charge, a tank attack, or a dive bomb attack. More importantly, it also includes the effect of concentrated HE fire.

 

[Kirkhill]

I am always astounded at the importance of concidence? Or is it synchronicity?

Once again today's papers yield another timely article.

The Battle of Novodarivka, Part II: The Challenge of Combined Arms on Tomorrow’s Battlefield - Modern War Institute

In June 2023, days into a major counteroffensive in the Russo-Ukrainian War, Ukrainian forces attacking along a supporting axis faced the task of seizing the village of Novodarivka from Russian occupying forces. Although it was an otherwise unremarkable village, the way in which Ukraine...

mwi.westpoint.edu

How do you make an ABCT relevant again?

Option 1
Remember it is a "Combined Arms" formation and use your infantry. Even if it means slowing the pace and demonstrating some patience while the infantry does its job.

Option 2
Bypass, isolate and destroy.

...

Getting back to the utility of wheels for a moment: both the Brits and the French have effectively waged bith battles and campaigns used wheeled armour. The French during Desert Storm.

 

[markppcli]

Why would you question the value of the assertion based on his exposure to an artillery range? It is either a valid assertion or it isn't, regardless of whether it was from Field Marshal Montgomery or Krusty the Clown.

As for definitions, how about:

• ‘Shock effect’ is a state where all or part of the enemy is rendered numb, lifeless, inactive or acting irrationally.
• ‘Shock action’ is the sudden, concentrated application of violence. It has been associated with rapid approach, such as a cavalry or bayonet charge, a tank attack, or a dive bomb attack. More importantly, it also includes the effect of concentrated HE fire.

I value his assertion based on the data he used to build it.

 

[markppcli]

25 years in the British army including 5 in BAOR and an extensive researcher and commentator. I'd give him some benefit of the doubt. Others in the field tend to agree with this particular assertion.

I, and Storr, would concede that whatever shock artillery imparts is transitory and of limited, if any, value if not rapidly followed up by assaulting manoeuvre forces.

You can also read that as 25 years, 5 of which in the field army and the rest in essentially academia. I view him largely as a theorist whose work is built off his experience on exercise. I could write a book stating the opposite because MR never assigned casualties from fires - would that be a valid data set? I’d argue no.

 

[Infanteer]

I value his assertion based on the data he used to build it.

What data was that?

 

[Infanteer]

My question on the definition of shock action is germane because there was a lot of discussion on who on the battlefield caused shock action, but no shared definition of what shock action actually is. If we're going to assign "shock action" as a capability to some unit and define requirements based on that task, then we should at least all agree what that is.

Ergo, shock action is the sudden, concentrated application of violence, associated with rapid approach and concentrated high explosive, that renders all or part of the enemy numb, lifeless, inactive or acting irrationally. Does this suffice?

 

[markppcli]

My question on the definition of shock action is germane because there was a lot of discussion on who on the battlefield caused shock action, but no shared definition of what shock action actually is. If we're going to assign "shock action" as a capability to some unit and define requirements based on that task, then we should at least all agree what that is.

Ergo, shock action is the sudden, concentrated application of violence, associated with rapid approach and concentrated high explosive, that renders all or part of the enemy numb, lifeless, inactive or acting irrationally. Does this suffice?

I agree in part, however I would add that it is to be decisive. Which is where I feel the artillery is unable to provide shock action.

What data was that?

In that book? His experience war gaming and exercising in Europe is unlikely to expose Storr to the realities of either concentrated artillery fire or an assault by armour. He would have seen it simulated or on a canned range.

 

[Infanteer]

I agree in part, however I would add that it is to be decisive. Which is where I feel the artillery is unable to provide shock action.

What is meant by decisive?

In that book? His experience war gaming and exercising in Europe is unlikely to expose Storr to the realities of either concentrated artillery fire or an assault by armour. He would have seen it simulated or on a canned range.

Except that's not what he used to make the inference FJAG referenced. Rather it was derived, in part, from the work of David Rowland and his team from DERA, who conducted a series of studies on battlefield effects based on the aggregate of 159 battles from the 20th century.

 

[markppcli]

What is meant by decisive?



Except that's not what he used to make the inference FJAG reference. Rather it was derived, in part, from the work of David Rowland and his team from DERA, who conducted a series of studies on battlefield effects based on the aggregate of 159 battles from the 20th century.

I stand suitably chastened in jumping to conclusions.

 

[GR66]

[snip]
Doctrinally you want it to provide security and reconnaissance, but what does that really mean in terms of todays sensors and strike capabilities?

What is security in this day and age, and how does one get it.
Depending upon threat, that may require National Level asset commitments, or for nations without those capabilities it would require partner nation support to blind satellites and/or jam/spoof enemy communication and sensors.
That isn't going to be found in a Bde level formation, and is really a Theatre level effort.
Sidelining that for a period, what are the security threats that a Division faces:
Enemy Ground Forces: Reconnaissance Teams, Special Forces, Conventional formations, UAS platforms from ISR to Strike, as well as as potential hostile civilians.
Enemy Air Forces: Strike and ISR larger UAS, as well as Strike and ISR aircraft and Helicopters.

What sort of force can screen that?

I’d argue it’s a lot more than a few wheeled vehicles.

With the modern "transparent" battlefield do we need additional capabilities for the Cavalry both for the screening/security role and for the recce role? Not really "new" capabilities but ones that might need to take a more prominent role with changes to the modern battlefield.

Things like APS on vehicles and C-UAV systems with the unit are pretty obvious requirements.

• Offensive and defensive EW systems pushed further down to the troop level?
• High volume (and cheap) drone swarms (both aerial and ground) to get enemy AD/EW/AT and vehicle APS systems to emit so they can be targeted by supporting artillery or indirect fire systems integral to the unit? Cheap anti-radiation missiles/loitering munitions to quickly take out the detected systems?
• UGV's equipped with flails or plow blades to criss-cross the front and cut the fibre optic cables trailing behind enemy UAV's?
• Decoy emitters of various types (and physical decoys) to confuse the enemy as to where our dispersed forces are concentrating?
• High volume multi-spectral smoke generators (deployed in UAVs/UGVs?)

With a less dense battlefield and forces not wanting to concentrate until the ISR battle has been won I think the role of the Cavalry will be to not only sense the enemy but blind the enemy as well as deceive them as to where our own troop concentrations are. Where we previously might have focused on blinding their recce vehicles probing the front, now it will focus more on blinding their remote sensors and unguided systems.

 

[FJAG]

. . . the Cavalry will be to not only sense the enemy but blind the enemy as well as deceive them as to where our own troop concentrations are

While cavalry can have a role in that, I think that deception - physical and electronic - is so essential on a modern battlefield flooded with sensors, that I think the role for that is in a specialized unit which we haven't created yet. IMHO, we need a unit made up of engineers, signallers and a lot of general labourers whose sole role is to create and execute a battlefield deception plan. That needs to be backed up by equipment and supplies and TTPs which integrate with the combat commanders plans and which will mislead the enemy and lure many of their resources into traps or to simply be wasted.

 

[KevinB]

@GR66 I think it depends on the enemy.

The pre-2022 Canadian Armoured Recce was IMHO already dead. The US Army Calvary Squadron is/was a pretty robust entity, but not suited either to the advances in sensor and strike capabilities.

Down here we have talked and put a lot of buzzwords into Multi Domain Operations. Dispersion for security and massing for assault. Things like decision dominance sound nice - but IMHO below Corps we are missing a lot of what is necessary to win the ‘sensor fight’.