Indirect Fires Modernization Project - C3/M777 Replacement

[FJAG]

Keeping in mind also that any move on our Arctic is not likley to be a purely military by our opponents, but a blend of political, civil and military power projection, coupled with disinformation, international political manoeuvring to paralyze our government and delegitimize our claims.

We totally agree and I think this, more than anything else, is what I see it as becoming an analogy of what China is doing in the South China Sea: Staking it's claims (physically, politically and commercially), and then aggressively nudging us away from them through politics and disinformation to delegitimize our claims, ignoring any international arbitration and using force to keep us away while our government is paralyzed.

IMHO we need armed ice breakers and the subs before we need the River Class.

 

[Kirkhill]

We totally agree and I think this, more than anything else, is what I see it as becoming an analogy of what China is doing in the South China Sea: Staking it's claims (physically, politically and commercially), and then aggressively nudging us away from them through politics and disinformation to delegitimize our claims, ignoring any international arbitration and using force to keep us away while our government is paralyzed.

IMHO we need armed ice breakers and the subs before we need the River Class.

And I would add long range fire power to rapidly neutralize threats with a small amount of weapons and people (cost effectiveness) and the means to keep our skies clear and our infrastructure secure.

 

[GR66]

If we had our shit together we'd be setting up arms manufacturing by the half ton on the basis that any war will be a long one which will gobble up rockets, missiles, ammo, UAVs and UGVs, etc etc and our distance from the conflict gives our industries a degree of protection - but we aren't that type of people.

This to me is really the key for Canada. Any major conflict anywhere in the World will need munitions in large volumes. Volumes that even the major nations are having trouble producing. This is where Canada should focus its efforts...both for our own defence and to contribute to the collective defence of our allies.

It may not put our flag on a map in the same way that an Armoured Division or a Naval Task Group would but I bet it would have a greater impact on the conflict overall than either of those would. Europe is not going to run out of people to fight against Russia if it comes to that but they could run out of the missiles, rockets and UAVs required to decisively win the war before it turns into an attritional fight. Similarly for the Indo-Pacific. We're not going to do a "Hong Kong 2.0" in Taiwan and admittedly the number of subs, ships and aircraft we could deploy wouldn't be enough to tip the balance but as was noted in a CSIS* video the China Thread, most wargames of a conflict between the US and China see the US running out of long-range anti-ship missiles within a week.

@FJAG is correct that the best time to have started down this path was years ago but as the saying goes the 2nd best time to start is now. IF war breaks out between Russia and NATO or China and the West it won't be a "one and done" type thing. It will set the stage for ongoing conflict and the munitions we produce will be in demand for years to come.

* No, not THAT CSIS

 

[FJAG]

There's a thing about weapons manufacturing that is an expensive and counterintuitive truth.

A country, like Ukraine, immersed in a war for its survival will daily consume every weapon it's manufacturing base can produce. This allows arms manufacturers to set up active production lines on an ongoing basis. At the end of a conflict, just like happened after WW2, those lines come to a sudden stop and end up in a recession unless they can quickly reorient themselves to other civilian product lines. With that the military based production lines shut down and turn to a greatly reduced peacetime output. No one puts those now idle, arms production lines into stand-by mode. As time goes by, the ability to restart production becomes ever more difficult, especially with the more technologically advanced weapons.

What is essential for any country is to ensure that the ability to surge the production of critical, high usage weapons remains available in peace time. If the predicted wartime usage rate of a specific weapon system is, lets say, 50,000 units per month, but our peacetime training usage rate is only 2,000 units per month, then we need to ensure that the production lines for those additional 48,000 units per month is kept mothballed and in reserve. In addition, if the startup time needed to get back to full production is two months, then we need to maintain a stock of at least 96,000 units as our war stocks to see us through.

In short, there is a need for governments to pay manufacturers to keep critical, yet mostly idle, manufacturing capacity available "in reserve." The consequence of not doing so is to either have absolutely massive war stocks on hand (with possibly a limiting shelf life) to see us through until new production lines can be built from scratch or else lose the ability to maintain a protracted war.

Another related factor is that weapon systems evolve. That has two consequences. First, governments need to invest in the R&D of weapon systems on a continuing basis, and second, as a revised or modified system comes into service, governments need to invest in not only the new active production lines but also the upgrading of the idle, "in reserve" ones.

We have governments and a military that tend to think mostly about today's needs. The vast amount of government allocated funds are spent on forces needed day-to-day and very little for those additional forces that need to be available in a hurry or on a protracted basis for tomorrow. The same is true for our capital investments. We spend money to replace worn out equipment with just enough (or even less) to provide enough for day to day usage. We do not set aside money for war stocks or for idle, but critical, surge wartime manufacturing capacity.

 

[Kirkhill]

There's a thing about weapons manufacturing that is an expensive and counterintuitive truth.

A country, like Ukraine, immersed in a war for its survival will daily consume every weapon it's manufacturing base can produce. This allows arms manufacturers to set up active production lines on an ongoing basis. At the end of a conflict, just like happened after WW2, those lines come to a sudden stop and end up in a recession unless they can quickly reorient themselves to other civilian product lines. With that the military based production lines shut down and turn to a greatly reduced peacetime output. No one puts those now idle, arms production lines into stand-by mode. As time goes by, the ability to restart production becomes ever more difficult, especially with the more technologically advanced weapons.

What is essential for any country is to ensure that the ability to surge the production of critical, high usage weapons remains available in peace time. If the predicted wartime usage rate of a specific weapon system is, lets say, 50,000 units per month, but our peacetime training usage rate is only 2,000 units per month, then we need to ensure that the production lines for those additional 48,000 units per month is kept mothballed and in reserve. In addition, if the startup time needed to get back to full production is two months, then we need to maintain a stock of at least 96,000 units as our war stocks to see us through.

In short, there is a need for governments to pay manufacturers to keep critical, yet mostly idle, manufacturing capacity available "in reserve." The consequence of not doing so is to either have absolutely massive war stocks on hand (with possibly a limiting shelf life) to see us through until new production lines can be built from scratch or else lose the ability to maintain a protracted war.

Another related factor is that weapon systems evolve. That has two consequences. First, governments need to invest in the R&D of weapon systems on a continuing basis, and second, as a revised or modified system comes into service, governments need to invest in not only the new active production lines but also the upgrading of the idle, "in reserve" ones.

We have governments and a military that tend to think mostly about today's needs. The vast amount of government allocated funds are spent on forces needed day-to-day and very little for those additional forces that need to be available in a hurry or on a protracted basis for tomorrow. The same is true for our capital investments. We spend money to replace worn out equipment with just enough (or even less) to provide enough for day to day usage. We do not set aside money for war stocks or for idle, but critical, surge wartime manufacturing capacity.

A third and related factor is the effect of time and human ingenuity.

It is not just the manufacture of weapons that is affected by changes in materials and technology.

Sometimes the entire basis for manufacturing changes over ti.e and neither the means or skills are available when war breaks out. So people are driven to do what they can with what is available. And armies adapt to the tools they have at hand.

Piano makers and cabinet makers converted to building Mosquitos. Appliance makers converted to building Stens, Brens, HPs and 60 mm mortars. Railcar manufacturers converted to making tanks. Lord knows where they found people to make Frank Whittle's first jet.

After the war those plants went back to building railcars, pianos and appliances and jet enhines found civilian applications.

The same thing happened after WW1 and is happening now.

Thousands of years ago on the Iraq Syria border a town under siege converted its bakeries to the manufacture of clay pellets for slingers.

Adaptation and innovation has to be part of the game plan.

If doctrine is ying then innovation is yang.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

There's a thing about weapons manufacturing that is an expensive and counterintuitive truth.

A country, like Ukraine, immersed in a war for its survival will daily consume every weapon it's manufacturing base can produce. This allows arms manufacturers to set up active production lines on an ongoing basis. At the end of a conflict, just like happened after WW2, those lines come to a sudden stop and end up in a recession unless they can quickly reorient themselves to other civilian product lines. With that the military based production lines shut down and turn to a greatly reduced peacetime output. No one puts those now idle, arms production lines into stand-by mode. As time goes by, the ability to restart production becomes ever more difficult, especially with the more technologically advanced weapons.

What is essential for any country is to ensure that the ability to surge the production of critical, high usage weapons remains available in peace time. If the predicted wartime usage rate of a specific weapon system is, lets say, 50,000 units per month, but our peacetime training usage rate is only 2,000 units per month, then we need to ensure that the production lines for those additional 48,000 units per month is kept mothballed and in reserve. In addition, if the startup time needed to get back to full production is two months, then we need to maintain a stock of at least 96,000 units as our war stocks to see us through.

In short, there is a need for governments to pay manufacturers to keep critical, yet mostly idle, manufacturing capacity available "in reserve." The consequence of not doing so is to either have absolutely massive war stocks on hand (with possibly a limiting shelf life) to see us through until new production lines can be built from scratch or else lose the ability to maintain a protracted war.

Another related factor is that weapon systems evolve. That has two consequences. First, governments need to invest in the R&D of weapon systems on a continuing basis, and second, as a revised or modified system comes into service, governments need to invest in not only the new active production lines but also the upgrading of the idle, "in reserve" ones.

We have governments and a military that tend to think mostly about today's needs. The vast amount of government allocated funds are spent on forces needed day-to-day and very little for those additional forces that need to be available in a hurry or on a protracted basis for tomorrow. The same is true for our capital investments. We spend money to replace worn out equipment with just enough (or even less) to provide enough for day to day usage. We do not set aside money for war stocks or for idle, but critical, surge wartime manufacturing capacity.

I was told to ditch all our 51 pattern, but I stuck it away in a storage area, come SYEP, we were able to kit out our recruits with it, then when that finished, I was told to absolutely hand in the 51 pattern, then next year our recruits had no webbing at all. We are shit at planning for expansion.