Can I ask where this comes from ? Or what makes you say this ? At the deck plate level (tactical), the ship absolutely revolves on putting the helo airborne, supporting it and working with it.
I can show you staff work and reports from the 60s where the RCN developed the concepts to support the purchase and employment of the Sea King. I can also show you the work that was done by the RCAF because they thought (sort of) that rotary wing ASW should belong to them. That doesn’t exist now.
They also put ships (and task groups) to sea solely in order to develop naval air tactics. Not anymore.
Up until the ‘90s we had a standing committee reporting to both the Commanders of Maritime Command and Air Command to oversee Maritime Wardare development, with a Maritime Air committee reporting to it. Not anymore.
When I first joined the community we still had “Salty Dips,” dedicated sails to introduce MH trainees at the training squadron to ship board operations. Not anymore.
Exercises used be used as an opportunity to work up from individual through team and then force level training, with appropriate hot washes. Not anymore (everyone is just 102 bashing).
The CRCN should be clearly articulating what his aviation requirements are, his plan to support the requirements definition and acquisition, and how he intends to support the force generation of the resulting weapon systems, not moaning about the failure of all of us to deliver Cyclone.
The mechanical issues with the Cyclone are not with out substantiation.
Yes, but they are not all on Sikorsky. There is plenty of blame to go around, including on the RCN (the aforementioned to understand and clearly articulate their aviation needs, leaving MH to wither under RCAF “stewardship”). Everyone needs to roll up their sleeves and fix it… whatever that fix looks like.
And the first step sghiukd be for CRCN to understand and clearly articulate his aviation needs, as the (indirect) force employed. And yes, I deliberately repeated myself.