A great piece from Andrew Coyne this morning, suggesting we treat this fight like what it is: an asymmetric conflict.
Ukraine and Iran are both standing up to dreams of empire. We can do the same
www.theglobeandmail.com
Canada can learn lessons from asymmetric warfare
Andrew Coyne
The similarity is often noted between the Ukraine and Iran wars: Mad billionaire autocrat with dreams of empire attempts to subjugate another country by force of arms; though seemingly in possession of overwhelming military advantage, is repelled by defenders armed with desperation, cunning and modern technology; now finds himself caught in a trap of his own making, unable either to advance or retreat.
There are common lessons, too: lessons that can be adapted to other situations, in which a smaller country confronts the aggressive designs of a much larger power – like, oh, for example, Canada and the United States. Yes, yes, I know: Tariffs are not missiles, and America is not Russia. But the underlying dynamics are similar.
The first lesson is
be not afraid. What is striking about both Ukraine and Iran (without, again, comparing them as moral examples) is how utterly fearless they seem, even in the face of such imposing adversaries. This seems to be a pattern in human events: The people with the most to fear are usually least in fear.
Second,
tie goes to the defender: It is an established principle of war that the defending force has the advantage over the invading force. It is much harder to take territory than to defend it. That is to our advantage, too: We are fighting for our economic lives, the Americans are not.
Applying these understandings gives rise to a third:
Deny the other side a quick victory. Do not negotiate based on the initial shock-and-awe campaign. Concentrate on the measures needed to survive it – income supports, credit lines, and so on, the economic equivalent of bomb shelters and gas masks – while preserving retaliatory capacity.
Fourth,
play for time. We’ll have to be willing to accept some short-term tactical losses: a plant here, an industry there. The point is to prevent these from becoming strategic defeats. The longer we can hold on, the more we can learn how to adapt, resist, and diversify our trade.
Fifth,
preserve second-strike capability. Whatever retaliatory measures we take, we should not blow them all at once. We need the Americans to understand that further actions on their part will invite further actions on ours. We can’t give them any free kicks.
Sixth,
demonstrate a superior willingness to endure pain. Tariffs ordinarily don’t make a lot of sense as a retaliatory tactic: Unlike missiles, they impose more harm on the country that imposes them than they do on their supposed targets. In the present conflict they may nevertheless have a certain utility. Yeah, this hurts us, too, is the message: but unlike you, we embrace pain.
Seventh,
speed and mobility beat massed power. The power of the weaker party in these kinds of conflicts lies in the opportunity to impose favourable “exchanges of costs.” A drone costs a fraction to make as a heavy missile. The U.S., as the larger party, also has more points of vulnerability. We should be alert to these openings.
Eighth,
limit our war aims. The aggressor in any such conflict has the burden of achieving its objective: All the defender has to do is frustrate it. Ukraine doesn’t have to conquer Russia to win. It just has to survive. Our objective, likewise, should not be to “defeat” the Trump administration, or even necessarily to preserve free trade. It is merely to persuade Donald Trump that we cannot be coerced: that no matter what measures he imposes, economic or otherwise, we will not bend to his will.
Ninth,
unity is everything. Attacks by an aggressor tend to unite the defending population – to inspire rather than to demoralize. It is our own counter-attacks that have the potential to divide us. Provincial premiers have been free with advice for the federal government on the retaliatory measures it should take – a potash export ban, say, or tariffs on U.S. manufactured goods – each of which, by an amazing coincidence, seems to be freighted with potential costs for other provincial economies while costing their own province nothing. That’s the last thing we need.
Clausewitz famously defined war as the “continuation of policy by other means.” The object of war, he said, is to produce a desired political outcome. Our objective in this trade war is to demonstrate to Mr. Trump that “economic force” cannot work: that it will not induce us to make concessions; that it unites our population while dividing his; that it will simply encourage us to “trade around” the United States, implying a loss of leverage over time.
Or as it is often said of Ukraine and Iran: their adversaries lose by not winning. They win by not losing.