Army Reserve Restructuring

[KevinB]

This.

It’s a performative move at best. Unless you work for government, you’re basically screwed/ on your own.

The fact that the CAF crow about it shows that the decision makers have no idea what having and keeping a civilian career is all about.

I know employers who won’t hire reservists because ‘they demand extra time off’, over and above their vacation entitlement, for training and the other staff bitch about it.

National Culture Shift is needed for that one.
The fact it gets done with gusto down here is shameful that Canada cannot manage it.

 

[mariomike]

I know employers who won’t hire reservists because ‘they demand extra time off’, over and above their vacation entitlement, for training and the other staff bitch about it.

Workers receive a vacation entitlement.

Where I worked, vacation was / is bid by seniority.

Since PRes Concentration was in the summer, as a junior employee , I would have had zero chance of qualifying for summer aka "Prime Time" vacation.

We had a two-week paid leave policy for summer PRes training .

 

[KevinB]

Workers receive a vacation entitlement.

Where I worked, vacation was / is bid by seniority.

Since PRes Concentration was in the summer, as a junior employee , back then , I would have had zero chance of qualifying for summer aka "Prime Time" vacation.

We had a two-week paid leave policy for summer PRes training .

From what I remember most Municipal, Provincial and Federal Gov positions have allocations for PRes work.
Though rumor was always that DND was the worst Federal department for offending on that.

However if not government related employment , there was little protection for individual PRes members.

 

[mariomike]

From what I remember most Municipal, Provincial and Federal Gov positions have allocations for PRes work.

Only familiar with one employer. Don't what other employer policies are.

Employees can take a leave of absence with pay, for the two week period of absence, to attend the Canadian Armed Forces Reserve Training Program.

All benefits continue during the leave.

An employee’s service is not affected by the leave. An employee’s vacation entitlement, and pension credit do not change.

 

[Harris]

There's quite a few factors that go into this mentality. Having also dealt with similar issues at my own unit, I am well versed lol.

To start, the CAF ties budgets to on paper strength. If your unit has 250 soldiers, then it gets allocated class A pay for 250 soldiers to parade their 39(? I can't remember the number) days per year. But if out of that 250, 100 show up the bare minimum, once per 60 days, then you can use that class A pay for things like work parties, additional paid days for leadership to come in and do PACE on another evening, etc. More on paper soldiers means more money for exercises, which means if you have 250 on paper, but only get the same 50 on ex, you get the budget of 250 to play with.

To compound this, if a unit gets too small on paper, the CAF doesn't trust that unit to reliably generate senior command appointments. An infantry "battalion" of 80 just isn't large enough to generate a LCol and CWO every 3 years that have the experience and knowledge to be able to sit at a table of their peers and not fall behind. If a unit gets too small, the CAF starts parachuting in command teams.

Finally, get small enough and you will be tactically grouped, which to many is just amalgamation by another name (or if you are in 31 CBG, you all get tactically grouped, regardless of your size).

The CAF and the Army want trained troops, not a mile long BTL. But until the CAF implements a way to incentivize getting rid of stale DP1 soldiers and the borderline NES, Units will continue to take advantage of the benefits and safeties of having a large on paper strength with a large non-employable cohort.

Ack all, but apparently things are not the same in all Brigades apparently (Shocker I know). I can only speak to my former Brigade 36 CBG, but the policies you talk about were/are different here:

• Pay is allocated based on the effective strength at a unit which was calculated by taking that tunber 3 times during the year, adding them together, and then dividing by 3. Then any special considerations were factored (multiple location Units etc...) and additional funds added as applicable. O&M was a % factor of that amount, again with special considerations factored in (Unit band, IA Coy, etc..., who would have a bit higher costs than a regular soldier)
• The parachuting in of command teams had very little to do with unit size in 36 CBG, and a lot to do with availability of Maj/MWO's to become CO/RSM. I myself commanded 3 units (10 years straight: 5,2,3 years) because I was available and had a civilian job that allowed me to do so. 36 CBG just doesn't have the numbers of people able to take those roles and those that are available are now doing 4-5 years vice the "normal" 3. The last 4 COs of my original Unit did 4, 5, 4, 5 years as CO respectively. Nearly all of the Reserve Units in 36 CBG have had CO's "posted" from other units and cannot consistently produce Command Teams. RSMs are no better and they too are frequently RSM of multiple units.
• 5XX had in the past resisted tactically grouping units. We have only one such grouping ATM, 1 and 2 R Nfld R's) We'll see how 2 Div feels about tac groupings I guess.

I kind of disagree with your last point a bit. The CCA can easily get a list of who isn't effective. The CA G1 has that info. If they want trained troops then release the chaff, and keep the wheat, but there is no appetite to implement "the purge". There doesn't need to be an incentive other than CO's are fired if they don't manage their troops properly. I can identify to the soldier who is "riding the system" and should be placed on NES, but no one wants to action it. Hell if they don't want to "punish" anyone, then just limit the Unit budget to TES numbers. That will incentivise the unit to get rid of the chaff.

 

[dapaterson]

However if not government related employment , there was little protection for individual PRes members.

As a company commander I had a Sgt wanting to deploy to Afghanistan whose full time job was working for the base in Ottawa.

The GoC policy at the time was "You shall let Res F members go for deployments".

The base commander personally refused his request.

Eventually we got it sorted, but yes, DND was not an employer of choice.

 

[dapaterson]

Ack all, but apparently things are not the same in all Brigades apparently (Shocker I know). I can only speak to my former Brigade 36 CBG, but the policies you talk about were/are different here:

• Pay is allocated based on the effective strength at a unit which was calculated by taking that tunber 3 times during the year, adding them together, and then dividing by 3. Then any special considerations were factored (multiple location Units etc...) and additional funds added as applicable. O&M was a % factor of that amount, again with special considerations factored in (Unit band, IA Coy, etc..., who would have a bit higher costs than a regular soldier)
• The parachuting in of command teams had very little to do with unit size in 36 CBG, and a lot to do with availability of Maj/MWO's to become CO/RSM. I myself commanded 3 units (10 years straight: 5,2,3 years) because I was available and had a civilian job that allowed me to do so. 36 CBG just doesn't have the numbers of people able to take those roles and those that are available are now doing 4-5 years vice the "normal" 3. The last 4 COs of my original Unit did 4, 5, 4, 5 years as CO respectively. Nearly all of the Reserve Units in 36 CBG have had CO's "posted" from other units and cannot consistently produce Command Teams. RSMs are no better and they too are frequently RSM of multiple units.
• 5XX had in the past resisted tactically grouping units. We have only one such grouping ATM, 1 and 2 R Nfld R's) We'll see how 2 Div feels about tac groupings I guess.

I kind of disagree with your last point a bit. The CCA can easily get a list of who isn't effective. The CA G1 has that info. If they want trained troops then release the chaff, and keep the wheat, but there is no appetite to implement "the purge". There doesn't need to be an incentive other than CO's are fired if they don't manage their troops properly. I can identify to the soldier who is "riding the system" and should be placed on NES, but no one wants to action it. Hell if they don't want to "punish" anyone, then just limit the Unit budget to TES numbers. That will incentivise the unit to get rid of the chaff.

The Army does not adequately resource pers admin for the Army Reserve. Never has. Many central functions for the Reg F are managed locally by Army Res units, amplifying the problem.

So units do pers admin by triage. And "hard" or "unusual" get put on the side of a desk to be dealt with in the future.


War story: I saw a rant on Facebook by someone identifying themself as the wife of a veteran, who had been retired nearly a year and hadn't got their pension.

Since I have some knowledge in that area and know some people who work there, I reached out to the pension folks and we dug in.

Turns out the individual had reached CRA (so entirely predictable), and their release file had sat at a CBG HQ for eleven months before being actioned. So the pension office had no way of taking action, they didn't know that the person had released.

Until pers admin for the Army Reserve is resourced, and leaders held accountable, this won't get better.

(Other parts of that story involve finally figuring out who the Individual was by finding their spouse's name in the Army SharePoint on a program for a grad parade...)

 

[Kirkhill]

National Culture Shift is needed for that one.
The fact it gets done with gusto down here is shameful that Canada cannot manage it.

We don't teach patriotism.

 

[MilEME09]

Until pers admin for the Army Reserve is resourced, and leaders held accountable, this won't get better.

Literally brought this up tonight because monitor mass is a mess, hasnt been properly updated in two years and no one seems to know whos responsibility it is to make sure peoples course etc are updated in the system. Think I made my OC pop a blood vessel when he realized no one had an answer.

 

[Halifax Tar]

National Culture Shift is needed for that one.
The fact it gets done with gusto down here is shameful that Canada cannot manage it.

What's more Canadian than purposefully doing the exact opposite of what ever the Yanks do ?

 

[Halifax Tar]

The Army does not adequately resource pers admin for the Army Reserve. Never has. Many central functions for the Reg F are managed locally by Army Res units, amplifying the problem.

So units do pers admin by triage. And "hard" or "unusual" get put on the side of a desk to be dealt with in the future.


War story: I saw a rant on Facebook by someone identifying themself as the wife of a veteran, who had been retired nearly a year and hadn't got their pension.

Since I have some knowledge in that area and know some people who work there, I reached out to the pension folks and we dug in.

Turns out the individual had reached CRA (so entirely predictable), and their release file had sat at a CBG HQ for eleven months before being actioned. So the pension office had no way of taking action, they didn't know that the person had released.

Until pers admin for the Army Reserve is resourced, and leaders held accountable, this won't get better.

(Other parts of that story involve finally figuring out who the Individual was by finding their spouse's name in the Army SharePoint on a program for a grad parade...)

Pers Admin isn't sexy.

 

[Kilted]

The Army does not adequately resource pers admin for the Army Reserve. Never has. Many central functions for the Reg F are managed locally by Army Res units, amplifying the problem.

So units do pers admin by triage. And "hard" or "unusual" get put on the side of a desk to be dealt with in the future.


War story: I saw a rant on Facebook by someone identifying themself as the wife of a veteran, who had been retired nearly a year and hadn't got their pension.

Since I have some knowledge in that area and know some people who work there, I reached out to the pension folks and we dug in.

Turns out the individual had reached CRA (so entirely predictable), and their release file had sat at a CBG HQ for eleven months before being actioned. So the pension office had no way of taking action, they didn't know that the person had released.

Until pers admin for the Army Reserve is resourced, and leaders held accountable, this won't get better.

(Other parts of that story involve finally figuring out who the Individual was by finding their spouse's name in the Army SharePoint on a program for a grad parade...)

And then a lot of the Admin Support we do have from the Regular Force/ some Class B only operates on the Reg Force CSS hours of 0800-1700 (by that I mean 0900-1100 and 1300-1500 for some places if your lucky) and a lot of the time aren't available to many PRes.

 

[dapaterson]

Pers Admin isn't sexy.

It's certainly not "MMT QL5 with a forklift qual on 404s" level sexy.

 

[daftandbarmy]

It's certainly not "MMT QL5 with a forklift qual on 404s" level sexy.

That's a great 'pickup' line

 

[Halifax Tar]

It's certainly not "MMT QL5 with a forklift qual on 404s" level sexy.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

That's whole lot more HQs! Damn we are good at building HQs!!!

 

[daftandbarmy]

That's whole lot more HQs! Damn we are good at building HQs!!!

Don't forget to add in the Battle Schools, their own little orbits of HQ-dom, too for a more accurate picture of the overhead.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

Don't forget to add in the Battle Schools, their own little orbits of HQ-dom, too for a more accurate picture of the overhead.

I seen some Command Ceremonies.... lots of grey beards!

 

[FJAG]

That's whole lot more HQs! Damn we are good at building HQs!!!

You know I've been down on HQs, but the more and more that I think of mobilization as a thing (something that wasn't so much before Ukraine) the more I'm brought to believe that we really need a lot more middle tier command levels staffed by full-timers - things like battalion, brigade and even div level - I think in small sized divs of around 11,000 so more divs are needed. Hybrid battalions with RegF cadres and at least one RegF sub unit is what I hang my hat on. Something that lets the army mobilize more quickly and efficiently and where COs are responsible and accountable for their ARes people just like their RegF ones.

Ottawa OTOH needs a purge based on some really robust IT and a major downsizing of admin layers and silos and processes.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Hmmm... interesting comparison

Canadian Army Modernization and Headquarters Restructuring​

Comparison of the Previous and New Command Structures​

​

Executive Summary​

On 10 September 2026, the implemented one of the most significant reorganizations in its recent history. The central feature of the change is a shift away from four geographically based divisions toward mission-focused formations, each responsible for a distinct function: warfighting, defence of Canada, institutional support, and training.

Although the reorganization substantially changes command relationships, it does not appear to represent a significant reduction in the number of headquarters. At the formation level, the number of headquarters is likely to remain approximately the same or increase slightly. A reasonable estimate is that the previous structure contained approximately 24 major headquarters, compared with approximately 26 under the new model, depending upon which brigade-equivalent and support organizations are included in the count.

The principal benefit, therefore, is not headquarters reduction. It is specialization of command responsibility.

Previous Structure​

Prior to September 2026, the Army was organized primarily around four geographically oriented divisions:

• 2nd Canadian Division, Quebec
• 3rd Canadian Division, Western Canada
• 4th Canadian Division, Ontario
• 5th Canadian Division, Atlantic Canada

Each division exercised responsibility for Army activities within its region, including Regular Force formations where applicable, Primary Reserve Canadian Brigade Groups, Canadian Rangers, and regional support organizations. The system was effective for administration and regional force generation, but the Army concluded that it was less suitable for generating and commanding forces for contemporary major combat operations.

At the major formation level, the old organization included Army Headquarters, four regional divisional headquarters, the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre, three Regular Force Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group headquarters, ten Reserve Canadian Brigade Group headquarters, regional support headquarters, and specialized organizations.

New CAMO Structure​

The new model replaces geography as the principal organizing concept with purpose and mission. The Army describes the objective as giving divisions greater authority over their core responsibilities while Army Headquarters concentrates on strategic oversight.

1st Canadian Division is headquartered in Edmonton and becomes the Army's principal high-readiness manoeuvre and warfighting formation. It commands the three existing Regular Force mechanized brigade groups and incorporates additional formations intended to provide the capabilities required to fight at divisional scale. These include 6 Canadian Combat Support Brigade, 1st Canadian Artillery Brigade, 1st Canadian Sustainment Brigade, and 3rd Canadian Light Infantry Regiment.

2nd Canadian Division, headquartered in Montreal, becomes primarily responsible for the defence of Canada. Its structure brings together Regular and Reserve capabilities for domestic operations, including the ten Canadian Brigade Groups and Canadian Rangers. It is intended to provide a national rather than primarily regional framework for domestic land operations.

The Canadian Army Support Division, based in Kingston, consolidates institutional and operational support responsibilities that were previously distributed among the geographically based divisions.

Training and doctrine remain a separate major institutional responsibility, complementing the three operational and support divisions.

Estimated Headquarters Comparison​

Using major formation headquarters at approximately brigade/group level and above as the basis for comparison, the change can be summarized as follows:

Headquarters category	Previous	New
Canadian Army HQ	1	1
Division/equivalent HQs	~5	4
Regular manoeuvre brigade HQs	3	3
Reserve CBG HQs	10	10
Combat support, artillery and sustainment brigade HQs	~1	~3
Regional support group HQs	4	4
National Ranger higher HQ	0	1
Other major training/formation HQ	~1	~1
Estimated total	~24	~26

These figures should be regarded as an analytical estimate rather than an official Canadian Army headquarters count, because the result depends on whether organizations such as support groups, training establishments, and regiment-level formations are considered headquarters equivalent to brigades.

​

Assessment​

The important conclusion is that CAMO is not primarily a headquarters-reduction initiative. The available organizational information suggests that the number of major headquarters will remain broadly similar and may actually increase modestly.

The more consequential change concerns what those headquarters are responsible for. The previous structure required four regional divisions to perform broadly similar administrative, force-generation, support, and domestic responsibilities within separate geographic areas. The new structure concentrates expertise and accountability around specific missions.

This also reflects a larger strategic ambition. Lieutenant-General Michael Wright has described the transformation as moving the Army away from a model centred on contributing forces to larger allied formations toward possessing the capabilities necessary to operate and potentially lead at divisional level.

Conclusion​

The best current estimate is that the Canadian Army is moving from approximately 24 to approximately 26 major formation headquarters, rather than substantially reducing command overhead. The strategic logic of CAMO therefore rests less on organizational efficiency through fewer headquarters and more on clearer accountability, specialization, operational readiness, and the ability to command Canadian forces at divisional scale.