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Multi Domain Task Force - Canada

Kirkhill

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Seeing as how I brought it up ---

What is an MDTF or Multi Domain Task Force?

Per the Congressional Research Service

In the Army’s Chief of Staff Paper #1: Army Multi-Domain Transformation Ready to Win in Competition and Conflict dated March 16, 2021, the Army described the Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) as “theater-level maneuver elements designed to synchronize precision effects and precision fires in all domains against adversary anti-access/ area denial (A2/AD) networks in all domains, enabling joint forces to execute their operational plan (OPLAN)-directed roles.”

MDTFs are designed to support freedom of action of U.S. forces. MDTFs are to be scalable from operational to strategic level and can be modified to support the needs of individual commanders. MDTFs also provide supported commanders the ability to plan, integrate, control, track, and assess the effectiveness of joint counter-A2/AD activities.



And what can it do? - From a pilot exercise during RIMPAC 2018


It was initially envisioned that the pilot program would be no more than 2,000 people, but the service is finding that it needs roughly 400-500 core personnel that are considered essential.

The Army designated the 17th Field Artillery Brigade out of Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, to be the core unit of the task force.

While it was not the task force pilot’s first exercise (that was Talisman Sabre in Australia in 2017), the pilot program played an integral role in RIMPAC, conducting, in one example, multiple live-fire engagements against a maritime target off the coast of Kauai, Hawaii.

...

The task force pilot successfully conducted a high-mobility rapid infiltration on a C-17 aircraft from Lewis-McChord, from Washington to Kauai, and set up an effective mission command from Kauai and Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, that demonstrated the ability to rapidly project power to create new land-based threats for adversaries.

The MDTF also successfully integrated Gray Eagle unmanned aircraft systems, AH-64E Apache attack helicopters in manned-unmanned teaming formations, and P-3/P-8s into the Link 16 network.

The task force, in a combined exercise, sunk the decommissioned landing ship tank Racine as part of the exercise, and shot down two aircraft in a simulation using an Avenger air-defense system and a man-portable system.

“We need to totally integrate as a joint force,” Brown said. “We depend on the other services’ capabilities we don’t have, but we want to present the commander and leadership with options because we are integrated so well.

The Army and the other services were able to connect things “across the board that had never been connected,” such as using ballistic missile defense and air defense artillery to go after cruise missiles, as well as linking sensors and shooters, owned by multiple services, “in ways that had never been done before,” Brown said.

The Army also tested manned-unmanned teaming, used prolifically in Iraq and Afghanistan with AH-64Es and Gray Eagles. The service tried it in a maritime environment during RIMPAC, but also linked these assets to other maritime and air assets “like they never were before,” according to Brown.

.....

Why is it important to Canada?

Firstly, because it is important to the US.

Congress has expressed concern about the threat to U.S. national security posed by Russia and China. The Army believes to address this threat, it must be able to operate in a multi-domain (air, land, water, space, cyber, information) environment, requiring new operational concepts, technologies, weapons, and units. The Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) is the Army’s self-described “organizational centerpiece” of this effort.

Secondly it appears that the US is actively developing and deploying the concept and that the concept will be employed in a Canadian context.

The Army originally planned to build five MDTFs:
two aligned to the Indo-Pacific region;
one aligned to Europe;
one stationed in the Arctic region and oriented on multiple threats;
and a fifth MDTF aligned for global response

The one in the Arctic Region is the one of particular interest to Canada. Currently it has been tasked as a third Indo-Pacific Command asset along with the two originally planned.

The 1st MDTF is headquartered and based at JLBM in Seattle
The 3rd MDTF is based at JLBM in Seattle but headquartered in Hawaii
The 4th MDTF is headquartered and based at Fort Carson, Colorado
All three of these are focused on the Indo-Pacific
The 1st and 3rd are collocated with I Corps
The 4th is collocated with III Corps

The 2nd MDTF is based at Fort Drum in New York but headquartered at Wiesbaden in Germany
It is focused on Europe with V Corps.

The 5th MDTF is based and headquartered at Fort Liberty, North Carolina.
It shares its base, and global responsibilities with XVIII Corps.

The tasking has left a couple of blanks in the original plans and those blanks concern the US Congress and should concern Canada.

Possible oversight issues for Congress include the following:
• In view of the Army’s 2024 Force Structure Transformation announcement and April 2024 update, it now appears the Army has changed its original MDTF alignment plans, which included an Arctic-focused MDTF and a CENTCOM-focused MDTF. Does the Army’s February 27, 2024, announcement and April 2024 update now constitute the Army’s official MDTF alignment plan? If so, how does the Army intend to address Arctic and CENTCOM-based MDTF capabilities requirements?
The Arctic region is the responsibility of three Combatant Commands: U.S. Northern Command, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. How does this shared responsibility affect the alignment, command and control, and responsibilities of the Army’s MDTFs?

The Arctic "problem" arises from looking at the world on a Mercator Projection with the Americas at the center, the Pacific and Asia to the left and the Atlantic and Europe to the right along with Africa. The Arctic subtends all three of those orange slices. And Canada sits right in its center, on top of the US, with coastal interests in the Atlantic, Pacific and the Arctic.

Canada is already integrated into the US defence plan via NORAD whose commander also commands Northern Command, the command with responsibility for the Continental US, Alaska and Canada and, courtesy of its NORAD focus is north facing through the North Pole to Russia.

The Orange Slice effect that creates the three Command conflict also creates a three Command opportunity. Bases situated in the arctic can profit from the shortening distances between lines of longitude as you go north. Effectively one base located at or close to the North Pole, equipped with suitably long ranged weapons, can protect the flanks of all three commands (Indo-Pac, North and Europe) with protective fires. Russia is actively pursuing that basing capability.

The US is geographically a bit behind the curve because Alaska's most northerly point, the closest point of approach to the North Pole is at 71N or 2100 km south of the Pole. Russia has well developed and permanently inhabited bases as far north as 80N on sovereign territory or 1000 km from the Pole, half the distance of the US's nearest point of approach.

There are three other possible points of exploitation available to the US. One is its airfield on Greenland at Thule (renamed recently) at 77 N or 1400 km from the Pole. The most northerly point on Greenland is at 83 N, or 700 km from the Pole, but there is no developed infrastructure that far north.

Norway has an active community on Svalbard at 78 N and the islands extend to 80 N but they are shared in co-dominium with Russia and is restricted to civil use only. Besides, Russia has its on base on the islands and has invited China to come and visit.

Which leaves Canada.

Our closest point of approach is Alert on Ellesmere Island at 82 N, or 800 km from the Pole. That would put the base about 200 km further north than the Russian bases and, even though it has only rudimentary infrastructure it does have some developed infrastructure. And most importantly, it is sovereign territory with nobody claiming co-dominium rights.

It makes for a useful firing point from which to dominate the northern flanks of the US Indo-Pac Command, North Command and Euro Command.

.....

So what capabilities does the MDTF bring to the theater commander?

1730671980507.png

First off it is a mobile structure by virtue of its integral Brigade Support Battalion and its Air Defense Battalion which allows it to push forward into the enemy's engagement zones.

Secondly it brings an ability to co-ordinate intelligence and direct its weapons at long ranges against enemy forces, fixed and mobile, to make it harder for the enemy to maintain operations from their advanced bases. It makes it harder to establish a Crimea like base of operations by making Russia's arctic bases less tenable.

Thirdly it brings the ability to sense the environment and enemy operations, conduct military intelligence activities and direct non-kinetic electronic and cyber attacks on the enemy or Operations Other Than War - hybrid operations. That would coincide with a lot of existing and planned Canadian and US capabilities.

Finally, and crucially from my point of view, the MDTF has the ability to fly in to theater, on aircraft ranging from C130s and up, a variety of Long Range Fires.

Those fires are not held in theater, generally speaking, although the Europeans seem to be actively promoting forward basing of the LRF Battalion currently because of the situation in Ukraine. Currently the tendency seems to be to forward base the HQ and the MDEB (Multi Domain Effects Battalion aka I2CEWS Battalion) while holding the actual weaponry, both Long Range and Air Defense, to the rear along with the logistics support.



...

The 1st MDTF is headquartered at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA and aligned to the U.S. Army Pacific. Since its 2017 activation, it has participated in a variety of exercises. In February 2023, the 1st MDTF’s long-range fires battalion, 5th Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery Regiment, deployed a LRHW system over 3,100 miles from Joint Base Lewis-McChord to Cape Canaveral, FL, during Thunderbolt Strike, a full rehearsal of expeditionary hypersonic launch capabilities.

The 1st MDTF is to be fully established in FY2024 with a Multidomain Effects battalion (MDEB), an IFPC battalion, a BSB, and a LRFB.


On April 13, 2021, the Army announced it would station its 2nd MDTF in Germany. The Germany-based MDTF is to support U.S. Army Europe and Africa. On September 16, 2021, the Army activated the 2nd MDTF at Clay Kaserne in Wiesbaden, initially consisting of a headquarters element; an intelligence, cyberspace, electronic warfare, and space detachment; and a brigade support company.

On December 13, 2023, Senator Charles Schumer and Representative Elise Stefanik announced in 2025 Fort Drum, NY, would become the home of 1,495 soldiers and personnel from the 2nd MDTF’s Long-Range Fires Battalion, Brigade Support Battalion (BSB), and Air Defense Battalion. The 2nd MDTF’s Headquarters and Effects battalions, activated in 2021, would remain in Germany.

The 2nd MDTF is to be headquartered in Germany with an MDEB and other elements stationed at Fort Drum, NY, with an IFPC battalion, a BSB and an LRFB. The 2nd MDTF is to be fully operational in FY2025 with the addition of the LRFB in FY2026. The 2nd MDTF is to focus on supporting the European theater.

The Army activated the 3rd MDTF at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, in September 2022. The 3rd MDTF is to support the U.S. Army Pacific as a component of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM). The 3rd MDTF participated in its first exercise May 4-19, 2023, as part of exercise Northern Edge 23-1.

The 3rd MDTF, headquartered in Hawaii with an MDEB, will have an IFPC battalion, a BSB and an LRFB stationed at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA, and is to be fully operational by FY2026.

The 4th MDTF is to be stationed at Fort Carson, CO, but focused on the Indo-Pacific theater, and is to be fully operational by FY2027.

The 5th MDTF is to be stationed at Fort Liberty, NC, and is to concentrate on regions as determined. The 5th MDTF is to be fully operational by FY2028.

....

It seems that the MDTF, with all its Long Range and Air Defence capabilities is becoming integral to the US way of war and every regional commander, including the North Command commander, is going to expect to have access to those capabilities.

Given that the MDTF is coming to Canada's backyard just as it has come to the Scandinavians, the Japanese and the Australians, as well as the Brits and the Europeans.

Our best plan is to get it incorporated into the NORAD dual command system so that we have some say over how, when and where those long range fires, and air defence, capabilities might be used.
 
If I get this right, a MDTF has an AOR somewhere on the globe assigned to it. When an operation needs to launch in X region, then the MDTF in assigned region fires up and
-Denies enemy aircraft and drones
-Denies enemy ships and small craft (or is this more USMC?)
-Denies enemy communications
-Protects the cyber environment and engages in cyber action against the enemy
-Strikes deep enemy targets
-Provides BCT/Air Wing/etc coming into to fight with all the int they need

Have I got 'er right?
 
Our best plan is to get it incorporated into the NORAD dual command system so that we have some say over how, when and where those long range fires, and air defence, capabilities might be used.
Please explain why we might want you there?
 
If I get this right, a MDTF has an AOR somewhere on the globe assigned to it. When an operation needs to launch in X region, then the MDTF in assigned region fires up and
-Denies enemy aircraft and drones
-Denies enemy ships and small craft (or is this more USMC?)
-Denies enemy communications
-Protects the cyber environment and engages in cyber action against the enemy
-Strikes deep enemy targets
-Provides BCT/Air Wing/etc coming into to fight with all the int they need

Have I got 'er right?
Not fully, the MDTF is constructed a the Army enabler for Multi-Domain Operations (Air, Land, Sea [surface and sub-surface], Space, Cyber, Information). Each MDTF is unique - structured to suit the theater that they are assigned to, mainly in this realm the A2/AD and C-A2/AD can vary greatly.

There are a lot of buzzwords in the MDO/MDTF documents - but decision dominance, with speed and range are some of the louder ones - which basically mean strike first, and operate inside the enemy OODA loop.
 
If I get this right, a MDTF has an AOR somewhere on the globe assigned to it. When an operation needs to launch in X region, then the MDTF in assigned region fires up and
-Denies enemy aircraft and drones
-Denies enemy ships and small craft (or is this more USMC?)
-Denies enemy communications
-Protects the cyber environment and engages in cyber action against the enemy
-Strikes deep enemy targets
-Provides BCT/Air Wing/etc coming into to fight with all the int they need

Have I got 'er right?
As I see it, the MDTF primary role is to punch through and destroy enemy anti access/area denial systems so that our own offensive forces have the ability to manoeuvre deeper into enemy territory.

Coincidentally it has systems to provide protection to its own long range weapon systems.

It is not a defensive system per se although by taking out major enemy systems at mid and long ranges, it does reduce the threat to other friendly forces in the theatre.

🍻
 
Please explain why we might want you there?

You might not want us there but we should be there.

LRHW and MRC are theater counters to tactical nukes, a step below sending in the ICBMs.

And Alert still has the listening post value it had when you built it. Now it makes a good broadcast, EW, Cyber launch point as well.

But if it were a launch point for Hybrid Ops or OOTW then it might attract interest that could require a local Air Defence capability.

And in that sense Alert is not that far from Thule. Another useful launch point that may need defending.
 
As I see it, the MDTF primary role is to punch through and destroy enemy anti access/area denial systems so that our own offensive forces have the ability to manoeuvre deeper into enemy territory.

Coincidentally it has systems to provide protection to its own long range weapon systems.

It is not a defensive system per se although by taking out major enemy systems at mid and long ranges, it does reduce the threat to other friendly forces in the theatre.

🍻

I would suggest that it is as much about discouraging A2AD efforts as it is about punching through them.

GIven the references to taking down aircraft and ships on exercises, as well as cruise missiles and managing everything from MQ1s and AH64s to P8s it appears as much as anything to be a Battle Management element.

An element that can airlift a battery of 4 TELs with 8 ready to launch missiles anywhere within the theater. On ex 5/3 were lifted from JLBM to Cape Canaveral, 3100 miles away to deploy missiles with a publicly announced range on test of 2100 miles. LRHW batteries could as easily be deployed to Reykjavik, Thule, Fairbanks or even Alert from either JLBM or Fort Drum.

I doubt if we will ever buy LRHWs for Canada, although I think we should, as a NATO contribution. A longer range version of the Honest John in Germany.

I do think we should be populating the C5ISR elements with Canadians, the HQ, the MDEB, the BSB and the AD/IFPC battalion(s). And if we used the SM6, ESSM, AIM 9s as the basis of the AD batteries then we would be overlapping RCAF, RCN and RRCA needs. We would also be supplying a useful addition to a national and continental IAMD network. And the SM6s would also add to the MRC ability to counter threats at point of launch and ICBMs on terminal descent.

That national capability might come in handy because I suspect the Americans would be more inclined to expend interceptors over Alert than over Ottawa.

And no matter what we do or don't do we are going to be speaking to something that looks an awful lot like an MDTF dedicated to operations in North America and the arctic.

We want to keep the sea lanes open through the GIUK gap to Notdkapp. We might find it useful to discourage shipping movements along the North East passage.
Both tasks are rendered easier if a precision strike by a 2000 mile missile can be delivered in 30 minutes.
 
Now it makes a good broadcast, EW, Cyber launch point as well.
No, it most certainly does not...

But if it were a launch point for Hybrid Ops or OOTW then it might attract interest that could require a local Air Defence capability.

And in that sense Alert is not that far from Thule. Another useful launch point that may need defending.
If there is a serious threat of attack across the arctic, I suspect Alert will be shuttered. I have said it before, and I will reiterate it again, Alert is a long way from help if things go wrong. Alert is 4300km from Trenton, Reykjavík is 300km closer... Reykjavik also has a paved runway, and is easier to sustain due to being far less isolated. In the Canadian arctic Inuvik, Iqaluit, Resolute, Cambridge Bay, etc... are all much better locations to stage anything than Alert is.

All that to say, Alert is great for what it is actually used for, but it is not a forward operating base for combat operations.
 
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If there is a serious threat of attack across the arctic, I suspect Alert will be shuttered. I have said it before, and I will reiterate it again, Alert is a long way from help if things go wrong. Alert is 4300km from Trenton, Reykjavík is 300km closer... Reykjavik also has a paved runway, and is easier to sustain due to being far less isolated. In the Canadian arctic Inuvik, Iqaluit, Resolute, Cambridge Bay, etc... are all much better locations to stage anything than Alert is.

All that to say, Alert is great for what it is actually used for, but it is not a forward operating base for combat operations.
Every so often I'd gotten thinking about a Canadian scaled version of an MDTF- a Battlegroup based around a "Jaegerized" Infantry Battalion + NSM battery + NASAMS battery, all with Nordic mobility. Seems like a great fit for A2AD in our Arctic, as a contribution to Scandic NATO, overall just a cool, semi-novel Canadian capability. Then I got looking hard at the ranges. Those A2AD "bubbles" are pinpricks on the map, and we'd get a lot more mileage out of more MQ-9B's, more P-8's (with Naval Strike capability), and more F35's.
 
Every so often I'd gotten thinking about a Canadian scaled version of an MDTF- a Battlegroup based around a "Jaegerized" Infantry Battalion + NSM battery + NASAMS battery, all with Nordic mobility. Seems like a great fit for A2AD in our Arctic, as a contribution to Scandic NATO, overall just a cool, semi-novel Canadian capability. Then I got looking hard at the ranges. Those A2AD "bubbles" are pinpricks on the map, and we'd get a lot more mileage out of more MQ-9B's, more P-8's (with Naval Strike capability), and more F35's.
Depends what you’re looking at for A2AD capabilities.
 
Part of Air Defence is Counter-Battery fire, taking out the launch platforms. One of the reasons I have become a big fan of the SM6 with its anti-air, anti-cruise, anti-UAV, anti-ballistic missile, anti-ship flexibility.

If it fails to make the aerial intercept it can coast on downhill to the launcher (hyperbole - might have to launch a second SM6)

...

HIMARS will be pushing antiship engagements out past 1000 km with the LRASM variant of increment 2 PrSM. And the Mid Range Capability reaches out to 1500 km with SM6s and Tomahawks. They provide real area defence in the Canadian context.

NASAMS will defend a brigade, an airfield, a port or a town. Or a ship.
 
1730849717023.png 1730849798305.png

The M142 HIMARS and the Mk70 PDS (Typhoon) both need to be take into the RRCA inventory. The range bands covered range from the tactical sub-30 km appropriate to a battlegroup to operational, or theatrical, 1500 km and expanding. The target sets are universal and deployments are ubiquitous.

NASAMs has its place as well.

1730850115827.png

But I suspect NASAMs type pods can be, or are already, built for HIMARS type applications.

With and without driver

1730850321824.png


Easier for the battery to jockey launchers around a site making the site harder to template. Also easier to get onboard a C130 without the cab.

 

To a degree one could argue that 6 CCSB could be the basis for a Canadian MDTF. However it would require a deliberate shift in Canadian Army thinking.
6 CCSB is basically being used as a force generator of sub and sub sub units provided to the tactical level manoeuvre brigades ( ie. Multi National Bde Latvia).
They are not being seen or used as an echelon above brigade element directly supporting a Corps or theatre.

The same is largely true of some potential new equipment, ie LRPF. Despite some arguments against it, it seems to be drifting more towards enabling manoeuvre bde deep fires (whatever nonsense that means ) vs an echelon above brigade element.
 

To a degree one could argue that 6 CCSB could be the basis for a Canadian MDTF. However it would require a deliberate shift in Canadian Army thinking.
6 CCSB is basically being used as a force generator of sub and sub sub units provided to the tactical level manoeuvre brigades ( ie. Multi National Bde Latvia).
They are not being seen or used as an echelon above brigade element directly supporting a Corps or theatre.

The same is largely true of some potential new equipment, ie LRPF. Despite some arguments against it, it seems to be drifting more towards enabling manoeuvre bde deep fires (whatever nonsense that means ) vs an echelon above brigade element.

I like that a lot.

One thing in your comment stuck out:

They are not being seen or used as an echelon above brigade element directly supporting a Corps or theatre.

I think I prefer the geographical bias of the theatre terminology to the institutional bias of the Corps.

A theatre may be the area of operations of a Corps, and in current US thinking that seems to be the way of it. But the European theatre has its own MDTF and its own Corps (V Corps) but V Corps only seems to have a brigade or two attached. On the other hand IndoPac has a Corps (I Corps) and an Army (8th Army) but they share 2nd/7th Inf Div, 11th Abn Div(-) and 25th Inf Div(-). And in WW2 theatres had multiple Army Groups.

To me it seems as if the MDTF is more about managing the battlespace, the geography, than it is about managing the manpower. A Canadian MDTF built on the level of Eurocom might only have a couple of brigades in a single division.

The MDTF is supposed to be able to manage Competition, Crisis and Conflict, setting conditions during peacetime competition, reacting rapidly in the event of a crisis and sustaining operations during conflict. To my way of thinking that would put the Canadian Army on to the continuous operations model that the RCAF and RCN live with.
 
think I prefer the geographical bias of the theatre terminology to the institutional bias of the Corps.
I tend to agree with you on linking it to geography and a theatre vs a Corps.

The MDTF is supposed to be able to manage Competition, Crisis and Conflict, setting conditions during peacetime competition, reacting rapidly in the event of a crisis and sustaining operations during conflict. To my way of thinking that would put the Canadian Army on to the continuous operations model that the RCAF and RCN live with.
I don’t really see an MDTF contributing any better or worse than any other army formation in competition or crisis or conflict aside from its different capabilities.

I think a Cdn Army MDTF A2/AD concept fits better into countering probable threat scenarios for both the West Coast and the Arctic than current Army concepts largely focused in the case of the Arctic on a light infantry Bn.

The MDTF concept also integrates better into the joint force concepts for the Indo-Pacific than a CMBG. Further the A2/AD concept is useful for assuring our access into Latvia and preventing Russia from interfering with the inflow of additional CMBG forces.

It would force the Canadian Army to think about how to contribute and fight in a joint force vs simply contribute and fight as a tactical ground formation.
 
Keep in mind MDTF is designed to enable Operations above Corps to function jointly.

When one looks at Europe: we have V Corps there - as well as contingency planning for III and XVIII.

For Pacific there is I Corps, (ignore 8th Army as an Army is larger than a Corps — it’s a left over placeholder in Korea from the war) the potential to move XVIII there as needed.

Also we have 20 Divisions, and some separate Bde’s, but we only have 4 active Corps, and no active Armies. Two of those Corps (I and V) are geographical, while XVIII ABN is the rapid response, and III the heavy metal response.
 

Article outlines some of how the CA sees and employs the 6 CCSB elements.
And the very first sentence has set a negative tone for me.

Over the past three years, 6 Canadian Combat Support Brigade (6 CCSB) has conducted an experiment to understand how best to integrate its myriad of enablers into a manoeuvre brigade headquarters.

Perhaps, I'm reading to much into "integrate." IMHO, that's going back to Afghanistan-style brigade headquarters rather than the light, agile and austere things that brigade headquarters, like brigades, should be.

IMHO, Many, if not all, 6 CCSB resources should reside with the Latvian eFP "multi-national div" HQ, whatever it may be but with strong Canadian control over them.

🍻
 
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