Topic: Canadian Special Operations Force Command (CANSOFCOM)

[Jarnhamar]

Perhaps the OMLT/Trainer Type SOFs could hone their craft bringing Reserve Companies up to speed.

Not until you can force reservists to train more regularly.

[Chris Pook]

Not until you can force reservists to train more regularly.

Not until you can make the training in the time available more effective.....

[MCG]

So if we were to compare the CAF to a potluck?

Is CANSOFCOM the dude that brings pulled pork but only enough for like two people to have

Is the Army the jackass that shows up with 10 rotten veggie plates from the roadside truck stop

If you want to make a potluck analogy, then imagine you are the host and you are reimbursing the cost of what anybody brings.  You ask "who can bring pulled pork for seven guys" to which Army replies "I'll bring pulled pork for 35 guys because I don't know how to reduce my recipe, and it goes best with my potato salad so you'll need to take a batch of that too" and CANSOF says "pulled pork for seven guys - I can do that."  You could then explain to Army that it would do the product to your standards and not its own, or save yourself the hassle and pick CANSOF.

...   Thus wasting the vertical insertion capacity of a majority of the paratroopers.

I suppose that is one conclusion you could reach.  But, given the other details of your story, would a more plausible conclusion have been that they had been wasting the majority of their infantry resources on parachuting when they really needed mechanized infantry for the wars they were going to fight?

[1984]

If you want to make a potluck analogy, then imagine you are the host and you are reimbursing the cost of what anybody brings.  You ask "who can bring pulled pork for seven guys" to which Army replies "I'll bring pulled pork for 35 guys because I don't know how to reduce my recipe, and it goes best with my potato salad so you'll need to take a batch of that too" and CANSOF says "pulled pork for seven guys - I can do that."  You could then explain to Army that it would do the product to your standards and not its own, or save yourself the hassle and pick CANSOF.

To further the analogy the Army would bring 12 chefs to prepare the pork, 6 chefs to make the salad, 2 redundant chefs to serve it and 5 visits by the Command chefs to ensure they can add their name to the medal roster, while CANSOF would pick their best chef, actually trust him to do the job and send him to the party alone (with maybe some overwatch across the street).

[Kat Stevens]

Perhaps the OMLT/Trainer Type SOFs could hone their craft bringing Reserve Companies up to speed.

We can give them the code name Sisyphus!  I crack me up sometimes.

[Chris Pook]

We can give them the code name Sisyphus!  I crack me up sometimes.

Sounds perfect!  Process, process, process. 

[CEDE NULLIS]

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/07/05/death-of-u-s-soldier-in-afghanistan-highlights-the-evolving-role-of-conventional-combat-troops-there/?utm_term=.05ac5f192d9c

Death of U.S. soldier in Afghanistan highlights the evolving role of conventional combat troops there
By Dan Lamothe July 5 at 3:11 PM

The death of a 19-year-old U.S. soldier in southern Afghanistan on Monday highlights the U.S. military’s evolving role in the war there under President Trump’s administration, after years of President Barack Obama restricting the use of conventional combat troops on the battlefield.

Army Pfc. Hansen B. Kirkpatrick, a mortarman with the 1st Armored Division’s 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, was killed by indirect fire while outside his base on a partnered operation with Afghan troops, said Navy Capt. Jeff Davis, a Pentagon spokesman. The attack, presumably by Taliban fighters, occurred in Helmand province’s Nawa district, and also caused injuries to two other U.S. soldiers who are expected to survive, Davis added.

Pfc. Hansen Bradee Kirkpatrick, 19, was killed July 3 in Afghanistan’s Helmand province by indirect fire during a partner operation alongside Afghan troops. (U.S. Army)
Kirkpatrick’s death is the fourth combat fatality this year of a conventional U.S. soldier in an operation outside a base. Obama relied nearly exclusively on Special Operations troops to advise Afghan troops outside bases in Afghanistan after tens of thousands of U.S. troops were withdrawn in 2014, but U.S. military officials have said that is unsustainable and that conventional forces are needed to carry out more missions.

Kirkpatrick, of Wasilla, Alaska, was described by his executive officer, Maj. James C. Bithorn, in a statement as a “caring, disciplined, and intelligent young soldier” who daily lived by his unit’s motto: “Deeds Not Words.” He had been in the unit about a year, Bithorn said.

“At a time when we remember the patriots who founded our nation in freedom, we are saddened by the loss of one of our comrades who was here protecting our freedom at home,” said Army Gen. John Nicholson, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan. “We will keep his family in our thoughts and prayers as we reflect on the sacrifice he and others have made to secure our freedoms and help make Afghanistan a better place.”

The death comes as Defense Secretary Jim Mattis prepares a strategy in Afghanistan that is expected to call for the U.S. military to return to a war footing with the Taliban and lift Obama-era restrictions that limited the mobility of U.S. military advisers on the battlefield. The Pentagon could add 3,000 to 5,000 U.S. troops to the 8,400 currently deployed and allow them to be closer to combat operations.

In Helmand province, considered the birthplace of the Taliban and the center of Afghanistan’s opium trade, nearly all U.S. forces were withdrawn in fall 2014 after years of fierce fighting led by U.S. Marines. The rapid deterioration of security in Helmand prompted U.S. commanders in February 2015 to rush a small, “expeditionary advising package” including U.S. troops to stop the downward spiral, and it has since expanded to include hundreds of conventional U.S. soldiers and Marines.

The previous U.S. military fatalities in Afghanistan this year included three conventional U.S. soldiers — Sgt. Eric M. Houck, 25; Sgt. William M. Bays, 29; and Cpl. Dillon C. Baldridge, 22 — who were members of the 101st Airborne Division. They were ambushed June 10 by an Afghan soldier that they were advising in eastern Afghanistan’s Nangahar district.

Two soldiers with the elite 75th Ranger Regiment, a Special Operations unit, were killed in a raid April 26. They were Sgt. Joshua Rodgers, 22, and Sgt. Cameron Thomas, 23.

The other U.S. service member killed in Afghanistan this year was Army Staff Sgt. Mark R. De Alencar, 37, a member of the 7th Special Forces Group. He died April 8 after his unit engaged in a firefight during an operation to counter the Islamic State’s faction based in Nangahar, U.S. military officials have said.

[PuckChaser]

I'm not sure what your point is by posting that article.

[CEDE NULLIS]

I'm not sure what your point is by posting that article.

I meant to add that it is related to the discussion above:

"Death of U.S. soldier in Afghanistan highlights the evolving role of conventional combat troops there"

[PuckChaser]

What does it add? A bunch of conventional guys doing an OMLT task in Afghanistan were killed, so what. It also notes SOF had casualties doing similar, yet likely in higher risk/higher value missions. It doesn't prove either way what force is appropriate for that specific theatre, unless you've got some deeper analysis?

[CEDE NULLIS]

What does it add? A bunch of conventional guys doing an OMLT task in Afghanistan were killed, so what. It also notes SOF had casualties doing similar, yet likely in higher risk/higher value missions. It doesn't prove either way what force is appropriate for that specific theatre, unless you've got some deeper analysis?

I'm not saying it proves anything. But I think it does speak to what we were talking about earlier in terms of what roles are suitable for SOF vs. line units. I'm not out to argue one way or the other but I think how different nations are approaching these "limited" engagements whether in Afghan, Iraq or Syria is interesting and relevant for the CF. At what point does it become "SF+" rather than just SF? 

It was mentioned earlier (in the Canadian context) that the political will to use SOF troops is higher than conventional troops due to public opinion. In regards to the incident in the article above, this is a relatively new development "after years of President Barack Obama restricting the use of conventional combat troops on the battlefield."

[Chris Pook]

If I'm understanding the point I think Cede Nullis was referring more to the rules of engagement that each nation has with its press.  In Canada conventional forces are openly deployed and widely covered.  Special Forces are close held.

And that is why I was suggesting rotating individuals through a CSOR subunit on secondment from their parent units rather than deploying light companies. 

Once the Green is swapped for Tan invisibility occurs.  Or so it seems.

[MarkOttawa]

It was mentioned earlier (in the Canadian context) that the political will to use SOF troops is higher than conventional troops due to public opinion.

Perhaps because the media and "public opinion" are kept largely in the dark and thus less predictably negative reactions of one sort or another, for whatever reason or another.  Plus fewer political demands in Parliament for votes to approve missions.

How convenient but appears can stress default go-to forces.

Mark
Ottawa

[daftandbarmy]

Not until you can force reservists to train more regularly.

The British Army maintain 2 x SAS (Reserve) Regiments: http://www.army.mod.uk/specialforces/30603.aspx

[Humphrey Bogart]

The British Army maintain 2 x SAS (Reserve) Regiments: http://www.army.mod.uk/specialforces/30603.aspx

As does Australia, 1st Commando Regiment.  https://www.army.gov.au/our-people/units/special-operations-command/1st-commando-regiment

I've read that a substantial portion of this Regiment are Police Officers civvy side.  They were also deployed extensively to Afghanistan.

[Lightguns]

As does Australia, 1st Commando Regiment.  https://www.army.gov.au/our-people/units/special-operations-command/1st-commando-regiment

I've read that a substantial portion of this Regiment are Police Officers civvy side.

That's an interesting idea, a reserve CSOR battalion with platoons in major cities, with non-RCMP police forces, and tuning their training cycle to police training cycles.  Mutually beneficial and one training standard.

[Humphrey Bogart]

That's an interesting idea, a reserve CSOR battalion with platoons in major cities, with non-RCMP police forces, and tuning their training cycle to police training cycles.  Mutually beneficial and one training standard.

You also get some Ex-CSOR or JTF2 guys that are retired but still might want to serve.  There is a whole thread over on the UK Site ARRSE about 1 Cdo Regiment.  Supposedly most of the Victoria and NSW State ERTs are part of 1 Cdo.  Military gets the benefit of getting highly trained individuals that also bring Real World experience to the table as opposed to just "exercising".

As I said, the unit was deployed extensively in Afghanistan and is a fully integrated component of Aus SOFCOMD

[daftandbarmy]

You also get some Ex-CSOR or JTF2 guys that are retired but still might want to serve.  There is a whole thread over on the UK Site ARRSE about 1 Cdo Regiment.  Supposedly most of the Victoria and NSW State ERTs are part of 1 Cdo.  Military gets the benefit of getting highly trained individuals that also bring Real World experience to the table as opposed to just "exercising".

As I said, the unit was deployed extensively in Afghanistan and is a fully integrated component of Aus SOFCOMD

TA SAS had their issues in Afghanistan but, based on what I've heard, I think continue to be deployed on ops in various roles such as trainers etc Their 'general war' role remains the same, IIRC:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7575034/SAS-reservists-withdrawn-from-Afghan-front-line.html

[Humphrey Bogart]

TA SAS had their issues in Afghanistan but, based on what I've heard, I think continue to be deployed on ops in various roles such as trainers etc Their 'general war' role remains the same, IIRC:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7575034/SAS-reservists-withdrawn-from-Afghan-front-line.html

Who doesn't have issues?

Australia actually went through a similar issue this thread was initially brought back from the dead for.

In attempt to keep casualties low in both Iraq and Afghanistan and also because the Australian Government at the time though SOF casualties would be more acceptable politically, Australia would only allow Special Forces to conduct Offensive Operations in those theatres. As a result, they burned their SOF out, twice having to withdraw their SOTF's because of Operator fatigue.

We've said it ourselves in our SOF Truths:

- Humans are more important than Hardware.
- Quality is better than Quantity.
- Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced.
- Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur.

Using SOF and only SOF as the default for everything is GOOD POLITICS...BAD POLICY
 

[Chris Pook]

One thing that I have noted with the Brits is that as the SAS and the SBS became more publicly acknowledged, and even as 1 Para was being converted to SAS Direct Action type roles, there seems to be a proliferation of new SOF organizations, like Special Reconnaissance and such that are publicly taking over jobs previously done by mist covered organisations like "The Det".  Once upon a time nobody knew the SAS existed.  Then they did and they didn't know the Det existed.  Then they did. 

I can't help but think this pushing things into the shadows doesn't really change much.  For example, putting more bodies into Tan berets is just going to increase the number of deployed iphones willing to send stories home to the girlfriend.

[daftandbarmy]

One thing that I have noted with the Brits is that as the SAS and the SBS became more publicly acknowledged, and even as 1 Para was being converted to SAS Direct Action type roles, there seems to be a proliferation of new SOF organizations, like Special Reconnaissance and such that are publicly taking over jobs previously done by mist covered organisations like "The Det".  Once upon a time nobody knew the SAS existed.  Then they did and they didn't know the Det existed.  Then they did. 

I can't help but think this pushing things into the shadows doesn't really change much.  For example, putting more bodies into Tan berets is just going to increase the number of deployed iphones willing to send stories home to the girlfriend.

.... and unauthorized books about B20 type f&ckups

[Haggis]

That's an interesting idea, a reserve CSOR battalion ...

This was tried in 4 Div (then LFCA), I believe, in the mid 1980's with the running of one serial of a "Commando Leader's Course".  That's as far as it went.

CANSOFCOM does maintain it's own PRL where ex-Reg F CANSOF members can go once they end their Reg F time.

[daftandbarmy]

This was tried in 4 Div (then LFCA), I believe, in the mid 1980's with the running of one serial of a "Commando Leader's Course".  That's as far as it went.

CANSOFCOM does maintain it's own PRL where ex-Reg F CANSOF members can go once they end their Reg F time.

This could probably work if it was heavily reinforced with a Reg F CSOR cadre/ training team and connected directly to CSOR vs. commanded through the various Mo-litia Bdes. It would probably have to be run like a temp agency though, with various individuals heading off at different times to top up units for specific tasks/ ops based on their levels of training and other aspects of 'life readiness'.

(And I think Danjanou knows how that 'Canadian Commando Course' experiment went... )