Author Topic: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy  (Read 786534 times)

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Offline MarkOttawa

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2650 on: May 11, 2019, 19:02:48 »
In post above ( https://milnet.ca/forums/index.php/topic,90990.msg1571415.html#msg1571415 ) ship at top left might be Medium Endurance Multi-Tasked Vessel and one at top right an Offshore Patrol Vessel--in 2013 Conservative gov't said CCG to get up to 5 of each ( https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2013/10/vancouver-shipyards-build-medium-endurance-multi-tasked-vessels-offshore-patrol-vessels-canadian-coast-guard.html ) to be built some distant day by Seaspan--pix of current ones built late 1960s:

1) Multi-tasked:



2) Offshore Patrol:



Our governments really seem to have little interest in effectively carrying out core federal responsibilities--i.e, CAF, CCG, RCMP.

Mark
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« Last Edit: May 11, 2019, 19:12:08 by MarkOttawa »
Ça explique, mais ça n'excuse pas.

Offline MarkOttawa

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2651 on: May 11, 2019, 19:56:01 »
On the other hand CCG helicopters can be got (effectively sole-sourced), under Conservatives, from Bell Helicopters in Montreal in by our standards warp speed and with almost no political or media fall-out:

Canadian Coast Guard’s New Medium-Lift Helos Sole-Sourced to Bell Helicopter Canada
https://mark3ds.wordpress.com/2015/04/11/mark-collins-canadian-coast-guards-new-medium-lift-helos-sole-sourced-to-bell-canada/

Bell Rung: All 15 Canadian Coast Guard Light Helos Delivered
https://mark3ds.wordpress.com/2016/03/14/mark-collins-bell-rung-all-15-canadian-coast-guard-light-helos-delivered/

But boy it sure helps when you have (US-owned) company actually making the dang things and selling them around the world at a profit. Rather than, one way or another, paying the shipbuilding companies to build the shipyards actually necessary for the work they've been promised. And getting the vessels some sunny never never land day. At least bloody very late.

FUBAR.

Mark
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Offline Colin P

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2652 on: May 15, 2019, 21:49:12 »
OFSV coming along



as is the JSS


Offline Oldgateboatdriver

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2653 on: May 18, 2019, 11:15:54 »
I didn't know if I should put this in this thread or in the Canadian Politics forum (seeing as there is an election coming  ;) ):

This went totally unnoticed in the English Canadian press yesterday (probably because the end of steel and aluminum tariff was greater news), but minister Garneau was in Quebec City and announced that Davie has been retained by the G. of C. for a contract for two new ferries of about 130 meters  in length, under a program where a sole bidder that qualifies can be selected. Any other potential bidder (watch out for Irving!!!) who believes it could bid on the work now has 15 days to make its case - otherwise, the government negotiates the details of the contract with the sole bidder. (I believe this was the rule used by the Conservatives to acquire the C-17's)

The two ferries to be replaced are the MV Madeleine and MV Holiday Island, both operating in the Gulf of St-Lawrence from P.E.I.

The reference below is to the Journal de Quebec, it's in French sorry - but you can always use Google translate.

https://www.journaldequebec.com/2019/05/17/ottawa-confie-la-construction-de-deux-traversiers-au-chantier-davie

Offline FSTO

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2654 on: May 18, 2019, 12:11:02 »
I didn't know if I should put this in this thread or in the Canadian Politics forum (seeing as there is an election coming  ;) ):

This went totally unnoticed in the English Canadian press yesterday (probably because the end of steel and aluminum tariff was greater news), but minister Garneau was in Quebec City and announced that Davie has been retained by the G. of C. for a contract for two new ferries of about 130 meters  in length, under a program where a sole bidder that qualifies can be selected. Any other potential bidder (watch out for Irving!!!) who believes it could bid on the work now has 15 days to make its case - otherwise, the government negotiates the details of the contract with the sole bidder. (I believe this was the rule used by the Conservatives to acquire the C-17's)

The two ferries to be replaced are the MV Madeleine and MV Holiday Island, both operating in the Gulf of St-Lawrence from P.E.I.

The reference below is to the Journal de Quebec, it's in French sorry - but you can always use Google translate.

https://www.journaldequebec.com/2019/05/17/ottawa-confie-la-construction-de-deux-traversiers-au-chantier-davie

Oh the hypocrisy of it all. We are open and fair, unless it actually has to get done. But if the previous government goes sole source its evil and bad but if we do it we are doing it for the good of the country. Next government comes in and they rinse and repeat!


Offline MarkOttawa

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2655 on: May 19, 2019, 12:12:22 »
The very crafty and often pernicious Prof. Michael Byers actually does know his stuff pretty well (esp. on Arctic) and makes pretty good sense here:

Quote
Mark Norman has been vindicated – but the navy-procurement crisis ticks on

Michael Byers holds the Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law at the University of British Columbia.

The truth about Vice-Admiral Mark Norman is finally coming out, with his breach-of-trust charge over allegedly leaking cabinet secrets to affect the leasing of a supply ship having been stayed. His trial has been spiked; the focus is now on Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, who reportedly initiated the request for an RCMP investigation in 2015, a highly unusual ask that he denies making. He also publicly predicted a trial, even before any charges were laid.

But this affair is about more than injustice and allegations of political interference. At its root, it is about a procurement system that left the Royal Canadian Navy unable to operate freely overseas – and that problem remains nearly as acute now as it was before.

A strong navy needs supply ships to enable warships to undertake long deployments without stopping in foreign ports or relying on allies. During an armed conflict, a supply ship can be the difference between victory and defeat. But Canada’s Navy lost both its supply ships in 2015 after a fire on one and serious corrosion on the other. All of a sudden, it could no longer form a task force – an independently deployable group of warships – despite this ability being central to its function as a blue-water navy, that is to say, a force that can operate across the deep and open oceans.

The Navy had foreseen a need for new supply ships before that, however. In 2004, it persuaded Paul Martin’s Liberal government to initiate a procurement process. But the projected costs quickly exceeded the assigned budget, and Stephen Harper’s Conservative government halted the process before restarting it one year later and then rolling it into the 2011 National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS). By 2015, it was apparent that the NSS was broken, and that the new supply ships would take a decade or more to arrive.

Enter Vice-Adm. Norman, appointed as commander of the Navy in 2013, who saw a solution to the intractable process: converting a second-hand container ship into a refuelling vessel.

However, this idea put the entire NSS at risk, and with it, entire careers. The NSS has grown into a complex institution with procedures, committees, personnel slots and budget lines involving three different government departments, and a workaround threatened overturning the cart. The conversion would also imperil decades of profits at Irving Shipbuilding in Halifax and Seaspan Shipyards in Vancouver. In 2011, the two companies had been selected to build all of Canada’s large ships because Davie Shipbuilding in Lévis, Que., was under creditor protection at the time. But by 2015, Davie was back, with the facilities, workforce and experience needed to build large ships. It even had a container ship, the MV Asterix, ready for conversion.

Mr. Harper understood that urgent measures were needed. So he gave Vice-Adm. Norman the authority to deal directly with Davie and get the job done. It was an unusual move that sidelined the rest of the bureaucracy, but the prime minister had Vice-Adm. Norman’s back – that is, until he was no longer prime minister.

Mr. Trudeau became a particularly easy mark for senior civil servants, especially given their propensity to always try and take advantage of new governments. It might not have been too hard to wind Mr. Trudeau up about Vice-Adm. Norman’s dealings with Davie, which included allegedly “leaking” cabinet information concerning the new government’s doubts about the deal Mr. Harper had struck on MV Asterix.

We don’t know whether Mr. Trudeau’s behaviour amounted to political interference in the justice system. What we do know for the moment, though, is that Vice-Adm. Norman’s legal fight against the breach-of-trust charge came at a heavy handicap. Someone told the media that the RCMP were searching Vice-Adm. Norman’s home in 2017. The Department of National Defence refused Vice-Adm. Norman’s request for government assistance on legal fees, even though doing so is normal practice. Thousands of documents were withheld, some of which would have revealed what a former Conservative cabinet minister later confirmed: that Vice-Adm. Norman was reporting directly to Mr. Harper.

Chief of the Defence Staff General Jonathan Vance was particularly unhelpful, suspending and then replacing Vice-Adm, Norman while publicly expressing a lack of confidence in him. He must go: At best, he failed to protect Vice-Adm. Norman, and at worst, he set him up.

But none of that deals with the actual problem at the core of this affair: The Navy has only one supply ship, the one that Vice-Adm. Norman secured. And this country’s geography demands supply ships on both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, as well as a third ship to stand in during maintenance and refits.

Seaspan will not be able to deliver new supply ships any time soon, even though it recently rearranged its construction schedule so as to start one but not both of the vessels before several Coast Guard builds. The firm ran into serious problems with the first ship built under the NSS, a Coast Guard fisheries science vessel, including faulty welds that had to be redone last year, and a damaging collision with a breakwater during a Seaspan-conducted trial earlier this year.

Fortunately, no full construction contract for the new supply ships has yet been signed. There is still time to cancel the planned second ship at Seaspan and to have Davie refit another container ship instead.

But this assumes rational decision-making, unaffected by interests and bureaucracy. Yes, Vice-Adm. Norman was vindicated – but don’t expect this government to change course.
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-mark-norman-has-been-vindicated-but-the-navy-procurement-crisis/

Mark
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Offline Oldgateboatdriver

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2656 on: May 19, 2019, 13:31:59 »
I am not a big fan of professor Byers, but must admit that this opinion piece of his is bang on.

Offline Navy_Pete

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2657 on: May 19, 2019, 14:02:37 »
Cancel and get another conversion ship?  Yeah, super good idea, then when they reach the end of their life in 15 years we can go back to square one, and lose the hundreds of millions we've already spent on JSS with nothing to show for it.

It was called the shipbuilding STRATEGY because it was intended to build a STRATEGIC ABILITY TO BUILD SHIPS IN CANADA in modern facilities. The first few years was redoing the shipyards from scratch to world class facilities.  And guess what, it takes a long time to get actual experience when you do things, and a lot of these activities (like test and trials) they are only doing for the first time now.

It was always going to be a long lead to get set up, but if we can stop being a bunch of shortsighted whinging idiots and stick tot he plan maybe it'll turn out okay. Nothing wrong with checking it out and making sure it still makes sense, but torpedoing it without a fundamental understanding of what it was supposed to do is dumb.  The whole thing is bound up in masses of red tape (none of which applied to the Asterix project) that add complications, delays and expenses, so if you want to fundamentally change it, quit messing around with bespoke ships, value proposition, massive oversight etc and get into a straight commercial relationship.  Our contracts are rubbish, and it's because the people that draft them never actually work on projects or have any accountability for ships actually showing up, so they play silly games to meet some random ancilliary department deliverable that has nothing to do with DND or CCG having capable vessels in a reasonable time at a good value for the taxpayers.

Would love to pile on the shipyards, but from where I sat most of the problems are caused by Canada.  Aside from DND, PSPC and CCG, there are all kinds of fingers in the pie, and central agencies like to occasionally run around popping everyone's balloons. 
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Offline Underway

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2658 on: May 19, 2019, 15:27:20 »
I am not a big fan of professor Byers, but must admit that this opinion piece of his is bang on.

I almost agree with everything.  At least his analysis of what happened.

As for a second conversion, I don't think we need it yet.  Just getting back from a NATO showed me once again that we have plenty of access to allied AOR's in the Med and North Sea.  As well as plenty of access to good ports to refuel and restore.  There's no emergency.

Asterix is going to do the job until we get the new capability.

Offline FSTO

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2659 on: May 19, 2019, 16:21:20 »
I almost agree with everything.  At least his analysis of what happened.

As for a second conversion, I don't think we need it yet.  Just getting back from a NATO showed me once again that we have plenty of access to allied AOR's in the Med and North Sea.  As well as plenty of access to good ports to refuel and restore.  There's no emergency.

Asterix is going to do the job until we get the new capability.
Probably why Asterix seems to be plying most of her trade in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

Offline Underway

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2660 on: May 19, 2019, 16:58:33 »
Probably why Asterix seems to be plying most of her trade in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

As per Admiral Baine's comments on the issue, that's exactly why.  Less traditional allies, bigger ocean.  Asterix will probably end up being the swing AOR.

Offline Chris Pook

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2661 on: May 19, 2019, 17:10:43 »
"...At its root, it is about a procurement system that left the Royal Canadian Navy unable to operate freely overseas..."

Per Dr. Byers.

Refreshed

"...At its root, it is about a procurement system that left the Royal Canadian Navy Government of Canada unable to operate freely overseas..."

The RCN offers the Government of Canada to ability to support its interests on the high seas and overseas.  One way in which it does that is providing security for transiting vessels. And ultimately that security comes courtesy of the Navy's ability kill and destroy with the sanction of the only authority licensed to permit that:  an internationally recognized national government.

But the Government needs more than just killing power to influence events.  In wars of the people, in this era of hybrid warfare and insurgent political parties, it is more important than ever to make friends and making friends is not just about killing people. Champlain made friends with the Huron by killing Iroquois.  His diplomatic efforts with the Iroquois were less successful.

Quote
"I almost agree with everything.  At least his analysis of what happened.

As for a second conversion, I don't think we need it yet.  Just getting back from a NATO showed me once again that we have plenty of access to allied AOR's in the Med and North Sea.  As well as plenty of access to good ports to refuel and restore.  There's no emergency.

Asterix is going to do the job until we get the new capability."

"Probably why Asterix seems to be plying most of her trade in the Pacific and Indian Oceans."

A fleet of support vessels (or even a large flotilla), a combination of Asterix AORs and Point Class type RoRo conversions - owned by, or at least operated on behalf of, the Government of Canada - would leave the Government a much greater opportunity to influence events while winning friends.

The vessels could obviously put at the service of the RCN but also at the service of the DND, at the service of Other Government Departments, of the Provinces, of other nations armed forces or their civil authorities, or even the United Nations.

If a Government of Canada really wanted to engage with the world, to earn a seat on the UN Security Council, to influence debates, then it could consider taking a good portion of the 0.7% of GDP (or GNI) nominally committed to international aid and development and committing it to building such a support fleet.  Given that the current DND budget is 1.2% of GDP then an increased allocation of 0.35% of GDP would be equivalent to a 25% increase in the Defence Budget and concurrently a 140% increase in Overseas Development Aid (ODA).  That ODA increase would still leave us under the target of 0.7% by 0.1%.  Even doing that we would be 14% short of our ODA target and 40% short of our NATO defence target.

And buying a flotilla like that would give the RCN more reasons to have capable ships --- to protect the support flotilla.


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Offline Colin P

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2662 on: May 20, 2019, 01:48:45 »
Look at timelines, when the new JSS is launched and deemed fit for service and the crew trained up, Asterix is going to need a major refit. If we ordered a 2nd Resolve class and continued with the JSS as well, you end up with 4 AOR's, which likley one will be in refit at any one time. Keeping the two Resolve class manned with a split crew reducing manning issues for the RCN, while doubling RAS ability. Beyond the navy needs, it means Canada can contribute an AOR to US or Allied missions around the world, which is a good way to earn those international brownie points with limited political risk. They also provide an excellent resource for training Canadian civilian deck officers, which means they can get deep sea time and experience to write higher tickets, becoming a source for Ship Pilots and other senior merchant marine jobs, all critical to Canada's trade.   

Offline Chris Pook

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2663 on: May 20, 2019, 02:00:03 »
Look at timelines, when the new JSS is launched and deemed fit for service and the crew trained up, Asterix is going to need a major refit. If we ordered a 2nd Resolve class and continued with the JSS as well, you end up with 4 AOR's, which likley one will be in refit at any one time. Keeping the two Resolve class manned with a split crew reducing manning issues for the RCN, while doubling RAS ability. Beyond the navy needs, it means Canada can contribute an AOR to US or Allied missions around the world, which is a good way to earn those international brownie points with limited political risk. They also provide an excellent resource for training Canadian civilian deck officers, which means they can get deep sea time and experience to write higher tickets, becoming a source for Ship Pilots and other senior merchant marine jobs, all critical to Canada's trade.   

Still looking for a bit more lift for beans and bandages (and occasionally bullets) and more room for aerial and seagoing connectors.  At least a couple of flat top RoRo conversions.
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Offline Harrigan

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2664 on: May 20, 2019, 08:41:43 »
I personally have no heartache with an incoming government reviewing an eleventh-hour sole-source contract by an outgoing government, and in a government-held riding threatened in an impending election, (and seemingly at odds with the oft-touted genius of the NSS).  Certainly if / when the Liberals do exactly that in the next couple of months, we will be very quick to criticise, and will want those contracts to be reviewed by a Scheer government.  But I am happy that review was a) short, and b) resulting in continuing the programme so that the RCN gets the ship.  And I have no quibble with Byers on the need for supply ships, as I think we can all agree that we would rather have the Asterix in service than not. 

But I will admit that I am very confused by all of this at the moment, and there are a few questions that have been gnawing at me for some time - particularly since the recent revelation that has "vindicated" Adm.Norman:

1. If the three former cabinet ministers have known all along that Norman had been operating under their direct orders, why did they wait until now to say so?  Why didn't they tell everyone at the start of all this and not put Norman through it?

2. Does it not seem odd that a government would give orders to a subordinate officer and not to CDS? 

3. Did CDS know that Norman was under such orders?  If he did know, then he appears to be hanging Norman out to dry (that seems to be Byers' assertion).  But if he didn't know, and Norman didn't tell him, then Norman would effectively be taking orders from outside his chain of command, and behind CDS's back. 

4. We are all up in arms on this site about Irving's influence with the Liberal cabinet.  But I am not sure I understand the difference between their influence to get the project reviewed, and Davies influence on the previous government to get the project started in the first place.  My simple mind sees both of them as industry influence on cabinet.  What am I missing?

I don't know the answers to those questions above, and the various reporting out there seems to very quickly line up with their particular partisan leanings, so of limited value.  But either way, it seems to me that an egrigious failure of the chain of command has been committed - I just can't figure out by whom. 



 
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Offline Colin P

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2665 on: May 20, 2019, 13:04:14 »
Well Micheal Byers is no friend of the CPC and the fact that this government is shedding Cabinet Ministers and MP's should be telling.

For #1, the former Ministers were likely unaware of the exact nature of the charge or the evidence for it. They may have not connected all of the dots. Also it would be the PCO, MND and RCMP to ensure there was enough evidence before requesting charges and laying them.

#2 & #3 The CDS has a military to run, Norman was the senior Naval Officer and this was a crisis for the navy. Harper was aware of the mess that is our procurement system and the critical need of an AOR for the RCN. Therefore likely he directed Norman to spearhead the replacement. i don't doubt that Vance and Norman discussed the direction from the PM and since it was a direct order from the PM (as I recall) Vance would have said "Carry on".

#4 Irving influence over everything in Eastern Canada is a major concern for a democracy and the CPC have no love for them. Plus Irving Shipyards had their hands full. Davie had pulled up their socks by themselves and it was an opportunity. Harper had already seen the value of single source contracts that actually deliver and had a history of unorthodox (for Canada) solution to military crisis needs (leased Leos and Mi17 helicopters). So likely the Davie solution appealed to him and also likely had some political benefit. 
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Offline Harrigan

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2666 on: May 21, 2019, 09:33:11 »
I am not sure I buy the argument that its all just a happy coincidence....

On #1 - I find it hard to believe that three former cabinet ministers didn't understand the nature of the charge against Norman, particularly if they knew the background.  And surely when Norman's name was being dragged into the mud, they would have been happy to have offered up the information to the RCMP to put things straight.  But they waited over two years, despite it being a very highly visible (and coincidentally politically advantageous) story.

On #2 & #3 - I don't recall the government in 2015 admitting that the NSS was a mess, and that it wasn't going to deliver what was promised, so suggesting that this was all just a noble endeavour that just happened to have "some political benefit" is a bit of a leap of faith is it not?  Would we be so glib if (when) the Liberals do it?  And what of the clear circumvention of the chain of command?  While you are certain Vance and Norman discussed this direction from the PM (or at least, from cabinet ministers) and were both ok with it, Vance's firing of Norman would seem to suggest that was not the case. 

On #4 - Irving/McCain in Eastern Canada, Hydro-Quebec/Powercorp/Quebecor/SNC-Lavalin in Quebec, Mosaic in Saskatchewan, Oil Companies in Alberta, etc etc.  No differences there - if it is major concern for democracy, they are ALL a major concern for democracy.....  Does the fact that Irving does have a lot of influence in Atlantic Canada justify circumventing the procurement process? 

I apologise if it just looks like I am out to shoot down any response.  It it not intended to be that way.  I am very happy that we have an extra AOR.  But the analysis of this whole mess cannot be as simplistic as CPC=Good, Liberal=Bad, as much as many of us on the site wish it were so.  The procurement process is fairly clearly laid out.  If you or I are ordered by our CO to circumvent financial and/or procurement regulations - which are in place specifically to halt corruption and fraud - I would hope we would tell the CO to pound sand.  (I know I have had to do exactly that in the past).  So what makes this different?  Is it OK if the PM orders it?  Would it be OK if Trudeau ordered it?

In a way, I think that the media frenzy over the political damage this issue is doing to the Liberals (not undeserved) is obscuring some bigger underlying issues around how things were done in the waning days of the previous government and the early days of the current one.  Of course, that suits some just fine.

Offline Colin P

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2667 on: May 21, 2019, 09:44:27 »
I can't think of any company out west that has the influence Irving has back East, not even in the days of Mac-Blo. The two shipyards at the time had their hands full, Seaspan was busy creating a new yard and planning 4 vessels. Irving was busy upgrading it's yard, busy completing a bunch of smaller vessels and planning the AOPS. There was no way they could deliver as fast as Davie could, who already had a almost new ship in their hands to convert.

It's very possible they let Norman swing for political purposes, but it's also possible they didn't understand the information that led to the charge, for all we now they might have assumed that the PCO was aware of Normans role with the previous government and that the charge was based on something else. Had a proper review been done prior to laying the charges, likely Normans orders would have come to light and no charges would have been made. This government rushed to find a head for a stake that the PM wanted and they picked the wrong man.

Offline FSTO

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2668 on: May 21, 2019, 10:01:44 »
The latest lean from Liberal Operatives on Twitter is now to bring out the "circumvention of procurement process rules" as a reason why Norman was charged. This loops back to the idea from some in government that procurement rules are sacrosanct and came down from the mount etched in stone. That is complete baloney, rules and procedures are constantly in flux because nothing is perfect and an entity that is married to dogma is doomed to failure.

Also there is no bloody way in hell that Vance (nor Lawson before him) was in the dark about CRCN dealing directly with Davie (allegedly) under orders from the PM. If Ottawa is as leaky as everyone says it is (and it is!) then he would have heard about it. But the process of acquiring the iAOR would have been part of the briefing package the CDS routinely reviews.
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Offline Chris Pook

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2669 on: May 21, 2019, 12:53:18 »
I would be fine with Trudeau ordering the circumvention of the procurement rules if it resulted in new frigates, new support ships, new transport ships, new coast guard ships, new helicopters, new trucks, new flight suits, new boots....
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Offline SeaKingTacco

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2670 on: May 21, 2019, 14:01:00 »
I too, am fine with the PM (any PM) circumventing contracting and procurement rules. At the end of the day, he is the final arbtrar of those rules and wears the results- good or bad.

Offline Spencer100

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2671 on: Yesterday at 16:57:13 »
As posted in the A/OPS thread.  Irving should get on the marketing and sell one to New Zeeland and then tell them they have a good deal on T-26's to replace their ANZAC's.  Lockheed Canada did sell them them the CMS330 and upgraded their ships. 

Offline Colin P

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2672 on: Yesterday at 20:05:35 »
JT Stated today that Seasspan gets 16 new CCG vessels to build and Davie is also going to get contracts.

https://vancouversun.com/news/local-news/vancouvers-seaspan-to-build-up-to-16-new-coast-guard-ships-trudeau-announces?fbclid=IwAR3Rw4d16rB0XnOoyPDBKPDIlp9x80taS4MbDXuX9bP3whQnHLy2mkulQY0


Meanwhile, this is the first news on the OOSV I have heard of in a while.
https://twitter.com/MoreThanShips/status/1116778596050378752