Canada's tanks

[PrairieFella]

Hence my comment:

Return to infantry and cavalry tanks at your peril lol.

A lot of the assumptions I'm reading about the future of tanks seem to make the fundamental mistake that all wars going forward will look like Ukraine, which is foolish imo. Not every war will devolve into the Somme where fighting is mostly static which allows the drones to have their pick of targets, nevermind the inevitable counter to drones which are coming, be them lasers or advanced jammers

 

[KevinB]

Part of what makes the costs of CAF projects so high is the life-cycle costs of things like parts. We tend to look at the price per unit the way we look at a private car purchase.

This is all just me putting out a wishlist. The two regiments of tanks would be re-equipping two existing regiments that currently have people, facilities and vehicles. So there would be divestment of equipment to go along with this acquisition (something we can be bad at). In some cases those vehicles are already tanks. One big kicker would be the warehousing/maintenance of the regiment-worth of operational stock. That would be a significant cost. I would put them in Europe, including those actively crewed in Latvia.

I don’t think you would want to divest any of the LAV’s as the Infantry and Armoured Reserves are pretty vehicle deficient.


I’d love to see Canada have enough active tanks for 4 Regiments, and 2 Reg’ts worth of spares.

A 2 Armoured unit Armoured Bde for Europe that has a Tracked IFV Mech Bn and suppprtijg elements as well.

2 Mech Inf Bde’s with 1 Armoured unit and 2 Mech Infantry BN’s

Mix and match PRes/Reg mix as desired

 

[FJAG]

The two regiments of tanks would be crewed by existing crewmen who are currently sharing tanks out West or on other platforms out East. This would be converting three recce sqns into tank sqns. The infrastructure piece is real (I mentioned that above) as is the parts procurement piece (which I also mentioned above). Gagetown can certainly take a sqn (+) with existing infrastructure, but it would need more to have a full Regiment plus the School requirements.

If memory.serves me right, the RCD served in Gagetown as a tank regiment from 1959 to 1970, first with Sherman’s and the Centurions, before moving to Germany.

I was under impression at the time that Gagetown’s primary purpose was to prepare for Germany at the time.

Since we’re playing a bit of napkin force here, my vote is to go to 14-tank squadrons and stretch those 200 tanks (maybe another dozen or so for the school) into four regiments. A 44-tank regiment suits our current PY allocation a bit better and the fourth regiment can be forward deployed.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

If memory.serves me right, the RCD served in Gagetown as a tank regiment from 1959 to 1970, first with Sherman’s and the Centurions, before moving to Germany.

I was under impression at the time that Gagetown’s primary purpose was to prepare for Germany at the time.

Since we’re playing a bit of napkin force here, my vote is to go to 14-tank squadrons and stretch those 200 tanks (maybe another dozen or so for the school) into four regiments. A 44-tank regiment suits our current PY allocation a bit better and the fourth regiment can be forward deployed.

Spares, ARV, AVBL?

 

[KevinB]

I'm curious as to what else would be in a 14 Tank Squadron?

The US Armor Company has 14 M1A2 Abrams, 2 JTLV, 1 AMPV (1st SGT) and one FMTV A2 (well some units, as it is still replacing the older M1078A1 FMTV) with a 400g fuel bowser trailer.

Past the Company/Squadron it really isn't possible to compare as the former CAB's (Infantry Heavy or Armor Heavy) are now being called Infantry Battalions (2 Bradley Infantry Companies and 1 Tank Company) and Tank Battalions (2 Tank Companies, and one Bradley Company).

The Armored Assault Company seems to have died off (2 Bradley Platoons with 2 AMPV based Infantry Platoons) as that was trialed as the "Infantry Company" for the Tank Battalions to give them more dismounts. However Bradley Platoon composition is still being played with, with options for more BFV's or AMPV's to increase the platoon dismounts. Also noted by at MCOE: since consolidating the infantry MOS skill identifiers of 11M (mechanized infantryman) and 11H (anti-armor specialist) to 11B (infantryman) in 2001 decreased lethality were seen at combat-training centers in Bradley crews:

 

[FJAG]

Spares, ARV, AVBL?

At this point, I’m only counting gun tanks. We definitely need the others as well.

My approach is to parcel tanks out to units to the maximum extent possible. I don’t like the concept of “operational stocks”. IMHO, it is a way of compensating for an army that is drastically under equipped and poorly maintained. Since we’re talking napkin forces here, I’m of the view that you deploy units with their own equipment or, in a worst case, have units rotate on each other’s equipment. Spares? Some. Not many in a peace-time scenario.

I want folks training on equipment. Including reservists. You can consider those your reserve folks and equipment. Tanks in a compound serve little purpose and reminds me of QMs who don’t issue gear because then there shelves would be empty.

 

[suffolkowner]

At this point, I’m only counting gun tanks. We definitely need the others as well.

My approach is to parcel tanks out to units to the maximum extent possible. I don’t like the concept of “operational stocks”. IMHO, it is a way of compensating for an army that is drastically under equipped and poorly maintained. Since we’re talking napkin forces here, I’m of the view that you deploy units with their own equipment or, in a worst case, have units rotate on each other’s equipment. Spares? Some. Not many in a peace-time scenario.

I want folks training on equipment. Including reservists. You can consider those your reserve folks and equipment. Tanks in a compound serve little purpose and reminds me of QMs who don’t issue gear because then there shelves would be empty.

Do we or have we bought spares of anything before?

 

[Colin Parkinson]

At this point, I’m only counting gun tanks. We definitely need the others as well.

My approach is to parcel tanks out to units to the maximum extent possible. I don’t like the concept of “operational stocks”. IMHO, it is a way of compensating for an army that is drastically under equipped and poorly maintained. Since we’re talking napkin forces here, I’m of the view that you deploy units with their own equipment or, in a worst case, have units rotate on each other’s equipment. Spares? Some. Not many in a peace-time scenario.

I want folks training on equipment. Including reservists. You can consider those your reserve folks and equipment. Tanks in a compound serve little purpose and reminds me of QMs who don’t issue gear because then there shelves would be empty.

Listening to Mr Hewes interview an old Chieftain tanker, who remarked that when the tanks were being used a lot, serviceability rates improved, but when they sat for long periods, a lot of problems appeared. So it seems to make sense to have a pool of tanks that gets used frequently and you can rotate courses through. There is a lovely under used training area in Suffield now. If we stick with Leopards, we can try to entice other users to send groups over to conduct training as well.

 

[KevinB]

Listening to Mr Hewes interview an old Chieftain tanker, who remarked that when the tanks were being used a lot, serviceability rates improved, but when they sat for long periods, a lot of problems appeared. So it seems to make sense to have a pool of tanks that gets used frequently and you can rotate courses through. There is a lovely under used training area in Suffield now. If we stick with Leopards, we can try to entice other users to send groups over to conduct training as well.

The issue isn’t use or lack of usage, it’s maintenance.

Tanks etc only have so much lifespan. So even well maintained usage does take a toll.

The US Army learned a dramatic lesson when it shipped a lot of materials to the Israelis during the Yom Kippur War. Most of that stuff was in stock from Korea and when the Israelis got it, the seals where dried out, springs rusted, transmissions in bad shape etc.

Which resulted in the POMCUS depots and the continual maintenance cycle.


Op Stock at first line is generally there to ensue that units are good to go. Various numbers are floated around, and generally it should depend on the item in question - how mission essential is it, how long do typical repairs take, availability of techs and materials etc.

For units with an absolute no fail mission criteria immediate OP Stock in unit holdings is a must.

The idea of robbing Peter so Paul can train too is asinine. Either fire Peter or Paul in that case, or suck it up and buy them both equipment.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

At this point, I’m only counting gun tanks. We definitely need the others as well.

My approach is to parcel tanks out to units to the maximum extent possible. I don’t like the concept of “operational stocks”. IMHO, it is a way of compensating for an army that is drastically under equipped and poorly maintained. Since we’re talking napkin forces here, I’m of the view that you deploy units with their own equipment or, in a worst case, have units rotate on each other’s equipment. Spares? Some. Not many in a peace-time scenario.

I want folks training on equipment. Including reservists. You can consider those your reserve folks and equipment. Tanks in a compound serve little purpose and reminds me of QMs who don’t issue gear because then there shelves would be empty.

CBO in Meaford was brutal to deal with.

 

[ueo]

CBO in Meaford was brutal to deal with.

???? What?

 

[FJAG]

GATES in Shilo was brutal on all armour. The sandy battle runs created havoc after 8 months of constant use and they were sent back to Germany every two years or so for rebuilds. I expect, but don’t know, that BATES had much the same effect.

OTOH, our M109s and M113 fleets held up very well with a more balanced training load. Our Z Bty vehicles held in stock in Germany were also in good shape.

The type of training and the conditions and maintenance provided make a difference.

That’s why I’m also of the view that ops stocks should be held at units with the responsibility and resources to maintain it rather than in some ops stock depot.

 

[FJAG]

Do we or have we bought spares of anything before?

The last that I know of was the 1950s purchases of 3/4 ton and 2 1/2 ton trucks. Everything after that was barely enough - and then we got into UORs

 

[OldSolduer]

Listening to Mr Hewes interview an old Chieftain tanker, who remarked that when the tanks were being used a lot, serviceability rates improved, but when they sat for long periods, a lot of problems appeared. So it seems to make sense to have a pool of tanks that gets used frequently and you can rotate courses through. There is a lovely under used training area in Suffield now. If we stick with Leopards, we can try to entice other users to send groups over to conduct training as well.

We found the same in 2 VP when we started moving the 113s to Shilo via road move vice rail or trailers. The only ones we trailered were M 577s, Pnr Dozers and TUAs. Even after a bit IIRC the TUAs road moved vice trailer.

 

[KevinB]

GATES in Shilo was brutal on all armour. The sandy battle runs created havoc after 8 months of constant use and they were sent back to Germany every two years or so for rebuilds. I expect, but don’t know, that BATES had much the same effect.

Which is why training fleets are a disaster. They get used, abused, and not a priority for repair/maintenance work.

OTOH, our M109s and M113 fleets held up very well with a more balanced training load. Our Z Bty vehicles held in stock in Germany were also in good shape.

The type of training and the conditions and maintenance provided make a difference.

Agreed

That’s why I’m also of the view that ops stocks should be held at units with the responsibility and resources to maintain it rather than in some ops stock depot.

I am a firm believer that you need both.

 

[dapaterson]

That’s why I’m also of the view that ops stocks should be held at units with the responsibility and resources to maintain it rather than in some ops stock depot.

Depots need to be priority for manning. Over field units. A serious military is serious about equipment and materiel readiness.

Fleet management means vehicles go from operational units to refurb at depot to op stock to operational units.

Operational units have different mandates and are not resourced for Depot level repair and refurb.

 

[Kirkhill]

If memory.serves me right, the RCD served in Gagetown as a tank regiment from 1959 to 1970, first with Sherman’s and the Centurions, before moving to Germany.

I was under impression at the time that Gagetown’s primary purpose was to prepare for Germany at the time.

Since we’re playing a bit of napkin force here, my vote is to go to 14-tank squadrons and stretch those 200 tanks (maybe another dozen or so for the school) into four regiments. A 44-tank regiment suits our current PY allocation a bit better and the fourth regiment can be forward deployed.

I will reiterate my preference for 14 gun tanks, plus 4 AMOS/NEMO, with the addition of a Skyranger Troop.

Design the Squadron as the heavy Weapons Squadron in a tracked Combined Arms Regiment.

6x14= 84 MBT
24 AMOS/NEMO
24 Skyranger

12×14 = 168 IFV

2x Heavy Brigades (Tracked)

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Putting tanks in Op Stock would not mean parking them against the fence at the back of the compound. Some will actually be in use - the tanks overseas on operations. Those Op Stock tanks in storage would have dedicated maintenance and proper facilities. They could be in Montreal ready to be shipped, or they could be forward-deployed to Europe. With the current situation my preference would be the latter. So you would have a sqn of Op Stock tanks in use with the eFP and two more sqns somewhere in Europe with a caretaker staff. Much easier to surge crews onto forward-deployed tanks. Place them near a major training centre (JMRC in Germany) and incoming rotos could also train on them.

This leaves the two Regiments of tanks in Canada plus School to be used for training.

This is all dreaming, of course!

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I will reiterate my preference for 14 gun tanks, plus 4 AMOS/NEMO, with the addition of a Skyranger Troop.

Design the Squadron as the heavy Weapons Squadron in a tracked Combined Arms Regiment.

6x14= 84 MBT
24 AMOS/NEMO
24 Skyranger

12×14 = 168 IFV

2x Heavy Brigades (Tracked)

This is not a great idea. We can debate about 14 vs 19 tank sqns. There are pros and cons with either and I have served in both. What experience are you basing your reiterated preference on?

A tank squadron is not a heavy weapons squadron. It is a manouevre sub-unit. Putting self-propelled mortars and AD in there does not make sense. The OC is fighting the direct-fire manouevre fight just like an infantry company OC. Mortars and AD belong elsewhere. The US was putting mortar sections in Cavalry Troops (company-sized elements) due to how they were employed, but that did not extend to tank companies. Those mortar sections were there to give the Cav Tp Commander his own fire support to get out of trouble (smoke or HE), not to provide fire support to other elements.

Could an Armoured Regiment have a mortar platoon? Sure. That is different.

 

[McG]

Does it change anything that Canada plans to migrate from a tank / recce dichotomy to everything being cavalry?