“ADF so bloated with star-ranked officers that its combat effectiveness is at risk” - Research paper

[SeaKingTacco]

I find a lot that within the CAF, especially in the Army, we are kind of bad for blurring the line at WO and up with their respective Command Team Partner.

The Tp Wo is only a 2IC when required. They're mostly in an advisory and support role, looking after the administrative and personnel side of the mission. Too often I have seen my peers use the "We" (as in, the NCO/WO and the Comd/OC/CO) when briefing their plan, vice owning a decision solely.

"The RSM and I, the Chief and I" may play well into "inclusion" of the NCOs in the decision making... but it confuses the hell out of the JRs, and in some cases, the Snr NCOs and WOs. The RSM, while holding considerable sway, hold no command authority. Neither does the SSM or Tp WO.

When we throw them under the bus with a decision made by those with Comd Authority... it creates the kind of "Animal Farm" mentality amongst the JRs that the WOs and the Officers are one and the same. That means they don't feel comfortable bringing up an issue to those senior advisors because "well you're part of the problem..." Hence the "Fleet MS" or Comd JR Advisor bullshit above.

If my WO is not getting the God honest truth from our troop, then they're not doing their job and I'm not doing mine. If I have to seek it from Cpl Bloggins, then the whole core of that Chain of Command tree is rotten and needs replanted.

That is a pretty good post.

 

[Halifax Tar]

I find a lot that within the CAF, especially in the Army, we are kind of bad for blurring the line at WO and up with their respective Command Team Partner.

The Tp Wo is only a 2IC when required. They're mostly in an advisory and support role, looking after the administrative and personnel side of the mission. Too often I have seen my peers use the "We" (as in, the NCO/WO and the Comd/OC/CO) when briefing their plan, vice owning a decision solely.

"The RSM and I, the Chief and I" may play well into "inclusion" of the NCOs in the decision making... but it confuses the hell out of the JRs, and in some cases, the Snr NCOs and WOs. The RSM, while holding considerable sway, holds no command authority. Neither does the SSM or Tp WO.

When we throw them under the bus with a decision made by those with Comd Authority... it creates the kind of "Animal Farm" mentality amongst the JRs that the WOs and the Officers are one and the same. That means they don't feel comfortable bringing up an issue to those senior advisors because "well you're part of the problem..." Hence the "Fleet MS" or Comd JR Advisor bullshit above.

If my WO is not getting the God honest truth from our troop, then they're not doing their job and I'm not doing mine. If I have to seek it from Cpl Bloggins, then the whole core of that Chain of Command tree is rotten and needs replanted.

So well said.

I wonder when we realize we've messed this up ?

 

[rmc_wannabe]

So well said.

I wonder when we realize we've messed this up ?

In true CAF fashion, a day late and a dollar short.

 

[Halifax Tar]

In true CAF fashion, a day late and a dollar short.

You're probably right.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I find a lot that within the CAF, especially in the Army, we are kind of bad for blurring the line at WO and up with their respective Command Team Partner.

The Tp Wo is only a 2IC when required. They're mostly in an advisory and support role, looking after the administrative and personnel side of the mission. Too often I have seen my peers use the "We" (as in, the NCO/WO and the Comd/OC/CO) when briefing their plan, vice owning a decision solely.

"The RSM and I, the Chief and I" may play well into "inclusion" of the NCOs in the decision making... but it confuses the hell out of the JRs, and in some cases, the Snr NCOs and WOs. The RSM, while holding considerable sway, holds no command authority. Neither does the SSM or Tp WO.

When we throw them under the bus with a decision made by those with Comd Authority... it creates the kind of "Animal Farm" mentality amongst the JRs that the WOs and the Officers are one and the same. That means they don't feel comfortable bringing up an issue to those senior advisors because "well you're part of the problem..." Hence the "Fleet MS" or Comd JR Advisor bullshit above.

If my WO is not getting the God honest truth from our troop, then they're not doing their job and I'm not doing mine. If I have to seek it from Cpl Bloggins, then the whole core of that Chain of Command tree is rotten and needs replanted.

Absolutely... I feel the need to scootch over and make a little more room on one of my favourite soap boxes...

 

[Navy_Pete]

I'm picking up what you're putting down.

Full disclosure I'm currently a CHOD on a ship. I make it a point to get up and walk around and talk to my people, once in the forenoon and again in the afternoon, at least. I try and find out how they are, what they are or are planning to do in ports, small talk, ect. As leaders we have to make the first move and show we are approachable and just people. Show them they can bring us their issues.

Also when disciplining I try to approach it like a good father. Be firm but compassionate. And listen to their situation from their point.

I find the biggest issue for my peers is priority and time management and too much tedious admin, that should be the job of an A/Hod.

On the ships this is one thing I liked about the MSED and the MCR: especially at specials there were prolonged periods of just sitting around 'in case' so you get a good chance to talk to people, and similarly always a good spot if you pop by on watch to have casual, normal conversations. I'm not sure if other departments have an equivalent, but it was a bit of an egalitarian atmosphere (outside of things like drills or emergencies).

Was in there a lot for broken stuff, but also made a point of stopping by regularly as well just to say hi and try and do the 'leadership by walking around'. I also did the daily departmental rounds piecemeal, so part of it was also stopping by to report some defects that needed sorted, return lonely tools that were left behind etc.

The amount of admin was staggering though; at one point we briefly had two AHODs and two phase 6s and I think that was the only time we had capacity for all the divisional work, let alone all the other reporting. One takeaway from that is I've been trying to actively reduce as much as I can now from the LCMM side, and explicitly go for reduced ship reporting/contractor augmentation for new stuff.

 

[Navy_Pete]

Do you find, objectively, that the RCN chiefs are well connected to the needs and concerns of the ranks? It is my observation that as time goes on this is less the case in other services

I'm in a cubicle in Ottawa, so don't have any current experience at the units, but probably a YMMV thing with individuals.

I do find a lot of people are making decisions based on what they remember from sailing 15 years ago though, so wish everyone Cdr and above would go do a walk around a ship just out of a DWP, where it has been normal for a while not to have basics like heat, hot water, ventilation etc, let alone enough people to support system reactivations or make actual repairs.

I frequently get accused of being negative, but when you have 25-30 of the 50-60 people you are supposed to have, and then have a lot of remote functions not working, those two things compound on each other. And when you have huge experience gaps as well it makes it worse. We don't like at how things roll up into the big picture, mostly because the few times we did things went red and ships didn't sail. So I'm hugely skeptical when people talk about 'intelligent risk management' when they don't want you to poke at things (sometimes literally; if you aren't confident about steel hull plating being able to take a hammer tap maybe it's a bad sign for critical structure).

 

[stoker dave]

wish everyone Cdr and above would go do a walk around a ship just out of a DWP,

A walk around the goes beyond the limits of bridge, wardroom, ops room and CO's cabin

Too many NWOs are afraid of machinery spaces.

 

[daftandbarmy]

A walk around the goes beyond the limits of bridge, wardroom, ops room and CO's cabin

Too many NWOs are afraid of machinery spaces.

I wonder if it's included in their training like, you know, 'here's how often you should go for a look around and what you should look for, how to ask people the right questions' etc etc ....

 

[Halifax Tar]

A walk around the goes beyond the limits of bridge, wardroom, ops room and CO's cabin

Too many NWOs are afraid of machinery spaces.

Try being Logistics.

 

[Navy_Pete]

A walk around the goes beyond the limits of bridge, wardroom, ops room and CO's cabin

Too many NWOs are afraid of machinery spaces.

My last CO would do weekly walkarounds with me around the whole ship during the deployment to pick up things like leaks and other minor things that needed fixed, but then also support adding in maintenance windows into the flex and getting other departmental help, including a major push during the RAMP to do a lot of lagging replacement from a contractor that needed a lot of escorts. This was after we had gone through a few hell years getting a lot of the big things fixed.

It was good to get the whole ship sorted, but also would take him down when we were doing major work (including PM after coming alongside) so he could see what it meant by changing out the PDE oil and some other big, regular jobs that came up.

It didn't stop things like having to fuel on a Sunday during a port visit, but a lot of things that would have been MSED things became whole ship things, and was even able to get some upper deck painting done with proper preparations (as best we could) as well as following silly things like DFT, so overall was able to turn the ship over in much better shape then we found it, without killing our department.

 

[OldSolduer]

I find a lot that within the CAF, especially in the Army, we are kind of bad for blurring the line at WO and up with their respective Command Team Partner.

The Tp Wo is only a 2IC when required. They're mostly in an advisory and support role, looking after the administrative and personnel side of the mission. Too often I have seen my peers use the "We" (as in, the NCO/WO and the Comd/OC/CO) when briefing their plan, vice owning a decision solely.

"The RSM and I, the Chief and I" may play well into "inclusion" of the NCOs in the decision making... but it confuses the hell out of the JRs, and in some cases, the Snr NCOs and WOs. The RSM, while holding considerable sway, holds no command authority. Neither does the SSM or Tp WO.

When we throw them under the bus with a decision made by those with Comd Authority... it creates the kind of "Animal Farm" mentality amongst the JRs that the WOs and the Officers are one and the same. That means they don't feel comfortable bringing up an issue to those senior advisors because "well you're part of the problem..." Hence the "Fleet MS" or Comd JR Advisor bullshit above.

If my WO is not getting the God honest truth from our troop, then they're not doing their job and I'm not doing mine. If I have to seek it from Cpl Bloggins, then the whole core of that Chain of Command tree is rotten and needs replanted.

There is only ONE person responsible - and that is the Commanding Officer, OC or Pl Comd.

 

[rmc_wannabe]

There is only ONE person responsible - and that is the Commanding Officer, OC or Pl Comd.

Agreed.

Too often the "Command Team" approach has conflated the concepts of Leadership, Command, and Responsibility between Officers and NCOs/Warrant Officers.

As a Tp WO, I had to remind my Tp Comd that it was his plan, not ours. I would obviously advise and support it as needed.

As a Tp Comd, I am lucky that I have a Tp WO that is of the same mind. I have some less experienced peers, however, that abdicate their position as a commander and default to the decisions of their Tp WO (for good and for bad).