220 Reservists Needed for TF 03-06

[George Wallace]

Oh....I whole heartedly agree with you.  Skill fade is a constant concern.  I have a hard time everytime I get back to using TCCS.  Too much eating out of Aluminium Mess Tins doesn't help either.

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

lol

 

[cbt arms sub tech]

So, this forum makes you think, whats the future of reservists in Canada's Army, who really knows about all this 3 War Block theory, if reservists can't get course's for LAV's, Coyote's, G-Wagon....If you have a full time job, an cannot work summers in Wainwright or Gagetown, do reservists have a role in overseas operations?

Operational experience makes some of our leaders trully leaders I believe in the field, from learning from there experiences, that being said, Ex-Reg's are a true asset to the reserve culture!  Just a thought as I would be really interested in hearing from the regular force members on this force, not trying to cause a mess of nasty comments, but reality of the reserve world?

Thoughts!

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

Without out the assists of having LAV's and Coyote's in your stable on a regular basis to train on and with there is little sense having reservists take these slots.  These are big complicated machines.  Very complex.  There is no doubt that a reservist could take the course and do well but without the equipment to train with later on the skills would fade to 0 and that course would have been a waste.  The LUVW not so much as you pretty much just drive it but considering they didn't replace Iltis with LUVW 1 for 1 there is little chances a reservist would benefit from having this course without a vehicle to use back at his unit.  That said if he were employed as a driver overseas with a LUVW as say a CIMIC driver then he probably would get the course.  Its not long and not complicated like the LAV family.

 

[cbt arms sub tech]

Great feedback CFL, any feedback for a reservist, that would like operational experience, although works full time, so I don't have the opportunity to take courses in Gagetown or Wainwright....I'm interested in getting G-Wagon or an HLVW course...As I'm a supply tech for a combat arms unit in LFWA!

 

[George Wallace]

CFL

There is one way it could be done, but that involves the Government doing something we all know they won't do, and that is to spend some money.  The Reserves could get the courses, and then have continuation training at their Armouries, not on the LAV or Coyote, but on Simulators.  Before every Gun Camp, all crews are run through the Sims to reconfirm their skills at the Reg Force Units.  The problem lies in the lack of Simulators and Operators, even in the Reg World.  It is not likely that we will see the Gov't spring for the cash to outfit the Reserves, if it can't even keep the equip it has up and running.

 

[George Wallace]

Great feedback CFL, any feedback for a reservist, that would like operational experience, although works full time, so I don't have the opportunity to take courses in Gagetown or Wainwright....I'm interested in getting G-Wagon or an HLVW course...As I'm a supply tech for a combat arms unit in LFWA!

There was a Reserve MSE Op Crse run in Edmonton this Summer on all of those Crses.

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

"The problem lies in the lack of Simulators and Operators, even in the Reg World."

"It is not likely that we will see the Gov't spring for the cash to outfit the Reserves," not to mention the cash strapped Regs.

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

To stir the pot a little:

I have pointed out in previous threads on operations that there is little requirement for the Reserve Force to "augment" the Regular Force on operations.  Contrary to popular belief, we have enough Regular Force riflemen, black hats and gunners for operational rotations.  There are very specific areas where Reserve augmentation is required - largely because of imposed force structure limitations (CIMIC, for instance).

I honestly believe that there is no value added in forming, preparing, training and deploying P Res sub-units (or sub-sub units) for operations - particularly infantry.  The enormous problems in bringing a Reserve company (for instance) to the level to which it can be considered deployable far outweigh any perceived advantages - even without addressing the disparity in individual qualifications.  I know for Palladium 11 and 12, Reserve companies were mandated for purely political reasons, rather than any real operational consideration.

There is great danger in "advertisements" such as we've seen posted here.  They create false expectations, give a false idea as to what is really required for augmentation (I'm willing to wager that more than three senior officers are required, for instance) and reflect a "political" mandate to include Reservists rather than a true operational requirement.

My 2 cents, as always...

Cheers,

TR

 

[Haggis]

To stir the pot a little:

That's a pretty big spoon you're using, there Teddy!  ;D

Oddly enough, I agree with you in general terms.  There are enough Reg F bayonets to fill the deployments, but at what cost to the long term "health" of the Army?  We need time for the Reg F to regenerate, train and improve in terms of everything from continuation training to Professional Development and to ensure the "Quality of Life" for members and their familes isn't damaged in the long term.

I have pointed out in previous threads on operations that there is little requirement for the Reserve Force to "augment" the Regular Force on operations.

The idea to deploy Reservists on Palladium Rotos 11 to 14 was quite probably politically influenced but I'd think the motives were more towards relieving the pers tempo burden (as described above) on the Reg F than to create a "deployable Army Reserve".  For that we need money, legislation and a heck of a lot more political will than we have today.

I honestly believe that there is no value added in forming, preparing, training and deploying P Res sub-units (or sub-sub units) for operations - particularly infantry.  The enormous problems in bringing a Reserve company (for instance) to the level to which it can be considered deployable far outweigh any perceived advantages - even without addressing the disparity in individual qualifications.

Despite the motives and the hurdles, several hundred members of the Army Reserve from Pte to LCol  now have recent operational experience and have brought that back to the Armoury floor.  How can that not help the Army Reserve to improve?  Is not that a fair Return on Investment?

There is great danger in "advertisements" such as we've seen posted here.   They create false expectations...and reflect a "political" mandate to include Reservists rather than a true operational requirement.

Quite right.  To entitle it "Task Force 03-06 AFGHANISTAN WANTS YOU"  Would be more appropriate.

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

When they only send 2 companies over at a time that leaves plenty of time for regeneration.

 

[Haggis]

When they only send 2 companies over at a time that leaves plenty of time for regeneration.

True....now.

We all know that each Reg F battalion has four Rifle Companies.   Only three are manned and they aren't close to 100%.   That's 27 Rifle Companies.

Look back 18 months or so.   Three for ATHENA 0, one for PALLADIUM 13 and one for HALO 0. Two had just returned from PALLADIUM 12, Three more were preparing for ATHENA 1.   Almost 50% of the Reg F infantry companies were either on, training for or coming off the existing ops.   Regiments "borrowed" from between battalions to flesh out those companies to 100%, leaving precious litte behind in terms of manpower and equipment.   We couldn't sustain that so the CDS implemented the "operational pause".

Now look ahead 9 months.... Two for ARCHER, one for ATHENA, one coming back from ATHENA, two coming back from ARCHER.   Two more preparing for ARCHER, one for ATHENA.   We're already up to nine committed companies again!   Should something else come up (as it usually does around election time) the numbers are getting pretty low.

Now, as I said, the goal of this (IMO) is not to produce a deployable Army Reserve.  But if we can toss 220 Reservists  into the mix on each roto, it gives a break to the Reg F soldiers and allows sufficient numbers of Reg F to train for and be available for the next "no notice" BG sized Roto 0 (i.e. Haiti, Sudan, Somewherestan, Toronto...).

 

[Jarnhamar]

I think for the amount of work,  effort and administrative trouble involved in raising a reserve company to operate overseas it's more efficient for the reserves to just augment the regular force as individuals.

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

"We all know that each Reg F battalion has four Rifle Companies."

Since when.

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

"borrowing" is the same name as "plug in play" which is the new catch word for the military.

 

[Gunner]

I am going to disagree with my good colleague Teddy and support Haggis' position. 

Throw yourself back a few years and the army was caught in a continuing deployment cycle of sending soldiers into Bosnia.  These were not small contingents and, indeed, after Balkans rationalization, our contribution was almost 1400 soldiers on Roto 6.  The army was weary, soldiers were weary of going to Bosnia and many did not want to go back to Bosnia.  In effect the army was suffering from Bosnia fatigue.  This is what the soldiers told the generals, and the generals had to come up with a plan.  This became much more important as more people were leaving the army (and more were broken) than were being recruited and filling out the units (more on this in a second).

LFWA spearheaded the the development of a Composite Reserve Infantry Company.  This was simply a reintroduction of deployment of Reserve sub-units that had successfully deployed to Cyprus in the early 90s with 1 and 2 RCHA.  Everyone recognized the risk in Bosnia was steadily decreasing and unconventional approaches could be applied to fulfill the government mandate.  There was much staff work involved in making the Reserves a LAV III equipped company because that was what was in theatre at the time.  Saner heads prevailed and the Op PALLADIUM TO&E was changed to reflect 2 x LAVIII Coys and 1 x LPV Coy.  The army was moving forward with a Reserve Coy to address the limited number of coys that were available.  As well, DND/CF were pushing government to reduce and get out of Bosnia as it was killing the army.

LFWA in 2001 was recovering from 3 back to back major troop rotations to Kosovo (Kinetic Roto 0 and Palladium Roto 6, Roto 6 (+) and Roto 7) as well as the bow wave of change initiatives were being felt.  Introduction of LAVIII/TCCCS and all of the required training requirements to move infantry units from a 70s Germany mindset to one of "being able to fight a 21st century" vehicle and communication system.  The units were feeling the effects of all of this, and we were down to 6 line companys in the 3 Infantry units.  The IRF(L) under 3 PPCLI required 3 coys but there were only 2 resident in the Bn.  There wasn't too much worry about this, as the IRF(L) had never deployed!

So Comd LFWA has 6 infantry coys, all are exhausted from recent deployments, 3 infantry coys only existed on paper.  The Comd knows that Roto 11 and 12 are just around the corner and he can just barely fill the TO&E with the resources he has but will require significant augmentation from the Reserves (as occurred on Roto 6 and 7).  Anyway, the CRIC comes into the picture as a means of addressing all of these shortfalls.  The idea, as articulated in other threads, is each CBG in LFWA will provide 1 x Pl ready for Coy training by 1 PPCLI.  The OC was bought on board early to integrate into 1 PPCLI.  The senior leadership of the CRIC was personally selected by Comd LFWA based on recommendations by CBG Comds and DComd.  Large individual training bills are formed (OC Cbt Tm Comd Qual, Pl Comds Ph IV Qual, Sr NCOS would have SAIC, etc),  This training was put in place in 2000 with a view to facilitating indiv and coll trg in the Fall and winter months and this coy was to show up on 1 May 02 ready to undergo coll trg as a coy.  This, of course, didn't quite happen but that is another story.

Sep 11 occurs and the IRF(L), which never deploys anywhere, is suddenly faced with a deployment on an actual "warfightng mission" and they subsequently deploy in Jan 02 with 2 of the 6 infantry coys in LFWA, and it is soon followed by a third coy from 2 PPCLI.  Now we have lost 3 coys of our original 6.  1PPCLI is left alone so it can provide the 2 LAVIII Coys for Roto 11 and 1 RCHA has to provide a Bty.  The CRIC shows up and 1 PPCLI trains what they are given.  Large Res augmentation ensues for Roto 11 (one of the largest since 2 PPCLI in 1992).  The TO&E is cut in late June 02 and a LAV III Coy and Arty Bty are taken off.  LPV coy continues to deploy and be employed successfully in Bihac.

Roto 12, even bigger problems for LFWA.  3 Coys off to Op APOLLO and will not be back until Aug 02, 1 coy deploying in Oct 02 on Roto 11 with the CRIC.  Comd asks CBC Comds at Area Council if they can provide a Cbt Arms Coy but they say they can't.  LFWA looks to send LPV coy to LFCA or LFAA.  Army Comd directs LFWA to mount the Coy and directs LFCA/LFAA to provide a cbt Arms Coy.  LFWA needs this Coy as we can't send the Op APOLLO folks back to Bosnia....  and there really isn't anything else in the cupboards (possibly rerolling arty to infantry but Comd not enthusiastic about this).  A very composite coy shows up for 2 PPCLI, much less trg than Roto 11 and while most of the leadership is inf (except the OC - ex Strathcona) and most of the soldiers are various cbt arms.  Once again, very large percentage of contingent is Reserve (IIRC even more than Roto 11) and it may be the largest deployment of Reservist since 1992 and well above the normal 20 per cent cap.

Roto 11 and Roto 12 are both successful and many lessons are learned on forming CRIC or CRCs.  Was it a smooth process?  Not at all.  But was the aim achieved in that it provided LFWA and the Army operational flexibility?  You better believe it did.  LFWA would have "imploded" if it hadn't been for those 2 Reserve Coys and unfortunately the key shortfalls in deployments, the CSS, were not as successful in dealing with shortages.

Anyway, this has been very long and it is not my intent to preach.  Can the Reserves deploy Coys?  Sure they can given the right amount of time and resources and Reg F assistance (training wise and key personal in certain areas).  It has been proven in Cyprus and in Bosnia.  Do you want to deploy a coy to Afghanistan?  Maybe, maybe not.  With it still being an exciting theatre and the large allowances and tax free status for deploying now, it is a severe morale issue if the Reg F doesn't deploy.  Having said that, the Army has to be very careful not to "rob Peter to pay Paul" by riping coys out of one organization in an effort to prop up another Bn so they can deploy overseas.  Now, I am well aware this is the basis of the TF concept and plug and play (having lived it on Roto 2).  1 PPCLI and 1 Svc Bn will deploy shorty and  there will be a large number of members who just arrived back from Roto 2 in Feb 05.  Are we going back into the back to back rotations and will we develop "Afghanistan Fatigue" in the future?  We will once eveyrone gets overseas again or until a newer and more exciting mission comes along.     

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

This, of course, didn't quite happen but that is another story.

Good post...  However, by leaving a tantalizing hint, as you did (above), you've left out a huge amount of the administrative and operational angst that led to the deployment of the CRIC for Roto 11, angst that (IMHO) was so severe as to preclude the deployment of formed sub-units for overseas operations.  As you stated, LFWA did not sustain even the deployment of two back to back companies - Roto 12 had to be sourced nationally, with all the attendent headaches for all concerned - as you know better than I.

I believe, and I was heavily involved in the early stages, that the initial CRIC idea was almost entirely politically motivated.  Gunner alludes to some of the major reasons why it was so attractive, but the fact of the matter is that 1 PPCLI was warned for PALLADIUM long before the Reserve Company idea was floated.  Yes, the Regular Force was suffering from Bosnia fatigue, yes they didn't want to go, but ultimately (I believe) that's not why the Reserves were tasked with the company.  C Coy 1 PPCLI was stood down for the deployment, as was Combat Support Coy.  Reroling units was not considered.  Use of another sub-unit from outside the Area was not considered.  Again, the CRIC was floated long before APOLLO (and the attendant chaos) came along.

Instead, the subunit deployments were designed to give Reserve Sr NCOs and officers a "chance" to "do their jobs" with a minimum of Regular Force "interference".  There was enormous political pressure - from the PRes community - to prove that the PRes could deploy in more than individual roles.  Did these people get valuable experience?  Sure, you do every time you deploy.  Was the concept effective in reducing the burden on the Regular battalions?  I would argue no, not in the end.  After all, the "operational pause" was initiated after the CRIC deployments.

I would argue that PALLADIUM "proved" nothing.  Anything can be accomplished with effort, time and money and the CIRCs were hugely expensive in all three.  They took over a year to force generate and required an inordinate amount of individual catch-up training and predeployment preparation.  The companies deployed into a benign theatre in which even the Reserve company leadership had substantial experience, yet the mounting "bill" was extensive and the administrative angst was out of all proportion to the operational effect.  I hope that the same concept is never considered for Afghanistan, unless the Army or Afghanistan significantly changes.

FWIW, Gunner and I worked these operations together and have developed different perspectives over the years.  What he says is entirely correct as far as it goes.  He believes it was all worth it...I'm a touch more cynical  ;D

Pot stirred!

 

[Britney Spears]

Instead, the subunit deployments were designed to give Reserve Sr NCOs and officers a "chance" to "do their jobs" with a minimum of Regular Force "interference".  There was enormous political pressure - from the PRes community - to prove that the PRes could deploy in more than individual roles.

Mmmm, it seems this was the overriding impetus behind the CRIC deployments, even more so that the "formed reserve subunit" stuff. Do you think that reserve leaders can be adequately developed if they were individual augmentees? Is there any precedent for this? I'm aware of individual augmentees at the pte/cpl level, which by all accounts worked reasonably well in the past.

 

[Gunner]

Good post...  However, by leaving a tantalizing hint, as you did (above), you've left out a huge amount of the administrative and operational angst that led to the deployment of the CRIC for Roto 11, angst that (IMHO) was so severe as to preclude the deployment of formed sub-units for overseas operations.  As you stated, LFWA did not sustain even the deployment of two back to back companies - Roto 12 had to be sourced nationally, with all the attendent headaches for all concerned - as you know better than I.

I lived for a year with the angst of raising Reserve Coys (you know very well what it is like trying to move a rock by yourself), it was not an easy process to say the least. Having said that, I believe we can do it better and if the right approach is taken, it can work.  We don't direct, plan and coordinate future events as well as we should have and we don't hold people responsible for implementing the Comds direction (Col Blimp....).   LFWA CBGs stated they couldn't mount the second company and I think we made the right decision at the time.  As the names began to come in for Roto 12, we could have mounted more of the CRC than we did.  Hindsight is 20/20 as always.  Don't forget, it wasn't just the Regs that had Bosnia fatigue, it was also the Reserves.  

I believe, and I was heavily involved in the early stages, that the initial CRIC idea was almost entirely politically motivated.  Gunner alludes to some of the major reasons why it was so attractive, but the fact of the matter is that 1 PPCLI was warned for PALLADIUM long before the Reserve Company idea was floated.  Yes, the Regular Force was suffering from Bosnia fatigue, yes they didn't want to go, but ultimately (I believe) that's not why the Reserves were tasked with the company.  C Coy 1 PPCLI was stood down for the deployment, as was Combat Support Coy.  Reroling units was not considered.  Use of another sub-unit from outside the Area was not considered.  Again, the CRIC was floated long before APOLLO (and the attendant chaos) came along.

It was very much Comd LFWA driven and he was correct given his view of Op PALLADIUM.  Don't forget the TO&E for Op PALLADIUM included 3 Coys, plus a Bty, Engr Sqn, Recce Sqn, etc.  Had the TO&E not changed and Op APOLLO did not happen, we still would have been hard pressed to mount the two rotations.  You will recall the level of augmentation required for Roto 6 and 7.  Had the CRIC not been formed, LFWA would not been able to do Apollo, Roto 11 and Roto 12 without significant risk (Op APOLLO guys coming back in Aug 02 and leaving again for Bosnia in Feb 03 - I believe some still did on the CSS side).  Bosnia was rather benign (certainly by Roto 11...) coupled with Bosnia fatigue, manning shortages in the Reg F, etc i think using a CRIC was the right idea.  Our approach for Roto 11 was wrong (in my opinion) as we tried to leave too much trg to the Reserve CBGs without enough redundancy.  We took a different approach to Roto 12 and, in essence, accepted the fact that they would not show up with any coll trg completed.

Instead, the subunit deployments were designed to give Reserve Sr NCOs and officers a "chance" to "do their jobs" with a minimum of Regular Force "interference".  There was enormous political pressure - from the PRes community - to prove that the PRes could deploy in more than individual roles.  Did these people get valuable experience?  Sure, you do every time you deploy.  Was the concept effective in reducing the burden on the Regular battalions?  I would argue no, not in the end.  After all, the "operational pause" was initiated after the CRIC deployments.

 

There was a burden on the Regular bns but, certainly for 2 PPCLI, the coy that was on op waivers trained the CRC, and I would leave it up to Devil 39 to state how much of a burden it was.  The Reserves can deploy, in the correct theatre and role, at the sub-unit level, if required.  It has been proven numerous times, is it worth the time and money?  Yes and no.   It fufills a function and role.  Certainly it does not necessarily have to be a recurring event.  Having said that, the longer we are in a theatre of operations, the more we should look to the reserves to fill roles in those missions (goes back to fatigue and keeping regulars focused on short notice deployments).

I would argue that PALLADIUM "proved" nothing.  Anything can be accomplished with effort, time and money and the CIRCs were hugely expensive in all three.  They took over a year to force generate and required an inordinate amount of individual catch-up training and predeployment preparation.   The companies deployed into a benign theatre in which even the Reserve company leadership had substantial experience, yet the mounting "bill" was extensive and the administrative angst was out of all proportion to the operational effect.  I hope that the same concept is never considered for Afghanistan, unless the Army or Afghanistan significantly changes.

The difference between a Regular and a Reservists is effort, time and money.  If you want to bring up the "standard" required, you have to put the money into it...that is supposedly the rationale behind the Reserves.  I'm sure you will agree that it can take a inordinate amount of individual training and predeployment preparation to deploy a Regular Force guy.  Something the establishment of CEFCOM will hopefully sort out.

FWIW, Gunner and I worked these operations together and have developed different perspectives over the years.  What he says is entirely correct as far as it goes.  He believes it was all worth it...I'm a touch more cynical  

Pot half empty...Pot half full!  I'm trying to be an optimist to stave off the depression.

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

Brit:

Ahhh, you've hit the problem on the head.  There are plenty of augmentation roles for senior Reservists, but virtually none in command roles.  To have a Reserve Pl WO in a Regular Force platoon would (under the current structure anyway) be very politically unpalatable, not to mention detrimental to unit cohesion.  The system for individual augmentees does work reasonably well, but I cannot see it in command roles anytime soon.  Problem?  You bet.

What's the solution?  Well, until the Reserve Force is resourced sufficiently to enable the activation of sub-units on relatively short notice without the attendant training gaps and massive administrative issues, I just can't see it happening unless directed for political reasons.  At the platoon level, though, it is more that do-able, particularly for less intense theatres.  I suspect that that's where the future for P Res unit deployment lies, at least in the short to mid-term...