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6 Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels being no longer Mothballed

Stoker

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Apparently 3 of the oldest vessels on each coast are going down. They may keep a forth on the West for training sometime during the year. Current contracts will be honored until they run out. The Commodore is having a town hall on Wed about what this all means, budget and manning shortages are suppose to be the reason.





I couldn't stand it anymore and fixed the title
 
The reservist screwed themselves with the MCDV's. Not that they couldn't sail the ships, it is that the Naval Reserve wore out the small cadre of people who were willing to live on 3 year Class B contracts.
Many of these folks decided to go all hog and go reg force or they quit entirely.

Do not know what the answer is.

How about getting rid of NAVRESHQ (Quebec) and rolling it into NSHQ (Since we all about returning to the past around here  >:D)
 
Any idea of the timelines for this happening?  Given that it's the end of the school year, a lot of reservists who are in school will be heading out to the coast for OJT.  I wonder if they will start putting more and more reservists on the heavies over the next 4 months in anticipation of reduced sailling time on the MCDVs.
 
Don't know all the time lines for this, details will be worked out soon I guess. There will be a training platform stood out west and I know CCFL will try and have a platform for training out here we hope.
For what I have heard people will be still employed to keep the corporate knowledge for the Arctic Patrol Ships. I have been told I still will be employed on Class C because of my specialty.
It's really a shame through, since the ship's have been upgraded with new radars, ops room fit etc.
 
Yes, we had our announcement out here (West) last week.

Indepth inspection of the Naval Board briefings foretold all of this a few weeks ago now. There is money set aside for disposal of the 6 KINGSTON class which will be taken off-line and sold/scrapped. It isn't a foregone conclusion that the oldest ships will be retired - three of the ships have expensive refits done ISO OP PODIUM for greater INMARSAT connectivity. Post Deployment input to DMRS is being sought as to how well the Interim Kingston Class High Speed Data Connection worked and possible placement in another three vessels - DMRS is foreseeing a huge cut to the KHSDC plan overall and are coming up with a solution.

DONT_PANIC - The timeline is immediate. Notwithstanding, we have plenty of space for OJT personnel out West and the East Coast will (apparently) maintain the fourth hull for OJTs in particular until the end of the summer.

I can say this unequivocably - THE WEST COAST IS NOT STANDING UP THE FOURTH HULL*(starred relaxation)

FSTO - > While that is partially true, most people have been on Class C contracts since 2002. At that time we had six full ship's companies. The problem was a combination of excessive sailing days per hull and, more importantly, when some manning shortages were apparent (after NAVRES failed to Force Generate adequate numbers of sailors) we pierhead jumped a good majority of people so they were sailing effectively 260+ days a year. Some might even argue that the culture shock of moving from the Gates and Pigs to an actual ship with somewhat more recognized capability and the commensurate lack of "booze cruises" drove alot of people away. We could argue a million reasons why NAVRES has found itself in this hole but the solution, in my opinion, will only come after the Strategic Review this fall. I suspect the Navy as a whole may move to some "full time/part time" construct or NAVRES simply won't Force Generate the KINGSTON class.

Starred Relaxation:
* Assuming the cost estimates from Coastal Div East weren't out to lunch.

 
Stoker said:
I have been told I still will be employed on Class C because of my specialty.

Everyone currently on contract will have them honoured until at least May 2011 - no special reference to specialties exist. Post 2011, each ship will still have a crew on Class C (6 hulls in total) and approximately half a crew available as standby for coursing, MATA/PATA etc. All told there should be at least 204 Class C positions available in addition to numerous Class B positions for trainees.
 
I really don't think the sky is falling, hvr this is a good time to try and generate more qualified pers and hopefully in a few years will have a more healthier pool of individuals to more to the Arctic Patrol Ship's. As Cronicby has said, there still are lots of jobs to go around. I suspect a lot of the younger guys will use this as an excuse to CT. There's even talk of offering a 5 year contract to remainding pers's, essentially making that person "regular force" but stuck to class.
 
Stoker said:
I really don't think the sky is falling, hvr this is a good time to try and generate more qualified pers and hopefully in a few years will have a more healthier pool of individuals to more to the Arctic Patrol Ship's. As Cronicby has said, there still are lots of jobs to go around. I suspect a lot of the younger guys will use this as an excuse to CT. There's even talk of offering a 5 year contract to remainding pers's, essentially making that person "regular force" but stuck to class.

Funny enough Stoker, just the opposite happened in my department. I had three of my most junior guys (and gals) come up and ask how they could amend their AVREPs so they could extend and get some of the core crew billets! :) Needless to say I showed them the forms and helped them out. I think we should give the younger folk credit - they see change and feel an opportunity. The only people I have spoken to who were more actively considering a CT already had plans to do so...

It will all come out in the wash  8)
 
This is really not a surprise. The Naval Reserve was manning 4 or 5 ships on a permanent basis prior to the MCDV's and then doubled that commitment with no corresponding increase in total establishment. The initial thought was that sailors would return to their NRD's following a posting to one of these ships but that never materialized. Instead, they remained with the ships, found postings ashore, CT'd to the regular force or simply released. The bench strength at most NRD's is incredibly thin.

As far as force generation goes, this will be a complete shock to those of you who have never served meaningful time at an NRD but people don't join the reserves to be full time employed by the Navy. Those people are directed to the regular force.
 
Hello Sailorwest. I hope all is well at Tecumseh.

I just want to correct a few facts here. Before the MCDV's, the Naval Reserve never manned ships on a permanent basis as a method of operation. In the few years leading to the arrival of MCDV's, it was felt that the knowledge base and experience of all reservists had to be raised to prepare for the switch from Gate vessels and PB's. To do that, a small cadre of reservists were put on long term contracts and two ships were acquired to provide better platforms for  training (mostly in minesweeping): The Moresby and Anticosti. These are the only ships that the reserve manned on a permanent basis before the MCDV's.

Otherwise, the reserve operated six ships (five Gate Vessels and Fort Steele, sometimes added to this: the fifth PB) full time for four summer months to provide MWV BWK training and trade training OJT. These same ships were used in fall, winter and spring to carry out week-end training of reserves. These ships each had regular force "custodian" who was the DA holder for all onboard materiel and  a regular force chief engineer. These two seaman sailed with the ship in the summer and on week-ends unless the reserve unit using the ship was able to provide for these positions. Also, on each coast, the administrative unit in charge of the reserve ships was augmented by a certain number of officers and trades people who were on an extended contracts, usually for a year or two, who assisted and supported those functions.

For instance, I had a year free between my two university courses in the early 80's and put that year in with (then) TD3 on the West coast. From the end of one school year to the beginning of the next, it went like this: from May to August, full time manning, I acted as a ship's officer, from September to April, with TD3, I provided administrative support for the various units coming down for the week end training, and when need be augmented their crew if they were short watch keepers, then May to August, back to being ship's officer for the summer. During that time one other officer was on a contract with me for the winter and about eight-nine other trades people, working out to about three or four of us per ship.

When the MCDV's were purchased, they were to replace all six reserve ships and to replace the PB's which were manned by the regular force and used for Mars III and first phase Mars IV training. However, after the MCDV's came online, the regular force ceased manning any of the MCDV,s (even though there was a slight increase of regular force personnel assigned to the MCDV's to cover the electrical/electronics trades ) and the whole burden fell squarely on the reserve to full time man ten ships. If this made sense for a few years at the beginning, in order to create quickly a core of trained personnel in every reserve units, it has long outlived its usefulness and has now long been a detrimental drag on the reserve. And yes, all this has been done without any increase in overall number of reservists.

So, having burned the candle from both ends, the Navy and in particular, the Reserve, finds itself where it should have been about two years after the introduction of the MCDV's to the fleet. It must make some serious decisions based on its view of the need for these vessels and for a credible and sustainable reserve force:

1) Do I need some of these MCDV's for Mars III and Mars IV, first phase training? If so, take these ships, put them on the West coast and man them fully with regular force personnel, like the old PB's. (Besides, the old PB's provided the reg force with something it is now missing: junior commands that let up and coming LCdrs show their mettle in preparation for later major commands - Trust me, it would also help the reg force with retention of LCdrs).

2) Do I want a viable reserve force as a basis for expansion in case of major conflict? If so, go back to the concept of operation that was used with the Gate vessels. You may have to increase the number of regular force support personnel to five or six per ship (CERA, Custodian, Buffer, Sr ET, Sr NET and maybe a A/CERA) from the two we used to have, but it will again provide the reserve with large number of sea positions in the summer and full training week ends. This will help with part timer's retention in reserve units, increase morale and go back to sustainability levels, though it may require foregoing some of the more exotic types of operations, such as route survey or ROV operations, but not necessarily so.

If, however, the Navy decided that it NEEDS all ten MCDV's manned and ready full time, it should then man them all fully with regular force personnel and find some other way to train the reserves.

As you can see, splitting the ships between East and West to perform these two tasks would likely end up requiring eight MCDV's in Esquimalt and four in Halifax.

By the way, if the Navy intends to  operate the AOPS in the arctic, or the gulf of St-Lawrence for that matter, when ice is present, the reserve will NOT be able to operate them, and in fact the regular force will find it difficult. I am originally from Quebec City, home of the largest fleet of icebreakers of the Coast-Guard , and have many friends on those ships. They reckon a watch keeper is safe to operate by herself in iced waters after acquiring about two to three years (cumulative - not calendar) of experience and a captain needs about ten to fifteen years.   
 
Additional on my last re: "foregoing some of the more exotic types of operations":

In another stream ( http://Forums.Milnet.ca/forums/threads/77766.0.html ), there is a suggestion the AOPS will start coming on line in 2014. Since they are intended to replace the MCDV's, and unless someone can point me to a significant mine threat to Canada's coasts in the next three years, is there a reason to continue to train anyone in mine warfare on the MCDVs? And if such a threat exists, should we ignore it in the future when we start decommissioning the MCDVs?

Truth is the mine threat on this side of the Atlantic/Pacific (as applicable) is negligible. We lived without such capacity for years and only acquired it back (with the MCDVs)  because we had plans to acquire nuclear subs, which would have warranted the expenditure by our enemies of the moment of the efforts required to covertly approach our shores to plant deep mines.

I know form another stream here ( http://Forums.Milnet.ca/forums/threads/92998.0.html ) that DND is looking at acquiring new remote mine disposal systems for the MCDVs, which makes little sense if we expect to start disposing of them in a few years. These systems have to be deployable from crafts of opportunity  however, and that may be all you need to cover the threat of mine in our waters, in view of the low level. Besides, the MCDVs are great diving support platforms. Perhaps upon decommissioning one can be kept on each coast for use as diving tender by FDU's.

Meanwhile, why don't we just concentrate on using them to qualify as many of the reserve units real part time officers and NCMs as possible?
 
Greetings Oldgateboatdriver,
You won't find me arguing against the model that you're describing. The challenge now is the paradigm that the Naval Reserve has placed itself regarding 'Total Force'. This is problematic on a few fronts. Primarily, the KIN Class became the exclusive domain of reservists, with only the NET and Electrician being Regular force. Now much of the trade OJT and the refresher training requirements for Cl A reservists are platform specific. This limits options. Secondly, as we are obliged to meet the same training standards as the Regular Force, recruiting into the Naval Reserve is more challenging in comparison with the Army Reserve. We cannot do any sort of in unit BMOQ training (ala SYEP/PRSTP) at the NRD where our compatriots in the Army Reserve can. I have seen potential recruits point to this as a reason why they do not choose to join the NR. What probably should happen is a reassessment of that concept of Total Force.

 
Sailorwest said:
What probably should happen is a reassessment of that concept of Total Force.
Well, everything looks like a nail to a man with a hammer. I would suggest that out-of-routining six Kingston class ships because of budget cuts is not a good reason to scrap Total Force - in fact, I would suggest that the two things are not only completely unrelated, but counterproductive. With fewer dedicated platforms, maybe NAVRES can move away from the Kingston class pigeonhole and start augmenting on the heavies - actual Total Force.

At the risk of dragging this thread far, far off topic: what some of the old guard don't get is that vast majority of the current Naval Reserve joined under Total Force, did their training under Total Force and identify with Total Force. And, as has been pointed out, NAVRES hasn't grown since Total Force was introduced - it hasn't shrunk either. So going back to the old way would (1) risk alienating the overwhelming majority of the formation to the benefit of a small minority who would suddenly be once again promotable, and (2) reduce overall effectiveness to no benefit. I agree that NAVRES has failed to force generate sufficiently to man twelve Kingston class ships, but it can still do six in a sleepwalk - a 100% improvement over the capability provided 15 years ago.

So yes, we could go back to the old "healthy NRD" model with legions of C&POs and senior officers holding down the bars of their respective messes with their elbows, but for what it's worth I'd rather see the NRDs relatively thin on the ground but populated with people dedicated to maintaining their trade and contributing to an actual mission (even, or especially, a mission that's just a bit of a stretch to achieve). There are already organizations for people who want to maintain their affiliation with the Navy without staying current.
 
To be so dismissive of naval mines as oldgate* does really scares me. Mines are one of the cheapest and potentially most deadly weapons out there. Because today we see our threats under a low threat, all it would take is one freighter to drop a couple of score of mines over the side and  our major ports will be paralyzed.

Its too bad we are looking at getting rid of these 6, while I am not a big fan of MCDVs I always thought they filled a nice niche role. Personally I think we should have built dedicated minehunters, minesweepers and command vessels rather then the ad hoc approach we tend to take. I think if we had a specific role for the Reserves we may able to retain more.
 
hamiltongs said:
Well, everything looks like a nail to a man with a hammer. I would suggest that out-of-routining six Kingston class ships because of budget cuts is not a good reason to scrap Total Force - in fact, I would suggest that the two things are not only completely unrelated, but counterproductive. With fewer dedicated platforms, maybe NAVRES can move away from the Kingston class pigeonhole and start augmenting on the heavies - actual Total Force.

At the risk of dragging this thread far, far off topic: what some of the old guard don't get is that vast majority of the current Naval Reserve joined under Total Force, did their training under Total Force and identify with Total Force. And, as has been pointed out, NAVRES hasn't grown since Total Force was introduced - it hasn't shrunk either. So going back to the old way would (1) risk alienating the overwhelming majority of the formation to the benefit of a small minority who would suddenly be once again promotable, and (2) reduce overall effectiveness to no benefit. I agree that NAVRES has failed to force generate sufficiently to man twelve Kingston class ships, but it can still do six in a sleepwalk - a 100% improvement over the capability provided 15 years ago.

So yes, we could go back to the old "healthy NRD" model with legions of C&POs and senior officers holding down the bars of their respective messes with their elbows, but for what it's worth I'd rather see the NRDs relatively thin on the ground but populated with people dedicated to maintaining their trade and contributing to an actual mission (even, or especially, a mission that's just a bit of a stretch to achieve). There are already organizations for people who want to maintain their affiliation with the Navy without staying current.
I guess the point is about why you have a Naval Reserve. If that is to have a full time flleet of ships run by full time reservists, an HQ organization manned by full time reservists, fleet schools and MOGs filled up with full time reservists, then you have essentially an operational reserve and should probably be at war (a naval war that is). If all of these people are working full time for the navy should they not be considered Regular Force? Why have Naval Reserve Divisions at all if there only purpose is to recruit sailors to join the permanent force? We have a recruiting organization for that.

The concept of a reserve is to have the ability to rapidly expand the organization in times of crisis. We now have limited ability to grow because of the large percentage of the current TES that is on full time service. We no longer have a strategic reserve capacity in the Navy. You may well have viewed it as a bunch officers and  chiefs holding the bar down with their elbows but they were there and available should they be needed. Now that there is little purpose for the Cl A sailor, a number of them choose to vote with their feet and once they are gone to the sup list, very rarely do they ever come back. When you make the value of being a 'citizen sailor' at the NRD worthless, then they will cease to exist because their time to do other things will be more important to them. 
 
Oldgateboatdriver said:
By the way, if the Navy intends to  operate the AOPS in the arctic, or the gulf of St-Lawrence for that matter, when ice is present, the reserve will NOT be able to operate them, and in fact the regular force will find it difficult. I am originally from Quebec City, home of the largest fleet of icebreakers of the Coast-Guard , and have many friends on those ships. They reckon a watch keeper is safe to operate by herself in iced waters after acquiring about two to three years (cumulative - not calendar) of experience and a captain needs about ten to fifteen years. 
Thanks for the historical perspective on NAVRES ship manning - very interesting. 

I agree with you about needing to gain experience in Northern operations, much like was done in the early 50s as HMCS Labrador came into naval service.  This could be obtained through exchange programmes with Norway (since the AOPS is based on their SVALBARD), Denmark (Thetis class), and/or from the Canadian Coast Guard.  Unlike the LABRADOR, the AOPS is 'only' capable of dealing with one metre of ice - suggesting it will not be competing with our heavy Coast Guard icebreakers but rather have freedom of manoeuvre during the 'navigable season'.  Some of the experience gained by Halifax, Kingston, and Victoria class vessels during the last few years will also be applicable.

I'm currently in a joint unit and a bit out of touch with the navy but has AOPS been declared the replacement for the Kingston class and to be manned by the NAVRES? 
 
Sailorwest said:
If all of these people are working full time for the navy should they not be considered Regular Force? Why have Naval Reserve Divisions at all if there only purpose is to recruit sailors to join the permanent force? We have a recruiting organization for that.
I don't disagree - but that's not a "Total Force" issue (which has to do with equality of training and the ability to seamlessly transition from part-time to full-time components; in fact, we aren't even really Total Force yet), it's an expectations issue and a PRes/Reg F definitions issue.

Now that there is little purpose for the Cl A sailor, a number of them choose to vote with their feet and once they are gone to the sup list, very rarely do they ever come back. When you make the value of being a 'citizen sailor' at the NRD worthless, then they will cease to exist because their time to do other things will be more important to them.
But if the sole purpose of the Cl A sailor is to serve an "in case of war, break glass" function and nothing more, isn't that why we have a SupRes? I agree that we do an abominable job of keeping SupRes info up-to-date, but that's the real balloon-goes-up we'll-take-anyone women-and-children-first reserve. The active reserve needs to be, well, active. And in a more than community outreach function.
 
Lex Parsimoniae said:
Thanks for the historical perspective on NAVRES ship manning - very interesting. 

I agree with you about needing to gain experience in Northern operations, much like was done in the early 50s as HMCS Labrador came into naval service.  This could be obtained through exchange programmes with Norway (since the AOPS is based on their SVALBARD), Denmark (Thetis class), and/or from the Canadian Coast Guard.  Unlike the LABRADOR, the AOPS is 'only' capable of dealing with one metre of ice - suggesting it will not be competing with our heavy Coast Guard icebreakers but rather have freedom of manoeuvre during the 'navigable season'.  Some of the experience gained by Halifax, Kingston, and Victoria class vessels during the last few years will also be applicable.

I'm currently in a joint unit and a bit out of touch with the navy but has AOPS been declared the replacement for the Kingston class and to be manned by the NAVRES?

I agree that with "global warming" the ice free season is getting longer and longer and we don't really need the same experience as the Canadian Coast Guard. We do have some officers that have operated in ice and the plan as I understand it is to have sufficient personnel trained to operate in ice for the years to come when we finally get AOPS. Probably from serving on coast guard vessels and exchange with other ice operating countries.

While it is expected that NAVRES will have some billets on  ASOP's,  no final decision as been made yet and studies are ongoing. If I was a betting man, we will indeed be manning these ship's however, with a greater reg force compliment on board, such as weapons techs, hull techs and possible aircrew.
 
We just had our "town hall" meeting with the Commodore today.  Out east the ship's that are staying will be SUMMERSIDE, GOOSEBAY and MONCTON. SHAWINIGAN  will be retained at least until late summer for training. Lots of things are being looked at, such as possibility putting a MCDV alongside Quebec City for training. These ships are not being disposed of, not yet anyways. Even though the ship's are going down, NAVRES budget's not been affected so far, so these are plenty of jobs for pers. There is also a strategic review happening soon that will probably redefine the role of the reserves.
Even though we are going to 6 ship's, op temp will be the same and probably may increase, but may utilize more crew switching out from time to time to prevent burnout.
The army side of things was mentioned with the Class B freeze and how they were way over established on billets. There will be no contract cuts on our end like they are having.
 
I love vigorous but polite exchanges of views. I think it benefits everyone, and sometime gives people in authority new perspective on a problem leading to a better solution.

Now back to topic: All I am advocating is this: If you mothball three MCDV's per coast, why not do it in such a way that you can easily reactivate two or three of them for three to four months every summer and run them with the real part-timer reservists out on short class A or B employment? It may  not be sufficient for them to learn new material, but it would be good for morale, retention and at the least, it would maintain their skill level through practice. This more than anything else could help with the "total force" idea of "seamlessly going from part-time to full-time" employment .

Now Ex-D, I am not dismissive of mines, far from it, and I could not agree more with you that  we should have  a small number of real minehunters. However, they would be for deployment oversea mostly, in support of the heavies.

I have both studied mine warfare and served on exchange in British sweepers, French minehunters and even as NATO observer/Referee in mine warfare exercises in the Channel. Bear in mind, mines are not IED's. Yes they  are cheap but only as compared to building warships, missiles or torpedos. They are not devices that individuals can just build in their garage then get to a boat. Also, they are large and heavy pieces of equipment (They must have an anchor of some sort for one thing - even the bottom mines). So they are not something you just  "chuck over the side" of a ship, but require quite a seamanship evolution with cranes, davits or rails. Modern freighters are not equipped to do this and it would require the collaboration of a large part of the crew, with the other ones noticing for sure. This would not happen from one of the large commercial merchies that cross the Atlantic/Pacific to come to North America (Besides, mining another's waters is an act of war in intn'l law - not something the countries of large merchies would want). 

As for Hamiltongs, be kind to your seniors. People like me are not referred to as "old guard" but as "dinosaurs". However, we do not like to be referred to as people tending bars. The reserve units are for more than "in case of emergency, break glass". In WWII they became the front line of recruiting and basic indoctrination. You see, if you recruit into the regular force in case of large wartime expansion, when the emergency is over you can't release them because they have contracts. The US found that out after Vietnam: They released people on dishonourable discharges for the most insignificant of breach of discipline as a force reduction strategy, with the effect you can imagine on morale and  attendant resentment.

The SupRes cannot provide this, nor can it provide the numbers of trained people the Navy might need in a hurry. This has to do with two facts: first, as the regular careers are extended, the average regular spends 25 to 30 yrs in service, retiring around age 45-50. Thus, being available for only 10 to 15 yrs on SupRes. This means at any time, only 2 or 3 thousand people are available for SupRes status. Second, they do not train as a rule, so they become quite rusty, where the PriRes who do their week-ends and annual two weeks at least keep their skill level up. (If you don't believe it, I have had young SupRes LT's  come do a two week stint after being out for three or four years who could not navigate me out of Halifax harbour safely at the end of their two weeks - no reflection on them, its just that you get rusty)





   
 
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