- Reaction score
- 7,389
- Points
- 1,160
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6661/09-27-StrategicMobility.pdf
Stumbled across this report. Linked by defence-aerospace.com.
CBO looked at six different ways 11 Billiion US Dollars could be used to improve the strategic mobility of US Forces.
Airlift options
1A - buy 21 more C-17s - 45 tons (avg) at 410 knots over 3200 nm (existing production)
1B - develop and buy 14 to 14 airships - 500 tons at 100 knots over 6000 nm (notional but possibly doable)
Sealift options
2A - buy 17 more LMSRs (Medium Speed RoRos) - 18,000 tons at 24 knots over 10,000 nm (existing production)
2B - develop and buy 6 High Speed ships - 10,000 tons at 45 knots over 5000 nm (notional but possibly doable)
Prepositioning options
3A - buy 4 more Stryker Brigade sets, each with its own new LMSR - 24 knots (existing production)
3B - buy 5 more Stryker Brigade sets and put them in existing LMSRs - 24 knots (existing production)
(Personal Observations - rounding has occured in places)
1 Stryker Brigade Set = 4 LMSR
4 LMSRs + 4 Stryker Brigade Sets = 11.3 BUSD
1 Stryker Brigade Set = 2.2 BUSD
1 LMSR = 550 MUSD
1 Stryker Brigade Set + 1 LMSR = 2.8 BUSD
CBO conclusions
Best option for promptness and capacity was pre-positioning with 2 complete sets being delivered within a week. Flexibility would be sacrificed, both in terms of gear available and where interventions could be undertaken.
C-17 airlift would be flexible and would start fast but it would take 30 aircraft, flying 300 missions 27 days to deliver 1 complete Stryker Brigade, or as the CBO put it about the same time as it would take to move a Stryker Brigade to port, load it on board a 24 knot ship, transit to the theater and then unload. (Curiously even a faster 33 knot ship would only knock 5 days off the deployment, speed only impacting the actual transit stage and not the move to port, load and unload - these numbers also do not include staging the vehicles and integrating them with the troops once they are unloaded).
The notional Airships might deliver 1 complete Stryker set in half the time of the C-17s but still 2 to 3 times longer than pre-positioning.
The notional High Speed (45 knot) Ships could deliver a Stryker set in 3 weeks (they could also deliver sets 2,3 and 4 in the same time frame).
Infrastructure would be a problem for all systems with the Airship being least infrastructure dependent, then the C-17s then finally all the sealift and prepositioning options.
They conclude that even a poorly positioned pre-positioned force is likely to be a better option than any of the others getting a Stryker Brigade anywhere in a 6,000 nm (12,000 km) radius, where it needs to be in under 14 days.
(Personal observation)
12,000 km from Halifax includes: the Horn of Africa via Gibraltar and Suez; the Cape of Good Hope; Cape Horn; Pearl Harbor via Panama.
12,000 km from Esquimalt includes: Sydney, Australia; the Straits of Malacca.
(Personal Suggestions)
Back to the Big Honking Ship and Duey's 15 CH-47 flat top.
Canada isn't talking about deploying Stryker Brigades requiring a 550 MUSD ship. It is talking about a force of about half the size with a higher proportion of light forces. The ship might be able to be smaller (as long as it maintains a good sized flight deck), and thus cheaper although a larger vessel is likely to make it easier to maintain equipment while afloat (eg a deck where vehicles can be driven on rollers while in port). The prepositioned equipment is likely to be cheaper as well.
The ship doesn't have to be a 24 knot medium speed ship nor even the 45 knot notional ship. A conventional 33 knot fast ship would reduce the 14 days for 12,000 km to about 10 days.
Storing a complete equipment set on board a ship also reduces the need for building warehouses on shore.
2 RoRos or Container ships (33 knots) and 2 equipment sets would allow Canada a lot of opportunities to get involved in a timely fashion in everything from humanitarian efforts, through crisis intervention/peace support operations, to high intensity conflicts (not in all situations because, as the CBO notes, you are only as flexible as the gear you have allows you to be).
The infrastructure issue is an issue for all forces, including the US - the issue being the "ship to shore" interface ("ship" here including aircraft and airships). That is where the heavy-lift helicopters as well as the High Speed Vessel experiments come in (not the 45 knot strategic vessels mentioned here but the Tactical/Operational wave-piercing Austal Fast Ferry designs). They allow for transfer from the mother ship in sheltered waters, possible even in a secure harbour remote from the theater, or at least in secure open waters, to the HSVs to take ground forces into austere ports. That also increases the number of extraction points. The HSVs, with suitably sized flight decks and refuelling facilities could also be used as Infanteer's "lily pads" allowing helicopters to leapfrog over long distances.
This is not a recipe for an assault force. It is a recipe for a deployable force with an exit strategy.
Parking such a ship in Ceylon, Singapore or even Sydney, together with one at home would put Canada well ahead of the reaction curve to deal with crises.
Stumbled across this report. Linked by defence-aerospace.com.
CBO looked at six different ways 11 Billiion US Dollars could be used to improve the strategic mobility of US Forces.
Airlift options
1A - buy 21 more C-17s - 45 tons (avg) at 410 knots over 3200 nm (existing production)
1B - develop and buy 14 to 14 airships - 500 tons at 100 knots over 6000 nm (notional but possibly doable)
Sealift options
2A - buy 17 more LMSRs (Medium Speed RoRos) - 18,000 tons at 24 knots over 10,000 nm (existing production)
2B - develop and buy 6 High Speed ships - 10,000 tons at 45 knots over 5000 nm (notional but possibly doable)
Prepositioning options
3A - buy 4 more Stryker Brigade sets, each with its own new LMSR - 24 knots (existing production)
3B - buy 5 more Stryker Brigade sets and put them in existing LMSRs - 24 knots (existing production)
(Personal Observations - rounding has occured in places)
1 Stryker Brigade Set = 4 LMSR
4 LMSRs + 4 Stryker Brigade Sets = 11.3 BUSD
1 Stryker Brigade Set = 2.2 BUSD
1 LMSR = 550 MUSD
1 Stryker Brigade Set + 1 LMSR = 2.8 BUSD
CBO conclusions
Best option for promptness and capacity was pre-positioning with 2 complete sets being delivered within a week. Flexibility would be sacrificed, both in terms of gear available and where interventions could be undertaken.
C-17 airlift would be flexible and would start fast but it would take 30 aircraft, flying 300 missions 27 days to deliver 1 complete Stryker Brigade, or as the CBO put it about the same time as it would take to move a Stryker Brigade to port, load it on board a 24 knot ship, transit to the theater and then unload. (Curiously even a faster 33 knot ship would only knock 5 days off the deployment, speed only impacting the actual transit stage and not the move to port, load and unload - these numbers also do not include staging the vehicles and integrating them with the troops once they are unloaded).
The notional Airships might deliver 1 complete Stryker set in half the time of the C-17s but still 2 to 3 times longer than pre-positioning.
The notional High Speed (45 knot) Ships could deliver a Stryker set in 3 weeks (they could also deliver sets 2,3 and 4 in the same time frame).
Infrastructure would be a problem for all systems with the Airship being least infrastructure dependent, then the C-17s then finally all the sealift and prepositioning options.
They conclude that even a poorly positioned pre-positioned force is likely to be a better option than any of the others getting a Stryker Brigade anywhere in a 6,000 nm (12,000 km) radius, where it needs to be in under 14 days.
(Personal observation)
12,000 km from Halifax includes: the Horn of Africa via Gibraltar and Suez; the Cape of Good Hope; Cape Horn; Pearl Harbor via Panama.
12,000 km from Esquimalt includes: Sydney, Australia; the Straits of Malacca.
(Personal Suggestions)
Back to the Big Honking Ship and Duey's 15 CH-47 flat top.
Canada isn't talking about deploying Stryker Brigades requiring a 550 MUSD ship. It is talking about a force of about half the size with a higher proportion of light forces. The ship might be able to be smaller (as long as it maintains a good sized flight deck), and thus cheaper although a larger vessel is likely to make it easier to maintain equipment while afloat (eg a deck where vehicles can be driven on rollers while in port). The prepositioned equipment is likely to be cheaper as well.
The ship doesn't have to be a 24 knot medium speed ship nor even the 45 knot notional ship. A conventional 33 knot fast ship would reduce the 14 days for 12,000 km to about 10 days.
Storing a complete equipment set on board a ship also reduces the need for building warehouses on shore.
2 RoRos or Container ships (33 knots) and 2 equipment sets would allow Canada a lot of opportunities to get involved in a timely fashion in everything from humanitarian efforts, through crisis intervention/peace support operations, to high intensity conflicts (not in all situations because, as the CBO notes, you are only as flexible as the gear you have allows you to be).
The infrastructure issue is an issue for all forces, including the US - the issue being the "ship to shore" interface ("ship" here including aircraft and airships). That is where the heavy-lift helicopters as well as the High Speed Vessel experiments come in (not the 45 knot strategic vessels mentioned here but the Tactical/Operational wave-piercing Austal Fast Ferry designs). They allow for transfer from the mother ship in sheltered waters, possible even in a secure harbour remote from the theater, or at least in secure open waters, to the HSVs to take ground forces into austere ports. That also increases the number of extraction points. The HSVs, with suitably sized flight decks and refuelling facilities could also be used as Infanteer's "lily pads" allowing helicopters to leapfrog over long distances.
This is not a recipe for an assault force. It is a recipe for a deployable force with an exit strategy.
Parking such a ship in Ceylon, Singapore or even Sydney, together with one at home would put Canada well ahead of the reaction curve to deal with crises.
