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Academic vs. other trg for officers (split fm US Army Senior Leadership)

Edward Campbell

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I'm reasonably happy to continue to believe that there is no correlation, none at all, between academics and leadership. I have absolutely no real, documentary evidence upon which to base this belief ... but all the evidence I have seen, reading and in my own experience, suggests that I'm correct.

Take the US case: I think it's fair to say that the five greatest military leaders of the 20th century were George C Marshall (head and shoulders the greatest military man of the 20th century in any country) followed by Bradley, Eisenhower, MacArthur and Nimitz. Of those four MacArthur and Nimitz are reported to have had first rate academic records while Bradley and Eisenhower were, to be charitable, undistinguished. None had an advanced degree. One wonders what made them better leaders: academics, sports or the very nature of the "officer production" system? My bets are on the latter two. I think the Duke of Wellington might have been right and the lessons learned on the "playing fields of Eton" likely had more to do with British military successes than education or, even, most experience.

I'm less than impressed with the degree laden David Petraeus types and those with experience like being (as Stanley McChrystal was) senior service college fellow at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and military fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, than I am with officers with lots of experience in command of troops at the platoon, company and battalion level. Of course the officers at the very top will need some exposure to politics and strategy, but it seems to me that too much "study," formal and in think tanks, must be had at the expense of leading people and commanding ships and units.

In my own, personal experience I can say that the best officers with and under whom I served almost all had degrees ... a couple were RMC graduates who never did the final (academic) year. There were a couple of exceptions ~ our Officer Candidate Programme did produce some absolutely sterling officers with nothing more than high school diplomas, a handful of the best of whom became generals ~ but generally the best officers wanted to have better educations because they were more interested in the world than were most other, ordinary people.

I remain committed to the notion that the most important training the army does is for junior leaders: junior officers and junior NCOs, it's where we "make or break" our people and good, hard, tough junior officers and junior NCOs will grow into good, thoughtful senior leaders in due course. The next most important course ought to be the staff college ~ for captains ~ because it should teach them to think under pressure. The things sailors and soldiers, including admirals and generals, do aren't really complicated or theoretically/academically difficult, but they have to be done under the most extraordinary circumstances so it seems a bit like brain surgery and rocket science all jammed together. Good leaders, master corporals and major generals, appear able to manage to perform brain surgery during rocket lift off, but I think that may have more to do with having been on the rugby first 15 than having a PhD.
 
E.R. Campbell said:
I'm reasonably happy to continue to believe that there is no correlation, none at all, between academics and leadership. I have absolutely no real, documentary evidence upon which to base this belief ... but all the evidence I have seen, reading and in my own experience, suggests that I'm correct....

:goodpost:

I definitely agree that a balance must be struck between learning through traditional academia, and learning by actually doing the job. 
 
The context of the Canadian degreed officer corps requirement (which has a number of loopholes) goes back to the events in Somalia, and the then-MND and PM endorsing all the recommendations of the Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces in 1997.  It's one of the few recommendations still in force; there's a group in Kingston with a vested interest in protecting the concept, as it justifies their (expensive) existence.

The party line can be found at: http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo9/no3/06-bercuson-eng.asp

Or, look for just about any article in the Canadian Military Journal by Bernd Horn or Bill Bentley, a pair of apologists for the requirement, whose excessive military academic bent blinds them to the existence of experiential learning, and to the need for a military to be intellectually heterogeneous - pushing a majority of your officers through two small schools in Kingston and then Toronto does not build the necessary intellectual capital for an organization.
 
Read the article - thought it was bunk, for pretty much all of the reasons highlighted by Journeyman.

E.R. Campbell said:
but generally the best officers wanted to have better educations because they were more interested in the world than were most other, ordinary people.

Concur - a bit of chicken/egg.  I believe the good officers seek an education, rather than being good because of it.

I remain committed to the notion that the most important training the army does is for junior leaders: junior officers and junior NCOs, it's where we "make or break" our people and good, hard, tough junior officers and junior NCOs will grow into good, thoughtful senior leaders in due course. The next most important course ought to be the staff college ~ for captains ~ because it should teach them to think under pressure.

Agreed.  The professional education is, in my view, far more important than the academic one.
 
Infanteer said:
Agreed.  The professional education is, in my view, far more important than the academic one.

Unfortunately, its impossible to get a professional education when you're in an position for less than a year. We have some new Sig Os that get 1 year as a Tp Comd until they are rotated out, because we have so many that need that "check in the box" so they can be a Captain. There's a whole lot of Lieutenant pay incentives, but we never use more than the first 2 or 3. A lot of the problem comes because the promotion to Captain isn't earned, which is highly dangerous considering what trouble a poor Captain can get themselves, or their subordinates into.
 
What you are talking about is experience, which is something different.  A professional education is also somewhat different from a technical education, although the two are often intermixed.
 
PuckChaser said:
Unfortunately, its impossible to get a professional education when you're in an position for less than a year. We have some new Sig Os that get 1 year as a Tp Comd until they are rotated out, because we have so many that need that "check in the box" so they can be a Captain. There's a whole lot of Lieutenant pay incentives, but we never use more than the first 2 or 3. A lot of the problem comes because the promotion to Captain isn't earned, which is highly dangerous considering what trouble a poor Captain can get themselves, or their subordinates into.

Not to nitpick, but it has nothing to do with the promotion to Captain. You get that after being commissioned for 3 years, doesn't matter if they employ you as a Tp Comd or a janitor (we just had a guy get to Bn from the training system first week of December and was promoted to Captain at the Officer's Mess Dinner). They are probably having a high turnover because there are a bunch of people coming behind them. When there is no one coming behind them, people get stuck in their baseline job (we just have a guy at our Bn on his third year as a Platoon Commander simply because the tap has been turned off on people coming in... 3-4 years ago people were getting 6 months). Regardless, your point still stands, too many outside factors influencing how much time someone gets in vital positions. My last OC had 6 months as Pl Comd and about 10 months as an OC.... 16 months experience as an actual Commander before potentially being a CO of a battalion.

I tend to disagree with the way we promote people to Captain but that's outside of this thread.
 
Deja vu all over again. We were debating this when I was a second lieutenant and that was more than half a century ago. Back then the Canadian Army had concluded that after a few years commissioned service, there really was no difference in officers regardless of method of entry. While obviously this was a generalization (no pun intended) we all felt at the time this was probably a valid observation.

Mods, this thread has veered into a Canadian policy issue. Perhaps it could be split.
 
E.R. Campbell said:
.... but I think that may have more to do with having been on the rugby first 15 than having a PhD.
I love you man.  ;D



A subtle reminder that the Canadian National Men's' 15 Rugby team starts the Americas' Cup on 5 February 2016 against Uruguay.
 
Old Sweat said:
Deja vu all over again. We were debating this when I was a second lieutenant and that was more than half a century ago. Back then the Canadian Army had concluded that after a few years commissioned service, there really was no difference in officers regardless of method of entry. While obviously this was a generalization (no pun intended) we all felt at the time this was probably a valid observation.

Mods, this thread has veered into a Canadian policy issue. Perhaps it could be split.

Agree with the split.

Don't know how the entry plans worked back then, but currently its not uncommon for a DEO to spend 2 years or more in training system, in some cases their entire 3 years required to be a Captain. This means guys are showing up to Bn without any actual service as Captains (if, like me, you consider your de-facto service to actually start when you are fully trained and sent to a unit).

When you have a guy promoted to Captain a week after he finished Phase 4 just getting his Platoon and still doesn't know where the rest easy is, and his peer Pl Comd showed up to Bn as a 2Lt and has 2 full years as a Pl Comd but is currently a Lt, I would say it ain't working and there is a real difference between those two. These scenarios are very common, my own company has this problem right now and we've had many similar cases since I got to Bn.
 
ballz said:
These scenarios are very common, my own company has this problem right now and we've had many similar cases since I got to Bn.

Perhaps it has to (partly) do with the very rigid rank hierarchy the Army tends to use.  For me, a junior Officer (2Lt, Lt or Capt) regardless of the rank is differenciated by experience in trade rather than rank/time in rank. It is the way we see things, at least in the Fighter Force and it seems to work for us!
 
Ideally, the CAF would have a single, simple common officer progression model:

OCdt/2Lt is an officer under training, not yet qualified DP1.

Lt is qualified DP1, employable in trade, and requires defined experience (and possibly additional training) to compete for promotion.  That experience clock starts ticking on promotion to Lt.

Capt is a competitive promotion.


Unfortunately, we've now got a blob of four ranks without adequate differentiation.
 
I think the real problem is with our training system where training that should take 6-9 months from enrolment takes 2+ years...
 
SupersonicMax said:
I think the real problem is with our training system where training that should take 6-9 months from enrolment takes 2+ years...

Agreed in spades. And this applies to NCMs as well as officers. Reaching back a long time, about 15-18 officers joined 1 RCHA in Gagetown in 1961. Of that nine of us were second lieutenants from the Officer Candidate Program who had started training in September 1960 and graduated in August 1961. The others were mainly lieutenants from the Regular Officer Training Program from service colleges and civvy universities, although one was a second lieutenant who had not completed the academic program at RMC. This group had completed three phases of training in summers. All of us also had completed the six week Young Officers Tactics Course as part of our phase training. We all were gainfully employable on arrival (well, at least most of us except for one who was in the "how the heck did he ever get through ROTP?" category) and were expected to perform as such regardless of origin. We were also similar in terms of age and background and as far as I can recall only one was from a military family.

 
SupersonicMax said:
Perhaps it has to (partly) do with the very rigid rank hierarchy the Army tends to use.  For me, a junior Officer (2Lt, Lt or Capt) regardless of the rank is differenciated by experience in trade rather than rank/time in rank. It is the way we see things, at least in the Fighter Force and it seems to work for us!

I've seen it in the army, too. I once served in a rifle company in one of our regular battalions that was commanded by a Captain. Now, he was a senior Captain, and was promoted Major six months after assuming command of his company,  but for a period he commanded other Captains and no one had any problems taking orders from him; including his Coy 2IC (Capt, pre-AOC) and his fresh off Phase IV Platoon Commanders (two of whom were Captains due to extended time in the training system).
 
If the training system can't put people through fast enough, we need the recruiting system to stop recruiting people for those trades to reduce the backlog in the system. Corps decides how many they want, School says I can train X out of those, CMP says Recruiting will provide X out of those able to be trained based on priorities, etc.

We shouldn't be recruiting people if they can't get through the training system. Outliers like injuries/training failures can be facilitated as the schools know the statistics, and can provide those to recruiting to get accurate numbers in the door.
 
dapaterson said:
Ideally, the CAF would have a single, simple common officer progression model:

OCdt/2Lt is an officer under training, not yet qualified DP1.

Lt is qualified DP1, employable in trade, and requires defined experience (and possibly additional training) to compete for promotion.  That experience clock starts ticking on promotion to Lt.

Capt is a competitive promotion.


Unfortunately, we've now got a blob of four ranks without adequate differentiation.

Some trades take 3-4 years to get to the BOQ point due to the amount of training required.  It's not uncommon in the Navy to have juniour two ringers working for snr two ringers for this reason.  The officers on board frigates are intentionally structured like that.

Same as some of the tech trades with the METTP program, where after two years in a tech college, they come to the fleet as LS with no actual sea time.

I think this is the part of personnel management where you have to adapt your approach based on what experience people actually have, rather then trying to come up with a one sized fits all round hole for all the various sized pegs.
 
PuckChaser said:
If the training system can't put people through fast enough, we need the recruiting system to stop recruiting people for those trades to reduce the backlog in the system. Corps decides how many they want, School says I can train X out of those, CMP says Recruiting will provide X out of those able to be trained based on priorities, etc.

We shouldn't be recruiting people if they can't get through the training system. Outliers like injuries/training failures can be facilitated as the schools know the statistics, and can provide those to recruiting to get accurate numbers in the door.

In theory, the AMOR process is supposed to do just that.

Navy_Pete said:
Some trades take 3-4 years to get to the BOQ point due to the amount of training required.  It's not uncommon in the Navy to have juniour two ringers working for snr two ringers for this reason.  The officers on board frigates are intentionally structured like that.

Same as some of the tech trades with the METTP program, where after two years in a tech college, they come to the fleet as LS with no actual sea time.

I think this is the part of personnel management where you have to adapt your approach based on what experience people actually have, rather then trying to come up with a one sized fits all round hole for all the various sized pegs.

There is no reason to rush to push people to Capt/Lt(N).  Pay for junior officers is very competitive with what the private sector pays - and training provided at no cost while being paid is almost unheard of in the private sector.

To use your tech trades analogy: why not have the Jr officer arrive as a SLt, then spend 3 or so years trade qualified getting experience, before challenging exams to be promoted to Lt(N)?

Admittedly, not all occupations follow identical progression models,  but some reasonable facsimile can be found.  It makes little sense to start paying some one in excess of $70K per year with little to no experience; that's what we are doing when we have turned Capt/Lt(N) into a "gimmie".
 
Navy_Pete said:
Some trades ...

I think the discussion about common career paths ends right there.

For the Forces at large there are those who are hired to fight and there are those who are hired to get them to the fight and keep them in the fight.

And with the great respect that I have for those that fight ultimately the biggest problem seems to be finding and keeping the people that get them there and keep them there.  By and large they are people that use civvy skills in a military setting.  They do their job on a daily basis, exactly the same way they would be doing it during war time.  The only difference is in war time they have to spend some time ducking.

Meanwhile, the people paid to fight the ships, fly the planes, close with and destroy - don't get a lot of opportunities to actually practice their "trade".  Most of their careers will be spent waiting for opportunities - that society demands they hope will never come.

Maintaining ships and planes, or servicing vehicles and gear is a world apart from leading an assault.  There is merit, in my opinion, to having an entirely different rank structure and progression model, for the technical trades as opposed to the combat trades - regardless of the impact it may have on how ADMs and CPSEU calculate their pensions.
 
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