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Afghanistan: Why we should be there (or not), how to conduct the mission (or not) & when to leave

Afstan: Counterinsurgency 501/Predate update: "Once Upon a Time in Afghanistan" (with photos)
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/06/afstan-counterinsurgency-501.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
Maybe the CF could stay in Afstan post-2011 after all [Matthew Fisher story]
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/06/maybe-cf-could-stay-in-afstan-post-2011.html

Looks like some politicos may be getting reasonable;
http://www.montrealgazette.com/news/Canada+could+fill+training+roll+Afghanistan+post+2011/3106853/story.html
a ball with considerable pressure may end up in grumpy Stephen's court--can he do a 180?...

    'Canada could fill training roll in Afghanistan post-2011, MPs say...

    "It is our committee's responsibility to make a recommendation to Parliament but ultimately, it is up to the government to put something forward [emphasis added]."..'

Listen up, Mr Harper.

Mark
Ottawa
 
Brits to replace CF at Kandahar after all?  But remember The Economist's musings are not always all that accurate:

The wars over the war
A new government gets to grips with another foreign-policy priority

http://www.economist.com/world/britain/displaystory.cfm?story_id=16277927

...Officials said the Chequers meeting was not a “review” of policy, but only a “seminar” intended to “take stock”. Mr Cameron, it is said, told the gathering that his government was not about to change course, and would support America’s war. On the same day, the prime minister called the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, for what officials say was a “warm” talk about the “peace jirga” being held in Kabul, and about preparations for military operations in Kandahar.

British qualms about the war—a poll by Com Res in April found that 77% of the British public wanted troops withdrawn from Afghanistan—take second place to Mr Cameron’s desire to forge close ties with the Obama administration. That message will delight Robert Gates, the American defence secretary, who will be visiting London to meet members of the new government before a NATO meeting in Brussels on June 10th and 11th.

The American commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, is due to submit in December the results of a review that will set out how far and how quickly NATO can start drawing down forces next year. Barring a political or military disaster, British officials are assuming that, regardless of how many provinces “transition” to nominal Afghan control in the coming months, a substantial number of foreign troops will remain in Afghanistan until about 2014.

It may be a sign of the prevailing mood in Whitehall that rumours are now circulating about the possible demise of Sir Jock Stirrup, the chief of the defence staff, perhaps in favour of the Afghanophile army chief, General Sir David Richards. Behind the scenes, General Richards has promoted the idea that British troops should move from Helmand to Kandahar province. Kandahar, Afghanistan’s second-largest city and the Taliban’s ideological fount, has always seemed to ambitious British officers a more prestigious property than Helmand. The departure of the Canadian contingent next year would create the opening for the British to move in, play a central role in the next phase of the war, maximise Britain’s influence with the Americans and, perhaps, retain a permanent command for the British.

Such ideas, though, seem to have been blocked at the top. Britain has invested heavily in military infrastructure, and in developing contacts and intelligence sources in Helmand. As Dr Fox put it: “It would be crazy to go somewhere else and start all over again.”

Mark
Ottawa
 
MPs say Canadian trainers may stay in Afghanistan after 2011
, Glob and Mail
canada_soldier_a_683061gm-a.jpg


Canada may keep a military presence in Afghanistan after its
combat mission ends next year in order to strengthen the
country's national security forces, an all-party House of
Commons committee on the conflict says.

The Canadian Forces is scheduled to end the combat mission
in July 2011, but there have been persistent calls from NATO
for Canada to maintain a small non-combat military presence
that would help in the ongoing — and often frustrating — effort
to train local soldiers and police officers. It's an idea that the
Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan is
willing to explore, said Liberal foreign affairs critic Bob Rae.

“The door is open to a serious discussion in Canada, and then
between Canada and NATO, about what the future looks like,”
Mr. Rae said earlier this week as committee members paid a
visit to Kandahar Airfield. “Increasing the capacity both of the
Afghan police, the Afghan military and frankly the Afghan judicial
system has been very much part of what we've been doing and
I think it's something that needs to continue.”

The committee spent several days touring facilities in Kandahar
and Kabul, but details of the visit could not be reported until
Thursday for security reasons.

Tory MP Kevin Sorenson, the chairman of the committee, said
Canada could play an integral role in strengthening Afghanistan's
police and military in 2011 and beyond. “We all realize that the
Afghan police as well as the military are going to have to increase
capacity if they're going to be able to secure their own country,
and Canada may have a role in that,” Mr. Sorenson said.

The politically sensitive question of Canada's future role in
Afghanistan has dogged the federal government since
Parliament passed a motion two years ago that requires the
Canadian military to cease combat operations by July 2011
and withdraw from Kandahar. Canada has about 50 RCMP
and municipal officers and 40 military police personnel
mentoring Afghan cops at the provincial reconstruction centre
in Kandahar city. The U.S. recently poured more police mentors
into the base and also operates a police training centre near
Kandahar Airfield.

Washington's preference would be to have the Canadian battle
group remain where it is. But a fallback position, as suggested by
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, would be for Canada to play a
larger role in doing something it already does: training the Afghan
army.

NDP defence critic Jack Harris said a post-2011 role for Canada is
in the works, but suggested a military presence was not the only
option on the table. “All Canadians do not want to see the sacrifice
that has been made be for naught and we do have obviously a
considerable amount of humanitarian concerns and institution-
building concerns about Afghanistan,” Mr. Harris said. “Whether
that involves military or not is another question indeed. There are
lots of other ways that we can help build institutions.”

The Afghan National Army is considered far more prepared to
crack down on insecurity than the Afghan National Police, a force
that continues to struggle with a tarnished reputation among local
villagers after years of corruption, extortion and drug abuse. Many
officers still lack training and equipment as basic as handcuffs.

During a tour of Kandahar two weeks ago, federal International
Development Minister Bev Oda said the U.S. has offered to provide
security for Canadian civilian projects past July 2011, though
planning is still at a preliminary stage. And the Mounties have
already started looking at how to continue the police training
mission next year, RCMP Commissioner William Elliot said in April.

Since Canada's mission in Afghanistan began in 2002, 146 Canadian
military personnel and two civilians — diplomat Glyn Berry and
journalist Michelle Lang — have been killed. Canada has more than
2,800 military personnel in Afghanistan, the large majority of whom
are in Kandahar.
 
Interesting what a difference a visit can make in one's viewpoint...
 
So true.
Once past the rhetoric of "No blood for oil" and other nonsense, it's good that the MPs got over there.  It should help them make informed decisions.  Kudos to them.
 
CF in Afstan post-2011? PM still "the biggest stumbling block"
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/06/cf-in-afstan-post-2011-pm-still-biggest.html

...he's not telling the truth...

Mark
Ottawa
 
Even the Toronto Star looking favourably at CF role in Afstan post-2011
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/06/even-toronto-star-looking-favourably-at.html

Dear Mr Harper,

Please get with the program...

Mark
Ottawa
 
I can't beleive Red Bob Rae and I actually agree on something. Mind you, he'll want to ensure that if the troops have to defend themselves, it will be with the permission of Parliament, and approval would have to be sought 35 days in advance of said contact!!

Kidding....
 
My sense of the "public" opinion, garnered from the media, including polls, and some bar chat, is that Harper is doing what the "people" want: he is sticking with a 2011 (military) withdrawal date.

It isn't, I think that people are against combat operations or against helping Afghanistan: they are tired of it and they cannot see how we are going to win. We can blame the government, including DND and the CF, for not explaining what we want to do and how we are trying to do it and we can blame the media for not explaining things but my guesstimate is that almost no one in the media and damned few in government, including those at the highest levels (including within DND and the CF) actually understand or care about the what, why and how of Afghanistan - how in hell should anyone expect "ordinary Canadians", the good folks Taliban Jack Layton claims to represent, to understand or care.
 
Mid Aged Silverback said:
I can't beleive Red Bob Rae and I actually agree on something.

E.R. Campbell said:
We can blame the government, including DND and the CF, for not explaining what we want to do and how we are trying to do it and we can blame the media for not explaining things but my guesstimate is that almost no one in the media and damned few in government, including those at the highest levels (including within DND and the CF) actually understand or care about the what, why and how of Afghanistan.

I gotta say, Bob Rae did a reasonably good job explaining it during a debate in October (see attached from Hansard - longish, but worth the read) - oh wait, it's a long, nuanced bit, so the media can't possible talk about it.
 
- edited to add CanWest material -

This from CanWest News Service:
Gen. Walt Natynczyk says the military is obeying "very clear instructions" from the government to withdraw from Afghanistan next year and he won't speculate on whether some troops could or should stay behind.

The chief of defence staff declined at a news conference Monday to be drawn into a debate sparked last week by overtures from Liberal foreign affairs critic Bob Rae suggesting the official opposition would support a post-2011 training mission for Canadian Forces in Afghanistan.

"It's not even worth, from my standpoint, speculating about future operations," Natynczyk said. "We have got very clear instructions from the government of Canada to move out on the withdrawal and that's what we're going to continue to plan on."

He quoted from the 2008 parliamentary motion requiring an end to the military mission and withdrawal starting in July 2011 and said a military team is in Afghanistan planning the logistics.

"Soldiers, sailors, airmen and women need those clear orders to get on with business," Natynczyk said. "So we're moving on those orders."

He noted the institutions that will continue a non-military mission for Canada in Afghanistan include Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Canadian International Development Agency, the RCMP and the correctional services ....


This from the House of Commons Hansard, with more of the latest official on-paper position - highlights mine:
Mr. Paul Dewar (Ottawa Centre, NDP):  Mr. Speaker, Conservative confusion reigns over our mission in Afghanistan. The Prime Minister will not come clean on Canada's role in Afghanistan after the full withdrawal post-2011. His parliamentary secretaries and some Liberals are calling for an extension, instead of finding a path to stability and peace.  I will ask a very simple question. What is the government's plan post-2011 in Afghanistan?

Hon. Peter Kent (Minister of State of Foreign Affairs (Americas), CPC):  Mr. Speaker, there is absolutely no confusion on this side of the House about our position in Afghanistan.  We have made it eminently clear that this government will respect the parliamentary resolution of 2008 and cease our military mission to Afghanistan in 2011. It will become a civilian and a development mission.

Mr. Paul Dewar (Ottawa Centre, NDP):  Mr. Speaker, without a plan, confusion will continue to reign. What we heard is no plan for the future.  The government should support negotiations and reconciliation in Afghanistan, and the neighbourhood. The government should be there to ensure those commitments are solid. We have not heard those commitments. There have been no dollars put on the table and no serious commitments.  We need to have a debate in this House of Commons on what is going to happen post-2011. We need to clear up the confusion.  Will the government join us in asking for all parliamentarians to have a debate in this House on Afghanistan post-2011?

Hon. Peter Kent (Minister of State of Foreign Affairs (Americas), CPC):  Mr. Speaker, let me very clear. For the past several months, despite foot dragging by members of the Afghan committee, we have been putting forward motions to consider the post-2011 mission in Afghanistan.*** We urge opposition members of the committee to participate and to forward their suggestions to Parliament.

Mr. Paul Dewar (Ottawa Centre, NDP):  Mr. Speaker, I did not know Parliament was a suggestion box.  The lack of commitment to peace and human rights is not limited just to Afghanistan. We learned today the Conservatives have cut funding for human rights and protection of civilians under the global peace and security fund from $1.1 million down to a paltry $30,000.  Why is the current government cutting support for peace and human rights at a time when it is so fundamentally needed?

Hon. Peter Kent (Minister of State of Foreign Affairs (Americas), CPC):  Mr. Speaker, once again, my colleague has his facts wrong. I come back again to his suggestion that members of the Afghan committee should accept the motion put by the government to consider exactly and to discuss and debate the post-2011 mission, and to forward those suggestions to the government.

*** - Re:  the bit in green - have I missed something substantive re:  suggestions on the mission?  I've seen the MSM hints, suggestions, alleged backroom whispering, but nothing concrete that's grossly different from the main message:  we're outta there (AFG) in 2011, w/a civvy mission left behind.  Or has MSM not included those bits in their coverage of the Committee, given that OTHER thing they've been reporting on instead of the Committee's main job?
 
From Hansard (Senate) yesterday (highlights mine):
Canadian Mission in Afghanistan

Hon. Hugh Segal: Honourable senators, I am rising to express my profound appreciation to the members of the House of Commons' Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan, who visited Afghanistan recently and returned late last week. They did so to make their own assessment of the situation on the ground and to see first-hand the remarkable work being done by Canadian Forces and humanitarian, development and diplomatic personnel.

Members of Parliament Kevin Sorenson, Byron Wilfert, Jim Abbott, Claude Bachand, Bob Dechert, Jack Harris, Laurie Hawn, Deepak Obhrai, Bob Rae and Pascal-Pierre Paillé, who made the trip, deserve our appreciation and gratitude, as do those who facilitated their movements on both the military and civilian sides.

When I rose in this place on March 30 to express hope that there would be a full parliamentary debate on next steps in Afghanistan after 2011 and my strong view that, whatever the configuration of the post-2011 Canadian contingent, Canadian Armed Forces be part of that presence, I was hopeful that our colleagues in the other place would have a chance to see the context for themselves.

There is now an opportunity for a full parliamentary debate in both chambers — not a narrow partisan debate, but a broad, multi-partisan, national interest debate — where proposals for the mix of forces and civilians deployed to Afghanistan can be openly and frankly discussed.

Canadian Forces were involved in the earliest assaults on Taliban strongholds. Canadians helped to stabilize Kabul to allow the formation of the first Afghan government, the democratic process and subsequent elections. Canadian Forces were then deployed to Kandahar province, the most violent and difficult of areas, to hold the line almost alone and contain the insurgency so people in other parts of Afghanistan could get on with their lives.

None of us can know what the final phase in Afghanistan will bring in terms of a constructive framework for stability and self-government, but it is clear that Canadian military experience, perspective, local sensitivity and highly-trained capacities need to be a vital part of that final phase.
 
One wonders when most of our major media will really notice the full extent of the US takeover at Kandahar--and note the further new US Army Brigade Combat Team for Kandahar City:

Allies Make Way for U.S. Troop Influx in Afghanistan
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703302604575293880767637918.html

KABUL—The influx of American forces into southern Afghanistan is redrawing the coalition's command structure there, giving Washington a decisive say in the unfolding campaign at the expense of allies such as Canada and Britain...

The change is most notable in Kandahar province, where the campaign's most critical offensive is planned this year. The Canadian military—currently in charge of coalition forces in Afghanistan's second-largest city and in surrounding districts—will see its battle space shrink mostly to one rural district, Panjway, by the end of the summer, U.S. officials say [emphasis added]...

The Kandahar-based commander of Regional Command South, British Maj. Gen. Nick Carter, is expected to be followed by the commanding general of the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division once Gen. Carter's term runs out in the fall, coalition officials say. With Regional Command East traditionally headed by the U.S., this would put American generals in charge of all three coalition commands in the insurgency's main areas of operations...

In Kandahar province, the 2nd Brigade Combat Team of the U.S. Army's 101st Airborne Division is slated to take over the insurgent-affected districts of Zhari and Arghandab north of Kandahar city from the Canadian-commanded Task Force Kandahar in the next month or two. Then, in August, the 1st Brigade Combat Team of the U.S. Army's 4th Infantry Division
http://www.carson.army.mil/units/4id/units/1stbde/1stbdeindex.html
http://www.dvidshub.net/units/1BCT-4ID
is scheduled to assume responsibility over Kandahar city itself
[emphasis added], coalition officials say.

Task Force Kandahar, which currently commands thousands of American troops in the area, has had to deal with embarrassing distractions over the past few weeks. Its commander, Brig. Gen. Daniel Menard, who had pledged to "break the Taliban's back" by May, was fined 3,500 Canadian dollars (about $3,300) at a court martial that month for negligently firing rifle rounds on the Kandahar airfield, an incident that occurred in the presence of the Canadian military's chief of staff. Days later, the Canadian military announced that it was relieving Gen. Menard of command and sending him home because of separate allegations of an improper personal relationship with a female subordinate...

Canada's shrinking role in Kandahar, where the provincial governor holds a Canadian passport, is a sensitive issue for Ottawa, which launched several large "signature projects" to develop the province and leave long-lasting influence. Similar sensibilities exist in Britain, where the government is eager that London's smaller role in Helmand not be seen as "Americans doing the job that we were not capable to do," Mr. Chalmers says...

In Kandahar, "Canada was put in a position of having to fight for a draw instead of going for a win," says retired Canadian Maj. Gen. Lewis MacKenzie. "Now, we'll be able to do the job the way we want it because we have allies with us."

Mark
Ottawa
 
From BruceR. at Flit:

Sunk-cost fallacy watch
http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2010_06_09.html

Canada's signature project in Afghanistan, not going well...

Mark
Ottawa
 
It seems that even the media are coming around to recognize we need a more coherent debate.  We need to (and should have from the start) identify what our objective is (what do we want to achieve), we need to determine what resources are required to achieve the objective/objectives, and we need something of performance metrics to gauge success and indicate where/when effort & resources should be applied or reduced.  This all starts (should have started) with the political debate too determine our goals/end-state.

Embrace debate on Afghan role
Editorial
Winnipeg Free Press
07 Jun 2010

Editorial An all-party fact-finding commission has just returned from Afghanistan.

The opposition members of the commission, having finally found some facts about an issue they have ben harping on for two years now, appear to be willing to reconsider the Canadian presence in that country.

After spending five days on the ground in Kandahar province, where most Canadian combat troops are deployed, they have returned more open-minded about the possibility of at least some Canadian troops remaining in Afghanistan after 2011. "We have an obligation to see this thing through," Liberal MP Bob Rae told the Commons special committee on the Canadian mission in Afghanistan. "I just want to say on behalf of the Liberal party that we are very committed to a role post-2011." He did not rule out that Canadian troops might play a part in that role. Nor did NDP MP Jack Harris when he said we must make sure the sacrifices made by Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan remain meaningful "by doing something that has a lasting effect on Kandahar." That's a far cry and a far more temperate tone than we heard in 2008 when this debate over the Canadian role in Afghanistan came to a head. Back then, the opposition parties were adamant that Canada set a definite date for withdrawal of its combat troops from Afghanistan -- cutting and running as it is more commonly called -- as if wars could be fought by consulting calendars.

The Conservative government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper disagreed, but facing defeat by a united opposition, it acquiesced and there has been little debate about the issue since. Canada is under some pressure from the United States and its other NATO allies to maintain a military presence after 2011, even if it is in a non-combat role, but a majority of the Canadian public seems to agree with the withdrawal date and even Mr. Harper now appears firmly committed to the notion.

The prime minister was almost rude in his rejection of United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's plea in March that Canada reconsider 2011, and in Paris on Friday he was perceptibly cool to news that the opposition might be willing to reconsider keeping troops in Afghanistan in a non-combat role but armed and in a position to protect Canadian aid workers and assist in reconstruction.

"I note those words with some interest... I think we've been very clear." What Mr. Harper seems to think he is clear about is that his government intends to stick to the 2008 parliamentary resolution to cut and run. "That continues to be our work plan," he said, despite Mr. Rae's comment that "The door is open to a serious discussion in Canada, and then between Canada and NATO, about what the future looks like." The future of Canada and Afghanistan could take many different shapes, despite Mr. Harper's inexplicable obstinacy last week. The all-party commission that visited Kandahar clearly found the occasion to be an eye-opener and the opposition -- the Liberals and the NDP, at least -- now appears willing to consider what shape the future should take beyond a straightforward, complete military withdrawal.

There has been almost no debate since 2008 about continuing a combat role, but there are other options, more useful and honourable ones than unqualified withdrawal, that the committee and Parliament can consider as the clock ticks down to 2011.

This is an opening the federal government should welcome rather than greet with the intransigence Mr. Harper showed in Paris. The Tories always opposed the 2011 deadline and Canadians know they and their country have invested too much blood and money in Afghanistan to ever be completely clear of that conflict until it is over. Nor should we want to be clear of it until then. Canada's role there does not have to remain what it was -- the military is perhaps too exhausted now to continue as it has -- but the opportunity to debate what that role should be is now open again and Canadians, and their politicians, should embrace it.

We can't abandon Afghanistan
Michael den Tandt
07 Jun 2010

For many months now, since before the last election, all parties in the House of Commons have insisted that no Canadian soldiers will remain in Afghanistan after July of 2011.

Each time Prime Minister Stephen Harper has been asked about this (most famously in March, after U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made a public pitch for a continuing mission during a state visit) the answer has been a flat no. No combat, no humanitarian component, no nothing. We're done. Harper took this position because, though an early supporter of the mission, he wasn't willing to expend political capital to keep it going. With the opposition Liberals and New Democrats clamoring at every turn for a speedy withdrawal and Canadians increasingly weary of casualties, Harper made a simple political calculation and took the issue off the table.

A recent all-party Commons committee trip to Afghanistan may change all that. After five days in Kabul and Kandahar, Liberal Bob Rae, New Democrat Jack Harris and Conservative Laurie Hawn apparently now agree that Canada should carry on post 2011, if only in a training capacity, and with a much smaller contingent of troops.

This would involve "inside the wire" work only, proponents of this option stipulate. In simple terms it means no more overland missions in LAV III armoured vehicles, which leave troops vulnerable to suicide bombers and IED ambushes. And it means, obviously, no combat missions.

ALWAYS A RISK

Is this realistic? And would it reduce the risks of operating in Afghanistan to zero? The answer to the first question is, somewhat. The answer to the second is no. Staying inside the wire will reduce risk substantially but never entirely. Afghanistan is a dangerous place at the best of times. There is always the risk of rocket attack.

Are these reduced risks worth running, given Canada's long-standing engagement in Afghanistan and given that our most important ally, the United States, is clearly committed now to establishing a basic level of security in the country?

Yes. If there is a way to continue to help, that allows the CF to greatly reduce its burden and the risk of casualties, then Canada should do so.

Canada in Afghanistan Keeping boots on the ground
Editorial
Globe & Mail
07 Jun 2010

It has taken an on-the-ground visit for some MPs to understand the need for an ongoing Canadian military presence in Afghanistan after 2011. It is about time, and the refreshing openness shown by MPs ought to bring about a new discussion about exactly how Canada will transition from its offensive posture in Kandahar next year.

The motivations for keeping soldiers on the ground, in whatever configuration, may differ. For some, like the NDP's Jack Harris, it is about honouring the memory of the dead soldiers' work there.

For others, such as the Liberals' Bob Rae or the Conservatives' Laurie Hawn, the need to continue working with the NATO mission, and to continue working for the development of Kandahar, are paramount.

Stephen Harper, meanwhile, continues to hew to a tight script, saying that "we are working according to the parliamentary resolution that was adopted in 2008 by which Canada's military mission will end and will transition to a civilian and development mission at the end of 2011." That resolution, which currently governs Canada's mission to the country, has become a straitjacket, confining debate around the Canadian mission rather than enabling it.

The institutions that will ultimately allow Afghans to govern themselves in relative peace and security are the national police and army. Canada has been deeply involved in training Afghan security forces, and that work must continue beyond 2011, especially since there has been less progress than hoped for: Afghan forces are still too reliant on NATO support in the field, are still prone to acts of corruption and torture, and still unable to protect their own people, underscored by Sunday's resignation of the country's interior minister and intelligence chief. Development work in and around Kandahar, meanwhile, will continue to require a security presence.

Canada can continue all of this without the offensive posture that much of the mission has assumed in recent years. But to do so with no Canadian security presence at all, relying entirely on other NATO or Afghan forces, is to outsource the protection of Canadian civilians entirely, and that is not acceptable.

Few Canadians can go to Afghanistan to witness the Canadian military and civilian efforts there. That MPs of different parties have returned with such relative agreement on keeping an armed presence is remarkable, indicating that the parliamentary resolution is increasingly at odds with the task that lies ahead.

Canadians have died in Afghanistan in numbers too great to comprehend or accept. But, knowing that an offensive role will end, Canadian soldiers can still play an instrumental role in delivering its promise to the Afghan people and helping to secure the country.

Just what is it we must see through in Afghanistan?
Comment  on: "We have an obligation to see this thing through," Liberal foreign-affairs critic Bob Rae said upon returning from Afghanistan.
Jeffrey Simpson
Globe & Mail
09 Jun 2010

Just what is this "thing" that must be seen through? A military defeat of the Taliban and its allies? A peaceful, democratic Afghanistan? A regional settlement? A demonstrably rising standard of living? A diminution of the poppy trade? Defining the "thing" in Afghanistan has been a shifting target, and it so remains. Nine years into the war, violence has spread to previously peaceful parts of the country, and is nowhere near ended in the southern and eastern provinces, especially Kandahar, where Canadians are stationed until the end of 2011.

When speaking of the "thing," it's worth remembering what one of the greatest military strategists of all time once remarked.

General Carl von Clausewitz, the Prussian thinker, said: "Once the effort required gets so huge that it is no longer balanced by the value of the political purpose, it must be abandoned." Von Clausewitz's dictum applies in spades to Afghanistan. The Americans are vastly increasing their presence, at great financial cost to their treasury at a time when it is broke. Canada has already lost 147 soldiers, with many others wounded - a number the government will not reveal. The effort by those two countries, to say nothing of others, has indeed been "huge," given that NATO publics are largely against the war, for a political purpose whose goal might be laudable but whose achievement is dubious.

It is estimated by the U.S. military that a successful counterinsurgency takes about 13 years, if conditions are right. If the recent U.S.

buildup is the starting point, does anyone really believe the Americans will spend a decade fighting in Afghanistan, when their country is fiscally busted and their people tired of war? If the starting point is taken to be the eviction by force of the Taliban nine years ago, that still leaves four tough years ahead.

The Americans are making a bet that the application of considerable force in a short space of time can squeeze the Taliban. To this end, they will bring the fight to the Taliban, assuming the Taliban are willing to give fight and finance warlords who will fight the Taliban for regional control with U.S. money.

It is unclear whether the "thing" in U.S. thinking involves squeezing the Taliban military so that at least some of its leaders might negotiate with the government in Kabul, or defeating the Taliban militarily.

Either way, time is not on the Americans' side, since they and NATO are interlopers in a country that has always resented outsiders.

The Americans have already indicated they are going to be pulling out, so why would anyone believe the short-term application of military force will work over the long haul, when the Americans are not in for that haul? An argument can be made that since NATO went in together, its countries should exit together; that is, some kind of alliance solidarity should be shown. Perhaps this is the "thing" to which Mr. Rae referred, in which case Canada could remain after 2011 far from the battlefield, training the Afghan army and carrying out aid programs.

The nub of that issue is training. Training, to be effective, is not done with chalk and a board, but involves accompanying troops as they fight, and fighting with them if necessary. Are Canadians, and are Liberals in particular, prepared for that kind of mission? It would seem that Mr. Rae is ready, but then as we are learning, when a designated spokesperson for the Liberal Party speaks, he or she apparently is speaking without much party authority, such is the division within the caucus.

Everyone is assuming that history would repeat itself - that if the Taliban returned to control some portion of Afghanistan, it would take over the entire country and invite its pals from al-Qaeda back to establish training camps to plot massacres of Americans and other infidels.

Both prospects are possible of course but unlikely, given the tribal nature of Afghanistan and changes in Pakistan, where the government finally understands the Taliban threat to that country.
 
A letter sent to the Globe in response to Mr Simpson's piece above and (so far) not published:

Jeffrey Simpson writes (Just what is it we must see through in Afghanistan? June 9), regarding the proposal that Canadian troops might continue in a training role after 2011, that "Training, to be effective, is not done with a piece of chalk and a board, but involves accompanying troops as they fight, and fighting with them if necessary."

That is not so.  Basic military training of Afghan recruits, officer training, training in technical skills (including the fledgling Afghan National Army Air Corps) and such things can be done quite effectively--in the Kabul area for example as has been suggested--without going "outside the wire" alongside the Afghans and engaging in combat.  After all that's how such training for our forces is done in Canada.

I would note that the Canadian Forces already are sending a small number of personal to engage in that sort of training in the Kabul area, as part of the fairly new NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan.

References:
http://ca.news.yahoo.com/s/capress/100408/national/afghan_cda_trainers_3 ["Some of the reinforcements will be sent to the NATO training centre in Kabul..."]
http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/Somnia/3015851/story.html
http://www.ntm-a.com/

And some earlier clarification of the "wire" matter from BruceR. at Flit:

Inside the wire
http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2010_06_07.html#006734

On the Question Period TV show this weekend, Liberal foreign affairs critic Bob Rae said the Liberals supported the deployment of Canadian soldiers as trainers "inside the wire" in Afghanistan.
http://watch.ctv.ca/news/ctvs-question-period/june-6/#clip310245

That sounds easier than it is. Afghan police and soldiers are trained on their own bases, obviously, but those are not "inside" coalition military facilities in any real sense. Afghans of any kind aren't normally allowed free run of ISAF military facilities, so the two have to remain physically distinct. So really what you're talking about is "inside the Afghan wire," at least part of the time: in other words, either cohabiting with Afghans, or failing that, "commuting" from a nearby ISAF base.

Which can be fine, of course, given some sensible precautions: I always felt quite safe in those sorts of situations...

Mark
Ottawa
 
Several forward (and backward) looking pieces:

Karzai Is Said to Doubt West Can Defeat Taliban (by Dexter Filkins)
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/12/world/asia/12karzai.html?hp

KABUL, Afghanistan — Two senior Afghan officials were showing President Hamid Karzai  the evidence of the spectacular rocket attack on a nationwide peace conference earlier this month when Mr. Karzai told them that he believed the Taliban were not responsible.

“The president did not show any interest in the evidence — none — he treated it like a piece of dirt,” said Amrullah Saleh, then the director of the Afghan intelligence service.

Mr. Saleh declined to discuss Mr. Karzai’s reasoning in more detail. But a prominent Afghan with knowledge of the meeting, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said that Mr. Karzai suggested in the meeting that it might have been the Americans who carried it out.

Minutes after the exchange, Mr. Saleh and the interior minister, Hanif Atmar, resigned — the most dramatic defection from Mr. Karzai’s government since he came to power nine years ago. Mr. Saleh and Mr. Atmar said they quit because Mr. Karzai made clear that he no longer considered them loyal.

But underlying the tensions, according to Mr. Saleh and Afghan and Western officials, was something more profound: That Mr. Karzai had lost faith in the Americans and NATO to prevail in Afghanistan.

For that reason, Mr. Saleh and other officials said, Mr. Karzai has been pressing to strike his own deal with the Taliban and the country’s archrival, Pakistan, the Taliban’s longtime supporter. According to a former senior Afghan official, Mr. Karzai’s maneuverings involve secret negotiations with the Taliban outside the purview of American and NATO officials.

“The president has lost his confidence in the capability of either the coalition or his own government to protect this country,” Mr. Saleh said in an interview at his home. “President Karzai has never announced that NATO will lose, but the way that he does not proudly own the campaign shows that he doesn’t trust it is working.”

People close to the president say he began to lose confidence in the Americans last summer, after national elections in which independent monitors determined that nearly one million ballots had been stolen on Mr. Karzai’s behalf. The rift worsened in December, when President Obama announced that he intended to begin reducing the number of American troops by the summer of 2011.

“Karzai told me that he can’t trust the Americans to fix the situation here,” said a Western diplomat in Kabul, who spoke on condition of anonymity. “He believes they stole his legitimacy during the elections last year. And then they said publicly that they were going to leave.”..

They must know our mission is doomed
Cameron and Clegg have made a calculation: sacrifice more soldiers in Afghanistan to keep on side with the US
(by Matthew Paris, usual copyright disclaimer)
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/matthew_parris/article7148482.ece

David Cameron has picked a fine time to make his Afghan debut. Convoy torched; helicopter shot down; the two security advisers to President Karzai whom the West most trusts resigned; and 29 Nato and British servicemen killed in nine days.

The photograph in Thursday’s Times of a burnt-out convoy of Nato supply trucks bound for Afghanistan took me back: not to Afghanistan, but to an earlier visit and another place.

More than 12 years ago I stood at the head of the Asherum Pass in the baking heat of the low, dry mountains of northern Eritrea. “The bodies — thousands of them —”, I wrote in The Times, “have been taken away, but the Russian tanks are still scattered across the valley like children’s war-toys, smashed and discarded. Everything shows the marks of burning. What a way to die . . . fried alive in those cast-iron coffins of tanks and trucks.”

Who now remembers the twists, turns, causes — or even the consequences — of that brutal, pointless, idiotic conflict? I would today be trying my Editor’s patience by devoting even a paragraph’s space to a war that ended hardly 20 years ago, killed up to half a million people, and cost the Soviet Union perhaps £8 billion. What was that one all about? Who cares now? At the time we all (including this newspaper) had opinions about who should win, and why; but the truth is that the Eritrean war was just a stupid and confused mess, in which no nation’s ambitions finally succeeded, no nation’s fears were properly conceived, and everybody lost. Thus, in a waste of rusting gun-metal, do geopolitical strategies die.

There are reports that in the ambush of military supply trucks bound for Afghanistan this week more than 50 vehicles were torched and destroyed, and many of their drivers murdered too. Appearing alongside our photo of the ambushed convoy was a report that a US helicopter (on a mission to rescue injured British troops) was shot down in Afghanistan this week, killing four American servicemen.

It has been little noted, but should be, that air transport — the backbone to military logistics in Afghanistan — has so far escaped serious attention from the insurgency. I remember wondering, while flying low and slow in a lumbering freight-carrier across the mountains from Kabul to Uruzgan last year, for how much longer that would continue to be the case, or what could be done if it ceases to be. The Afghan National Army (to which, in the crazed imagination of our own military propagandists, we hope to be handing over the conduct of operations “as soon as possible”) doesn’t even possess a serious air capability.

So let’s get this straight: Afghanistan’s own army can’t shoulder, their own air capability can’t support, and their own economy can’t pay for, this war. And that’s reckoning without the corrupt and impotent Government in Kabul we are there to shore up. Some exit strategy.

How did we get ourselves into this? In a powerfully sustained inquiry by this newspaper’s defence team, The Times this week has gone a long way toward explaining how we British did get ourselves into it. Military chiefs and politicians put the exhortatory Tally-ho! before the more inquisitive What-ho? The melancholy Heigh-ho will follow, in due course. The covering of backs has started already but the truth is that many people actually wanted a fight...

[See:
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/afghanistan/article7147041.ece
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/afghanistan/article7147160.ece  ]

David Cameron and Nick Clegg must know in their hearts that this Nato-Isaf operation is doomed. But pull the rug from beneath America’s feet now — now, of all times, when we’re trying to save BP from the wrath of President Obama? No. The Prime Minister and his deputy have made a calculation [emphasis added--it's all about an oil company?].

In one side of the balance they have placed the lives of servicemen alive today, but who will die in Afghanistan in what (when we finally, like the Russians before us, abandon a client government to its fate) will be seen to have been a hopeless cause.

In the other side of the balance they have placed the value of Britain’s friendship with America; the share price of BP (with its consequences for our economy); the goodwill of militarists in Mr Cameron’s own and (led by Paddy Ashdown) Mr Clegg’s parties; the goodwill of much of the media (including, I suspect, this newspaper); the trust of millions who genuinely still believe we are capable of underwriting our own security by guaranteeing a stable state in Afghanistan; and the respect of millions more whose instinct would be that the humiliation of an early exit is just too high a price to pay...

Plus two views (reflecting a rather different Weltanschauung from ours, time to look inside some G-20 heads as well as G-7?) from former senior Indian civil servants, the first a former deputy minister of foreign affairs, the second an assistan secretary to the cabinet (in our terms): 

Afghanistan: the march of folly (though how he expects a UN peackeeping force to work beats me, that's in effect what ISAF originally was when confined to the Kabul area) 
http://beta.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article453206.ece?homepage=true 

AFGHANISTAN: INDIAN OPTIONS
http://ramansterrorismanalysis.blogspot.com/2010/06/afghanistan-indian-options.html 

Via Moby Media Updates: 
http://mobygroup.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=category&sectionid=8&id=35&Itemid=50 

Mark 
Ottawa
 
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