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Afghanistan: Why we should be there (or not), how to conduct the mission (or not) & when to leave

What's it all been about?

Canada’s Afghan legacy unclear (usual copyright disclaimer)
http://www.torontosun.com/news/canada/2011/03/12/17593981.html

KANDAHAR, Afghanistan - The Canadian mission in Afghanistan is ending, and in about four months, the majority of Canada's soldiers will come home.

Now that the Canadian Forces have spent almost 10 years marching on Afghan soil and evading homemade bombs, it's time to assess the situation.

The danger in this country has never been more difficult to detect for allied troops. Coalition soldiers continue to travel the roads hoping to evade a detonation which would pulverize their convoys.

Media from all over have descended upon this country to report on the reality of this mission. What will remain when all foreign soldiers leave?

In Kandahar, many hope to leave and turn a page. At home, families who are also in combat - but from a distance - hope for an end without any more tragedy.

During the course of Canada's involvement in Afghanistan, Prime Minister Stephen Harper succeeded Paul Martin, who took over from Jean Chretien, the man in charge when the country decided to enter the war.

What have Canadians citizens remembered about this oft-criticized mission?

Since Canadian troops landed in Afghanistan in 2002, 158 Canadians have lost their lives: 154 members of the military, two humanitarian workers, one journalist and one diplomat.

These people shouldn't become a banal statistic or another face in a mosaic.

After the summer, Canada is scheduled to have 950 soldiers and support staff left in Afghanistan until 2014 to help train the Afghan army.

The majority of soldiers will be stationed in the capital, Kabul.

No soldier is supposed to stay in Kandahar, the most volatile Afghan province, where close to 3,000 Canadian soldiers have been stationed since 2005. The Forces insist that fighting against the insurgency is ending. So far, the war has cost Canada $7 billion.

According to retired colonel Michel W. Drapeau [the media's go-to guy for someone ex-military to be critical of the CF], the goal of Canada's mission in Afghanistan, particularly in Kandahar, has never been clear.

"Was it a mission to destroy or neutralize the Taliban?" he asked. "Was it to control the territory, to render it safe for the local population, or was it to gain time to allow for the Afghan authorities to take control of their own security?"

The results of the war are not clear either, he said.

"I don't know if we lost the war in Afghanistan, but I know that we didn't win it," he said. "In fact, I have a hard time quantifying what we won in this conflict."

However, Drapeau said the Afghan war has restored the Canadian Forces in the eyes of Canadians and Canada's allies. The Forces have regained their reputation, he said.

Mark
Ottawa
 
On this, "... the goal of Canada's mission in Afghanistan, particularly in Kandahar, has never been clear", however, Drapeau is quite correct. If there is no strategic aim - and I would argue there has never been one, not since 2001 - then how in hell can the CF a have clear mission, much less goals and objectives and all that? Maybe he's just like a stopped clock - right twice a day - but he is right on that point.
 
E.R. Campbell: I would say that for several years Canada's and ISAF's strategic goal has been to hold off, and hurt as much as possible, the Talibs whilst the ANSF are built up to take over the job.  That latter part however has been a very long time in the works; the first part has only really moved forward since the various US surges, beginning with Bush's first very modest ground one in Sept. 2008:
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gYzezvQJllNb71qrzwSoXLF_DdeA

A combat aviation brigade was then ordered deployed under Bush in December, and the planning was done for what became the early 2009 first Obama surge:
http://firstread.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2008/12/19/4438123-us-to-double-troops-in-afghanistan
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/03/AR2009020302858.html?hpid=topnews

Mark
Ottawa
 
On Canada's goals:
(from here)

•maintain a more secure environment and establish law and order by building the capacity of the Afghan National Army and Police, and support complementary efforts in the areas of justice and corrections;
•provide jobs, education, and essential services, like water;
•provide humanitarian assistance to people in need, including refugees; and
•enhance the management and security of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
Nationally, Canada is helping to:

•build Afghan institutions that are central to our Kandahar priorities and support democratic processes such as elections; and
•contribute to Afghan-led political reconciliation efforts aimed at weakening the insurgency and fostering a sustainable peace.

Granted, this was issued in 2008.

There is more info at that site.
 
Unfortunately but honestly the above is, in terms of strategy--specifically military, gov't propaganda.  Except maybe for the first bullet.

Mark
Ottawa
 
Where are we?

Petraeus to face Congress as Afghanistan war doubts grow
Gen. David Petraeus will report progress, but top intelligence analysts say the U.S. troop surge has failed to fundamentally undermine the Taliban.

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-petraeus-20110315,0,33454.story

...When Gen. David H. Petraeus appears before Congress on Tuesday to tout progress in Afghanistan, he will face a series of pessimistic assessments about the state of the war, including the intelligence community's conclusion that tactical gains achieved by a U.S. troop surge have failed to fundamentally weaken the Taliban.

A year after the launch of a revamped counterinsurgency strategy, several major obstacles persist: The government of President Hamid Karzai is viewed as corrupt and ineffective, the Taliban exhibits a fierce will to fight, and the enemy enjoys safe havens in the tribal areas of Pakistan that drone strikes can disrupt but not eliminate, according to public U.S. intelligence assessments.

The difficulties raise questions about whether the U.S. is achieving sustainable gains in a 10-year-old war that is costing lives and billions of dollars, and whether the strategy can work on the timetable proposed by the Obama administration...

"I don't think there's any question about the tactical successes that the … forces led by Gen. Petraeus have enjoyed, particularly in light of the surge," National Intelligence Director James R. Clapper told Congress last week. "I think the issue, the concern that the intelligence community has, is after that, and the ability of the Afghan government to pick up their responsibility for governance."

At the same hearing, Gen. Ronald Burgess, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, offered a sobering view — one that is shared by the CIA, U.S. officials say — that contrasted sharply with the optimism expressed in recent days by Petraeus, who will appear before the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates.

"The Taliban in the south has shown resilience and still influences much of the population, particularly outside urban areas," Burgess said, speaking of a region where the U.S. has been focusing many of its resources.

The U.S.-led coalition has been killing Taliban militants by the hundreds, he said, but there has been "no apparent degradation in their capacity to fight…. We have enjoyed tactical defeats and operational successes against the Taliban. However, the Taliban does remain resilient and will be able to threaten U.S. and international goals in Afghanistan through 2011 [emphasis added, these people sure are frank compared to ours]."

Gates traveled to Afghanistan last week and declared that the current strategy was working...

A report March 2 by the British Parliament's foreign affairs committee concluded that despite the "optimistic progress appraisals we heard from some military and official sources … the security situation across Afghanistan as a whole is deteriorating." Counterinsurgency efforts in the south and east have "allowed the Taliban to expand its presence and control in other previously relatively stable areas in Afghanistan."..

Mark
Ottawa
 
Our new training mission seems to have been overlooked:

Keeping The Peace In Afghanistan
AW&ST, March 16
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/dti/2011/03/01/DT_03_01_2011_p39-291333.xml

This fall marks the 10th anniversary of U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan. Despite more than $50 billion in reconstruction funds that have poured into the country—$29 billion of which have gone to Afghan security forces, with an additional $11 billion slated to be spent this year—even the most optimistic assessments are that little progress has been made in rule of law, governance and security.

Now that Washington and Kabul have tagged 2014 as the year that the Afghan National Security Forces will begin taking the lead for the country’s security, the push is on to train and field as many members of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) as possible. While NATO trainers have made huge strides in professionalizing the force and growing their ranks while speeding up training schedules, constant combat and staggering attrition call into question how much can really be expected of these forces in a few short years. Chief among the worries is the sorry state of the ANP, whose training and welfare was, until 2009, almost an afterthought.

In December, U.S. Army Lt. Col. Brian Lamson, chief police strategist for NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTMA), told an audience in Washington that “we are right now just at the starting gate of the professionalization of the [police] force.” It was only in November 2009 that NTMA—which has responsibility for training and supporting all Afghan forces—was stood up and began consolidating where and how Afghan police were trained. Up to that point, training was decentralized, disorganized and a mishmash of contractors, military police, infantry from NATO countries and international police units.

Maj. Gen. Stuart Beare of the Canadian Armed Forces, who serves as deputy police commander for NTMA, told DTI last month that “a year ago you could have gone to different police training centers and you would have had national variations of what they thought a patrolman would need to be, or Afghan civil order police or border police needed to be. Today, there’s one program of instruction developed by us with the Afghan interior ministry, which is the standard against which we train.”..

One big problem with the training program for the ANP and ANA is attrition, which includes desertions and casualties—killed and wounded. The numbers are stunning. In August 2010, the head of NTMA, U.S. Army Gen. William Caldwell, estimated that to increase the police force from the current 115,000 to the goal of 134,000 by October 2011, NATO would have to recruit, train and assign almost 56,000 men to meet that augmentation target of 19,000. The remaining 37,000 recruits would melt away at some point during the process. When asked about attrition, Beare admitted that “if we continue to perform at last year’s rates, we won’t get to 115,000.”

While Beare says that attrition rates are getting better, the numbers still don’t inspire much confidence in the health of the force, or its future as an effective institution...

There are 850 professional police trainers working at seven training centers around the country, a mix of American and NATO trainers, as well as contractors. Still, the police training system is short 290 trainers, and despite repeated pleas—and promises from allies—there doesn’t look to be any more trainers coming [emphasis added]. Despite this, Jack Segal, former chief political adviser to the commander of the NATO Joint Force Command in Afghanistan, says that he thinks Afghanistan can eventually achieve a reasonable police force, but that “we need to reassess that it needs to be national. I don’t think it needs to be—but that requires a strategy.”..

Mark
Ottawa
 
Conclusion of a lengthy piece at Foreign Policy's "AfPak Channel":

My Embed with a Warlord
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/11/my_embed_with_a_warlord

...
A few days later, we took a U.S. Black Hawk helicopter with Daoud to a remote part of a neighboring province. At a dusty police and army post, there was a little ceremony for insurgents who were "reintegrating." They lined up to be presented with gifts of chapans, traditional Afghan coats made of thick, warm material with a bright green and red stripe. The local police chief threw the coats over the insurgents' shoulders and shook hands. They looked embarrassed to be there. The atmosphere was muted. "We are just simple farmers," said one. "We had to join the Taliban. They were in our village. We had no choice."

But as we left, one of the Taliban issued a quiet threat to our interpreter: "If we see you again, we'll cut your throat," he said, under his breath. (They were also well armed for farmers: Kalashnikovs, heavy machine guns, and rocket-propelled grenades. The police had taken the precaution of having the firing pins removed from the weapons for the ceremony.) Daoud told me that "within 100 days" the defecting Taliban could expect to be offered jobs in the local police. A few weeks ago, they had been manning Taliban checkpoints on the main road through the district. Soon they would be doing the same thing for the police. This was what reintegration meant in practice.

NATO commanders are pleased with the way the offensive is going in the north. Daoud seems to be one of their favorite Afghan officers. He gets things done. In provinces like Baghlan, village after village is falling to the government. It looks as if the Taliban are being routed -- certainly that is what Western officials would like to think. But how solid are these gains? Will they stand up to a Taliban summer offensive? If villagers, and some Taliban themselves, can change sides so easily, they can change back again. The hard-line, ideological Taliban returning from Pakistan with the warm weather will try to turn the momentum of the conflict back again.

The battle for Afghanistan is a battle for public opinion, and most Afghans just want to be on the winning side. With the push for "transition" to Afghan security control, the country's forces are on the offensive, eager to show NATO they can take territory from the insurgents. For ordinary people, then, "transition" may mean that one group of gunmen is replaced by another, Taliban exchanged for arbakis. And reintegration may mean it is the same group of gunmen all along.

Mark
Ottawa
 
A article which I thought was very interesting:

New York Times

Pressure Mounts on All Parties in Afghan War to Begin Talks
By ALISSA J. RUBIN
March 16, 2011
Pressure Mounts on All Parties in Afghan War to Begin Talks
By ALISSA J. RUBIN
KABUL, Afghanistan — As American troops press the Taliban in their desert and mountain redoubts, Western diplomats, Taliban leaders and the Afghan government have begun to take a hard look at what it would take to start a negotiation to end the fighting.

Efforts to start peace talks have yielded little in the past. Nonetheless, interest in a political track is growing as pressure mounts to find a palatable way to reduce the military commitment here and as public support for the war ebbs in the United States and Europe.

“The environment is shifting,” said a Western diplomat here, who echoed a number of others interviewed. “If the Taliban make a decision they are interested, things could move quite quickly.”

Publicly, at least, the Taliban have always stated that they will not negotiate before foreign troops leave the country. Now, however, some Taliban leaders have signaled that they will be open to talks sooner if their security can be guaranteed, and rank-and-file fighters appear increasingly eager to see an end to the war.

For their part, United States officials have also been adamant that they will not talk to top Taliban or other insurgent leaders they consider to be “irreconcilable.” But recently they have quietly begun reducing the obstacles to talks.

In February, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, in a speech at the Asia Society in New York, appeared to recast longstanding preconditions for talks: that the insurgents lay down their arms, accept the Afghan Constitution and separate from Al Qaeda. Instead, she described them as “necessary outcomes.”

Officially, the State Department played down the change in language, but a senior Western diplomat in Washington, who was familiar with the strategy behind Mrs. Clinton’s speech, said: “It was not intentional to explicitly make preconditions into outcomes. But the text now leaves room for interpretation, which opens doors.”

Intentional or not, the speech was read in Kabul as giving a green light to other Western countries to start laying the groundwork for talks.

“The seismic shift here was Hillary Clinton’s speech,” said a diplomat here. “This is liberating for other countries who want to try to facilitate a negotiation.”

It is the American nod that many have been waiting for. Several countries, among them Saudi Arabia and Qatar, have tried to serve as peace brokers, but without the imprimatur of the United States. That the Americans are signaling that they are open to talks “is a paradigm shift,” said Rangin Dadfar Spanta, President Hamid Karzai’s national security adviser.

The Afghan government insists that the preconditions for talks remain the same but supports diplomatic efforts that would lead to negotiations, and it appears willing to provide amnesty and security for the Taliban leaders so that they can participate in talks unhindered.

The High Peace Council, which was appointed by Mr. Karzai, recently wrote letters to the Quetta Shura and the Peshawar Shura, two of the Taliban’s leadership organizations, inviting them to talk. A member of the council, Hajji Deen Mohammed, said the Taliban shuras replied with questions about whether the council had true autonomy and could ensure the safety of insurgent leaders.

“We are working on this process to find a location or safe haven for the Taliban to go there with protections and guarantees to talk to the Americans and the world,” said Arsala Rahmani, the former Taliban minister of higher education and now a member of the High Peace Council.

American officials in Washington said that allowing the Taliban to open an office in Turkey was a possible measure under active consideration, but that no decisions had been made.

“We have gotten approval for an office from Turkey, and if we have an office, then the world can come and the Taliban can come and within a week, once it’s set up, they will be talking,” said Mr. Rahmani, who is one of a handful of former Taliban officials who maintain contacts with the Quetta Shura.

Mr. Rahmani, however, is viewed as a moderate. When asked, a member of the Quetta Shura insisted that there were no talks at all. Several diplomats in touch with the Taliban indirectly said members of the leadership could not be seen to be reaching out to the West because then they would lose their ability to persuade Taliban foot soldiers to keep fighting.

The Taliban would also consider it vital that some of its leaders be removed from the United Nations sanctions list, which would allow them to obtain passports and travel outside Pakistan, where they are based, so that they could be part of negotiations, said Western diplomats.

Removing them from the list would also build confidence that American and Western officials were negotiating in good faith, as would releasing one or two high-profile Taliban fighters who are in detention in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, the diplomats said.

But the effort is fraught as well. Each application for a Taliban member’s removal from the list requires voluminous documentation and approval by each United Nations Security Council member. Russia, which fought a nine-year war with the Afghans, has been skeptical of efforts to remove any of them.

Another looming problem is Pakistan. The Taliban’s fortunes are intertwined with that of the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI, which helped to create the Taliban in the 1990s, but now the Taliban feel trapped by Pakistan. Some senior Taliban leaders have tried to negotiate with the Afghan government without Pakistan’s approval, including the No. 2 Taliban commander, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, who was arrested in Pakistan last year.

Other Taliban commanders, too, have been detained, threatened or even killed by Pakistani security forces, to press them to keep fighting.

The “Taliban won’t go for peace talks either in Pakistan or Afghanistan,” said Hajji Qar Mohammed, a senior tribal leader in Quetta who is close to the Taliban.

“In Pakistan the ISI won’t let them talk freely and say what the leadership wants, and in Afghanistan the Taliban leadership doesn’t trust Karzai’s administration,” he said.

Alissa J. Rubin reported in Kabul. Eric Schmitt contributed reporting from Washington, Carlotta Gall from Kabul and Taimoor Shah from Kandahar.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/17/world/asia/17taliban.html?hp=&pagewanted=print
 
It's no secret that I oppose staying in Afghanistan. We had it, as we used to say, made in the shade in 2006/07 in Kandahar and, therefore, in all of Afghanistan viz a viz the Taliban, anyway. But our erstwhile allies, including the USA, dropped the strategic ball - of anyone ever had a grip on it post about 2003 - and they, Europe and the USA, mainly, left us dangling when one or two or, at the outside, three brigades would have put paid to the Taliban, in its home base, in 2007 and now we find ourselves, still, holding on the shitty end of Merkel's and Obama's stick while they play domestic politics with our soldiers lives.

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from the National Post is an article that pretty well sums up the current fiasco:

http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2011/06/25/george-jonas-snatching-stalemate-from-the-jaws-of-victory/
George Jonas: Snatching stalemate from the jaws of victory

George Jonas  Jun 25, 2011

When U.S. President Barack Obama announced America’s planned troop withdrawals from Afghanistan this week, he aroused the ire of those who think Western forces shouldn’t withdraw before finishing the job, without scoring any points with those who think the U.S. and its allies shouldn’t have sent troops to do the job in the first place. Others, myself included, think it depends on what “the job” was supposed to be.

If the job was to depose a hostile regime that trained and sheltered enemy belligerents, troops were tailor-made for it. Whom would you have sent? Lyric poets? Social workers? No one? Let al-Qaeda roam at will? Maybe pay the Taliban a terrorists tax?

Nonsense. Our soldiers did what soldiers do flawlessly. They defeated the enemy. In Afghanistan they deposed the Taliban and installed Hamid Karzai as interim president by late 2001. In Iraq the Anglo-American forces did just as well: They sent Saddam Hussain scurrying into his spider hole within six weeks after hostilities began in the spring of 2003. By December of that year, Saddam had been captured. After hiding in caves, Osama bin Laden hunkered down in self-imprisonment in Pakistan. The troops had put both out of action long before they actually perished.

However, at the risk of sounding like a broken record, I’ll say again what I’ve been saying for years. If the job was to build a secular democracy in Afghanistan, it wasn’t a job for troops. It wasn’t a job for foreigners, period. It was (and continues to be) a job for Afghans.

By 2004 Karzai was elected as Afghan president. Whatever the governments of Iraq and Afghanistan were doing, they were no longer supporting terrorists or plotting against the West. They weren’t hostile powers anymore. By Dec. 7, 2004, the latest, our soldiers could have gone home from Afghanistan. From Iraq, they could have gone home even earlier, after Dec. 13, 2003. The military mission was over. The war was won.

Our problems started when, not content with winning the war, we wanted to win the peace. We changed the job description of our troops from “defeat an enemy regime” — a realistic task for which they had the weapons and the know-how — into “build a friendly nation” — an unrealistic task for which soldiers have neither talent nor equipment.

The mission-creep from regime change to nation building made for a creepy mission. It snatched stalemate from the jaws of victory. Now, even if we win, the dismal years after 2003-4 will have made the Western alliance’s gambit in Mesopotamia and the Hindu Kush the longest and costliest campaign in modern Western history — and the end isn’t yet in sight.

It wasn’t all arbitrary foolishness, of course. We had reasons. They sounded plausible. Some were plausible. It wasn’t a mistake to think, for instance, that an American pull-out after deposing Saddam may result in civil war in Iraq. The mistake was to think that American occupation would prevent it. It wasn’t a mistake to think that the coalition pulling out of Afghanistan might result in the Taliban seeping back. The mistake was to think that the coalition staying would keep the Taliban away.

What pulling out would have prevented wasn’t the Taliban seeping back, but the Taliban seeping back into our lap. We could have left behind a clean slate, instead of a slate soiled by a seeping Taliban. In 2004 we would have left at the top of the market, like a smart investor. Now we’ll leave at the bottom, like a chump. The rule is simple, really: If you don’t quit while you’re ahead, chances are you’ll quit while you’re behind.

Which is what Obama is proposing to do now. America — and Canada, too — are selling at the bottom of the market. Afghanistan is no more secure from the Taliban today than it was in 2004. It’s less secure. Then the Taliban was down in the dumps. Now it’s emboldened. Then it was coming off a string of defeats; now it’s on the march, with some victories under its belt.

Are there alternatives? It’s doubtful. The West isn’t going to annex Afghanistan or Iraq, which is the only way to build a nation. But after letting Afghans and Iraqis go their own way, we must learn to accept that solutions are as temporary as problems, and King Solomon’s “this too shall pass” applies to good times and bad times equally. A war isn’t futile just because it may have to be fought over again. A need for frequent repetition is what meals, baths and battles have in common.

One final note: In ages past the foe had to spy on America to find out its strategic intentions. Now he obtains them through White House press releases. Our twittering times are making intelligence agencies obsolete. We’re our own Wiki-leaks. “I’m withdrawing 33,000 troops by September, 2012,” says the commander-in-chief.

How would Obama respond to the suggestion he’s taking the bread out of the mouth of spies? I don’t know. Maybe he’d say: “Let them eat cake.”

National Post


One quibble: I'm not so sure history will give us - the US/NATO led West - credit for a stalemate. My guess is that 50 and 100 years from now this will be seen as another US defeat at the hands of yet another rag-tag national liberation 'movement.'

A bigger quibble; annexing Afghanistan or Iraq would never bring democracy. The Arabs and West Asians and North Africans all need two things before they can ever become real democracies - something better than the pale, illiberal imitations we see in most of the world :

1. A religious reformation; and

2. An intellectual, cultural, enlightenment.

Neither is likely to happen and the second probably depends upon the first.

We - the US led West - had a pretty clear aim is 2001/02 and some of us still had one again in 2005/06/07. But that "some of us' did  not include the USA or most of the big, rich, powerful European leaders. By 2003 the US had drifted into a totally aimless and ultimately useless fiasco in Iraq - which will not end with any of the USA's strategic objectives - such as they were - being achieved for anything but the most brief and temporary time periods. By 2005 Europe was tired of Afghanistan and wanted out.

We are still there because our government decided it was more important to appease a still important American ally than to pursue our own self interest. In effect we decided that appeasing the USA is our self interest.
 
While annexing and nation building in the traditiona manner isn't in the cards, there may still be one way to generate the "enlightenment" that is needed to stabilize these societies and bring about the peaceful and stable global situation we need for our own national interest.

What I will suggest is accepting lots of young people from the region to come to Canada on long term scholarships. This is hardly contestable on humanitarian or practical grounds, Afghanistan (or most other potential target nations) need doctors, plumbers, skilled tradesmen, bankers etc. We cannot plead poverty either, we should be able to devote resources on the same scale as we did on the military side of the equation (billions of dollars over almost 10 years). The key is to be able to send back a cadre of tens of thousands of people who not only have the skills, but who have also absorbed the cultural attitudes of Canadian society (or liberal western culture in general).

Think of this as a sort of insurgency in reverse. The families of the cadre will know that when their sons and daughters return they will be cared for, since the cadre members will by definition be able to earn much higher incomes on average (this will also ensure long term support for the program as more parents will want to put their children into the program). When the cadre begins to return, they will also form an attractor for people looking to get ahead, and a stark contrast to the sort of mindset and culture that currently exists.

Sadly, we had the chance to do something like that during our stay in the region, on our return to Kandahar it was reported that something like six million children had started going to school. If we had generously supported the school effort and utilized our military power to sheild and shepard the children through school, then by 2014 there wold be a cadre of six million trained and educated people able to take the reigns of Afghan society. (The primary difference here is there would be no garuntee that they would have western friendly attitudes).
 
As long as no-one goes near Colorado:

Sayyid Qutb's America
Al Qaeda Inspiration Denounced U.S. Greed, Sexuality
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1253796

Mark
Ottawa
 
Thucydides said:
While annexing and nation building in the traditiona manner isn't in the cards, there may still be one way to generate the "enlightenment" that is needed to stabilize these societies and bring about the peaceful and stable global situation we need for our own national interest.

What I will suggest is accepting lots of young people from the region to come to Canada on long term scholarships. This is hardly contestable on humanitarian or practical grounds, Afghanistan (or most other potential target nations) need doctors, plumbers, skilled tradesmen, bankers etc. We cannot plead poverty either, we should be able to devote resources on the same scale as we did on the military side of the equation (billions of dollars over almost 10 years). The key is to be able to send back a cadre of tens of thousands of people who not only have the skills, but who have also absorbed the cultural attitudes of Canadian society (or liberal western culture in general).

Think of this as a sort of insurgency in reverse. The families of the cadre will know that when their sons and daughters return they will be cared for, since the cadre members will by definition be able to earn much higher incomes on average (this will also ensure long term support for the program as more parents will want to put their children into the program). When the cadre begins to return, they will also form an attractor for people looking to get ahead, and a stark contrast to the sort of mindset and culture that currently exists.

Sadly, we had the chance to do something like that during our stay in the region, on our return to Kandahar it was reported that something like six million children had started going to school. If we had generously supported the school effort and utilized our military power to sheild and shepard the children through school, then by 2014 there wold be a cadre of six million trained and educated people able to take the reigns of Afghan society. (The primary difference here is there would be no garuntee that they would have western friendly attitudes).

And who would guarantee protection and income for the families for the 9 years that the young doctor is gone away to learn from the infidels?  And upon their return the doctor would work in a third-world hospital for which his first world skills would be unsuited and he would quickly pack up his family and move to Pakistan.
 
I have some, very limited, sympathy for Sen. Colin Kenny's position, outlined in this opinion piece, which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from the National Post.

(My 'sympathy' is limited to the fact that it is always difficult to be the first to utter an unpopular position; I recall, many years ago, being roundly and vigorously criticized for an essay that suggested that the Entente cordiale (1904) (between Britain and France) was the worst foreign policy blunder in nearly 1000 years of British history and that World War I was unnecessary and that if it had to happen Britain was on the wrong side – the wrong side being any side at all. I finally passed the course but only after having to face down irate professors who suggested that I dishonoured their late fathers, uncles, atc.)

http://www.nationalpost.com/news/Afghanistan+without+purpose/5062068/story.html
Afghanistan was a ar without purpose

Colin Kenny, National Post

Jul. 7, 2011

Canada deployed troops to Kandahar because General Rick Hillier, then chief of the defence staff, assured Paul Martin that the Taliban -the radical Islamic movement ousted from governing Afghanistan by the Americans in 2001 -was pretty well dead.

Today, in far too many parts of Afghanistan, the Taliban struts. Either Hillier's intelligence was unforgivably inadequate, or infusion of our troops and the troops of our NATO allies into Afghanistan actually brought the Taliban back to life. Either way -or more likely, both ways -this has not been an intelligent war for Canada.

When 157 Canadian soldiers have died fighting for what was advertised as a just and important cause, one is reluctant to say that the war didn't make sense. I, like others, hesitated in saying that at the outset, waiting patiently for an explanation from two prime ministers -Martin and Stephen Harper -as to why it did.

That explanation never came. It was never attempted, because it would have been picked apart by anyone with the least bit of strategic insight, and it might even have been picked apart by the Canadian electorate.

Canada has accomplished two things in Afghanistan, at enormous cost. It has soothed our most important allies, the Americans, who had been giving us the cold shoulder since we had refused to join them in Iraq. It has also given the Canadian army combat experience, which (for those soldiers whose bodies or minds are not shredded in the process) can be a real morale-booster.

Soldiers take pride in a job well done. Canadian soldiers have acquitted themselves nobly in Afghanistan, overcoming insufficient numbers and, on occasion, inadequate equipment. For those who have managed to make it through, there are good reasons to be proud.

We have pleased the Americans and our military selfimage has blossomed. Anyone who tells you we have accomplished much else of consequence in Afghanistan is dissembling.

Have we freed the Afghan people from the nasty Taliban? In some areas, perhaps, for now, at least during daylight hours. But we are leaving, and so are the Americans. And it is no longer a dirty little secret that the Americans are now trying to negotiate a deal that would give the Taliban a piece of governance now, and undoubtedly a lot more once the foreigners are gone.

Have we trained the Afghan army and police so they can defend democracy when our troops are gone? There may be improvements in the Afghan army's ability to fight, but nobody is pretending that this is a disciplined and motivated force that can stand up to the Taliban and win. Without NATO, they won't have artillery or air support. Sadly, right now one of the big issues is how many American soldiers are being killed by people wearing Afghan army uniforms, which should have meant they were on the same team. As for the police, they remain largely a band of brigands who shake down poor people for money because they can.

Have our hundreds of millions of dollars in aid money improved the lot of impoverished Afghans? Not so you'd notice. A few village projects seem to have taken root and a brokendown dam has been rehabilitated, but how many Afghans have been eradicated by the Taliban for co-operating with the infidel aid donors? Far too many. And how many girls are now going to school who weren't before we arrived? Far too few.

The truth is that Canada tried to pretend for a while that the mission was all about development, but we never had enough troops in place to give the kind of stability needed to do development. Aid money spent in needy stable countries tends to produce far more sustainable results than aid money spent amidst chaos.

Have we at least left a democratic, representative government in place that will give Afghans an alternative to the Taliban when we leave? We have not. What was identified as one of the most corrupt and inefficient governments in the world several years ago is still one of the most corrupt and inefficient governments in the world.

Have we at least denied al-Qaeda and their fellow travellers a home base? That would have been an achievement, but they were gone when we got there -off to Pakistan, Yemen and those many places that are far more difficult for the West to target.

Is hindsight 20-20 vision? Of course. But there were things we knew that should have stopped Paul Martin from accepting the advice of Rick Hillier that we go gung-ho into Kandahar, and should have stopped Stephen Harper from extending the mission.

We knew that Afghans are vehement in their hatred of foreigners -particularly infidel foreigners -occupying their land. They whumped mighty British invaders twice and humiliated the powerful Soviets, helping to bring the Soviet Union crashing to the ground. So it stood to reason that the Taliban -the enemy of the foreigners -would attract every recruit who found the infidel's presence repugnant. Sure enough, the once-diminished Taliban began to grow, and grow.

We soon knew that it would take far longer than we intended to stay to drag Afghanistan out of the Middle Ages. In 2007, Chris Alexander, Canada's ambassador to Afghanistan, estimated that it would take "five generations" to make a difference there.

We knew that drug money was fuelling the Taliban and that senior Afghan officials on "our side" were involved in the drug trade -the Americans spend enormous amounts of money tracking the kingpins of the drug trade everywhere it exists.

We knew -or soon knew -that we didn't have nearly enough Canadian troops in Kandahar to go toe-to-toe with the Taliban. By 2007 we were begging for more NATO support. But we didn't get any until more than 100,000 Americans finally showed up, not that their arrival solved an unsolvable problem -this was a war that couldn't be won.
We knew -or should have known -that the weapon of choice in terrorist circles is the improvised explosive device (IED), better known as the roadside bomb, and when you don't have helicopters to move your troops, you have to move them by land, which makes them more vulnerable to roadside bombs. We didn't have helicopters -we sold ours to the Netherlands in the Mulroney years. Sometimes we borrowed a helicopter from the pool, but mostly, until the government finally bought some from the Americans, we went by land. As a result, our mortality rate was significantly higher than those of our allies.

We knew that the Taliban could wait us out because it has all the time in the world -yet the House of Commons still attached a withdrawal date to our participation, making it clear to the enemy that we weren't determined to stay in for the long haul.

Most of all, we knew that Afghanistan was near the very bottom of anyone's list of countries important to Canada -no trade ties, no immigration ties, no strategic importance.

And yet we went, and stayed, and extended, and then got out, except for some cosmetic training duties, and nobody has ever explained why. Yes, we pleased the Americans. Yes, we gave our army combat experience. I acknowledge that these are not inconsequential achievements.

But I ask you to balance the ledger and ask yourself, "Did this war make sense to Canada?" And then you have to ask why, if it did make sense, no Canadian prime minister ever dared to explain why.

Colin Kenny is former chair of the Senate committee on national security and defence.
Kennyco@sen.parl.gc.ca


I want to resist the temptation of a paragraph by paragraph rebuttal, but ...

”Canada deployed troops to Kandahar because General Rick Hillier ...”: Bullsh!t, and what's worse Kenny, a fairly astute and well connected insider, knows it's BS. The “blame Hillier” lie has been pretty well debunked by scholar after scholar but Liberals cannot avoid repeating it. Canada deployed to Kandahar because we were, de facto, frozen out of the nice, safe, easy provinces by the Europeans ~ no one wanted Kandahar and our “voice” in NATO was too soft to be heard, something for which we can thank 40 years of (mostly Liberal) neglect of our role in the world, starting with that idiot Trudeau's 1970 piece of policy vandalism, 'A Foreign Policy for Canadians,' – the worst foreign policy white paper ever from Ottawa. Paul Martin's dithering didn't help, nor did Alex Himelfarb's relative disinterest in and distaste for foreign and defence policy, but Gen. Hillier was just one of many, many bums in seats around a big conference table and his intelligence, faulty or not, was only one of many, many inputs that Paul Martin et al considered.

We went to Afghanistan twice – first, on Jean Chrétien's watch, because Canadians, en masse, wanted us to “do something” in the immediate wake of 9/11; and second, when  Chrétien was still PM, in order to be “too busy to go to Iraq.” We went, first, to Kandahar, for one 'rotation,' by the end of which public support for the mission had nearly evaporated; then we went to Kabul and there was, if not real public support, at least 'relief' that we were not going to Iraq. Then, under Paul Martin, we went back to Kandahar.

Contrary to Kenny's assertions, successive governments did explain 'why' we were in Afghanistan; it is fair and true to say that the rationale for the mission was never expressed clearly and simply – something that would have suggested that political leaders, themselves, actually understood and supported the mission (and I believe that none of  Chrétien, Martin or Harper did/do understand or support the mission). It is also fair to say that the government's rationales shifted but there were, initially, three reasons to be there:

1. To defend ourselves – a real concern because Osama bin Laden had explicitly named Canada as one of his targets. Afghanistan was al Qaeda's main base. Denying al Qaeda its main base was, and still is, a good plan;

2. To “punch above our weight” - something we had, as a matter of policy, decided not to do for many, many years (ever since about 1968) – because we recognized that our inability/unwillingness to do our fair share to maintain world security was costing us in e.g. Trade negotiations; and

3. To help Afghanistan to help itself – to make it secure enough that it would not, not soon, anyway, allow itself to become a terrorist base.

None of those were bad reasons to go to war.

Kenny gives us a litany of things we “knew.” He implies that we knew those things in 2001/02 or, again, in 2005, and it is true that some scholars and commentators did warn about most of the things on his list, but the fact is that we didn't 'know' in 2001/02 or even in 2005 what we can see, now, in hindsight.

Was the war in our 'national interest?' Kenny says we have no interests, vital or not, in Afghanistan. He's right, in his own narrow view, but the was wasn't about Canada's interests in Afghanistan, it was about Canada's interests in Washington, Beijing, New Delhi and London. On that basis, and on balance, the war made sense and Colin Kenny talks nonsense.
 
I  get the feeling the security situation in Afghanistan not getting any better, at least judging by the number of attacks. The violence never abates. I'm no expert but I think we are being screwed the same way the Russians were. We are not stopping our enemies funding. Saudi, Pakistani and (rumour has it)Chinese money is still flowing into the coffers. If we don't stop the money we will just be bled dry. Which was Osama's plan all along. Bleed the West till they are destroyed financially. If we don't cut off our enemies resources we are fighting by proxy more countries than we can handle. Since we don't have the will to even seriously talk about taking on the men behind the money it all seems rather pointless. Withdrawing could significantly decrease foreign funding and hurt our enemy more ironically.
 
Edward:

Had any government framed our last ten years as an effort to curry favour in allied nations then we could perhaps claim (at best) a draw - the most common phrase of political discourse is "Yes, but what have you done for me recently?", with "recent" generally defined as the attention span of a politician, 15 minutes at best.

But a claim of "victory" or "success" is measured against the declared objectives.  And if we (the royal "we") have declared that victory is the eradication of the Taliban, then we have failed.  If we have declared that victory is transforming a feudal, warlord state into a Jeffersonian democracy, then we have failed.  If we have declared that victory is installing a professional military and police capable of defending their own country, then we have failed.

None of these are a denigration of the sailors, airmen and air women, and particularly not of the soldiers who served (and continue to serve, and will continue to serve).  But that a nation the size of Canada has been hard-pressed to keep a single battalion on the ground is risible.  That unwilingness to commit contributed greatly to the failure to achieve strategic aims; how many times did we read in the news that Canadian Soldiers had cleared the Panjwai of Taliban, then left?

Kenny's article has its flaws, but the premise is sound: the declared objectives have not been met.  And will not be met.  Not due to failings of the soldiers on the ground.

(His misunderstanding of accountability for decisions, however, is odd - I would have thought he would know better than to blame the loudest voice in the room.)
 
dapaterson said:
Edward:

Had any government framed our last ten years as an effort to curry favour in allied nations then we could perhaps claim (at best) a draw - the most common phrase of political discourse is "Yes, but what have you done for me recently?", with "recent" generally defined as the attention span of a politician, 15 minutes at best.

But a claim of "victory" or "success" is measured against the declared objectives.  And if we (the royal "we") have declared that victory is the eradication of the Taliban, then we have failed.  If we have declared that victory is transforming a feudal, warlord state into a Jeffersonian democracy, then we have failed.  If we have declared that victory is installing a professional military and police capable of defending their own country, then we have failed.

Almost six years ago this site - Army.ca - was complaining, through its Ruxted Group, that our mission lacked a clear aim. In fact Ruxted was commenting on a published opinion piece by Sen. Colin Kenny. I think that our policy always involved appeasing either Canadian public opinion - which alternated between "go" and "return" - and/or Washington political opinion - "with us or against us." That's why went in the first place, why we stayed, why we went to Kandahar and why, most recently, we agreed to stay on, yet again, in a different role, despite being badly let down by the fair weather friends we call allies. But I continue to assert that our primary or, at least, most consistent goal was to "punch above our weight" and, thereby, to restore some of the reputation for burden sharing that we had, from 1970 to 1990, tossed aside.

None of these are a denigration of the sailors, airmen and air women, and particularly not of the soldiers who served (and continue to serve, and will continue to serve).  But that a nation the size of Canada has been hard-pressed to keep a single battalion on the ground is risible.  That unwilingness to commit contributed greatly to the failure to achieve strategic aims; how many times did we read in the news that Canadian Soldiers had cleared the Panjwai of Taliban, then left?

Kenny's article has its flaws, but the premise is sound: the declared objectives have not been met.  And will not be met.  Not due to failings of the soldiers on the ground.

I agree with both points.

(His misunderstanding of accountability for decisions, however, is odd - I would have thought he would know better than to blame the loudest voice in the room.)
 
I'll agree with Kenny on his point that the Afghan government is one of the most corrupt and inefficient governments in the world.

His point on girls going to school as 'too few' is moot. Before we got there there were none in school.

While some of his other points may have merit, the article seems framed to show most of the problems are somehow Harper's, even if unstated. It smells of liberal.

If we learned one thing over there, it's how far we can trust our myriad of NATO partners, individually, unless the conflict affects them personally or takes place on their soil or soil of interest. I was disappointed in how many payed lip service to the mission and refused to leave their bars in Kabul for six months.
 
More from Senator Kenny, shared in accordance with the "fair dealing" provisions, Section 29, of the Copyright Act.
In the National Post last week, I argued that our military mission to Afghanistan was pretty much a failure. There were some successes - we pleased our American allies and we gave our troops combat experience.

But there were plenty of negatives on the other side of the balance sheet.

For a start, if one of the main reasons for the mission was to root out al-Qaeda, they were long gone by the time our troops got to Kandahar - scattered to less vulnerable international hiding places.

There are a number of facts that Canadians should consider when reflecting on the mission: we exit with the Taliban stronger than it was when we came; we exit with a corrupt government in place as the only alternative to the Taliban; we exit with the Afghan army and police ineffectual protectors of democracy; we exit with only traces of successful foreign aid expenditures (despite all the money spent); we exit with the drug trade in full and unmolested swing; we exit with the Taliban unwilling to sign on to a peace deal because they know the westerners will soon be gone, so why deal?

For what Canada gained - and I acknowledge that pleasing the Americans and giving our troops combat experience are worthy achievements - we lost 157 heroic soldiers, sent many more home physically and/or psychologically wounded, and spent billions of dollars that could have done a lot of good in other poor countries - or, for that matter, at home.

I applaud the fact that, for those who survived this ordeal, morale is up in the Canadian Forces.

That shouldn't come as a surprise; soldiers like to test their mettle, and our soldiers' courageous performance in Afghanistan, despite not always having a sufficient number of personnel or the right equipment, won the admiration of military people around the world, not to mention the Canadian public. So, bravo.

But at what price? I got many thoughtful replies to my article in the Post, some from military people, and others commending me for confronting the truth. I also got a lot of messages full of four-letter words (which you would think would be easier to spell).

One e-mail said my *#@$% opinions provided a perfect rationale for abolition of the Senate.

Funny, I always thought one of the primary roles of the Senate was to hold the government of the day to account, and that's exactly what I was trying to do with two governments - one led by Paul Martin and the other by Stephen Harper.

Neither has ever levelled with the Canadian public on what they intended to achieve in Afghanistan, and how they would measure success.

Harper has demonstrated clearly how the politically cunning measure success: skip the unpleasant details and just offer up a hearty "mission accomplished."

Well, various research agencies have provided those who are interested with some unpleasant numbers that the cheerleaders for this war like to skip over.

According to the Human Rights Unit of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 2,080 Afghan civilians were killed by anti-government elements in 2010; 3,366 were injured.

It has been argued that the loss of so many innocent lives has soured Afghans' attitude toward NATO's presence in Afghanistan. Certainly the Taliban's increasing resistance has been palpable.

According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, travel risk in 2003 was "medium risk" in 90 per cent of the country, with 10 per cent being "high risk." By 2010 only half the country was rated "medium risk, with 20 per cent rated "high risk" and 30 per cent rated in an even more dangerous category - "extreme risk."

According to the Afghanistan NGO safety office (ALSO Report Issue 76, June 2011) the number of armed opposition group attacks increased from 5,677 in 2008 to 12,929 in 2010.

According to the U.S. government's IED Defeat Organization, the number of Taliban roadside bomb attacks deemed to be "effective" ballooned from 219 in 2005 to 3,084 in 2010.

According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Taliban had "shadow governors" in place in 11 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces in 2005. By 2009 there were 33 shadow governors in place, each responsible for directing the insurgency against government and coalition troops.

And so it goes. Meanwhile, the UN says 2,579 NATO troops have died in Afghanistan since 2001. UN figures show that 8,832 Afghan civilians have been killed as a result of military operations since 2007 (nobody had deemed it essential to count before then).

I don't think this adds up to success.

Then again, if you believe that it is important to look at this war through rose-coloured glasses to make everyone feel better, I guess we should just forget about all these repugnant little numbers.

Give me an A.

Give me an F. Give me a G ...
Source:  National Post, 14 Jul 11

On that last stat on civilians killed, I know NATO can always do better (and strive to), but let's also remember that between 7 and 8 out of 10 of the civvy casualties in the first 1/2 of 2011 were caused by the bad guys according to the latest UN stats - more on that in earlier threads here and here.

- edited to add latest UN stats -
 
The American approach (?):

http://outsidethewire.com/blog/afghanistan/argendahb-awakening.html

Argendahb Awakening?
Written by JD Johannes 
Wednesday, 20 July 2011

Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Mintz made a series crucial decisions in late April and early May that flipped the Taliban's tactics upside down and is establishing the infrastructure needed to deliver what could be a devastating series of knock-down punches in what used to be Mullah Omar's backyard.

For the last four months I have been traveling Afghanistan looking for a place where the surge here may equal the effects of the 2007 Iraq Surge.  If there is anywhere in Afghanistan where a movement similar to the Anbar Awakening that sprang up in Iraq's Al Anbar province along the the Euphrates river in 2007 can be built, it is the Argendahb river valley west of Khandahar.

The physical terrain is remarkably similar to that of the Euphrates river valley.  There is a key highway, irrigated farmland, clusters of villages and a river.  Granted the Argendahb is a mere stream compared to the Euphrates which is key difference because it does not create a physical barrier, but it is a terrain feature that can be used tactically.  Most interesting is how much the insurgent's view of the Argendahb matches Al Qaida's view of Al Anbar.  For the Capital T hard core Taliban the river valley west of Khandahar is an almost spiritual homeland.  For Al Qaida in Iraq, the pure Sunni Islam of Al Anbar was their base of support.

This open source map comes from the University of Texas.  TF Spartan, 3rd Brigade, 10th Mountain operates west of Khandahar mostly in the area between Highway 1 on the north and the river to the south.

The way LTC Mintz, commander of 1-32 Infantry, has arrayed his forces is also remarkably similar to the way Marines and Soldiers were stacked up on the Euphrates river valley in 2007 as the Anbar Awakening spread down stream from Ramadi to Baghdad .

Instead of living on Company sized combat outposts of about 125 men and patrolling through the farm land that is strewn with mines to the villages then returning to the outpost, Mintz's men live in platoon and squad sized patrol bases and strong points in the villages with their Afghan Army brothers.  An average patrol base has about 25 men in it.  The water is warm, the food is MREs and the living is dirty--a lot of Soldiers love it.

Throughout Afghanistan Army units go on patrol through the fields only to be shot at from behind the walls of the villages.  The game plan of the Taliban is to shoot at Soldiers from two sides in hopes of baiting the Soldiers into crossing a mine field.  By buying or renting a house in the village, building a few shooting postions on the roof and staying in the village 24/7 the tables are turned.  The Taliban now has to cross their own mine fields and try to attack the US Soldiers who are in covered positions behind the walls.  The US Soldiers patrol in the villages, the fields and roads between the villages and in a bubble of the fields around the villages.

Mintz, who is to combat tactics what Chuck Knoll, the legendary coach of the Pittsburgh Steelers, is to football fundamentals, has executed a plan that is truly full spectrum Counter Insurgency.

Counter Insurgency is a competition for the people, not farm fields.  The goal is to separate the Taliban from the people.  By living in the villages, the soldiers have not just weekly or daily contact with the population, but hourly contact.  The Taliban, to have influence over the people, have to fight their way through a platoon of US Soldiers and Afghan soldiers.  If the Talibs don't die in the process, they usually give up under the precision fire of US soldiers.

Mintz' soldiers are killing Taliban, having constant contact with the people, and protecting the people from the Taliban who shoot into the village.  A complete 180 from the usual scenario in Afghanistan, but the exact scenario that I saw first hand in Iraq's Euphrates river valley as local villagers stood up and joined with the Marines in taking on Al Qaida.

Completing the local villager's piece of the puzzle is the Weapons Shura--occasionally referred to as 'Nalgham Force'--a small band of eccentric leaders with mixed motives who at personal risk have joined with Mintz' soldiers to provide security for the villages.
P1010203.jpg
Members of the Weapons Shura and Afghan Police meet with LTC Mintz (blocked by his interpreter) and CPT Dennis Call, commander of Charlie Company.  They hold their meetings under a canopy of grape vines.
P1010204.jpg
The Argendahb is grape country.

To be sure, a couple small outposts in the villages and few dudes with AKs do not an awakening make, but I saw beginnings of the Anbar Awakening and the situation is similar.  The physical infrastructure of small patrol bases and strong points in the villages is the first step.  The next is to drill down deep into the political structure of the village, find the key leaders, gain their confidence and convince them to join with the US and thier Afghan Army brothers to fight the Taliban.  CPT Call plans on developing an ID Card program for the villagers, which is text book counter insurgency and creates a semi-gated community.  No ID card, no access to the area and no more hiding in plain sight.  The step beyond that is to find the power-players with the Zoor who are on the Taliban's side but can be tilted to the side of the Afghan/US coalition.

There is a lot more for me to drill down into, so more will be coming in a couple days.  This thing could fall flat on its face, but LTC Mintz and his boss, COL Patrick Frank the commander of Task Force Spartan, are veterans of the 2007 Iraq surge and know what success looks like in counter insurgency.  Their success this time may be an Arghendahb Awakening right in the area where Mullah Omar used to have his Mosque.
 
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