Afghanistan: Why we should be there (or not), how to conduct the mission (or not) & when to leave

[TCBF]

"...the agriculture in Afghanistan needs to be supported, with funding given to farmers for equipment and knowledge so they actually can grow other crops instead of Poppy."

- They'll grow whatever the men with the AK-47s tell them to grow, and so would you.

 

[rmacqueen]

You're forgetting that many farmers turn to Poppy crop because it is the easiest and cheapest to grow with the most payback. In the harsh terrain of many areas of Afghanistan, some farms cannot grow any other crop but Poppies! What needs to be done is the agriculture in Afghanistan needs to be supported, with funding given to farmers for equipment and knowledge so they actually can grow other crops instead of Poppy.

The other option is a legalized poppy crop.  Many pharmaceutical companies buy poppies to create morphine for medical use with Australia, France and Spain being three of the largest producers in the world.  Afghanistan has the potential, with the help of western countries, to become a major exporter of licit opium.  Illegal poppy farming is flourishing because it gives your average Afghan farmer and income stream.    It is a product that is in demand with a distribution network already in place.  Supply them with the means to grow medicinal poppies and a distribution network to sell them and I have no doubt that they would be willing to switch.  After all, the farmers are not the ones reaping the huge profits from illegal opium, they are just trying to make a living.

 

[McG]

NATO vows to take initiative in Afghanistan
Updated Sun. Feb. 18 2007 4:38 PM ET
Canadian Press

TERIN KOWT, Afghanistan -- NATO will not sit idly by and allow militants to launch their own wave of bombings and suicide attacks in southern Afghanistan, the alliance's southern commander declared this weekend.

"A spring offensive (by the Taliban) will not happen because we are going to take the initiative," Dutch Maj.-Gen Ton Van Loon told reporters during a visit to this isolated mountainous region.

The international community, "the government of Afghanistan, the Afghan army, the Afghan police - we'll make sure we go into as many areas as we possibly can to make sure the Taliban cannot go back and bully the population."

For weeks U.S. commanders have been warning that extremists, most of them based in neighbouring Pakistan, were preparing to unleash a bloody offensive aimed at driving NATO out of the southern region and capturing the crown jewel of the fundamentalist movement, Kandahar city.

The Taliban warned Friday that its "war preparations" were complete and thousands of militant fighters had crossed the border - statements that caused a flurry of panicked, unsubstantiated rumours in Kandahar that aid organizations and foreigners were being targeted.

"We haven't seen anything to indicate they're massing," said Van Loon.

While simultaneously pressing the alarm and calling for more troops, western commanders have also tried to downplay the possible threat, saying the Taliban do not pose a strategic risk to the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai and that extremists are capable of only launching guerrilla-style raids.

The militants challenged those predictions two weeks ago when they overran the town of Musa Qula, in northern Helmand province, where the governor had negotiated a controversial ceasefire.

The call for more soldiers and fewer restrictions on those already operating in Afghanistan has divided the nearly 60-year-old military alliance because the bulk of the hard fighting in the south has been carried by Canada, the U.S., Britain and the Netherlands.

In a speech Thursday, U.S. President George W. Bush said NATO member countries need to send more troops.

But Van Loon said the number of combat soldiers in the region was "sufficient" and he would like to see extra forces go towards reconstruction.

With the influx of thousands of additional troops, the majority of them from the United States and Britain, speculation has been building that the military alliance would launch its own ground offensive in order to check an expected militant drive.

Indeed, Canadian Col. Mike Kampman, the principal adviser to Van Loon, said in an interview that NATO's strategy for 2007 is to marginalize the militants by pushing them up into the mountains.

In what must surely be a sign of things to come, NATO announced Sunday that it conducted a major operation in Garmsir, south of the Helmand capital of Lashkargah.

More than 150 British soldiers, supported for the first time by Afghan artillery units, attacked what was believed to be a major Taliban headquarters.

The operation began late Saturday and continued throughout Sunday. It was centred on three major compounds, where a significant tunnel complex linking the strongholds was discovered also destroyed.

There were no NATO or Afghan army casualties.


Canadian troops on the ground will readily tell you they expect to be fighting this spring and summer in Helmand province, along the river which has for years been a thoroughfare for the drug smugglers who partially fund the extremists. But they will also tell you that if the battles are in Kandahar province, in Panjwaii and Zhari districts - places already paid for with Canadian blood - then NATO's war is in trouble.

http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20070218/nato_afghanistan_070218/20070218?hub=World

 

[The Bread Guy]

From EVERYONE's favourite party on this site  ;D - shared in accordance with the "fair dealing" provisions, Section 29, of the Copyright Act.

Liberals back Afghan mission until 2009
Campbell Clark, Globe & Mail, 21 Feb 07
Article Link

The federal Liberals will support Canada's NATO mission remaining in southern Afghanistan until 2009 but call for another country to take over afterward, according to sources in the party.

Split between hawks and doves, Stéphane Dion's opposition party has hammered out its long-promised common-ground position that includes signalling to allies that Canada will give up the leadership of the Kandahar-based NATO mission at the end of its current tour, two years from now.

When he took the reins of the Liberal Party in December, Mr. Dion said he would have little patience for a rising Canadian death toll unless the mission achieved better results. But he also faced a faction of MPs, including deputy leader Michael Ignatieff, who adamantly oppose early withdrawal.

Tomorrow, Mr. Dion will deliver an address in Montreal outlining his party's new position. Liberal sources said the key elements have been hammered out in meetings of MPs over several weeks.

Canadian troops moved from Kabul, the Afghan capital, to the more dangerous Kandahar province at the beginning of 2006, where a reconstituted Taliban has conducted a series of bloody offensives. Forty-three Canadians have been killed since the Canadian military deployed to Afghanistan in early 2002.

Last spring, Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper extended the mission, initiated by the previous Liberal government, to February 2009. But some candidates then running for the Liberal leadership, including Mr. Dion, suggested Canada might consider withdrawing sooner.

Now, the Liberals have decided to back the current Kandahar mission until the end of that current deployment, hoping to avoid criticisms that they would abandon a Canadian international commitment.

They will also argue that the mission is misguided and losing support from Afghans, that the West should change its approach and that Canada should tell NATO to find another country to take over the mission in 2009.

However, one Liberal said that does not mean Mr. Dion will rule out a possible future role for Canadian troops in other parts of Afghanistan.

That position will allow the Liberals to criticize the Conservative government on its conduct of the Afghan mission, but might also reduce its impact as an issue differentiating the two parties in an election campaign. Now only the NDP is calling for early withdrawal.

In addition, the Liberals will propose changing Canada's approach to Afghanistan, including a bigger commitment to development aid, political efforts aimed at broadening the support of the Afghan government and combatting corruption, and dealing with the illegal opium-poppy crop that helps finance the Taliban.

The Liberals say public support for the mission is waning because the Conservatives have focused Canada's role too much on military efforts and not enough on diplomacy and development aid. The Conservative government has insisted it is doing both, but that it is impossible to deliver aid without securing a strife-torn region.

Many experts have recently called for a major increase in both troops and aid. In January, the United States and Britain announced increases in their troop contingents in the country, and U.S. President George W. Bush said he would seek an additional $10.6-billion over two years.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Maybe M. Dion got smart and paid heed to Ruxted's "First things first" article.

 

[zipperhead_cop]

Two thousand suicide bombers, General Manson says, “will not win many hearts and minds.” 

I’m not so sure.

The suicide bomber is not a completely new phenomenon and experience says that this for of highly ritualized sacrifice resonates in some cultures.  It did for the early Christians; it did in Japan in the 20th century as it has and apparently continues to do in many Islamic societies.  Simple acts of sacrifice or martyrdom can, I think have a profound effect on people who are deeply connected to their religious beliefs – as few of us in 21st century Canada are.

I'll believe it when there are 2000 splat marks.  It's pretty easy to chime off with numbers like that.  If they really had that many motivated individuals, they would put a rifle in their hands and use them as troops, not cannon fodder.  IMO. 

 

[MarkOttawa]

A post at The Torch:

Bring back the Iltis
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2007/02/bring-back-iltis.html

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

I wonder if our media will notice this major development:

Afstan: ISAF fighting forces to be up 7,300/7,300
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2007/02/afstan-isaf-fighting-forces-to-be-up.html

Mark
Ottawa

 

[a_majoor]

The ACM are cutting out the hearts and minds of the people who may support NATO and the rebuilding effort, which might work in the short term but perhaps not so well in the longer term:

http://www.bloggingtories.ca/btFrameset.php?URL=http://hallsofmacadamia.blogspot.com/2007/02/kill-em-all.html&title=Kill%20em%20all...

Kill em all...

Let Allah sort em out...

    -- KANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN -- Taliban fighters say they have executed dozens of suspected informants, as they hunt for the spies who helped NATO target several of their leaders in recent weeks.

    Muslim custom requires a quick burial after death, but the Taliban told the families of the executed men to leave them hanging for up to three days, as a warning to others who might work for the foreign troops.

A question for Taliban Jack Layton... "Can we book you that flight to Afghanistan now? You know... the one where you negotiate peace with these guys."

That's what I thought.

Taliban launch violent purge
Insurgents blame paid informants for increasingly accurate NATO strikes

GRAEME SMITH

From Tuesday's Globe and Mail

KANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN — Taliban fighters say they have executed dozens of suspected informants, as they hunt for the spies who helped NATO target several of their leaders in recent weeks.

Air strikes in the past three months have killed at least three major Taliban commanders in southern Afghanistan, and the insurgents say they're facing an increasingly active infiltration campaign by Western agents.

In a videotaped interview from a hideout in Sangin district of Helmand province, a Taliban commander was asked to explain NATO's recent success at finding the movement's leadership.

"This year they put many spies in our groups, give them lots of money, so they find our bosses," said the young commander, who said he joined the insurgency four years ago. He covered his face, sitting cross-legged in what appeared to be a storehouse for weapons: Kalashnikovs, belt-fed machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades.

"We have arrested about 60 or 70 spies, and we killed many of them," he told the Globe and Mail researcher who conducted the interview.

Other insurgents in Sangin said the executions, mostly by hanging, have reached such a frantic pace that 17 suspected spies were killed in the previous week alone.

One suspect was paraded in front of the camera with his arms tightly bound behind his back and a blindfold covering most of his face. The Taliban accused him of trading information about the insurgents for the equivalent of $3,800. The man denied the allegations.

His captors said his fate would be decided by a Taliban shura, or council of elders.

Details of the Taliban's purge are hard to verify, because the insurgents are notorious for spreading false information about their inner workings, and NATO does not discuss its covert operations.

But villagers across Helmand province say they've noticed the result of the insurgents' concern about spies, as bodies of the condemned have been hung from trees.

Muslim custom requires a quick burial after death, but the Taliban told the families of the executed men to leave them hanging for up to three days, as a warning to others who might work for the foreign troops.

Although patrolled by NATO troops, Taliban insurgents control much of Helmand province and operate unchecked in wide swaths of the territory. (Interpolation: They wish they did)

One of the latest stories circulating among Taliban fighters in the province describes an elaborate counter-intelligence effort by the insurgents.

As the story goes, Mullah Hanan, a commander of perhaps 100 Taliban near the town of Gereshk, was feeling increasingly worried about his safety.

One night in January, he grew suspicious that a spy might have infiltrated his band of fighters, so he decided to sleep in a compound some distance from the main group. He picked five trusted bodyguards to keep watch, and each of them were assigned shifts.

One man requested the final shift before daybreak, and in the predawn hours he sneaked away from his slumbering leader and used a satellite phone to mark his co-ordinates. Then he apparently made a phone call; shortly afterward, air strikes destroyed the mud house where Mr. Hanan was sleeping, along with the compound where most of his fighters spent the night.

According to the version of the tale repeated among the insurgents of Sangin, the treacherous bodyguard returned to Mr. Hanan's ruined compound two or three weeks later. He started chatting with a group of farm labourers nearby, probing for information about whether the Taliban commander had died in the fiery attack. They watched him continue along toward the charred blast site, and one labourer quietly followed him as he stood in the shade of a tree-lined irrigation canal near the ruins. The labourer overheard him speaking on a phone, telling somebody: "Mullah Hanan is dead, I'm looking at his destroyed home."

The Taliban always try to emphasize their popularity. And in their telling of this story, the farmers were outraged by the bodyguard's betrayal, so they tackled him and handed him over to the insurgents.

He was wearing a bulletproof vest under his traditional kameez (a long shirt) and carrying a satellite phone.

With a promise of forgiveness from the insurgents, the bodyguard quickly named his intelligence handler, a landowner who ran a large poppy farm.

Like his subordinate, the landowner told the Taliban he would give them all his contacts if they would spare his life. They instructed him to visit a mosque and swear on a Koran that he would stop working against the insurgents. Then they told him to summon his contacts for a meeting that evening, and after a flurry of phone calls his sources had gathered at one of their regular safe houses.

The Taliban said they surrounded the house and captured them all.

Despite the Taliban promises, none were spared. A shura was swiftly convened to condemn them all, and their bodies were displayed in several parts of the province, including Gereshk, Sangin and Musa Qala.

Before he was executed, the Taliban said, the bodyguard confessed to receiving $100,000 (U.S.) for the death of Mullah Hanan, and a $25,000 bonus for the foot soldiers killed in the same operation. The insurgents never found the money.

 

[Edward Campbell]

This, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act, is from today’s Globe and Mail:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20070228.wxcommit28/BNStory?cid=al_gam_globeedge

NATO off course, report concludes

GLORIA GALLOWAY
From Wednesday's Globe and Mail

OTTAWA — A former Canadian ambassador to NATO says the war in Afghanistan cannot be won militarily and it will require negotiation with the Taliban to bring an end to the conflict.

Gordon Smith, who was Canada's NATO ambassador between 1985 and 1990, and a team of experts from across Canada will release a report tomorrow that says the current NATO policies are not on course to achieve the objectives of peace and stability in the country, "even within a period of 10 years."

Dr. Smith, who is also a former deputy minister of Foreign Affairs and is now director of the Centre for Global Studies at the University of Victoria, says recent announcements that will bring NATO's troop complement in Afghanistan to 37,000 will have little impact.

"One of the experts that we asked about how many troops would be needed for a military victory said, 'Oh, maybe half a million.' So adding a couple of thousand is wonderful but it doesn't do anything."

The real objective of the NATO force is to prevent a resurgence of Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda terrorist organization -- a group that has moved to other areas of the world and is remobilizing in Pakistan, Dr. Smith said.

In his report, entitled Canada in Afghanistan: Is it Working?, he says that "the most essential goal is to isolate Al Qaeda from the mainstream Taliban and to find incentives to dissuade the Taliban from a commitment to international jihadi violence."

That may not be easy because of the close relationship between the two groups at the top levels, says the report, but it could be accomplished over time. And "while negotiations certainly cannot guarantee that the Taliban will be brought into the political process, failure to negotiate will almost surely cede the field to them."

Similar advice was offered yesterday at the defence committee of the House of Commons, where representatives of the United Nations and NATO tried to convince politicians of the value of a long-term commitment to the international mission.

One of the legacies of the Bonn agreement of 2001, in which high-ranking Afghans, working under the auspices of the UN, carved out a plan for governing their country, is that it was not a peace accord, said Christopher Alexander, the deputy special representative of the UN Secretary-General in Afghanistan.

Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban, and the leaders of jihadist parties were excluded from those talks.

Both Mr. Alexander and James Appathurai, a spokesman for NATO, stressed that progress was being made in Afghanistan, but the NATO commitment could not end any time soon without the country plunging into civil war and without serious damage being done to the credibility of both NATO and the UN.

Canada has said it will keep its troops in the country until at least 2009. But Mr. Alexander said it is more realistic to be talking about a time frame like that in the Balkans, where NATO sent troops in 1992 and still maintains a presence of 18,000 soldiers.

"What we are all saying in the United Nations, in NATO, in individual nation states, is that this is likely to be a long-term commitment, both on the military side and in other areas," he said.

Mr. Appathurai said it is important for Canadians to realize that they are not battling alone, nor is Canada the only country to have borne the burden of casualties. And those countries that had previously refused to send troops to the dangerous southern region where Canadian forces are stationed have removed those restrictions, he said.

I think most Army.ca members understand that the Taliban ≠ al Qaeda nor are the insurgents in Afghanistan 100% Taliban or, therefore, al Qaeda.  At a point in its ‘life’ the Taliban was a political movement – based, if I’m correct, as its name implies upon students.  The Taliban reflects a ‘legitimate’ aspect of Afghan society – a conservative, religious aspect, to be sure, but legitimate all the same.

I, personally, think that Dr. Smith and others continue to misunderstand and misrepresent the reason for the mission in Afghanistan and, consequentially, the force requirements.  As others – with far more and better knowledge than I – have pointed out: we are not there to conquer Afghanistan, this is not 1880 or even 1980, and, therefore, we do not need 500,000 soldiers.  We are there to help the properly elected government of Afghanistan assert its mandate over all of the country and, simultaneously, to provide much needed aid to a poor country which has been ruined by decades of war.  A force of a few tens of thousands – and, to be sure a few thousand more than we have now – ought to be sufficient if we can provide real, material help to the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

This Taliban purge of “spies” remind me of the same attempt by the Communist Party of Malaysia to deal with the double agents planted by the British, in the end the purges killed far more people than the British had spies and weakened their organization, plus missed most of the real spies. Hopefully this purge will create bad blood, cause them to stop communicating with each other and start weakening their chain of command. 

 

[GAP]

NATO off course, report concludes
GLORIA GALLOWAY  From Wednesday's Globe and Mail
Article Link

OTTAWA — A former Canadian ambassador to NATO says the war in Afghanistan cannot be won militarily and it will require negotiation with the Taliban to bring an end to the conflict.

Gordon Smith, who was Canada's NATO ambassador between 1985 and 1990, and a team of experts from across Canada will release a report tomorrow that says the current NATO policies are not on course to achieve the objectives of peace and stability in the country, "even within a period of 10 years."

Dr. Smith, who is also a former deputy minister of Foreign Affairs and is now director of the Centre for Global Studies at the University of Victoria, says recent announcements that will bring NATO's troop complement in Afghanistan to 37,000 will have little impact.

"One of the experts that we asked about how many troops would be needed for a military victory said, 'Oh, maybe half a million.' So adding a couple of thousand is wonderful but it doesn't do anything."
More on link

 

[Teflon]

"One of the experts that we asked about how many troops would be needed for a military victory said, 'Oh, maybe half a million.' So adding a couple of thousand is wonderful but it doesn't do anything."

Now there's a very analytical responce! Based on years of experience at the craps table no doubt!

 

[seamus]

The amount of troops on the ground would be sufficient, but due to the fact most of them are not involved. This leads to the fact a minority of the troops do most of the fighting. With the numbers they are stating that are needed, there will still only be the same number of NATO soldiers doing the fighting.

 

[Edward Campbell]

I have read (unconfirmed) reports from various sources in the Middle East which suggest that the PLO, Hammas, Hezbollah, etc, etc have executed far more spies, informers and other assorted 'traitors' than Israel has ever had on the payrolls.  It was reported that Israel's relatively few but well placed agents actually initiated several witch hunts which had severe impacts on the Arab movements.

 

[MarkOttawa]

What Mr Smith himself published today (also in "Sandbox" topic) seems not unreasonable, and bears little resemblance to the Globe's headline for Ms. Galloway's piece; and I wonder why the material on the (very impressive) Commons committee appearance by the Canadians from the UN and NATO was buried at the end of Ms Galloway's piece.  At least the Ottawa Citizen gave the appearance a full story
http://www.canada.com/topics/news/world/story.html?id=2182d6f7-51d6-432e-a0d0-4e3713875ea6&k=78228

and the Embassy newsweekly article gives even more substance (though a snarky headline):
http://www.embassymag.ca/html/index.php?display=story&full_path=/2007/february/28/afghanistan/

It's not unthinkable to bring the Taliban inside the tent
Globe and Mail,  March 1, 2007, By GORDON SMITH
http://www.rbcinvest.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/ArticleNews/PEstory/LAC/20070301/COAFGHAN01/Comment/comment/comment/2/2/4/

Anyone who thinks the issue is simply one of supporting our troops in Afghanistan as they fight bravely to bring peace to that unfortunate country doesn't get it. Nor does someone who thinks our military ought to leave now, or even in 2009, with Canada turning its focus to development assistance.

I have nothing but admiration for our troops. As a behind-the-scenes drafter of a defence white paper and a former ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, I know the military and am proud of the great job it is doing.

It is good news that Canada will devote increased assistance to Afghanistan and that more troops are being sent by our allies. But that won't be enough.

There is no purely, or even largely, military solution. Nor is there a solution through development assistance alone. Indeed, there may not even be a satisfactory solution at all. If anything is to work, there must be an internal political resolution. That means trying to bring in elements of the mainly Pashtun Taliban -- those not determined to fight to the bitter end -- to both the Kabul government and provincial governments, where Pashtuns are heavily underrepresented...

The central reason Canada intervened in Afghanistan -- from the first elite Joint Task Force 2 commandos to those soldiers there today -- was the al-Qaeda threat. That threat has not gone away. It is increasingly accepted that al-Qaeda is reconstituting itself in northern Pakistan. Nothing is more important to Canadian security than addressing this threat. It is critical that every possible wedge be driven between al-Qaeda and the Taliban. This is an additional reason why elements of the Taliban must be brought inside the tent...

NATO and its friends have been very cautious about committing large numbers of troops. Indeed, many NATO countries have placed highly limiting conditions on the use of their forces. The reality is that Europeans (save the British) don't see Afghanistan as "their" war.

Meanwhile, some in Canada advocate pulling out militarily and providing massive development assistance instead. That won't work either. For development, there must be security. The Taliban would not just fade away if foreign troops were withdrawn. Development workers would be killed...

Finally, our troops have fallen victim to the mantra of the "militarization of aid." To a person, the aid community feels very strongly about this. Yet it is obvious, for example, that immediate assistance must be provided in the villages where our soldiers have operated. Broken doors and crushed corners of buildings must be repaired; jobs must be created, bringing some cash into the community. The aid community cannot say both that it is too dangerous for them to operate in conflict situations and that the military should not deliver assistance. The Canadian Forces should be provided with all the money needed to provide immediate assistance in the wake of their operations.

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

Babbling Brooks rips CP over a story
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/03/01/hrc-watchdog-070301.html

on the new Afghan prisoner agreement:

Let's talk about timelines
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2007/03/lets-talk-about-timelines.html

Gotta love straight-up news stories, written without a hint of misplaced editorializing...or blog post written without a hint of sarcasm:

"The Kandahar office of Afghanistan's human rights commission has agreed to act as a watchdog for detainees captured by Canadians to ensure that valid complaints of abuse are investigated, the Canadian Press has learned.

The secret agreement with military commanders papers over concerns raised by human rights groups about the practice of handing captured Taliban prisoners over to Afghan authorities who have a reputation for torture. It could also take some of the fire out of a burning debate over allegations that Canadian troops abused detainees last spring. [Babbler's bold]"

Of course, buried way down at the bottom of the story is a little tidbit of information that shows the CF isn't simply trying to do damage control on the allegations raised by Amir Attaran, Amnesty International, and their ilk:

"The negotiations were started almost a year ago when Nader Naderi, commissioner of the Afghan human rights commission based in Kabul, went to Canada and met with the minister of defence. [Babbler's bold]"

That's right: the CF didn't wait until Attaran and Koring started fishing with abuse allegations a month ago, or when Amnesty International raised another complaint a week ago. They were talking with Abdul Quadar Noorzai, of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission in Kandahar last summer.

In fact, the intent to pursue such an agreement was written into the original detainee transfer agreement signed in December 2005 - see paragraph 11:

"11. Participants recognize the legitimate role of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission within the territory of Afghanistan, including in regard to the treatment of detainees, and undertake to cooperate fully with the Commission in the exercise of its role."

The Canadian Forces didn't sign this agreement to "paper over" anything. The truth is they were committed to cooperating with the Human Rights Commission in Afghanistan before the likes of Attaran and Amnesty even had a detainee agreement to object to.

Even when they do the right thing, the CF can't get decently accurate reporting from our nation's press. I wonder why.

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Weinie]

  "Do as I say, and there will be peace in our time." stated Gordon Smith. (or Neville,  as he is remembered so fondly by his buds at DFAIT)

 

[vonGarvin]

http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/03/01/nato-negotiations.html

Another so-called expert on COIN waddles in with his opinion.  Sheesh.  We need more of these racist bastards.  Witness this statement:

Smith, deputy minister of foreign affairs from 1994 to 1997, said negotiating with the Taliban is an unpleasant task but he believes it has to be done.
"One has to explore the political solutions, difficult and unpleasant though they may be. I don't have a higher regard for the Taliban than anybody else, but I don't think there is any other alternative but to talk to them."

So, remember people that the basis for negotiations is to meet halfway.  So, in other words, we have to make concessions to them for them to make concessions to us.
"Okay, Mullah Omar, it is agreed.  You reduce your beheadings of journalists, school teachers and doctors by 50%, and we'll ensure that we give our patrol schedule to the corrupt members of the Afghan police when we enter your districts"

This idiot, "Mr." Smith, would have us talk to the Taliban.  Why doesn't Mr Smith talk to the citizens of Khandahar, Kabul and Bagram and ask them what THEY want, instead of crying that his diaper is full and that his rubber sheets are getting slippery?  Heck, let's send HIM over!!!

 

[The Bread Guy]

Here, straight from the horse's mouth....

NATO Needs to Change Course in Afghanistan
Centre for Global Studies, University of Victoria, 1 Mar 07
News Release - Full report (29pg 364KB .pdf)

March 1, 2007 – Calgary, AB – In order to achieve a representative government and a self-sustaining peace for Afghanistan, NATO may have to find a way of negotiating with elements of the Taliban says a new study released today by the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute. The study, prepared by Gordon Smith, Director of the Centre for Global Studies at the University of Victoria with a small team of experts from across Canada, also questions whether there is adequate co-ordination in Afghanistan between military activities and civilian relief in the zones of conflict in the South.

“The Canadian military and civilians have made an extraordinary contribution,” acknowledges Smith, “but the overall level of effort—much lower than in the Balkans, for example—being expended by NATO and other members of the international community is insufficient for the task. There is doubt that NATO will be able to meet its objectives to provide the Afghan people with a stable life after decades of conflict, destruction and poverty.”

The report details how the Taliban are deeply entrenched in Afghanistan and are organizing themselves for a new offensive, in part because of assistance flowing in from Pakistan. There are also signs al-Qa’ida is attempting to reconstitute itself in Pakistan. “Meeting NATO objectives requires some form of political resolution within Afghanistan,” says Smith. “It also requires Pakistan playing a more positive role by facilitating negotiations with those Talibs not determined to fight to the bitter end.”

Smith suggests that the current poppy eradication campaign isn’t working and that the crop should be sold through a marketing board which would be processed for medicinal purposes.

Smith, a former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Ambassador to NATO, concludes that if NATO fails in Afghanistan this could have dire consequences for the Alliance.

The complete report Canada in Afghanistan: Is it Working? is available online at www.cdfai.org.

CDFAI is a “think tank” pursuing authoritative research and new ideas aimed at ensuring Canada has a respected and influential voice in the international arena.

-30-

For more information contact:

Gordon Smith
Executive Director, Centre for Global Studies
University of Victoria, CDFAI Advisory Council Member
250.472.4726 (office)
250.704.9052 (cell)
gssmith@uvic.ca