I have hear beer fuelled rumours to the effect that some planners want a two mission profile:
1. Haiti – assigned, primarily, to 5th and 34th brigades; and
2. Afghanistan – assigned to almost everyone else.
That is just a dumb enough idea to fly. Before I get into a rough staff check on its feasibility, remember that the CDS has just stated that we can maintain a 2500 person commitment post-09 in Afghanistan. Implied in that is (a) with our existing force structure, and (b) without taking on another major deployment. Or at least, that is how I understand it.
Let's say we take on Haiti with 5 and 34 Bdes providing the manpower. We are probably talking a battle group of three subunits of two rifle/mech coys and a lt armd sqn, perhaps a tac hel flight, some UAVs, and the HQ/NSE organization. Heck, let's toss in a PRT with its own security element. This seems to me to take us back to the six months in theatre and twelve months at home cycle.
This will also have a ripple effect on Afghanistan by decreasing the mean time between tours for the rest of the army, I wonder in particular if we can support two separate operations medically. To my tiny mind, reducing the Afghanistan contingent does not reduce the support requirement proportionally. Maybe it even makes the challenges more difficult.
Now toss another disaster calling for DART or another flood or ice storm, or, heaven forbid, a large scale internal security crisis into the equation, and we are getting close to running a personnel deficit.
I'm not trying to be a pessimists, but my old J3 Plans experience at contingency planning kicked in, and I don't like what I see. Perhaps somebody smarter and more current than I can come up with a way for it to work. If so, please do.
1. Haiti – assigned, primarily, to 5th and 34th brigades; and
2. Afghanistan – assigned to almost everyone else.
That is just a dumb enough idea to fly. Before I get into a rough staff check on its feasibility, remember that the CDS has just stated that we can maintain a 2500 person commitment post-09 in Afghanistan. Implied in that is (a) with our existing force structure, and (b) without taking on another major deployment. Or at least, that is how I understand it.
Let's say we take on Haiti with 5 and 34 Bdes providing the manpower. We are probably talking a battle group of three subunits of two rifle/mech coys and a lt armd sqn, perhaps a tac hel flight, some UAVs, and the HQ/NSE organization. Heck, let's toss in a PRT with its own security element. This seems to me to take us back to the six months in theatre and twelve months at home cycle.
This will also have a ripple effect on Afghanistan by decreasing the mean time between tours for the rest of the army, I wonder in particular if we can support two separate operations medically. To my tiny mind, reducing the Afghanistan contingent does not reduce the support requirement proportionally. Maybe it even makes the challenges more difficult.
Now toss another disaster calling for DART or another flood or ice storm, or, heaven forbid, a large scale internal security crisis into the equation, and we are getting close to running a personnel deficit.
I'm not trying to be a pessimists, but my old J3 Plans experience at contingency planning kicked in, and I don't like what I see. Perhaps somebody smarter and more current than I can come up with a way for it to work. If so, please do.