Afghanistan: Why we should be there (or not), how to conduct the mission (or not) & when to leave

[wack-in-iraq]

wack-in-iraq there are a lot of things we don't hear about so I wouldn't discount that story.  "Need to know" exists for a reason. 

I have, to the surprise of many people I tell the story to, described my IED attack as "awesome" though to the others I was with it might be something they would describe in a different way.

Usually if an IED goes off and a terp is killed and Canadians are injured it will make the news.

As for you describing your IED attacks as awesome... this makes me question you ever having encountered one.

 

[Bzzliteyr]

Yeah.  Thanks.

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/awesome

Go learn a bit then come back and challenge my statement having just reinforced it with your ignorance.

 

[MarkOttawa]

And from Terry Glavin (he's all over the radio):

A Hundred Flowers Bloom, A Hundred Schools Of Thought Contend
http://transmontanus.blogspot.com/2009/03/hundred-flowers-bloom-hundred-schools.html

He really lets it out in the final three paras.

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

And Paul at Celestial Junk:

Bashing Harper
http://cjunk.blogspot.com/2009/03/bashing-harper.html

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

A Torch post:

Canadian funding for Afghan elections--ignored
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/03/candian-funding-for-afghan-elections.html

Mark
Ottawa

 

[McG]

It is unfortunate that some people instantly interpret & preach upon the conception that “military ≠ the solution” is the same as “military ≠ part of the solution.”

On this war, the President should listen to the PM
Lawrence Martin
Globe & Mail
05 March 209

On Afghanistan, where three more Canadian soldiers were killed on Tuesday, you get the feeling that our Prime Minister is being refreshingly candid while Barack Obama, he with the four-square reputation, is playing dangerous games.

Stephen Harper shocked more than a few observers with his recent statement that the Pakistan-abetted Taliban insurgency probably will never be defeated. Leaders seldom, if ever, say this kind of thing when their troops are on the battlefield. Usually, they just raise false hopes.

Mr. Obama is going the surge route in Afghanistan. The first big foreign policy act of his presidency is a major escalation of a war - 17,000 more troops. It makes him sound more like Lyndon Johnson than a peacemaker. And it looks suspiciously like an act of political counterbalance - I've got to look tough - for his planned exit from Iraq.

After you send in the troops, the problem is getting them out.

Presidents don't like to leave without a claim to victory. Otherwise, they fear they'll be seen as sending a message to the world that America is weak.

If Mr. Harper is correct that the insurgency in Afghanistan will always be there, a proclamation of victory by Mr. Obama will not be easy. Complicating his predicament is the planned American departure from Iraq in 2010. Mr. Obama can't be seen as pulling out of two wars. What president has ever done that? Having made this commitment to Afghanistan, there's a good chance Mr. Obama could get bogged down in that war for his entire time in office. He was the candidate of change. On war, his change is an exchange - one battlefield for another.

His upgrading of the war means more crippling budget outlays for defence. With the deficit totally out of control, the new White House team is taking a pass on the one area where it could save the treasury a fortune. It's also taking a pass on sending the world a message that the new administration wants to reverse, not augment, the arms race.

The U.S. has won that race, lapping the field a hundred times over. Its defence budget is now more than that of all the other nations of the world combined. But for Mr. Obama, that still isn't enough. His budget calls for another substantial increase in military spending. He promises a review of some defence programs with the aim of eliminating some of the more useless weapons systems. But even with that, the overall numbers are likely to be up.

The President appears to be on his way to making good progressive changes in other areas of foreign policy, but Afghanistan is vital.

His new troops are being committed even before his administration completes a strategic update on the conflict. Like other presidents, he has the look of being tied (to use yesteryear's phrase) to the military industrial complex. Gotta feed the war machine.

The first George Bush got the wimp tag and, in response, invaded Panama. Ronald Reagan took out puny Grenada, and his ratings soared.

Bill Clinton, needing a distraction from the Monica Lewinsky scandal, sent missiles into Baghdad to change the headlines.

As for Mr. Obama, he should heed Mr. Harper's words. "We're not going to win this war just by staying," the Prime Minister told CNN. "Frankly, we are not going to ever defeat the insurgency." He noted, too, that the foreign presence is engendering much opposition from local Afghans. In that context, how will Mr. Obama's 17,000 new grunts be viewed? Mr. Harper is by no means turning soft on foreign policy. Check his over-the-top sabre-rattling with Russia on what looked like a routine flyby mission near Canadian air space. Check his bellicosity when he accused Iran of being inherently vile, and his silence on the abuses at Guantanamo.

These are ways of feeding his right-wing base. His new take on Afghanistan necessitates that. He's being criticized in some quarters for putting out a defeatist message that demoralizes the troops.

But the troops, you would think, should be able to see the realities for themselves. And so should Barack Obama.

Fortunately, others remember and are reminding that the military is still a vital part of the solution.  A shot term surge, to clamp-down on the insurgents, deter aggression, and provide a period of increased security may pay significantly by allowing accelerated political & reconstruction activities to move forward.

THE AFGHAN MISSION
Harper's right: We won't win just by staying There is no conventional victory in non-conventional warfare. Our task is to make the insurgents' influence irrelevant
Lewis MacKenzi
Globe & Mail
05 March 209

Retired major-general, first commander of UN peacekeeping forces in Sarajevo I will never get used to the disconnect between reality and what masquerades as political debate in our House of Commons.

The latest example involves all the partisan posturing over Afghanistan embellished with an apparent dearth of knowledge of things military regarding the Prime Minister's "we're not going to win this war just by staying" comments - on, heaven forbid, CNN.

The usual result of a CNN appearance by any Canadian is elevation to instant celebrity status. But, in this case, the entrails of Mr. Harper's comments regarding the Afghan insurgency continue to be dissected for political gain rather than allowing them to shed some light on a grossly misunderstood campaign.

Past words of encouragement by the Prime Minister to our soldiers while visiting them in Afghanistan - we don't cut and run - have to be understood in the context of the moment and not as literal policy. Anyone who has had the privilege of leading and motivating soldiers understands that. Equally important is the responsibility to be honest when explaining the mission to the country's centre of gravity - the public - while the soldiers do the dirty work for the rest of us.

There is no conventional victory in non-conventional warfare.

There is no tickertape parade to mark the defeat of an enemy, nor is there a signing of a surrender document in a railway car in some faraway place. Insurgencies rarely totally disappear. The objective is to reduce them to a manageable scale where they have little impact on the day-to-day lives of the victim country's population. Much like organized crime in a large American city - or, for that matter, a Canadian city, given the influence of street gangs in the past decade. Violent crime exists, and there are areas in some cities you should avoid; but the level of crime does not cause the average citizen to ask: "For safety's sake, perhaps the better option is to join the bad guys." The objective in a counterinsurgency is to isolate the insurgents from the support they coerce from the general population through fear and intimidation and to cause their influence to be irrelevant.

While the military has a key role to play in achieving this isolation, opportunistic and even frequent victories over the insurgents will not, on their own, guarantee "victory." Advantage has to be taken of the fact that, in many cases, particularly in Afghanistan, a significant number of the insurgents can be weaned from the insurgency if they are convinced that their families would be more secure opposing the insurgency rather than supporting it.

In too many areas of southern Afghanistan, this is not the case, as there are insufficient NATO, non-NATO and Afghan security forces on the ground to offer the local population a comfortable level of security. Battles are won by our counterinsurgency forces, but 24/7 security of the "liberated" areas is impossible.

Compounding the frustration of those nations that joined the Afghan army and police in fighting the insurgents is the Afghans' diminishing confidence in President Hamid Karzai and his government. Accusations of corruption and incompetence are grist for opponents of the United Nations-sanctioned mission. But it's quite remarkable what the country has achieved by way of representative government since the Taliban were ousted in 2001.

Starting from zero, a mere eight years of experimentation with elections and governance have produced some pretty impressive results - results that will be sacrificed on the altar of international indifference unless we move to put as much emphasis on governance and development as we have on fighting. That won't happen without security, but security without trust in the government and measurable improvements in the quality of life of ordinary Afghans will be a wasted effort. This is not brain surgery.

Anyone who has a passing knowledge of how to reduce an insurgency sings from the same sheet of music. Yet, we have provided less than 30 per cent of the accepted formula that dictates how many soldiers you need to offer security to a local population and ignored for years the critical role played by good governance and development in isolating the insurgents.

I have repeated ad nauseam that "victory" for the NATO forces will be our departure from Afghanistan with an Afghan security force capable of dealing with a much reduced counterinsurgency threat.

Many nations are functioning today with insurgents trying to disrupt their populations with little effect while life and business continue as usual: Spain/ETA, Colombia/FARC and Peru/Shining Path provide at least three convincing examples.

Acknowledging that the Afghan insurgency will never be defeated in the near term is merely reality. But it can be made irrelevant, and must be. Canada has played, and will continue to play, more of a role than most in this undertaking.

 

[MarkOttawa]

From Terry Glavin, on the Canadian media and Afstan:

All The News That Fits What We Want You To Think, We Print
http://transmontanus.blogspot.com/2009/03/all-news-that-fits-what-we-want-you-to.html

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

From Norman Spector:

TODAY'S DISHONESTY
http://www.members.shaw.ca/nspector4/DISHONEST.htm

Vow to Afghanistan at risk (Star)
http://www.thestar.com/News/Canada/article/597463

Canada will fall short of an agreement it signed with the Afghan government if it fails to "eliminate" the insurgency – a goal Prime Minister Stephen Harper now says is likely unattainable….

It was signed by former chief of defence staff Gen. Rick Hillier and Afghan Defence Minister Abdul Wardak in Kabul on Dec. 18, 2005, in the middle of the federal election that brought the Conservatives to power….

A newly elected Harper quickly stamped his support on the mission when he reacted to an upswing in violence in Afghanistan by declaring Canada would not "cut and run" from the country.

Memo to A Woods: The agreement was authorized by Paul Martin’s government. And Parliament, under pressure by the Liberals, voted to end our combat mission in 2011, regardless of the state of the insurgency.

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Franko]

Usually if an IED goes off and a terp is killed and Canadians are injured it will make the news.

As for you describing your IED attacks as awesome... this makes me question you ever having encountered one.

There are some on this board that have been blown up, Bzzz being one of them. I was close enough to 2 during this tour to speak my mind about it.

Before you open yer yick from the safety back in North America do a bit of research into what you are talking about.

The Army.ca Staff

 

[leroi]

My response, in the online Barrie Examiner:

Afghanistan Facts
http://www.thebarrieexaminer.com/ArticleDisplay.aspx?e=1458541

Mark
Ottawa

Mark, brilliant letter.  It takes a lot of energy keeping up with some of the myths in the press these days.  You very clearly set the record straight for many Canadians.

 

[MarkOttawa]

leroi: Thanks.  Amazing how the real course of events less than a decade old--and all on television--are either forgotten or misrepresented.

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

An excellent piece by Major-General (ret'd) Terry Liston, formerly the head of plans and operations for the CF (usual copyright disclaimer):

Harper spoke the truth
http://www.nationalpost.com/story-printer.html?id=1360544

As the bodies of three more Canadian soldiers arrive back home, Prime Minister Harper's statement on CNN that the Taliban in Afghanistan cannot be defeated have generated outrage among Canadians of all political stripes. By contrast, Canadian soldiers patrolling the Pashtun grape fields and compounds may for the first time be sensing that their government finally understands the situation in Afghanistan.

Their war is not combat against a conventional army. They know that they cannot chase down and kill every Pashtun Taliban rebel in the country, which is larger than Manitoba. And there are even more in Pakistan. They know that for every Pashtun that is killed by NATO forces, another 10 young men are sent from his tribe to avenge him.

Western armies have recently agreed on how to overcome an insurgency. The consensus is based in large part on the British success in Ireland and Malaya, and the lessons drawn by the French and U. S. from their failures in North Africa and Vietnam, respectively. It has been validated by the rapid turn-around of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq under U. S. General David Petraeus.

The British experience in Northern Ireland is revealing. During 38 years of "troubles," the British army never defeated the IRA. Its closing report on the campaign emphasized that "the Army did not 'win' in any recognizable way; rather ... it allowed a political process to be established without unacceptable levels of intimidation." When the military campaign ended in 2007, a political solution had been reached. Both sides had concluded that fighting, alone, could not deliver the crushing victory they wanted and the world consequently saw the previously unimaginable spectacle of the Reverend Ian Paisley shaking hands with Sinn Fein president Gerry Adams.

The recently published U. S. Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency field manual (FM3-24) similarly emphasizes that the top priority is not the destruction of the enemy. Rather, "securing the civilian" is the most important part of the Army's mission. The manual emphasizes the critical role of politics and politicians at all levels, noting that "political leadership may ultimately deliver a negotiated solution to aspects of the conflict or to the insurgency itself." In addition, nation-building activity, carried out by civilian agencies, is identified as a key priority.

General Petraeus, author of the U. S. manual, victor in Iraq [well, so far--latest here]
http://www.damianpenny.com/archived/012791.html
and now commander of all U. S. forces in the Middle East (including Central Asia), spoke to the Munich Conference on Security Policy on Feb. 8.
http://blog.macleans.ca/2009/02/09/more-from-munich-gen-petraeus-no-spin-zone/
He told world leaders and diplomats that there is no purely military solution in Afghanistan. True, he called for a short-term surge of forces to stop the current downward spiral of instability, but he did not talk of winning the war, nor of victory over the Taliban. Consistent with his counterinsurgency doctrine, he said: "Together with our Afghan partners, we have to work to provide the people security, to give them respect, to gain their support and to facilitate the provision of basic services."

He re-emphasized the fundamental principles of counterinsurgency doctrine: "clearing communities of Taliban and other extremist groups,
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/03/afstan-us-clear-and-hold-tactics.html
working with Afghan security forces to prevent militants from returning, extending humanitarian aid and reconstruction assistance to local residents and helping Afghans build effective institutions capable of assuming full responsibility for security and governance." He also said that NATO forces must recommit to supporting the Afghan government in political reconciliation.

Mr. Harper's statements on CNN are consistent with this counterinsurgency approach. They reflect for the first time an honest statement of the military challenge facing our brave young soldiers in Afghanistan. He might have emphasized that the "end-state" for which 111 of our finest young men and women have died also requires intense nation-building and energetic diplomacy to achieve reconciliation within Afghanistan as well as with its neighbours. But, it's an encouraging start...

As for "political reconciliation", the new American president is also looking beyond "winning" militarily:

Obama Ponders Outreach to Elements of the Taliban
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/08/us/politics/08obama.html?ref=todayspaper

One wonders when the prime minister will get credit from our journalists and opposition parties for thinking broadly, like the president. Just kidding.

And President Karzai agrees with President Obama:

Afghan leader Karzai backs Obama's call on Taliban
http://ca.news.yahoo.com/s/reuters/090308/n_top_news/cnews_us_afghan_karzai_obama

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Greymatters]

Only one of many myths being perpetuated in the media and general public - if something is repeated enough times it will be regarded as the truth...


Top ten misconceptions about Canada in Afghanistan (IMO anyway):

10 - We invaded the country after 9/11
9 - Our soldiers are forced to go there against their will, or, they are all mercs/psychos/social outcasts
8 - Politicians would have ended the 'unrest' with the Taliban without military involvement
7 - The military does nothing to help the local people
6 - The violence would end if we just left
5 - Humanitarian aid orgs were doing their work much better without military protection
4 - The local government is controlled by our military
3 - The Conservative government sent us there
2 - We are there to protect the interest of US oil companies
1 - Its a peacekeeping mission

 

[leroi]

Only one of many myths being perpetuated in the media and general public - if something is repeated enough times it will be regarded as the truth...


Top ten misconceptions about Canada in Afghanistan (IMO anyway):

10 - We invaded the country after 9/11
9 - Our soldiers are forced to go there against their will, or, they are all mercs/psychos/social outcasts
8 - Politicians would have ended the 'unrest' with the Taliban without military involvement
7 - The military does nothing to help the local people
6 - The violence would end if we just left
5 - Humanitarian aid orgs were doing their work much better without military protection
4 - The local government is controlled by our military
3 - The Conservative government sent us there
2 - We are there to protect the interest of US oil companies
1 - Its a peacekeeping mission

Greymatters, good list.

Here's another myth that I've heard a lot: "the people of Afghanistan don't want us (Canada as military/as aid/ as whatever) there. "

This is pure unadulterated BS that's being spun by the media. In fact, the people of Afghanistan are terrified of us leaving.

On March 5th at a fundraising breakfast, I listened to author/journalist Sally Armstrong speak passionately for over one hour about Afghanistan and she very cleary stated that the people of Afghanistan can't understand the mentality of  the "pull the troops out now" Canadian peace activists and she said, when the Afghans hear about this wierd Canadian phenomena, it leads them to believe they have no hope and that the world's gone stark raving mad!!

Sally's spent about 16 years working with women and children in Afghanistan.  In her book "Bitter Roots, Tender Shoots: the Uncertain fate of Afghanistan Women," she says, women and girls are better off now than they were under Taliban rule and that each year their situation is improving marginally. "

Yet, if I open a certain Toronto newspaper tomorrow, I'm sure to see the opposite being reported.

 

[MarkOttawa]

A former CIA officers highights the value of the "small footprint" special forces can offer:

In Afghanistan, Less Can Be More
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/10/opinion/10keller.html

AS President Obama moves to ramp up the United States’ presence in Afghanistan, he might benefit from the lessons learned by one of the C.I.A.’s legends of covert operations, Bill Lair. Mr. Lair ran the C.I.A.’s covert action in the 1960s in Laos, which at its height included 30,000 Hmong tribesmen battling Communist insurgents.

I met Bill Lair when he came to the C.I.A.’s training center in Virginia in 2000 to speak at the graduation ceremony for my class of trainees. His agency career had started in the 1950s in Thailand, where he trained an elite force called the Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit. By the early ’60s, Mr. Lair was in neighboring Laos, trying to build an anti-Communist resistance. Corruption was endemic, poppy cultivation was widespread and the poorly educated Hmong tribesmen of northern Laos were barely out of the Stone Age. Yet Mr. Lair and his unit quickly taught the Hmong to resist the Communist tide using guerrilla tactics suited to their terrain and temperament.

By 1966, his C.I.A. bosses looked to tap into this momentum and started throwing more men and money at Mr. Lair — personnel and funds he felt only bloated the operation...

Flash forward 40 years. United States forces scramble to train Afghan Army and police units to take on the Taliban forces crossing the border from Pakistan. Many of these raw Afghan recruits come from poorly educated Pashtun tribes. Corruption is endemic. Drug trafficking is flourishing. Complaints that indiscriminate use of American airpower is killing civilians are routine.

As they say, déjà vu all over again.

The counterinsurgency lessons that Bill Lair tried to impart to us young spies are relevant today: Keep your footprint small. Don’t use trainers who don’t know the language or culture. Don’t let the locals become dependant on American airpower. Train them in tactics suited to their circumstances. Don’t ever let the locals think mighty America will fight their battles or solve all their problems for them; focus on getting them ready to fix their own problems. Keep the folks in Washington out of the way of the people doing the work in the field.

This is why President Obama’s plans to send 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan should be seen as a mixed blessing. In fact, it may be equally significant that the Pentagon has announced it is sending 900 new special operations people to Afghanistan over the spring and summer [emphasis added], including Green Berets, Navy Seals and Marine special operations forces. Ideally, these troops will be well trained in Afghan languages and culture, and prepared to fight in the dry, mountainous terrain the Taliban occupy.

The goal, one hopes, is that these forces will work alongside and train the fledgling Afghan Army commando battalions. Since early 2007, some 3,600 Afghan Army troops have been put through Army Ranger-type training at a former Taliban base six miles south of Kabul. With American help, they have proved adept at such tasks as capturing Taliban leaders, rescuing hostages and destroying drug-smuggling rings.

This is not a war we can win ourselves; the Afghans are going to have to win it by fighting to retake their own country from both Taliban thugs and corrupt government officials. While additional American troops may be an unavoidable necessity to provide security in the short and medium term, we should never forget that doing too much for a weak ally can be just as bad as doing too little.

Arthur Keller is a former C.I.A. case officer in Pakistan.

More on training generally:
http://www.cstc-a.com/mission/CSTC-AFactSheet.html

...Under CSTC-A’s [Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan] operational control is Task Force Phoenix, with military strength of more than 6,000, responsible for training, mentoring and advising the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police.

The CF's role [links in original]:
http://www.comfec-cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/archer/index-eng.asp

Operation ARCHER

Since July 2005, Canada’s participation in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM
http://www.centcom.mil/en/topics/significant-operations/operation-enduring-freedom/
in Afghanistan has been conducted under Operation ARCHER.

The primary activity under Operation ARCHER is the deployment of about 12 senior CF members in Kabul with the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A),
http://cstc-a.com/index.html
a U.S.-led multinational organization that provides mentors and trainers to help Afghanistan’s Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior organize, train, equip, employ and support the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police.

The military nature and coalition structure of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM makes it adaptable to a wide range of multinational projects, such as the CSTC-A, designed to help the Afghan authorities build the components of a new security infrastructure: operational forces and their sustaining institutions, and the general staff and ministries to direct these organizations. These projects are part of the long-term international effort to rebuild Afghanistan’s infrastructure, government and national institutions, including the army and police, that began with the fall of the Taliban in December 2001.

Mark
Ottawa

 

[observor 69]

Yes, the Afghan mission is 'failing' and, yes, the rituals continue

JEFFREY SIMPSON

Globe and Mail, March 11, 2009

Every Canadian death in Afghanistan is a tragedy followed by a ritual.

A bomb explodes, or some other means of death carries a soldier to the grave. The body is returned to Canada in a flag-draped coffin. Comrades salute. Families grieve.

We cannot imagine their loss. Reporters dwell yet again on the bravery of the departed and offer a few details of their curtailed lives. The Prime Minister's Office issues a statement of regret. Clichés abound, for what new can be said?

Truth, which a wag once said is so precious in war that it must be protected by a bodyguard of lies, is too painful to bear: They died, as will many more, in an ill-defined mission that defied all the rules of counterinsurgency, sent by an enthusiastic general who has curiously become a kind of media hero, and by gullible politicians who did not ask the right questions, did not know the country, the nature of the war, the precise aims, the equipment required to fight it, and how to define success.

Prime Minister Stephen Harper says a military victory is not possible in Afghanistan and, of course, he is right. It took a long time for this elementary truth to be spoken. As in everything political, truth will always attract as much, if not more, criticism as illusion.

It will always be one of those "might have beens" if the Americans, instead of launching a costly diversion into Iraq, had focused - with their NATO partners - on Afghanistan after the Taliban were bombed out of the country.

For the Americans, Afghanistan remained a sideshow and, for NATO, a mission that was difficult to organize and execute. Now, years after the first deployments of Canadians to Kandahar, and NATO and U.S. troops elsewhere, the mission is a "mess," according to U.S. Vice-President Joe Biden.

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton says Afghanistan is a narco-state. Just about everyone has lost confidence in Afghan President Hamid Karzai, otherwise known as the Mayor of Kabul. Dennis Blair, director of U.S. national intelligence, says Mr. Karzai's feeble, corrupt government "erodes its popular legitimacy and increases the influence of local warlords and the Taliban."

The U.S. military agrees that the situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating. Even reticent Canadian generals have dropped their bullish, occasionally bombastic, talk. Reports from think tanks everywhere say the situation is worsening.

Afghans think so, too. A massive survey of public opinion there recently found "a clear trend toward greater pessimism over the last two years," with the most pessimism in the southern and southeastern parts of the country, where the Canadians (and others) are located. In 2006, 54 per cent of respondents said they were more prosperous than under the Taliban; today, only 36 per cent say they are more prosperous than under the Taliban.

Afghanistan's interior ministry lists a "high" threat level in 11 provinces (out of 34), a somewhat more upbeat estimate than one offered a few months ago by U.S. agencies.

The University of Ottawa's Roland Paris, arguably Canada's steadiest hand in observing Afghanistan, wrote last month: "There is a growing sentiment among watchers of this mission - and in policy circles in Washington and elsewhere - that the international operation in Afghanistan, in its current form, is failing."

Note the words "in its current form." Essentially, what Canada and the rest of NATO have been doing is more "current form," maybe with somewhat different equipment, with the benefit of lessons learned, with a few more resources but with few results in the troubled parts of Afghanistan.

The drug economy fuels the insurgency; the government's corruption continues unabated; the border with Pakistan remains porous; Pakistan is unable and unwilling to control its militants; NATO dreams of a strong central government in a country that has never had one. Most, if not all, of the rules of counterinsurgency are being broken. The expenditure of more treasure, human and monetary, beckons.

Is it any wonder that, by common account, this mission is "failing," that the families of those fallen and yet to fall receive cold comfort from sacrifice, that we are trapped in a situation from which no escape beckons, and that the rituals will continue?

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20090310.wcosimp11/BNStory/specialComment/home

 

[GAP]

The mission may not succeed the way it was envisioned and persecuted......does that make it wrong.

Maybe the original vision of happy people wandering through colorful markets, all happy and gay under a democratic government isn't quite what should have been thought of, but that is what is marketed......

Maybe the military approach has been fractured by too many competing mandates and caveates by too many countries who want to be there only to be able to say they contributed. If it's going to be an American Operation (which Enduring Freedom is), then the US should just do its' thing, tell the others they are welcome to help, but don't expect the majority of the forces to kowtow to some politically correct
lesson plan.

 

[OldSolduer]

GAP there sure are a lot of Armchair Generals aren't there? :rage:

Yet not one of them dares to set foot where angels fear to tread. Nor do they seem to have any solutions but to whine and complain about whatever they don't like.

 

[GAP]

I am just tired of the MSM, et al, with the "I told you so in....(insert date)", but yeah....lotsa Armchair Generals.....

 

[observor 69]

Much of Mr.Simpson's comments are based on his reading of this book by Thomas Ricks

http://forums.air-force.ca/forums/threads/84504/post-819598.html#msg819598

Mr.Ricks has spent a lot of time in Iraq over the years and spoken to all the senior players military and political.

Petraeus is now commander of Central Command and it is apparent by the announcements of the Obama administration that they are being advised on Afghanistan by Petraeus.