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Afghanistan: Why we should be there (or not), how to conduct the mission (or not) & when to leave

Start of a Torch post:

CF commander in Afstan: A "serious, desperate situation"
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/10/cf-commander-in-afstan-serious.html

The audio (it's important to realize that the overall impression from the interview is a lot less sensational than the Reuters' story below suggests)...

Another one:

Brit battalion to move from KAF to Helmand/Taliban strengthening/Who's the US fighting?
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/10/brit-battalion-to-move-from-kaf-to.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
Two pieces in The Economist make the case for the McChrystal plan:

Obama's war
http://www.economist.com/printedition/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=14644385

Obama's faltering war
http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14652443

Not ready to join the herd that thinks the ship is irrevocably sinking:
http://canada-afghanistan.blogspot.com/2009/10/tired-cliches-of-afghanistan.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
Start and end of a Torch post:

Brits partnering with ANA units
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/10/brits-partnering-with-ana-units.html

Previously on the subject of partnering...

Now from UK Prime Minister Brown, via Defence of the Realm:
http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/2009/10/afpak-in-house.html

"...
The Afghans are to set up a corps headquarters in Helmand and British forces will be ready to partner 5,000 of the 10,000 Afghan troops being trained by the coalition in Helmand over the next few months. This is not just a case of embedding mentors with Afghan units, as has been done in the past, but working integrally right up to the top of the command chain [emphasis added]. In future operations, the protection of populated areas must be the shared responsibility of Afghan and coalition forces..."

Imagine our prime minister actually talking about the conduct of operations. I guess that involves, er, combat.

Mark
Ottawa
 
A long interview in "Small Wars Journal" with a veteren of Rhodisia's "Bush War".

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/306-noonan.pdf

Sample:

Q: The dichotomy between the employment (and degrees) of violence wielded by insurgents and constituted authorities is a point well taken. Though in Mukiwa, you noted that an area in Matabeleland --one in which you spent considerable time and sweat building friendly relationships and sound human intelligence sources--essentially turned "red" after a violent incursion by the Rhodesian Light Infantry. Why do terrorization tactics work to the insurgents' advantage, but backfire so spectacularly when used by government forces?

A: Because on a balance of terror, they will always tend to win. We arrest people and put them in jail, the insurgents take much more ferocious action. It's the western paradox, but also it’s inherent in asymmetrical conflict. If you are going to lose in the balance of terror, then you have to be able to promise protection in return for support. If you don't have the continuity of presence on the ground to provide civilian population consistent protection then they will feel too exposed and afraid to support you, or be seen to support you. For that you need to stay out among the people, not pull back into secure fire bases, in which you are essentially isolated from the population, and which help to characterize you as an 'invading' force. To some extent the problem can be ameliorated by having Afghan forces, with NATO advisors, provide the continuous presence, but you still need the muscle to protect them because obviously, the danger of that continuous presence is that your forces (Afghan or NATO) are more exposed and vulnerable. And we’ve seen that with the increase of suicide bombing, which aims to counter exactly that mixing. In a counter-intuitive way, the use of suicide bombing is often actually a sign that the balance of conflict is against the insurgents. It’s an attempt to drive a wedge between the people and the COIN forces, to change the balance of fear audit I spoke about, by making civilians scared to be near govt or NATO forces or institutions.

The situation I described in Mukiwa that you refer to is one where we had being pursuing the strategy of cooperation etc, and then a fire force unit of our own side had swung in and carried out a scorched earth patrol against civilians who had, up until then, been cooperating. After that those people no longer trusted us to keep our word and no longer cooperated.

It is wrong to think of the population as being monolithic. Different elements of society cooperate or not for differing reasons, some might be politically motivated but most are swayed by fear or by promises of help and betterment.
 
Start of a Torch post:

The Taliban are indeed our enemy--but, what, me worry?
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/10/taliban-are-indeed-our-enemy-but-what.html

Quite a few people are now saying that al Qaeda are the real AfPak threat, and the Taliban are just nasties with a local focus (see below). Those people should read this,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/18/world/asia/18hostage.html?ref=todayspaper
by a NY Times reporter held captive for seven months. And that "local threat" includes nuclear-armed Pakistan (again, see below). What, me worry?

'...
Over those months, I came to a simple realization. After seven years of reporting in the region, I did not fully understand how extreme many of the Taliban had become. Before the kidnapping, I viewed the organization as a form of “Al Qaeda lite,” a religiously motivated movement primarily focused on controlling Afghanistan.

Living side by side with the Haqqanis’ followers [more here and here],
http://www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/haqqani_network/
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/08/the_haqqani_network.php
I learned that the goal of the hard-line Taliban was far more ambitious. Contact with foreign militants in the tribal areas appeared to have deeply affected many young Taliban fighters. They wanted to create a fundamentalist Islamic emirate with Al Qaeda that spanned the Muslim world...'

Mark
Ottawa
 
The president looking for an out--or applying pressure?

Emanuel says U.S. must gauge viability of government in Kabul
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/18/AR2009101802261.html

White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel said Sunday that before a decision is made on whether to send more U.S. troops to Afghanistan, the United States must assess the strength and viability of the Afghan government.

"It would be reckless to make a decision on U.S. troop level if, in fact, you haven't done a thorough analysis of whether, in fact, there's an Afghan partner ready to fill that space that the U.S. troops would create and become a true partner in governing the Afghan country," Emanuel said on CNN's "State of the Union."...

Mark
Ottawa
 
From Bruce R. at Flit, certainly worth the read:

You want to know what I think? I'll tell you what I think
http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2009_10_19.html#006565

Herschel Smith from Captain's Journal linked to a recent post here.
http://www.captainsjournal.com/2009/10/18/can-an-insurgency-and-counterinsurgency-remain-static/
His comments suggest he feels I'm guilty of a little ambiguity on my Afghanistan position, so maybe now's a good time to clear it up. My "Afghan position" and $1.50 will buy you a coffee at Tim's, of course, but it's fair to say my own thoughts have been crystallizing of late anyway. So here we go: the big "What Must Be Done?" post. Continue reading if you dare...

Mark
Ottawa
 
Much of what Anne Applebaum writes applies to Canada:

The slowly vanishing NATO
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/19/AR2009101902510.html

...
Only very rarely do the casualties of one country make it into the media, the political debates or the prime ministerial speeches of another country. There has been an international coalition operating in Afghanistan since 2001. NATO has been in charge of that coalition since 2003. Yet to read the British press, one would think the British are there almost alone, fighting a war in which they have no national interest. The same is true in France and in the Netherlands. American media outlets hardly note the participation of other countries, even though some -- Britain and Canada -- have endured casualties at a higher rate than that of the U.S. military, relative to the size of their contingents.

There is almost no sense anywhere that the war in Afghanistan is an international operation, or that the stakes and goals are international, or that the soldiers on the ground represent anything other than their own national flags and national armed forces: Most of the war's European critics want to know why their boys are fighting "for the Americans," not for NATO. Most of the American critics dismiss the European contribution as useless or ignore it altogether. As Jackson Diehl pointed out Monday,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/18/AR2009101801460.html
the central debate about future Afghanistan policy is taking place in Washington without any obvious contributions from anybody else [emphasis added, e.g., "A key piece of the NATO puzzle is the U.S., which is considering upping its troop count by 20,000 to 40,000. (MND) MacKay would not speculate on what the U.S. would ultimately decide..."
http://www.winnipegsun.com/news/canada/2009/10/18/11444081-sun.html
--remember when George Bush was slanged to the rafters for being unilateral?]. I'm not going to blame the U.S. administration alone for this: It's not as if Europe has put forward a different plan -- and there was certainly a moment, back at the beginning of this administration, when that would have been very welcome.

The fact is that the idea of "the West" has been fading for a long time on both sides of the Atlantic...

...the next time NATO is needed, I doubt whether it will be there at all.

Meanwhile the SecDef seems to be rather opposing the White House line:

Gates: Afghanistan war strategy should come first
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5jzA0Whh_1id_XIqXstD76TAO4qbwD9BEH88G0

ABOARD A U.S. MILITARY JET — The Obama administration needs to decide on a war strategy for Afghanistan without waiting for a government there to be widely accepted as legitimate, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Monday.

Gates' comments put him at odds with top White House and NATO officials who are balking at ordering more troops and other resources to Afghanistan until the disputed election crisis there is resolved...

In separate comments over the last two days, White House chief of staff Rahm Emanuel and NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen each said no decision on the future of the war strategy should be made until the legitimacy of the Afghanistan government is assured.

Gates said Obama was nearing a decision on the strategy.

The Pentagon chief was headed to Japan and South Korea where he planned discuss support for the war in Afghanistan with leaders there. He was to attend a meeting of NATO defense ministers in Bratislava, Slovakia, later in the week where Afghanistan would be a top topic.

"This is an alliance issue," he said. "It should not be looked upon as exclusively the responsibility of the United States to respond [emphasis added, good luck, see above]."..

Mark
Ottawa
 
Torch post:

While Washington deliberates...Gen McChyrstal is implementing his COIN strategy
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/10/while-washington-deliberatesgen.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
More at The Torch:

Gobsmacking cynicism, or, gosh, what's an Afghan to think, eh?
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/10/gobsmacking-cynicism-or-gosh-whats.html

...
Mr Wells, move to Afstan. And eat your own cleverness.

Mark
Ottawa
 
Good and bad news:

1) Good news, well, er, coordinated:

In Helmand, a model for success?
Influx of Marines and focus on security bring peace to a southern Afghan town -- at least for now [with photo gallery]

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/21/AR2009102104144.html?sid=ST2009102104197

There’s No Substitute for Troops on the Ground
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/22/opinion/22boot.html?th&emc=th

2) Bad news:

Militants deepen their foothold in Afghanistan's north
The Taliban and others wield power brazenly in the once-stable region. Roadblocks and ambushes are now part of life for the nervous population.

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-afghan-north22-2009oct22,0,715306.story

More on Kunduz here
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/09/afstan-reaction-to-kunduz-airstrikea.html
and here.
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/06/how-bundeswehr-doesnt-fight-much-in.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
At the Torch:

Eric and the Tablibs
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/10/eric-and-tablibs.html

Inside Afstan...and out ["out" very...]
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/10/inside-afstanand-out.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
Start of a Torch post:

Agincourt... and counterinsurgency?
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/10/agincourt-and-counterinsurgency.html

Further to this post,

Agincourt and...Afstan? Update: And Winston
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/10/agincourt-andafstan.html

some observations passed on by a friend in a message to him:

"I have Anne Curry's book
http://www.amazon.ca/Agincourt-New-History-Anne-Curry/dp/0752428284/ref=sr_1_3?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1256686640&sr=1-3
and it is a very fine work..."

Mark
Ottawa
 
Start of another Torch post:

Afstan: Obamamiddlesplittingstrategy
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/10/afstan-obamamiddlesplittingstrategy.html

Earlier,

...Round and round the mulberry bush
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/10/afstan-round-and-round-mulberry-bush.html

and now the latest:

"U.S. to Protect Populous Afghan Areas, Officials Say

President Obama’s advisers are focusing on a strategy for Afghanistan aimed at protecting about 10 top population centers..."
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/28/world/asia/28policy.html?ref=todayspaper

Mark
Ottawa
 
From BruceR. at Flit:

Today's essential Afghan reading
http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2009_10_28.html#006574

...We have been trying, with all the best of intentions, to work against the grain of an established society (of which both AWK [see here]
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/28/world/asia/28intel.html?hp
and the Khostis who dislike the New Model ANA are a part), relying on the military's ability to build anew, or at least keep the roads open while Afghans do. But neither armies nor Afghans are known for building things very well. (Armies excise, break, smash quite effectively, no question.) The results have become evidently suboptimal, and smart people like the Zabul diplomat are getting discouraged. You could say "well, start working along the grain then." And that might have been an option as late as 2005. But the infrastructure, the investment, the sunk cost involved in the current society-renewal strategy in places like Helmand and Kandahar has become so massive, widespread and pervasive since, that I'm thinking you can't just wind it back down easily anymore. Societies have this in common with both subatomic particles and sensitive environments: the mere act of observing them, let alone trying to change them, distorts their progress. Our presence has taken parts of Afghanistan down a road they never would have gone down on their own. And that means we're inevitably going to be somewhat less able to restore them to something it once was, or allow them to choose their own way now, because of all that we have committed to preserving all that we've built so far.

All that to say I'd be skeptical about any "just arm the tribes" line of argument, whether by Cdr. Adams or elsewhere by Maj. Gant,
http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/wp-content/themes/stevenpressfield/one_tribe_at_a_time.pdf
at this point. It might work if you could draw a dotted line around the area where you want to try it and say "this is our approach in this area," and keep main-force ISAF and ANSF out. But if the areas of operation for conventional and unconventional strategies overlap, you risk coming back to the AWK thing again, with everyone seemingly working at cross-purposes in a semi-chaotic situation...

Mark
Ottawa
 
Terry Glavin on Capt. Simon Mailloux, amongst other things especially regarding President Karzai's brother and the CIA:

Afghanistan: It's Always The Context You'll Want To Keep Your Eye On.
http://transmontanus.blogspot.com/2009/10/afghanistan-its-always-context-youll.html

...
"Bravery is not an American monopoly. Most allies report many soldiers volunteering to return to Afghanistan despite the increased violence. A Canadian officer who lost his leg in a roadside bomb attack in 2007 recently returned to Kandahar, in his words, 'to do good.'..."
[ http://forums.milnet.ca/forums/threads/89337.0.html ]

A confession: A clandestine "Kandahar Strike Force" composed of slightly brutish Afghan gunmen who are perhaps insufficiently inclined to the delicate sensibilities of the American Civil Liberties Union yet vaguely responsive to the suggestions of certain characters in the otherwise unremarkable suburb of Langley, Virginia, is not something I find altogether displeasing at the moment...

Mark
Ottawa
 
Start of a Torch post:

Afstan post 2011: Why should MND MacKay care very much?
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/10/afstan-post-2011-why-should-mnd-mackay.html

After all, the prime minister said recently:
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5guPUzhF_gDkR2VYDuJnhffp7NNuw

'...
"Canada's military mission in Afghanistan will end in 2011," Harper told reporters. "And we will not be extending the military mission, period."..'...

Mark
Ottawa
 
Start of another Torch post, by Babbling Brooks:

The Third Way: Ending the Illusions in Afghanistan - Part 1
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/10/third-way-ending-illusions-in.html

I have recently had the honour and pleasure of corresponding with Shane Schreiber, a decorated Army officer currently serving in the CF. He has written an article outlining some of the problems and potential solutions in Afghanistan, as he sees them, and we are publishing it here at The Torch.

Personally, I believe his perspective is well worth your consideration: Schreiber has numerous overseas operational deployments, including two tours in Afghanistan - one as a Company Commander in Kandahar in 2002, and another as Chief of Joint Operations for ISAF Regional Command South Headquarters, Kandahar in 2006. He holds three post-secondary degrees, and is an award-winning author on military affairs.

Obviously, the views he expresses here are his own, and are not reflective of Government of Canada, Department of National Defence, or Canadian Forces policy or opinion.

While you may or may not agree with each point he makes, I believe we need to listen more to credible people like Schreiber before forming our own opinions. He is but one example of the thousands of men and women (civilian and military alike) in this country who, each individually, have amassed more academic and hands-on knowledge and experience in Afghanistan than any dozen journalists and pundits you care to name.

The article is a lengthy one, so I have broken it down into two parts: this is Part 1, which lays out some of the most pressing problems facing Afghanistan and those looking to help that country.

- Damian...

Mark
Ottawa
 
More from Lt.-Col. Shane Schreiber:

The Third Way: Ending the Illusions in Afghanistan - Part 2
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/11/third-way-ending-illusions-in.html

And from Maclean's:

Afghanistan: Noble fight or lost cause?
http://www2.macleans.ca/2009/11/01/afghanistan-noble-fight-or-lost-cause/print/

On Nov. 10, Maclean’s will present a round table discussion on “Afghanistan: Noble Fight or Lost Cause?” at the Neptune Theatre in Halifax, the second in a series of talks. The debate, broadcast live nationwide on CPAC, will feature Scott Taylor, a former soldier and the publisher and editor of Esprit de Corps, and Mercedes Stephenson, military analyst and vice-president of Breakout Educational Network, among others. The event will be moderated by CPAC’s Peter Van Dusen, and include Maclean’s columnists Paul Wells and Andrew Coyne as panellists. Click here for tickets.
http://www2.macleans.ca/in-conversation-with-macleans/

This week, Wells and Coyne kick off the discussion...

To be televised Tuesday, November 10 at 7 pm ET /8pm AT /4pm PT:
http://www.cpac.ca/forms/index.asp?dsp=template&act=view3&section_id=24&template_id=1266&lang=e

Mark
Ottawa
 
What to do about Afstan? BruceR. responds to Shane Schreiber.  First from Shane Schreiber (with link to Part 1),

The Third Way: Ending the Illusions in Afghanistan - Part 2
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/11/third-way-ending-illusions-in.html

now the start of a post at Flit:

Today's... I don't know what this is, frankly
http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2009_11_03.html#006575

At serious risk of breaking the stones-glass houses rule, I feel compelled to write something here about another Canadian military online essayist.

The fellow behind this post
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/11/third-way-ending-illusions-in.html
has more relevant experience, with the military, with Afghanistan, and probably with life in general than I do. So please take my criticism of his writing with that in mind. It's his attempt at a big solution piece on What to Do in Afghanistan. The synopsis:

First, get the world to legalize the consumption of heroin. Check.
Second, get Karzai and Abdullah to form a national unity government. Um, check.
Third, get the Karzai-Abdullah government to introduce conscription and mass-enrol Afghans into the army and police. (...)
Fourth, get Pakistan to "reclaim control" of its FATA territories. (!!!)
Fifth, get Afghan and Western forces to "consider the Durand line irrelevant" and chase Taliban onto Pakistani territory whenever required and thus deny them a safe haven. (!!!!!)

If you do all that, on a "tight and non-negotiable timetable" it will not mean victory, but you will have bought Afghans their "last, best chance," after which we can pull out.

I'm sorry, but reading that in this context is not unlike reading "first we need to breed a race of superponies...

Mark
Ottawa
 
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