- Reaction score
- 7,147
- Points
- 1,360
Emphasis mine....
"Al Qaeda: Propaganda and Media Strategy"
Angela Gendron, Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa, published in ITAC "Trends in Terrorism" Series, Volume 2007-2
Article link - .pdf version
Highlights of Summary:
"Islam has been riven throughout its history by the periodic attempts of radical fundamentalists to impose their own interpretation of Islamic law through militant jihad. Al Qaeda’s religious “war against unbelief” is yet another attempt, but it too will fail unless it is successful in winning the support of the Muslim ummah. This is the main objective of its propaganda and media strategy.
Al Qaeda places great importance on winning the battle of ideas and sees its media strategy as crucial and complementary to its operational campaign.....
Al Qaeda’s long-term strategic and intermediate goals are the substance of its propaganda, which dwells more heavily on its interpretation of world events and militant jihad as the agent for change, than its eschatological vision for the future ....
Propaganda materials have developed from ideological “talking head” interviews given to the Western press from the 1990s onwards, to operational training videos and rap lyrics which celebrate the demise of infidels. They are disseminated through the broadcast and print media, or over the Internet, to three broad target audiences: the adversary, supporters and the Muslim ummah. The Internet is predominantly used as a medium to communicate with and radicalize its own supporters.
Increasing volumes of audio and video tapes have been produced since 9/11 by Al Qaeda’s production company, al-Sahab. The majority have been channeled through al-Jazeera, the Qatari-owned satellite television channel, which Al Qaeda favours as being sufficiently reliable and unbiased to air its messages.....
Pent-up demand in the Arab world for uncensored information is being met by a number of state controlled pan-Arab media and satellite television networks. Some relaxation of control has meant that these channels have now become instruments in the battle for Muslim minds. The media environment in the Arab world remains tolerant of Islamic terrorism and may have contributed to its increasing incidence.
The fear of fitna or chaos within the Muslim ummah has so far undermined the will of traditional scholars to contest the legitimacy of Al Qaeda’s radical message. While radicals readily brand Muslims who disagree with them as apostates, mainstream scholars do not respond in kind because to do so is takfir or heresy. This information asymmetry has favoured radicals, but new initiatives in the West are being launched to confront Al Qaeda’s persuasive propaganda.
Subtle shifts in Al Qaeda’s propaganda indicate that internal changes are taking place. A greater emphasis on the legitimacy of operations, particularly with regard to tactics and targeting, may be an attempt to bring militant jihadism into the mainstream in order to garner support; alternatively, it may signal a divergence between the leadership and the radical Salafist scholars whose rulings are shaping the development of the movement and the legal framework within which jihadis operate."
"Al Qaeda: Propaganda and Media Strategy"
Angela Gendron, Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa, published in ITAC "Trends in Terrorism" Series, Volume 2007-2
Article link - .pdf version
Highlights of Summary:
"Islam has been riven throughout its history by the periodic attempts of radical fundamentalists to impose their own interpretation of Islamic law through militant jihad. Al Qaeda’s religious “war against unbelief” is yet another attempt, but it too will fail unless it is successful in winning the support of the Muslim ummah. This is the main objective of its propaganda and media strategy.
Al Qaeda places great importance on winning the battle of ideas and sees its media strategy as crucial and complementary to its operational campaign.....
Al Qaeda’s long-term strategic and intermediate goals are the substance of its propaganda, which dwells more heavily on its interpretation of world events and militant jihad as the agent for change, than its eschatological vision for the future ....
Propaganda materials have developed from ideological “talking head” interviews given to the Western press from the 1990s onwards, to operational training videos and rap lyrics which celebrate the demise of infidels. They are disseminated through the broadcast and print media, or over the Internet, to three broad target audiences: the adversary, supporters and the Muslim ummah. The Internet is predominantly used as a medium to communicate with and radicalize its own supporters.
Increasing volumes of audio and video tapes have been produced since 9/11 by Al Qaeda’s production company, al-Sahab. The majority have been channeled through al-Jazeera, the Qatari-owned satellite television channel, which Al Qaeda favours as being sufficiently reliable and unbiased to air its messages.....
Pent-up demand in the Arab world for uncensored information is being met by a number of state controlled pan-Arab media and satellite television networks. Some relaxation of control has meant that these channels have now become instruments in the battle for Muslim minds. The media environment in the Arab world remains tolerant of Islamic terrorism and may have contributed to its increasing incidence.
The fear of fitna or chaos within the Muslim ummah has so far undermined the will of traditional scholars to contest the legitimacy of Al Qaeda’s radical message. While radicals readily brand Muslims who disagree with them as apostates, mainstream scholars do not respond in kind because to do so is takfir or heresy. This information asymmetry has favoured radicals, but new initiatives in the West are being launched to confront Al Qaeda’s persuasive propaganda.
Subtle shifts in Al Qaeda’s propaganda indicate that internal changes are taking place. A greater emphasis on the legitimacy of operations, particularly with regard to tactics and targeting, may be an attempt to bring militant jihadism into the mainstream in order to garner support; alternatively, it may signal a divergence between the leadership and the radical Salafist scholars whose rulings are shaping the development of the movement and the legal framework within which jihadis operate."
