Americans Late to Major Ground Combat in WWII?

[Bruce Monkhouse]

Oyaguy,
May all the "ghosts" of your so-called "sideshows" come back and kick your ***........
    +
MOD NOTE
Have some respect for those that perished or begone with you.

 

[2 Cdo]

Sorry Oyaguy but saying battles anywhere but Normandy were a sideshow is a definite insult to those troops who fought in these "sideshows"! How easy it must be to play armchair tactician 50 plus years after the fact!

It reminds me of a little story my father told me; On returning from Korea he was reporting into his new posting and a "grizzled old Sgt" told him that Korea wasn't a REAL war like WWII. He went on and on about the fighting that took place in Africa, Italy, Normandy and the Pacific and how the whole world was involved. My father then asked this Sgt where he served during WWII and the Sgt replied that he had fought all through Italy. My dad then asked him if he was worried about the fighting in Africa, and the Sgt replied "No because I was fighting in Italy".

My father ever the smart-ass then said as far as he's concerned the size of the war doesn't matter, all that mattered was if someone to your front was shooting at you that was a big enough war for him!

The point Oyaguy is that ALL theatres, and all the battles were instrumental in defeating Germany and Japan not just D-Day(which was a sideshow to the Eastern front ;D). Couldn't resist!

 

[Infanteer]

Although I share oyaguy's sentiment that all the other theaters of WWII (Atlantic, Mediteranean, Southeast Asia, Pacific, China, Bomber Campaign) do not have the awesome scope of the 4 years of the Eastern Front (well, China would be pretty damn close), I wouldn't relegate them to "sideshows" - in a total war, these events are all interelated and all equally important.   As an example, my reference to the bomber campaign and the Luftwaffe meant to show that a huge amount of resources and industrial capability were diverted from the German War Effort in the East to help ward off the Bombers; this is Industrial Man-Hours that could have gone to Panthers, Tigers, 88's etc, etc to fight the Russians.

 

[I_am_John_Galt]

Hmmm, nice title. Hooked me straight away.
...
Whatever date any of the western allies got into the game, it wasn't until June 6 1944, that the western allies were finally operating in a major theatre, against the main enemy. Everthing up to that, was a side show. North Africa, Italy, all the Pacific Island jumping, were theatres/operations that generally took relatively small numbers of troops. From June 6 1944 to May 8 1945, wasn't even a whole year of major ground combat operations.

I think you are confusing body count with strategic importance (or possibly European history with world history): look at the Battle of Midway alone.  Had the Allies (Americans) lost that single battle the entire West Coast of North America (to say nothing of Australia) would have been exposed to the Axis (Japanese) and there very possibly never would have been a Western Front in Europe ... it seems to me that this little "side-show" (<3,000 total casualties) was at least as important as the main event.

{EDIT: I'm not trying to suggest that Midway was the most important battle of the war, I'm simply providing a single example of a What If? which I think demonstrates how weak your "side show" rationale is.}

 

[dutchie]

"Hey man, everything not in a Spielberg movie is a sideshow..ok? When I see Tom Hanks rolling across the African desert, fending off the Jap hordes, or fighting Germans up the Italian boot, then I'll give it the respect it deserves."

BTW, if Japan was such a sideshow, why did the Yanks need to drop 2 nukes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki to end that 'sideshow'?

Pull your head form your bum before you post, smartguy.

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

Some points just off the top of my head:

1.  If the Brits hadn't held the Germans at the Channel, we would have lost.

2.  If the Yanks hadn't created Lend-Lease and supplied both the UK and USSR, we would have lost.

3.  If the Allies had agreed to a pre-mature crossing of the Channel in 1942, we would have lost and Europe may well still be Communist.

4.  If the Americans hadn't agreed to a "Germany first" strategy and concentrated on what they regarded as the main enemy - Japan - victory would have come years later, if at all.

5.  If the USSR hadn't held the line at Stalingrad, we would have lived with years of stalemate in the West.

6.  If the USSR had been decisively defeated at Kursk, it may well have been over in the East, with years of warfare to go in the West.

7.  The Allies captured as many Axis soldiers in Tunisia as the Soviets defeated at Stalingrad.  A pretty decent "sideshow", really.  Imagine Hitler controlling the Suez Canal and linking up with his Russian army in the Caucausus...

8.  The Soviets weren't concerned with any theatre but their own.  For the Americans, Australians, New Zealanders and Indians, it could be argued that the Pacific was the main theatre.

Finally, comparing casualty figures for WW 1 and WW 2 is rather pointless.  WW 1 was attrition warfare at its peak, with deliberate (and I'm using that term loosely) sacrifice of men and materiel to "bleed" the enemy.  WW 2, by and large, was a manoeuvre war - totally different.  It could be argued that Soviet casualty rates (on the military side) were so much higher than the West's partially because of the Soviet proclivity to conduct massed infantry attacks against dug-in defensive positions.

IMHO, everyone contributed equally to the defeat of the Axis and there were no real "sideshows" (although it could be argued that the Italian campaign was a strategic error).

Cheers,

Teddy

 

[Acorn]

1.   If the Brits hadn't held the Germans at the Channel, we would have lost.

etc.

"What ifs are dangerous, though I think you're right on a couple of those you mentioned.

It could be argued that Soviet casualty rates (on the military side) were so much higher than the West's partially because of the Soviet proclivity to conduct massed infantry attacks against dug-in defensive positions.

It could be argued, but would be wrong (in my opinion). About 50% of all the Soviet military casualties suffered in the war were inflicted in the period from Spring '41 to Spring '42. I don't think there was any Soviet proclivity to conduct massed infantry attacks against prepared positions at all. The opposite, in fact. Doctrinally they became very good at armoured warfare of the day: infantry breaks the line and the tanks go in and shoot up the cooks and rear HQs. The trick that they eventually mastered was to concentrate the infantry attack where the enemy was weakest.

It's a topic that probably deserves a thread of its own (if there isn't one already).

Acorn

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

I wasn't meaning to "what if" WW II, but instead to prove a point about participation.  You can "what if" this subject to death and there are plenty of alternative history novels to indulge the imagination.  My point was that you can't simply write off a theatre or an activity (or a major participant, for that matter) simply because you "believe" it didn't help with the overall war effort.

As for the Soviets, you could well be correct.  I'm hardly an expert.  However, the battle at Seelow Heights (1945) is a pretty decent example of Soviet lack of imagination and tendency to use frontal attacks.  Throw in use of penal battalions to lead assaults, etc., and the casualty rates climb pretty quickly.  As you said, though, perhaps a subject for a different thread...

Cheers,

Teddy

 

[T.I.M.]

That being said, I remember reading that after 1942, the German's never had more than 25% of the Luftwaffe in the Eastern Front - all that production, manpower, and resources was directed to repelling the bomber offensives.

Actually, "Black Cross, Red Star" puts the numbers at upwards of 60% of the entire Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front until late 1943.  Only by mid '44 it had dropped to about 40% of operational strength on the Eastern Front, and most of the Luftwaffe's best squadrons remained in the East until the end of the war.

 

[T.I.M.]

As for the Soviets, you could well be correct.   I'm hardly an expert.   However, the battle at Seelow Heights (1945) is a pretty decent example of Soviet lack of imagination and tendency to use frontal attacks.   Throw in use of penal battalions to lead assaults, etc., and the casualty rates climb pretty quickly.   As you said, though, perhaps a subject for a different thread...

Well, the Red Army's embarassing and costly debacle at the Seelow heights follows after the stunning armoured sweeps through Ukraine and Belorussia, and actually wasn't typical of late war Soviet military prowess.   For example, the 1st Guards Tank Army that was hurled into frontal attacks on unsuitable ground at Seelow had only the previous summer conducted a number of lightning advances that outflanked German forces and struck deep into their rear of an entire Army Group in what stands as the ultimate realization of armoured warfare in WWII.

Seelow was a case of Zhukov far from his best, what with his rival Konev making speedy progress to the south, and Stalin breathing down his neck to take Berlin as fast as possible, no matter the cost.   Zhukov thus acted far too hastily and made a number of costly errors out of desperate urgency.   In turn, he was facing one of the greatest defensive commanders of WWII - General Heinrici - at his best.   Some historians consider Heinrici's judgment at Seelow almost flawless.

That's not to say the Russians didn't spend a great deal of manpower, often in a very wasteful manner.  While Soviet commanders did try to conserve combat power (contrary to myth, there was not a bottomless supply) as a rule they were also more callous about expending it than Western Allied or German commanders.  They tried to win through deception, surprise, and superior manuever when possible, but if it wasn't then they were also willing to resort to pure, bloody, brute force.

Zhukov did the latter at Seelow, driven by politics rather than strategy, but his fame comes from his success at the former.

 

[Acorn]

T.I.M. addressed the Seelowe debacle, which is the exception that proves the rule. The Soviets were actually unlikely to attack in such a way due to the shortage of pers they had. By the time of the assault on Berlin the typical Infantry Division was lucky to field a Regiment in actual strength. They compensated with firepower: an inf regt (bn in size)would have a sqn of JS2 tabks attached, as well as a battery of SP artillery - either 152 JS or tracked 203mm  howitzers in direct support.

If one were to conclude a "Soviet proclivity" to infantry assaults based on Seelowe, what does Kursk indicate about the Germans?

Acorn

 

[Brad Sallows]

What constitutes "major ground combat"?

 

[Infanteer]

Actually, "Black Cross, Red Star" puts the numbers at upwards of 60% of the entire Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front until late 1943.   Only by mid '44 it had dropped to about 40% of operational strength on the Eastern Front, and most of the Luftwaffe's best squadrons remained in the East until the end of the war.

Hmm...I got my info here:

Moscow never acknowledged that, from late 1943 onwards, only 20 percent of the Luftwaffe was deployed on the Eastern Front, because the remainder was fighting the Western allies over Germany.

Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany 1944-1945. pg 10.

Hastings doesn't quote his source in the book, but he's a fairly respectable writer.

I remember seeing the 20% figure in a paper I read that focused on German Air unit production, but I can't remember the name of the paper.

 

[Old Sweat]

At the risk of descending into curmudgeonry, Hastings is a good technical writer, but as a journalist by profression is always looking for "the story." He should be read very, very carefully, as he tends to opt for the sensational over the factual.

 

[Infanteer]

Agreed - I got that sense from reading his book.  It flows very well, but the only thing he cites is the quotes by people he interviewed.  Great reading, but not the greatest scholarship (as proof, see my ability to back up my claim against T.I.M., who cites a highly rated history of the Eastern Front).

 

[STA Gunner]

In defence of Max Hastings, his book on the Falklands War was superb.  He was there, and he offers an excellent platoon/company level description of the war.  But, you would be 100% correct if you said that you had to find other sources for the higher levels though.

I enjoy him as much as I enjoy Pierre Berton for military history.  I just cannot use them extensively for research.

 

[T.I.M.]

Well, the 20% number could be confusing fighters with the overall strength of the entire Luftwaffe, as a higher percentage of those were moved West to counter the bombers.

I'm going from memory myself but I think for single engine day fighters the numbers were something like three-quarters in the West towards the end of the war.