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Analyst: Disband the US Air Force??????

CougarKing

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This is apparently what this David Axe, who wrote this article which was also previously posted on Aviation Week's Ares Weblog, has suggested. This of concern to Canada because it may affect how the CF interacts with NORAD and USAF units that are stationed in Canada in joint USAF-Aircom facilities.

We all doubt such a proposal will ever go through, though it wouldn't be so bad if they just gave all the USAF's assets to the US Army and resurrected the US Army Air Corps of the late 1930s or US Army Air Force(s) of World War II, giving the US Army the fixed-wing tactical bombing and strategic bombing capability they haven't had since World War II, without having to rely upon USAF.

General "Hap Arnold" was one of the proponents of making the USAF independent of the Army, since he didn't like the fact that Eisenhower or Patton or Bradley supposedly wanted to redirect B-17 or B-24 bomber squadrons to attack German reinforcements headed for Allied lines in the months after D-day, instead of attacking Germany's industrial heartland which they had been tasked with doing.

http://defensetech.org/

http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,154578,00.html?ESRC=eb.nl

Axe: Disband the Air Force!

Fed up with unnecessary gold-plated fighter jet programs, the service’s impatience with counter-insurgency and its anti-China rhetoric, back in August I proposed the disbanding of the U.S. Air Force. The air service’s missions could be folded into the Army, Navy and Marine Corps without any loss in national power -- and we’d benefit from cuts to Pentagon overhead.
Now Robert Farley over at The American Prospect has taken up the cause in a new piece, “Abolish the Air Force.” To complement the piece, Farley has solicited input from a number of bloggers, including yours truly.

“Does the United States Air Force fit into the post–September 11 world, a world in which the military mission of U.S. forces focuses more on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency?” Farley asks:
    Not very well. Even the new counterinsurgency manual authored in part by Gen. David H. Petraeus, specifically notes that the excessive use of airpower in counterinsurgency conflict can lead to disaster.

    In response, the Air Force has gone on the defensive. In September 2006, Maj. Gen. Charles Dunlap Jr. published a long article in Armed Forces Journal denouncing “boots on the ground zealots,” and insisting that airpower can solve the most important problems associated with counterinsurgency. The Air Force also recently published its own counterinsurgency manual elaborating on these claims. A recent op-ed by Maj. Gen. Dunlap called on the United States to “think creatively” about airpower and counterinsurgency -- and proposed striking Iranian oil facilities.

“Striking Iranian oil facilities?” That’s exactly the kind of bone-headed chest-thumping that has made the Air Force a liability to U.S. diplomacy, as I explained in my reply to Farley’s piece:

    In September Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne brazenly undermined years of careful diplomacy aimed at heading off an unnecessary war with China -- all in the name of defending the service’s latest Cold War-style fighter jet.

    Defense experts had proposed cutting the planned 1,800-unit production run of the $100-million F-35 light fighter, a plane originally justified to Congress on the grounds that it would cost less than the current $50-million F-16. The F-35 program’s $300-billion budget would be better invested elsewhere, the argument went. But Wynne rejected the proposal: “How big do you think China is?” he said.

    As if a fleet of short-range fighters would make any difference if the United States went to war with China. Does Wynne honestly believe that we’ll somehow find ourselves holding territory in China from which to operate these aircraft? Does he really anticipate a ground war on the Chinese mainland?

    Of course not. The idea is sheer lunacy. (You think the occupation of Iraq is expensive and bloody? Imagine the occupation of China!) Wynne’s statement was pure rhetoric.
    But in the world of diplomacy, rhetoric matters. Note the care with which Navy and Marine Corps leaders have approached China in recent years. Since the low point in U.S.-China relations in the aftermath of the 2001 collision between a Navy patrol plane and a Chinese fighter, our sea services have taken the lead in reaching out to the communist state and industrial powerhouse. Admiral William Fallon, who organized the first exchange of port visits in years and plotted out joint exercises with Chinese forces, has steadfastly avoided painting China as a prospective enemy. And Marine general James Mattis said in Washington this year that China should be a partner, not an enemy – and that we’d best be conscious of the way our words and attitudes influence Chinese behavior.

    But to Wynne, our delicate relationship with the world’s future superpower is grist for the military-industrial lobbying machine. His dangerous characterization of China is indicative of deep cultural problems in the nation’s youngest military service. The Air Force’s top priority is buying airplanes. Don’t take it from me. Air Force general Ronald Keys said in August that the air service’s “hardest wars” weren’t in Iraq or Afghanistan, but in the halls of Congress. For the Air Force, global strategy and fighting our current low-tech wars are both secondary concerns. That’s putting the cart way before the horse.
 
Nope - cant see it happening in the USA.

However, if our air assets continue to shrink, I can see it happening here... Army Aviation anyone?
 
It isn't going to happen, and it should not. Still, when I was the Canadian Forces Laision Officer at TRADOC many years ago a popular theme was "Explain to the Senate Armed Forces Committee why since 1947 when the United States Air Force was created by Congress, America has never won a war."
 
The important piece of documant in all of this? The Key West agreement between the US Army and the newly formed USAF. It set out what type of aviation capabilities the USArmy was allowed and what they were restricted to. Unlikely that the USAF would collapse back onto it's progenitor.
 
Old Sweat said:
It isn't going to happen, and it should not. Still, when I was the Canadian Forces Laision Officer at TRADOC many years ago a popular theme was "Explain to the Senate Armed Forces Committee why since 1947 when the United States Air Force was created by Congress, America has never won a war."

Wasnt the USAF cited as the success factor in Iraq Part 1 and Kosovo?
 
I was at TRADOC before both campaigns, but arguments plus and minus could be made about these more recent operations. While the bombing and cruise missile attacks were successful, in both cases ground troops had to complete the operation. That sounds a bit like sour grapes; the achievement of air power in the GW1 was considerable and rather less so in Kosovo. Was the job made easier by the air preparation? Of course. Could it have negated the requirement for ground forces? No, but again it made the job easier for the army.

The question is whether there is a vital requirement for the USAF as a separate service? Emotionally, yes. Logically, no. Which means it will probably survive. If nothing else, it give the other services a convenient target for spleen venting.

 
Here's just a follow-on/response article by Bill Sweetman to the original article that started this thread.

http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,154872,00.html
Don't Worry About Disbanding The Air Force
Aviation Week's DTI | Bill Sweetman | October 26, 2007
This article first appeared in Aviation Week’s Ares weblog.

We can all argue for days about disbanding the Air Force. It's no doubt a hot and emotional argument among the Army and Marines -- the same argument's been made since Dunkirk, and well before that.

But there's no need to argue, because as testimony this week makes clear, the process is already under way.

The key quote from USAF Secretary Michael Wynne: "In the 1990s, the Air Force deliberately chose to assume risk in modernization and, instead, sustained aging weapon systems throughout continual combat operations.

"The tragedies on 9/11 and resulting War on Terror regrettably coincided with the period when the Air Force expected to recover and begin a true force-wide re-capitalization."

Basically, in the 1990s, the USAF elected to finish the Cold War B-2 and F-22 programs and defer replacement of other aircraft, including the fighter and transport force. The result is that the USAF today has three major programs on the books. Two are support elements -- CSAR-X and a new tanker.

The other is the Joint Strike Fighter. However, the key to the project's survival is that the Marines want it -- in the process, adding billions and several years to the development process and compromising its performance relative to what could be done with a CTOL fighter.

It's also increasingly clear that short-range fighters alone will not sustain future air campaigns. The diplomatic and logistical difficulties of acquiring and sustaining bases are limiting. But as Wynne points out, nations as small as Venezuela are acquiring the ability to deny their airspace to B-1Bs and B-52s.

Meanwhile, the Army and Marines are getting billions for Mine Resistant, Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, in the process rendering the C-130 fleet useless; as a result, the Army wants to control another vast program to develop a helicopter or tilt rotor, and Boeing's even thinking of selling C-17s to the Army. The Army has also foisted a new tactical transport on the USAF (the JCA) and is buying its own fleet of UCAVs that will be compatible with an Army-only ground control system. And then there is a $120-billion program to replace everything else the Army owns.

The Navy, meanwhile, gets what is essentially an all-new aircraft carrier and a new destroyer, its biggest surface combatant in decades.

Apart from Northrop Grumman, the industry appears to be reading the tea-leaves and deserting Air Force programs.

As one observer comments on recent third-quarter conference calls: "Neither Lockheed Martin nor Boeing listed any new military aircraft programs (beyond KC-X and BAMS) among their opportunities for 2008... Lockheed Martin's management seems fully absorbed with execution of existing programs, not new business, and Boeing's management is so obsessed with 787 right now that IDS (defense) was barely discussed."
 
The thought spreads:

Abolish the Air Force, by Robert Farley
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=abolish_the_air_force

(There's also an online discussion.)
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=whats_the_air_force_for

In August of this year, reports emerged that British Army officers in Afghanistan had requested an end to American airstrikes in Helmand Province because the strikes were killing too many civilians there. In Iraq, the Lancet Study of Iraqi civilian casualties of the war suggested that airstrikes have been responsible for roughly 13 percent of those casualties, or somewhere in the range of 50,000 to 100,000 deaths.

Does the United States Air Force (USAF) fit into the post–September 11 world, a world in which the military mission of U.S. forces focuses more on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency? Not very well. Even the new counterinsurgency manual authored in part by Gen. David H. Petraeus, specifically notes that the excessive use of airpower in counterinsurgency conflict can lead to disaster.

In response, the Air Force has gone on the defensive. In September 2006, Maj. Gen. Charles Dunlap Jr. published a long article in Armed Forces Journal denouncing "boots on the ground zealots," and insisting that airpower can solve the most important problems associated with counterinsurgency. The Air Force also recently published its own counterinsurgency manual elaborating on these claims. A recent op-ed by Maj. Gen. Dunlap called on the United States to "think creatively" about airpower and counterinsurgency -- and proposed striking Iranian oil facilities. ..

Unfortunately, the Air Force has had a poor strategic record. In the Korean War, heavy strategic attacks on North Korean cities failed to reduce Communist capabilities. Operation Rolling Thunder -- the campaign designed to destroy North Vietnamese will, transport capacity, and industry -- went on for three years and had little noticeable effect on the course of that war. The strategic air component of Operation Desert Storm failed to topple Saddam Hussein or dislodge him from Kuwait. Even the 2003 "Shock and Awe" campaign did not destroy the Hussein regime, or reduce its capacity to communicate internally or externally.

Arguably, airpower did succeed on its own in bringing victory in the 1999 Kosovo War. For 78 days, the NATO alliance bombed Serbian military and infrastructure targets in order to force Serbia's withdrawal from the province of Kosovo. After increasingly serious threats of a ground invasion and the end of Russian support, Serbia succumbed to the NATO occupation of Kosovo. Even acknowledging the decisiveness of the airstrikes, however, the ability of a small country to stand against the world's most powerful military alliance for almost three months does not speak well of the coercive capacity of modern airpower...

...The Air Force is most effective when operating in support of the Army, and least effective when carrying out its own independent campaign. However, the Air Force dislikes ground support. Its antipathy to tactical missions, for instance, is at the root of its repeated efforts to shed itself of the A-10 Warthog. The A-10 is a slow attack aircraft, extremely effective against tactical enemy targets. The Army loves the A-10, but because the aircraft contributes neither to the air superiority mission that the Air Force favors nor to the strategic mission that provides its raison d'etre, the Air Force has always been lukewarm toward the aircraft. Offers on the part of the Army to take over the A-10 have been rejected, however, as this would violate the Key West Agreement.

If strategic bombing won independence for the Air Force, yet strategic bombing cannot win wars, it's unclear why the Air Force should retain its independence...

There's a better way to use American airpower. The Army and the Navy can accomplish the jobs that the Air Force does well within their current institutional structures. Tactical airpower should belong to the Army. Although the Army and the Air Force have worked out credible systems of cooperation, reunifying the two would likely result in tighter collaboration between air and ground forces. The tactical mission would also include air superiority, which is necessary to prevent enemy use of airspace and to allow freedom of action for U.S. forces. Similarly, some tactical elements of airpower would pass to the Marine Corps.

To the extent that the United States requires a capability to punish other states militarily for political purposes, the Navy can handle the job. The aircraft carriers of the Navy already represent the most powerful concentration of mobile military power in the world. Navy cruise missiles, launched from submarines and surface vessels, can strike most of the surface of the Earth within a couple of hours. Adding certain elements of the Air Force portfolio to the Navy would neither transform nor hinder the Navy's power projection mission.

The strategic nuclear capability of the Air Force should also go to the Navy. The USN already operates its own strategic deterrent in the form of the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, armed with the Trident missile. The Navy could also operate the other two legs of the nuclear triangle (ICBMs and strategic bombers) without difficulty, especially since the latter would support the Navy's strategic mission...

Mark
Ottawa



 
I'd like to support a continued independent air force, but its difficult to think of a good counter-argument on this subject... is there a really good single reason why the air force should remain a unique entity?  Someone's got to have one...
 
In the context of a large Air Force such as the USAF, a good argument supporting the need for an independent Air Force would be Strategic Bombing which aims to destroy key enemy targets such as leadership/govt. targets as well as weapons/munitions factories, oil depots and so forth, as one of its goals, along with a commitment to continuing to support Aerospace R & D  that is conducted by NASA and Defense Contractors. This would be especially helpful if the enemy nation/target area in question is too far inland and out of range of a US Carrier battle group.

But as Farley pointed out, it would make sense if Tactical Bombing would be relegated just to Army and Marine Corps' commanders' control.

Does anyone think that having all heavy airlift/AMC assets under Army control would better serve ground commanders' needs? If I can remember correctly, the USMC has C-130s of their own as well.

Also, both the Army and the USMC have proven themselves adept at the use of rotary-wing airlift for vertical envelopment and for other uses such as battlefield ambulances for the wounded, though I still think it was a mistake to disband the 1st Air CAV of Vietnam War fame (and give them armor instead) though the 101st Air Assault Division now assumes a similar role. 



 
The WW2 era AAC did strategic bombing. I dont ever see the USAF morphing back into the AAC so its here to stay IMO anyway.
 
T6,

It might be safe to say that there would have been a lot more A-10s today if the USAF had stayed part of the US Army/USAAC.

 
Farley sparks an article in the Air Force Times:

Is the Air Force essential or outdated?
http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2007/11/airforce_radical_plans_071103w/

In an article in the Oct. 21 issue of The American Prospect magazine, Farley argues that the Air Force’s reason for existing as an independent service — to conduct strategic bombing campaigns such as those against the German industrial base in World War II — is overrated and could be absorbed by the Navy. He also argues that the Air Force’s most successful contribution to modern warfare — tactical close-air support of ground troops — would be better served by putting air and ground forces under a unified Army command.

But not even a week before publication of Farley’s article, retired Army Gen. Barry McCaffrey — a widely respected thinker on national security issues — released a memo making just the opposite argument and one almost as radical: that the deterrence capabilities of the Air Force, along with the Navy, should form the centerpiece of American national security policy, and to accomplish that the Air Force needs to be bigger. Bigger even than the most ambitious Air Force general has suggested.

Timing aside, the stark contrast between these two positions underscores the Air Force’s identity crisis as it begins its seventh decade as an independent service. It comes at a time when overstretched ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are doing most of the bleeding and getting most of the headlines — and funding.
Independent thinking

Farley said a military service can be independent only if it can plan and win a war essentially on its own [emphasis added--the role of old SAC, but not a route one would wish to follow to win]. The Army, with the addition of more air assets, can pass this test, he says, as can the Navy, which has its own ground component in the Marines.

The Air Force, Farley said, cannot and could not win a war on its own.

“The genesis of the Air Force was based around the strategic bombing mission … but that particular mission does not have a strong record of success as an independent way to fight and win wars,” he told Air Force Times. “I think that the strategic effectiveness of air power specifically independent of the use of ground force has been exaggerated.”

As proof, Farley says, the bombing designed to destroy an enemy’s will and ability to fight failed to be a decisive factor in World War II, Korea, Vietnam and now twice in Iraq. “The best way that air power has been used has been in conjunction with the Army,” he said. As for the Air Force’s role as a strategic deterrent with its long-range bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles, Farley argues that the Navy is better suited for that mission.

“I would turn these assets over to the Navy because I think the Navy has this consistent strategic view of the world,” he said.

Indeed, some military observers have pointed to the strategic acumen of the Navy as a factor in its success in putting leaders such as Adm. William J. Fallon, commander of U.S. Central Command, and Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, into such plum positions.

Farley admits that he is one of few observers inside or outside the military to propose such an idea. Indeed, several retired and current military leaders and experts interviewed by Air Force Times dismissed the idea out of hand...

After spending time recently — at the invitation of Chief of Staff Gen. T. Michael Moseley — with Air Force leaders and operational units, McCaffrey wrote and distributed a six-page memo to fellow West Point academics and military and political leaders in Washington in which he sharply criticized the underfunding and marginalization of the Air Force. He said he plans to write a memo soon making similar points about the Navy.

In the Air Force memo, he advocates ,buying more than 600 C-17 cargo jets and more than 350 F-22 fighters [emphasis added], far more than Congress has indicated it’s willing to pay for...

The Air Force’s role in potential, if unlikely, confrontations with China or Russia is one of several points on which McCaffrey and Farley disagree [emphasis added].

Farley said he sees the Navy as the principal power projector with regard to Pacific nations, but McCaffrey said Air Force F-22s stationed in Japan, South Korea, Guam and Hawaii should be an important part of the strategic deterrent. The Air Force currently has F-22s in Alaska and will base them in Hawaii in the future.

“We need a high-tech Air Force, not to fight people with it, but to give credibility to our diplomatic and economic” power, McCaffrey said. “If you don’t like to fight, create a military force that has deterrence capability in the next 15 years.”

McCaffrey and Farley don’t see eye to eye on how important the F-22 really is. Farley says buying more jets is an “absurdity,” but McCaffrey considers buying more of them the Air Force’s most pressing priority during the next 10 years.

“The F-22 ... is widely derided by serious people as ‘the Air Force wants an expensive toy,’”McCaffrey said. “We damn sure better have the capability to signal to people [that] we have a sizeable air-to-air capability that can also penetrate your airspace and destroy your aircraft. ... And that means the F-22A, period. And buying [only] 91 of them? That’s a stunt. That’s not a military program.”

The Air Force expects to have 100 F-22s by the end of the year, and the contract calls for 183 Raptors. But that’s still far too few in McCaffrey’s view.

The Air Force’s failure to secure more procurement dollars is largely due to the fact that Iraq and Afghanistan are consuming much of the nation’s attention and defense budget.

“The bottom line is ... the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan suck up the oxygen in the debate about what we really want the Air Force and the Navy to do,” he said. And, “If you’re spending $12 billion a month [for the wars] ... then you don’t have the money to get [more] [emphasis added]...

Mark
Ottawa
 
The problem with guys like these is that they take air supremacy/superiority for granted (and I don't think it's presumptuous to guess that the vast majority of the Army's planning is predicated on same).

Bringing-up the subject of strategic bombing in Vietnam without mentioning Linebacker II is disingenuous at best.

These guys are basically just trolling ...
 
Galt, T6,

In your opinion, if the AAF/AAC's fixed wing assets had remained part of the US Army, would it be safe to say that there would be more A-10s today?
 
CougarDaddy said:
Galt, T6,

In your opinion, if the AAF/AAC's fixed wing assets had remained part of the US Army, would it be safe to say that there would be more A-10s today?

Possibly, but it's also quite possible that it never would have been developed ... besides, how is the question relevant?
 
Just curious- just thinking the A-10 still would have developed considering that an AAC tailored for the US Army's CAS needs would have received the funding the USAF receives today, if the USAF never came on its own. But of course, this is just more assumptions on my part. Thanks for the reply.
 
Article speaks for itself:

New York Times

Up, Up and Out By PAUL KANE
Silver Spring, Md.

ROBERT GATES, the secretary of defense, has proposed a budget overhaul that will go a long way toward improving our national security, but more can be done to meet his long-term goal: creating the right military for the 21st century.

Not since Henry Stimson’s tenure from 1940 to ’45 has a defense secretary been faced to the same degree with simultaneously fighting a war and carrying out far-reaching reforms. Yet there are three major changes Mr. Gates should add to his agenda, and they deserve President Obama’s support.

First, the Air Force should be eliminated, and its personnel and equipment integrated into the Army, Navy and Marine Corps. Second, the archaic “up or out” military promotion system should be scrapped in favor of a plan that treats service members as real assets. Third, the United States needs a national service program for all young men and women, without any deferments, to increase the quality and size of the pool from which troops are drawn.

At the moment, the Army, Navy and Marine Corps are at war, but the Air Force is not. This is not the fault of the Air Force: it is simply not structured to be in the fights in Iraq and Afghanistan. While Army, Marine and Navy personnel have borne the brunt of deployments, commonly serving multiple tours, the Air Force’s operational tempo remains comparatively comfortable. In 2007, only about 5 percent of the troops in Iraq were airmen.

Yes, air power is a critical component of America’s arsenal. But the Army, Navy and Marines already maintain air wings within their expeditionary units. The Air Force is increasingly a redundancy in structure and spending.

War is no longer made up of set-piece battles between huge armies confronting each other with tanks and airplanes. As we move toward a greater emphasis on rapid-response troops, the Army has tightened its physical fitness regime and the Marine Corps has introduced a physically grueling Combat Fitness Test for all members. Yet an Air Force study last year found that more than half of airmen and women were overweight and 12 percent were obese.

Next, the current military personnel system is a peacetime bureaucratic construct that serves neither national security nor those who wear the uniform. Congress sets the level of manpower for each military service. Within this constraint, military planners have to decide how many riflemen, mechanics, cooks, medics, pilots and such there should be within the military’s job types, known as Military Occupational Specialties. Then the Pentagon has to decide how many people will be retained in the ranks or promoted.

The result is an “up or out” system that demands service members move up the ladder simply to stay in the military. Any soldier passed over for promotion twice must leave or retire.

Treating service members like so many widgets — in particular, the enlisted men and women who make up 85 percent of the ranks — is arbitrary and bad management. I have seen many fit, experienced officers and enlisted Marines arbitrarily forced out because there were only so many slots into which they could be promoted.

The military should develop a new accounting and personnel system that tracks the cost of developing its human capital and tallies each service member as an investment with a fixed value based on his education, training, experience and performance. This would reflect the departure of a valued service member as an asset lost, not a cost cut. Why are fit men and women who have served in combat, a human experience that a million dollars can’t buy, being pushed out instead of retained for 15, 20, 30 years?

Last, Mr. Gates should urge President Obama to confer with Congress and introduce national service at age 18 for all Americans. Under such a system, young people from all classes and backgrounds would either serve in the military or do other essential work like intelligence assessment, conservation, antipoverty projects, educational tutoring, firefighting, policing, border security, disaster relief or care for the elderly. The best qualified would be assigned to the military.

The 1.6 million Americans who have served in the current wars represent less than one percent of all citizens. We need to spread the risk and burden of fighting our wars. If more of our national leaders had been in uniform, or knew they might have children at risk in war, their decisions during military confrontations might be better. And this is not just about the struggle against terrorism: would New Orleans reconstruction have lagged so long if we had had a national service program in natural-disaster recovery?

President Obama has the political capital to make these critical changes. Given the urgency of war and money available under the economic recovery plan, now may be our best chance for decades to truly modernize America’s defenses.

Paul Kane is a Marine veteran of Iraq and a former fellow with the International Security Program at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.
 
Let's have baby steps for Canada, and repatriate tac hel to the Army, and maritime hel to the Navy...
 
dapaterson said:
Let's have baby steps for Canada, and repatriate tac hel to the Army, and maritime hel to the Navy...

Wasn't this essentially the point of amalgamating our services into one service, the Canadian Armed Forces, in the first place? Technically, Canada doesn't have a navy, army, or air force...just the Canadian Forces.
 
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