AOR Replacement & the Joint Support Ship (Merged Threads)

[Kirkhill]

A degree of bitterness this morning Edward?  Of course we have to build ships in the only shipyard facing ice restrictions.

I don' t know a thing about shipbuilding - but that hasn't stopped me before.

Davie's largest construction berth - 250m x 60m (how do you get ship into the water from there?)
Davie's largest drydock (most constricted dimensions) 364.24m x 36.57m at dock gates  ( I know you can get a ship into the water from there)

LHD Wasp ~ 40,000 tonnes 257m x 32m  - seems to fit the dry dock but a bit long for the construction berth
LPD-17 San Antonio ~ 25,000 tonnes 208.5m x 31.9m - seems to fit both berth and drydock
HMS Ocean ~ 20,000 tonnes 203m x 36.1m (at deck 28.5 m at waterline) - Is that a fit or not?
RNlMS Rotterdam ~12,000 tonnes 162.2m x 25m - an easy fit it seems

Spanish BPE 27,000 tonnes 230.8m loa (205.7m between perpendiculars) x 32.7m (29.5m at water line)
French Mistral 20,000 tonnes 199m x 32m

On balance it appears to me that Davie might be able to build and service any of the above ships.

http://www.vicship.com/specs.htm  
On the other hand it seems that Victoria Shipyards Dry Dock is larger than Davies and the port is ice free.
Perhaps an expert can explain this conundrum.

Either way we should be able to build any of the ships we need here.  

I just don't like the way that we go about apportioning business and costs in this country.  In the words of the youngsters "it sucks".  Even right decisions are suspect because of a lack of clarity, transparency, openness, trust etc.

In any event - how possible is it that the hulls themselves could be built in a low cost environment like Korea or Romania, and then fitted out at VSL or Davie?

I keep coming back to the 150 MCAD Tamesis  

http://autospeed.drive.com.au/cms/A_1290/printArticle.html

22,000 lane-meters, capable of carrying locomotives, 38,000 tonnes,  and at 240m x 32m it seems it might also fit in either shipyard.

A hull with a motor and steering wheel isn't all that expensive.  Its all the rest of the gear that adds costs.  As do the number and nature of the intermediate contractors.


By the way the locks on the Panama Canal are 294.1 x 32.3 meters wide.  They handle cruise ships, cargo and US Navy vessels like the Wasp but not the Enterprise.

 

[Monsoon]

I'll answer Kirkhill's question first:

On the other hand it seems that Victoria Shipyards Dry Dock is larger than Davies and the port is ice free.
Perhaps an expert can explain this conundrum.

The Victoria Graving Dock once was the largest in the British Commonwealth, but drydocks aren't the same as construction berths which allow for the actual laying of a keel and assembly of the hull structure.  Also, the St-Lawrence is navigable through winter as far up as Montreal.  Ice forms, but is regularly broken.

In any event - how possible is it that the hulls themselves could be built in a low cost environment like Korea or Romania, and then fitted out at VSL or Davie?

The hull construction itself is really one of the least expensive parts of the job - the real money goes into system design and integration.  The cost of towing an empty hull across the ocean kills any savings you might find by offshoring the hull manufacture.

And Edward Campbell:

The decision to force Saint John to close was 100% political.

Nonsense.  The Irvings did whatever they could to keep it open, and they can hardly be said to be politically unconnected.  The Saint John yard found some work in constructing merchant ships, but the only political decision that shut it down was the decision to not subsidize the shipbuilding industry.  The yard simply couldn't bid low enough to get the contracts to stay in operation.

I would argue that we need only as much capacity as is necessary to finish (add weapons and electronics suites) and refit most ships in Canada.  We (government and business alike) should buy all from the lowest global bidder and allow the taxpayers of the 'winning' country to subsidize the ships we need.

Or we (the government) could say, "This $12bn contract costs an extra $2bn to give to a Canadian contractor, but we'll get back $3bn in corporate and personal income tax from that money.  And the long-term revenue from having a marine industry in the country will generate even more money".  It's easy to scorn subsidized industries, but they do make sense when you take into account the investment aspects of it.  And when talking specifically about domestic military industries, it's simply irresponsible for an industrialized nation to offshore it's military construction capability.  We have a mobilization plan for our military, what about mobilization for our industry?

 

[Kirkhill]

Quote
I would argue that we need only as much capacity as is necessary to finish (add weapons and electronics suites) and refit most ships in Canada.  We (government and business alike) should buy all from the lowest global bidder and allow the taxpayers of the 'winning' country to subsidize the ships we need.

Or we (the government) could say, "This $12bn contract costs an extra $2bn to give to a Canadian contractor, but we'll get back $3bn in corporate and personal income tax from that money.  And the long-term revenue from having a marine industry in the country will generate even more money".  It's easy to scorn subsidized industries, but they do make sense when you take into account the investment aspects of it.  And when talking specifically about domestic military industries, it's simply irresponsible for an industrialized nation to offshore it's military construction capability.  We have a mobilization plan for our military, what about mobilization for our industry?

Brilliant notion hamiltongs.  I can get behind that.  Now just make sure that DND only gets charged for $10bn and that the remaining $2bn comes out of Industry Canada's budget where it belongs. 

 

[Monsoon]

Brilliant notion hamiltongs.  I can get behind that.  Now just make sure that DND only gets charged for $10bn and that the remaining $2bn comes out of Industry Canada's budget where it belongs. 

True dat.

 

[Cdn Blackshirt]

I would argue that we need only as much capacity as is necessary to finish (add weapons and electronics suites) and refit most ships in Canada.   We (government and business alike) should buy all from the lowest global bidder and allow the taxpayers of the 'winning' country to subsidize the ships we need.

There are two major impediments to having a native shipbuilding industry:

"¢ Low demand - which means we build too many "one off" vessels; and

"¢ Too much competition for foreign sales, supported by ludicrous subsidies by many governments.

Joining the subsidy game is madness.   Better to have one or two government owned/contractor operated dockyards to fit out and refit warships and subsidize nothing in Canada.   Buy everything off-shore, let the other guys subsidize us.

I personally disagree.  I think our failing has been the lack of strategic planning on the part of NDHQ brought on by a failure of budget systems to protect the military and its mission.

Should the government change its budgetary structure to put "Overseas Deployments" as a Foreign Affairs supplemental budget item, we would not have this problem. 

That would leave line items for:  Domestic Operation and Procurement in place, with little volatility which would allow planners a long-term ability to structure procurement using our assets to our best advantage.

Bottom Line:  Deployments should never bugger up well-laid procurement plans.  You fix the budget, you can then schedule hulls out over at least a 10 year time frame making effective use of your shipyards and getting the economies of scale we will never get using the current model.



Matthew. 

 

[Edward Campbell]

If the Department of National Defence needs ships, aircraft, trucks - whatever - to deploy then the defence budget must bear the costs.  The business of Industry Canada paying for the regional benefits (which never existed from day one) is just creative accounting. There are already too many fingers in the pie - attempting to apportion costs to e.g. DFAIT will cause more heartburn, waste more time and cost more money.

Most defence industries are inefficient and ineffective, they have, generally, a poor ROI and remain in business only because they are needed by the government.  This is not, totally, the industry's fault - may major defence companies are well managed.  The major problem with defence procurement is that most defence ministries are lousy customers.  They rarely know/understand what they need - and they usually get want and need all mixed up.  Contracts are, usually, driven by political considerations; that means that cost and performance are minor considerations.

Most governments, like Canada's have policies in place which prohibit the customer (e.g. DND) from enforcing the fairly standard, every-day conditions of the contract, like "this product must meet spec."  The Department of Public Blunders and Wonders (or whatever we call the government's central procurement agency today) has a split mandate: to buy things efficiently and effectively and to help Canadian business.  The latter usually takes precedence over the former, especially if the supplier of inadequate goods and services is in a government MP's riding.*

There is nothing wrong with companies designing, developing and producing good military kit - even just OK military kit, if they can find buyers for it - witness GMDD now General Dynamics in London with the Piranha/Grizzly/Bison/LAV III/Stryker programme.  To the degree that everyone subsidizes exporting industries we might as well do the same for Canadian companies.  We should, however, drop all pretence about having a distinct Canadian defence industrial base.  We are piece workers in an integrated North American defence industrial base.  We should buy our hardware, always, with two considerations in mind:

"¢ The operational requirement; and

"¢ The life cycle costs.

We should always buy the product which meets the requirement - it doesn't have to exceed it - and has the lowest life cycle costs (which means that capital costs (the sticker price) are often not terribly important - especially not for long life, high cost, maintenance intensive items like ships, planes and tanks.

That means we can build hulls wherever we want because, hamiltongs tells us (and I believe him), they are a minor part of the programme.

That also means that we should, whenever possible:

"¢ Join an allied programme, especially one with COLOG (Cooperative Logistics)  and maintain configuration management (I think that's what it's called - it means keeping our aircraft and tanks 'up to spec' with the allied fleet);and, consequently

"¢ Stop Canadianizing everything - sometime, now and again, it is necessary but too often it just adds costs and complications for something which was not called up in the requirement and, also too often, is not supported by the requirements staff in Ottawa.

Defence procurement is a complex, sometimes maddening business. In my experience - and I have some, even though it is out of date, at the senior staff level - the only countries that have more politicized processes than Canada are the USA and France.

But, the key is a suitable mix of:

"¢ Good, well reasoned, validated operational, requirements; and

"¢ Life cycle costing - which requires extensive, excruciatingly boring reliability/maintainability analysis and seemingly endless hours of briefings from pencil-necked engineer/bureaucrats.

----------
* For a few years I sat in the back-row at meetings of groups (e.g. the Programme Control Board (three stars and civilian equivalents)) which authorized spending and, over time, monitored progress.  I saw project managers (usually Navy captains or army/air colonels) come back again and again to report 'lost' money due to Canadian suppliers being unable to meet specs - not by just a wee tiny bit, either, which forced the PM to go off-shore, at DND's expense, to procure whatever was needed - parts, materials, sub-systems, etc.

 

[Kirkhill]

Edward:

Any idea how the cost analysis was done in the days of HM's Dockyards vice (Defence Logistics/Defence Procurement/Defence Research/P3 initiatives in the UK) or the current PWGSC abomination over here?

My issue is with the IRB budget coming out to DND's purse.  I am with you (and for that matter the Dutch Parliament and Ministry of Defence) in that I don't believe there is an economic case for IRBs/Offsets. A political case yes, but not an economic case.  And I now understand from your posts that such benefits may contravene various trade pacts.

I don't disagree that DND should be responsible for its budget, and that the government should pony up the funds in their entirety or else admit defeat, tuck its tail between its legs and shut up shop.  Insofar as I don't see either eventuality soon one way to get more money into the hands of NDHQ is to:

-  increase the revenue stream by acquiring grants from departments like Industry Canada (which supplies that service to private sector Canadian entities to support Canadian industry), NRC for research grants to trial new kit for "Canadian" applications and HRDC for training grants for recruits and serving members.
-  sell its services to other departments such as Foreign Affairs, a ploy recommended by the UN, NATO and the OECD so that Troops to maintain order count towards Pearsons 0.7%
-  reduce the areas on which it is required to spend funds such as IRBs/Offsets/Pensions and other "statutory" expenditures

Thus the government can double the budget without offending its voting public.

Is it the right way to do things? No.
Is it duplicitous and underhanded? Yes
Do I care? No.

As long as the necessary kit gets into the right hands in appropriate numbers with the right training and support.

Cheers Edward

 

[Kirkhill]

Here is another alternative to the strategic lift conundrum.  It embraces the CDS's BHS concept

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2004/Mar/Army_Logistics.htm
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/hsv.htm
http://www.dt.navy.mil/wavelengths/archives/2004_05.html

May 17, 2004
Division Supports Innovative High-Speed Catamaran Sea Trials
By William Palmer

WEST BETHESDA-Test engineers recently rode Swift (HSV 2, for High Speed Vessel) to measure the ship's seakeeping and load bearing abilities. The high-speed catamaran is modified from a commercial high-speed ferry design and outfitted with a flight deck and weather-protected stowage area for two H-60 helicopters, a vehicle load ramp capable of holding a 60-ton M-1 Abrams tank, berthing space for 107 with a reconfigurable seating area to provide an additional 87 berths when required, and enough communications gear to support a wide range of missions. Doug Griggs (5200), Martin Donnelly (5400), and James Gray (6530) sailed on Swift as she transited from Naval Amphibious Base at Little Creek, VA, to Jacksonville, FL, then to an operational area off the coast of Honduras, supporting a Joint Logistics Over The Shore (JLOTS) exercise called New Horizons, a joint Navy/Army/Air Force humanitarian relief exercise.

Prior to her departure for Little Creek, Swift tied up at Old Town Alexandria, VA, as a public demonstration for DoD personnel, dependents, and contractors, and to show the Department of Defense's use of new technology to support traditional missions. One feature of the ship is that it is currently the only ship in the Navy authorized to use a paperless navigation-steering system, designed to use no paper charts.

Because the ship is manned with two crews, the operational tempo is intense, leaving little room for down time. So when the trio of engineers collected data, they had to act when opportunities arose. Hours after getting underway from Little Creek, Swift encountered waves approaching 12 feet in height off Cape Hatteras. The team used that time to measure seakeeping and structural response information, with a number of wave "slamming" events being recorded. The sea conditions encountered almost perfectly matched the most severe test regime in the evaluation program.

Upon the ship's arrival in Jacksonville, three H-60 helicopters, several HUMMV military vehicles, and aircraft support equipment were loaded aboard. The Carderock Division team was at work here as well, as they instrumented the load ramp and mission deck with strain gauges. The gauges remained in place for the duration of the exercise, which consisted of loading vehicles from a larger transport "roll-on, roll-off" ship and moving the vehicles 100 miles to a port. The catamaran made trips between the transport ship and shore averaging about three hours, carrying a large selection of vehicles, including 2.5- and 5-ton trucks, tractor-trailer tankers, cranes, graders, loaders, ambulances, and various trailers. Offloading the ship took about 30 minutes, with no tugs or shore support used in the offload.Swift is built by Incat, a commercial shipbuilding firm in Hobart, Tasmania, leased under contract to Military Sealift Command, and operated by the Mine Warfare Command at Ingleside, TX. For more information about Swift, contact Doug Griggs at 301-227-4921, DSN 287-4921, or griggsdb@nswccd.navy.mil.

Take the Tamesis class of BHS to act as a floating mobile warehouse and support facility.  Minimum cost 160 MAUSD (150 MCAD or 120 MUSD).
Add 2 to 3 HSV catamarans to act as High Speed Trucks or lighters for delivery to various ports at 141 MUSD each (Curious the truck costs more than the warehouse)

The HSVs would not be for amphibious assault but would increase the range of delivery options.  They might also find utility on the West Coast and internationally (ice free waters) without the warehouse, for disaster relief.

The BHS would be able to carry sufficient fuel to replenish the HSV Lighters during vehicle transfers.

Interesting sidenote is that the Lighters would then be able to outrun any available "escorts" (50 kts vs 30 kts)

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

The question is how well it would fair in the North Atlantics/Pacific Oceans. Our navy operates in some of the most extreme weather conditions in the world, so please take that into account.

 

[Kirkhill]

The question is how well it would fair in the North Atlantics/Pacific Oceans. Our navy operates in some of the most extreme weather conditions in the world, so please take that into account.

Understood Ex-Dragoon.  It isn't an all-encompassing solution.  Might it be a better solution than we have?  Is it more affordable than the all-encompassing solution?  I don't know.  I'm just throwing it out for consideration.

Personally I like the idea of the Tamesis and Lighters, but perhaps a more conventional lighter might be in order.  The combination of price for the HSVs and the experience of the Pacificats gives pause.  On the other hand the speed, range and shallow draught are intriguing.

Final observation: while the Navy operates in the North Atlantic and the North Pacific, are those the areas that the Army is going to be tasked to send troops?  Might you not be seeing more of the sun in the future?

Cheers

 

[Cloud Cover]

Canadians laugh and shrug if the Army can't get to the ME by whatever means. They get pissed off when the Navy can't give the Army a ride to the arctic. The Navy needs to be able to appease all, with no exceptions.

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

Final observation: while the Navy operates in the North Atlantic and the North Pacific, are those the areas that the Army is going to be tasked to send troops?  Might you not be seeing more of the sun in the future?

Unfortunately predicting the future has never been one of my skill sets but is it not better to get a ship that can weather the rigours of the Northern oceans then one that cannot?

 

[Kirkhill]

Unfortunately predicting the future has never been one of my skill sets but is it not better to get a ship that can weather the rigours of the Northern oceans then one that cannot?

You're right. And no buts.

Whiskey's point is taken as well but there is a but.

The difference might be though that Northern operations can be served by a Company/Battalion (100  to 500) force without heavy vehicles and there are other delivery options (air) as we own bases in the North and are free to move amongst them.  International obligations require the delivery of a Task Force/Brigade (1200-3000) with heavy support and there are no (IMHO) alternatives to sea lift.

Cheers.

 

[Monsoon]

This just in:

CANADA â “ JSS RfP Delayed Until Early 2006
October 03, 2005
On 13 September 2005, the Department of National Defense (DND) announced a delay in the issuance of the Request for Proposal (RfP) for the Joint Support Ship (JSS) Program. The original release date of September/October 2005 (for the four approved teams) has now been pushed back until the January 2006 timeframe with Canadian Navy sources believing December 2005 the more likely date. This delay is attributed to an unofficial moratorium on procurement programs announced by the Chief of Defense General Hillier in April 2005 following the release of their latest defense paper Canada's International Policy Statement. The moratorium was meant to identify priorities within the Canadian services and for the Navy. JSS is still the number one priority for the sea service and the program will move forward. The second naval priority identified in 2005 is for the acquisition of an amphibious capability (See article CANADA â “ In The Market For an Amphib?)

This September announcement follows the 30 June 2005 closure of the Letter of Interest (LoI) solicitation, in which six responses were received by the Canadian Government and only four met the criteria for the program. The four consortiums that will receive the RfP when issued include:

General Dynamics Canada (Prime Contractor) with Davie Marine Inc, Fleetway Inc, Irving Shipbuilding and Lockheed Martin Canada Inc. Consortium consisting of BAE Systems Limited (BAE Systems Naval Ships) with Newdock (St John's Shipyard Ltd). Canadian North Atlantic Marine Partnership with ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems AG, Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, Peter Kiewit Sons Co and Maersk Canada. SNC-Lavalin ProFac Inc (Prime Contractor) with Washington Marine Group, Raytheon Canada Ltd, Thales Canada, Alion Science & technology/JJMA Marine Sector, Aker Marine, Fincantieri, Merwede and Schelde. The following is the most recent schedule of key events as of this writing based on a three-ship build at a projected total cost of C$2.1B (US$1.72B) (US$573M per unit) with an additional C$4B (US$3.28B) for through life costs:

December 2005/January 2006: The Request for Proposal (RfP) will be issued only to approved teams.

April/May 2006: Project Definition contracts awarded to two industry teams.

Summer/Autumn 2008: Winning design selected and effective project approval expected from the Treasury board.

Construction Contract Award 2009

Scuttlebut is the CDS staff wants to try to shoehorn some Amphib capability into the JSS spec, but CMS wants to keep the projects separate (knowing that if JSS goes in for redesign now, it'll never get bought).  This delay may be a play for time on the part of CDS to get some Amphib into the specification. Seems likely since the next press release was:

CANADA â “ In The Market For An Amphib?
October 03, 2005
September 2005 press reporting continues to indicate that the Canadian Navy is interested in acquiring an amphibious capability in the near term. Identified in Canada's International Policy Statement (April 2005), the top three Canadian Naval programs were listed as the JSS, an amphibious capability followed by the Single Class Surface Combatant (SCSC). With the JSS Program nearing a construction contract, the sea service is beginning to plan for the acquisition of its amphibious capability.

Recent comments from the Chief of Maritime Staff (CMS) Vice Admiral MacLean indicate that the sea service wishes to acquire the capability by 2007. Acknowledging that new construction is not an option at this juncture, the Canadian Navy is now investigating its options with a variety of allies with the most likely option being the procurement of a used vessel for near-term operations.

In order to meet a 2007 timeline, the sea service would have to acquire a used vessel via "Hot Transfer", or the immediate transfer of an active vessel from a foreign navy to the Canadian Navy. The primary candidate for a Hot Transfer would be the US Austin class LPD with potentially up to five units decommissioning from 2006 through 2008 as they are replaced by the new San Antonio class. An Austin class LPD would enable the sea service to acquire its capability by 2007 while studying long-term solutions. New construction candidates for the long-term solution include the Rotterdam class (UK- Bay class LSD, Spain â “ Galicia class) and the Italian San Giorgio class LPD. Although the Canadian Navy has expressed a desire for the US San Antonio class, the price tag of over US$1B will make it extremely difficult to procure.

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

Thanks for the update hamiltongs.

 

[FSTO]

Austin Class!?!  I hope not! Bloody things are 30+ years old  and the Americans do not take care of their equipement as well as we do (they know that they will be getting new stuff!  :crybaby

 

[Kirkhill]

General Dynamics Canada (Prime Contractor) with Davie Marine Inc, Fleetway Inc, Irving Shipbuilding and Lockheed Martin Canada Inc.

 
http://www.generaldynamics.com/
Check out Products and Services, Marine, NASSCO for some of the things GD might be offering


Consortium consisting of BAE Systems Limited (BAE Systems Naval Ships) with Newdock (St John's Shipyard Ltd).

http://www.btinternet.com/~warship/Today/bay.htm
Perhaps a BAE proposal (Schelde Enforcer design though)?


Canadian North Atlantic Marine Partnership with ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems AG, Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, Peter Kiewit Sons Co and Maersk Canada.

http://rusi.4t2depot.com/downloads/pub_rds/Carmel.pdf
A Maersk/Flensburger solution? - Flensburger builds Container and RoRo ships, including the 6 RoRos acquired for the British strategic transport option.


SNC-Lavalin ProFac Inc (Prime Contractor) with Washington Marine Group, Raytheon Canada Ltd, Thales Canada, Alion Science & technology/JJMA Marine Sector, Aker Marine, Fincantieri, Merwede and Schelde.

http://www.scheldeshipbuilding.com/enforcer/
The original designer and supplier of the same vessel built by BAE Systems as the Bay Class ships.


JSS Statement of Requirement.
http://www.forces.gc.ca/admmat/dgmepm/pmojss/docs_presentations/state_op_require_e.asp


My Guess is that SNC-Lavalin, Washington Marine, Schelde have a good look-in at the JSS project

While ei ther Davie or Maersk have a shot at the BFS project with a conversion of a Container or RoRo in the near term, as opposed to taking over a 30 year old hull.


My wishful thinking anyway.

The following is the most recent schedule of key events as of this writing based on a three-ship build at a projected total cost of C$2.1B (US$1.72B) (US$573M per unit) with an additional C$4B (US$3.28B) for through life costs:

573 MUSD per hull AND 3.28 BUSD for through-life costs?

 

[Monsoon]

My Guess is that SNC-Lavalin, Washington Marine, Schelde have a good look-in at the JSS project

I would have said that the GD has the best "team Canada" solution, but that may not be a driving factor in JSS.  It doesn't appear that the SNC-Lavalin team would have a yard in Canada large enough to build the ship.

573 MUSD per hull AND 3.28 BUSD for through-life costs?

Sounds about right.

 

[Kirkhill]

http://www.yotor.com/wiki/en/hm/HMS%20Ocean%20(L12).htm   LPH HMS Ocean 271 MUSD - 21,000 tonnes displacement

http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo020206/text/20206w17.htm   LPD HMS Bulwark 327 MUSD - 14,000 to 21,000 tonnes displacement

http://navy-matters.beedall.com/lsda.htm   LSDA RFA Largs Bay   161 MUSD - 16,000 tonnes

http://navy-matters.beedall.com/mars.htm   MARS Fleet Replenishment 8-15 RFA vessels for 3.5 BUSD (235 MUSD to 444 MUSD per vessel) possibly even leased from industry, just like the OPVs for EEZ patrol   (http://navy-matters.beedall.com/opvh.htm) and strategic lift (http://navy-matters.beedall.com/roro.htm)

We do have our own way of doing things.   Don't we?

 

[Monsoon]

http://www.yotor.com/wiki/en/hm/HMS%20Ocean%20(L12).htm  LPH HMS Ocean 271 MUSD - 21,000 tonnes displacement

http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo020206/text/20206w17.htm  LPD HMS Bulwark 327 MUSD - 14,000 to 21,000 tonnes displacement

http://navy-matters.beedall.com/lsda.htm  LSDA RFA Largs Bay  161 MUSD - 16,000 tonnes

http://navy-matters.beedall.com/mars.htm  MARS Fleet Replenishment 8-15 RFA vessels for 3.5 BUSD possibly even leased from industry, just like the OPVs for EEZ patrol  (http://navy-matters.beedall.com/opvh.htm) and strategic lift (http://navy-matters.beedall.com/roro.htm)

We do have our own way of doing things.  Don't we?

Not sure I understand your meaning, but I think you're talking about the comparative costs.  You'd have to factor the through-life into that, as well - I suspect the "purchase" cost includes some expenses that discount the through-life costs in the JSS price above.  Also, the JSS will be much more than a Landing Ship - it will also be a combat replenishment vessel and C2 platform.  The ships you mention would be interesting for Amphib capability, though.