AOR Replacement & the Joint Support Ship (Merged Threads)
- Thread starter Ex-Dragoon
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Until we have two AORs in the water and operational, it makes sense to keep the capability around.
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I don't necessarily disagree. I would like to see a permanent option either with more JSS or leverage our relationship with South Korea and have several tankers built as a long term measure.
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PRO is delayed enough and PRE is ahead enough that they might be less than six months apart. Honestly this might turn into a Halifax/Vancouver situation at this point...
PRO also has way more first of class trials to do that PRE won't need to do.
The retain Asterix.campaign will fail based solely on crew availability. We have to stich together two tanker crews. That's going to be tight enough before we want to add a third.
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Seeing a lot of maneuvering to be the first crews on the tankers as it will no doubt a good go. For crewing I can see Federal Fleet stepping up with moe personnel to replace the naval crews, of course that comes with a price.
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If I'd had a chance I'd have been angling for Ops Chief in PRO, but beggars can't be choosers.
Oldgateboatdriver
Army.ca Fixture
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The best thing that could come out of the end of the "Asterix" leasing contract is the creation of a CFAV "supply" side.
Halifax Tar
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I think we were shortsighted; we should have built Oblix as well and bought both of them outright.
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Buying them would have meant carving out capital (vote 5) from other projects; leasing means it's vote 1 (usually). Lots of bad decisions are driven by types of funding and when they are available.
PrairieFella
Army.ca Veteran
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For those not imvolved in procurement - whats the rationale behind divvied pots of money instead of one fund? Also - why is it called vote haha.
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Not sure if you are being serious, but…
As I understand it:
Parliament “votes” the funding for DND (and every other Government Department) both annually and through supplemental votes during the year.
The funding is further sub-divided in to things like, pay, national procurement, Operations and Maintenance (etc- not an exhaustive list). That is set by Parliament. The CAF/DND therefore has no authority to alter those amounts and must stay within them. If DND/CAF thinks they are going to exceed something in-year, they need to go back and ask for authority to do so.
Since that authority is sometimes not granted (or deemed too difficult to ask for), it leads to weird decisions where maybe O&M funding gets used to “rent” a capability instead of buying it outright, because there was too much competition for National Procurement funding. Or maintenance gets deferred, even though everyone know an item will rot out, because the O&M budget is too small for a number of years in a row.
Happy to be corrected on any point above by our more ADM (Fin) adjacent members, here.
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Parliament votes to appropriate funding for the operation of th government of Canada.
Within DND, it's divided (big picture) into four types (with lots of sub-divisions that are not directly on Parliament's radar):
Vote 1: operations and maintenance. Includes most pay, low value items, and consumables. (The latter gets interesting, since a million dollar air to air missile is a consumable, while the $50k test rig for those missiles is not).
Vote 5: Capital. Acquisition of equipment and infrastructure with a useful life measured in years and a cost beyond a certain threshold (I think 30k, but it's been a few years since I've read up on it). These are assets that require lifecycle sustainment. Capturing costs like this ensures that the assets of the GoC are properly captured, and future costs can be estimated.
Vote 10: Grants and Contributions. Money given to third parties that may have indirect benefits to the CAF or DND. Think things like payments to NATO, or R&De Grants.
Vote 15: Employee benefits. At this time, vote 15 includes only payments for the employer share of Long Term Disability payments for CAF members. Other payments (employer share of EI, CPP/QPP, CFSA) are not included in vote 15.
Rainbow1910
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I don’t especially agree, for a few reasons.
1.) Davie wanted an exorbitant amount of money to purchase both Asterix and her hypothetical sister ship outright, primarily because they wanted to long term business of the leasing agreement. The price in 2018 for the outright purchase of Asterix was $724m CAD (tax inclusive) while Obelix would have been similar, or even more expensive if procured later.
2.) The design is fundamentally a compromise in being a somewhat slapdash civilian conversion, it has notable survivability and redundancy issues in comparison with a ground up design while having its own unique issues like a lack of fuel tank baffles.
3.) Personnel requirements upon delivery would likely have been difficult for the RCN to entirely onboard on its own, the lease being majority civilian crewed assisted the RCN in getting these vessels operational to a notable degree.
In my opinion, the Canadian Govt should have recognized that they dropped the ball consistently on planning for replacements for the existing tankers and went abroad for interim replacements. Especially if we went to a nation like Korea, we could have received a more capable vessel on a similar timeline that was more suitable to long term Canadian use cases. This is doubly so when you also consider the money spent on the lease agreement itself.
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As I understand it, it was 20M to buy the ship and 200M to convert and a 100M a year to lease. Anything else outside the lease is extra incurred by the crown. How much to buy several oilers from Korea?
Halifax Tar
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I don't think we understand sustainment costs money, big money, and its not sexy.
It was a clear and present option at the time. But hey, I am all in on Korea.
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Let's look at #1 differently.
In 2018 they asked for 724$m all in to buy it outright. So from 2018 until now, 2026, 8 yrs later that cost would have been 724/8yrs = 90.5m/yr. Stretch that out to say 2028 when both the JSS 'should' be both commissioned, and you have a 10yr timeline, or 72.4m/yr. In 2028 we could turn around and sell Asterix on the open market and recoup X% of our initial investment back, or, put it into a 'med/long term' readiness state in case of war or until we build the 3rd (4th?) JSS that virtually all of here acknowledge the need for.
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This post should be a sticky somewhere.
Generator light up on future HMCS Protectuer:
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Royal Canadian Navy Today and Yesterday. 106,036 likes · 14,991 talking about this. Discussion, photos and articles about the Royal Canadian Navy of the Past, Present and Future. This is not a...
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A Canadian Ferry that meets civilian coastal transport needs and CAF transcontinental needs? Department of Transport vessels, operated by civilian companies that can be militarized?
....
"In mid-2019, the Prevail consortium went public with a detailed proposal, a Multi-Role Vessel (MRV) based on the charter and conversion of an existing, proven roll-on roll-off vessel. The consortium is a credible provider and brings decades of combined experience across ship design, construction and commercial operation, the disciplines that deliver merchant vessels on time and to budget.
"For a relatively low cost, they could provide a 230m ship with around 7,500 tonnes deadweight, capable of 21 knots, 10,000nm of range, 28 days of endurance, accommodation for up to 600 embarked personnel with is tiny core crew of 35. There was capacity for a 960m2 command centre, considerable aviation capacity, and davits able to launch landing craft or USVs up to 24 tonnes."
www.navylookout.com
"The MRV would be offered on a charter basis, which avoids the need for a large capital outlay. Under the model offered, Prevail finances, procures, crews and manages the vessel, with no large up-front payment. A commercially crewed ship can sustain well over 300 operational days a year, far beyond the norm for a service-manned hull. This would normally involve funding through the MoD’s day-to-day spending (RDEL) budget, which is under even greater pressure than the Capital budget (CDEL). The Treasury Green Book may offer a route through this. Structured as a charter with an option to buy, the arrangement could be treated as CDEL spending at the outset, with the service elements converting to resource spending later in the term, perhaps around year ten."
...
"Chartered strike ships should not be seen as a replacement for a properly conceived MRSS, and a leased conversion carries some risk around accounting and survivability. The instinct that saw the idea quietly shelved as the RN held out for purpose-built grey hulls has now been publicly abandoned, for better or worse. If the hybrid navy means generating mass from cheaper, distributed, uncrewed platforms, a low-cost mothership sits closer to that vision than expensive LPDs or LPHs, for which there may never be the budget or personnel numbers required."
...
"The strongest objection remains that a converted merchant hull is not a warship, and that a chartered, civilian-crewed vessel has no place in a shooting war. The baseline MRV is offered fitted for, but not with, self-defence weaponry, the fit chosen by the customer. The 2019 mockups showed positions for up to 3 Phalanx CIWS alongside smaller guns and decoys, a balance similar to that fitted to Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships when they deploy to higher-threat regions. Carrying organic short-range air defence on non-warships is an established practice for the US Marine Corps, which has mounted MANPADS on vehicles carried onto ships’ decks. The consortium also worked up options for ballistic protection, additional bulkheads, more robust firefighting and blow-out panels to improve the vessel’s chances of surviving a hit.
"None of these ‘bolt-ons’ gives a commercial ro-ro conversion the protection, redundancy and survivability of a warship. Such a ship does not belong in the front line of a contested air and missile environment, although its uncrewed systems can extend its reach. The MRV should not be seen as ‘attritable’, but its price point means multiple vessels could be obtained for the cost of a single MRSS, dispersing the force, delivering similar effect and removing single points of failure."
...
....
"In mid-2019, the Prevail consortium went public with a detailed proposal, a Multi-Role Vessel (MRV) based on the charter and conversion of an existing, proven roll-on roll-off vessel. The consortium is a credible provider and brings decades of combined experience across ship design, construction and commercial operation, the disciplines that deliver merchant vessels on time and to budget.
"For a relatively low cost, they could provide a 230m ship with around 7,500 tonnes deadweight, capable of 21 knots, 10,000nm of range, 28 days of endurance, accommodation for up to 600 embarked personnel with is tiny core crew of 35. There was capacity for a 960m2 command centre, considerable aviation capacity, and davits able to launch landing craft or USVs up to 24 tonnes."
Royal Navy should reconsider Littoral Strike Ship - Navy Lookout
In 2019, the MoD set aside £35 million to develop a Littoral Strike Ship (LSS), a deliberately low-cost vessel built around commando raiding operations but the idea faded as amphibious thinking consolidated into a single large programme - the Multi-Role Strike Ship. With the Royal Navy now both...
www.navylookout.com
"The MRV would be offered on a charter basis, which avoids the need for a large capital outlay. Under the model offered, Prevail finances, procures, crews and manages the vessel, with no large up-front payment. A commercially crewed ship can sustain well over 300 operational days a year, far beyond the norm for a service-manned hull. This would normally involve funding through the MoD’s day-to-day spending (RDEL) budget, which is under even greater pressure than the Capital budget (CDEL). The Treasury Green Book may offer a route through this. Structured as a charter with an option to buy, the arrangement could be treated as CDEL spending at the outset, with the service elements converting to resource spending later in the term, perhaps around year ten."
...
"Chartered strike ships should not be seen as a replacement for a properly conceived MRSS, and a leased conversion carries some risk around accounting and survivability. The instinct that saw the idea quietly shelved as the RN held out for purpose-built grey hulls has now been publicly abandoned, for better or worse. If the hybrid navy means generating mass from cheaper, distributed, uncrewed platforms, a low-cost mothership sits closer to that vision than expensive LPDs or LPHs, for which there may never be the budget or personnel numbers required."
...
"The strongest objection remains that a converted merchant hull is not a warship, and that a chartered, civilian-crewed vessel has no place in a shooting war. The baseline MRV is offered fitted for, but not with, self-defence weaponry, the fit chosen by the customer. The 2019 mockups showed positions for up to 3 Phalanx CIWS alongside smaller guns and decoys, a balance similar to that fitted to Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships when they deploy to higher-threat regions. Carrying organic short-range air defence on non-warships is an established practice for the US Marine Corps, which has mounted MANPADS on vehicles carried onto ships’ decks. The consortium also worked up options for ballistic protection, additional bulkheads, more robust firefighting and blow-out panels to improve the vessel’s chances of surviving a hit.
"None of these ‘bolt-ons’ gives a commercial ro-ro conversion the protection, redundancy and survivability of a warship. Such a ship does not belong in the front line of a contested air and missile environment, although its uncrewed systems can extend its reach. The MRV should not be seen as ‘attritable’, but its price point means multiple vessels could be obtained for the cost of a single MRSS, dispersing the force, delivering similar effect and removing single points of failure."
...
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It is not as if there is a lack of demand...
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Astron Serving as Freight-Only Vessel for Labrador North Coast
The provincial government has added a second vessel to bolster freight delivery on Labrador's north coast. The...
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