Army doctrine and its Implementation

[Good2Golf]

I am a strong proponent of pulling base functions out of the RCN, CA, RCAF, CMP & VCDS and vesting them in a support Command, while simultaneously culling the Res F structure, so that the CA will consist of hybrid Reg / Tes formations:

One Armd Bde
Two Inf Bde
One Engr Bde
One Arty Bde
One SIGs Bde
One CSS Bde

All under a single Div.

Too bad they got rid of CANOSCOM…

 

[dapaterson]

I think you can cull a slew of GO/FO's there too

Added bonus.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

The structure of the Airborne Division is intriguing as it consists of three Mobile Brigade Combat Teams (MBCTs) that have Infantry Carrier Vehicles (ICVs). Could our light infantry battalions fit in there somewhere? There is work afoot to obtain light vehicles to enable mobility.

 

[Brad Sallows]

There is work afoot

Better not have written that on purpose...

 

[markppcli]

The structure of the Airborne Division is intriguing as it consists of three Mobile Brigade Combat Teams (MBCTs) that have Infantry Carrier Vehicles (ICVs). Could our light infantry battalions fit in there somewhere? There is work afoot to obtain light vehicles to enable mobility.

What would be the Pro / Con list of formally integrating them into that structure ? Say as :

2 BG (Canadian)

• 1 RCR
• 3 RCR
• 3 R22R
• 2 RCHA
  • 3 x 8 Gun M777 battery
  • Op Battery
  • AD Battery
• RCD
• HQ Sigs
  • MP Pl
  • Fd Sqn
  • Fd Sqn
  • Sig Sqn

 

[GR66]

The structure of the Airborne Division is intriguing as it consists of three Mobile Brigade Combat Teams (MBCTs) that have Infantry Carrier Vehicles (ICVs). Could our light infantry battalions fit in there somewhere? There is work afoot to obtain light vehicles to enable mobility.

Any links available?

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

What would be the Pro / Con list of formally integrating them into that structure ? Say as :

2 BG (Canadian)

• 1 RCR
• 3 RCR
• 3 R22R
• 2 RCHA
  • 3 x 8 Gun M777 battery
  • Op Battery
  • AD Battery
• RCD
• HQ Sigs
  • MP Pl
  • Fd Sqn
  • Fd Sqn
  • Sig Sqn

Perhaps! The trick is that those M777s and Engineers would belong in the Div Arty structure. Perhaps those infantry battalions would just have real mortar platoons and rely on US artillery? Our instincts, though, would be to add in what we consider Bde-level assets.

We have been integrating Canadian light battalions into IBCTs since 2020 for their Brigade validation exercises. Perhaps we set our sights on that for now with a view to how we would integrate an infantry brigade (if not a brigade group?) into one of those US Divisions.

 

[FJAG]

@TangoTwoBravo is that White Paper restricted circulation? I can't find an open source for it. In fact most open Army 2030/Waypoint 2028/29 material goes back to the Sept/Oct period of last year.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I am comfortable referring to it here (there are no caveats), but I will not share it in its entirety outside the DWAN. It is quite fresh - no doubt it will pop up elsewhere in due time.

 

[markppcli]

Perhaps! The trick is that those M777s and Engineers would belong in the Div Arty structure. Perhaps those infantry battalions would just have real mortar platoons and rely on US artillery? Our instincts, though, would be to add in what we consider Bde-level assets.

We have been integrating Canadian light battalions into IBCTs since 2020 for their Brigade validation exercises. Perhaps we set our sights on that for now with a view to how we would integrate an infantry brigade (if not a brigade group?) into one of those US Divisions.

I think we bring our own Arty to the Party, they just get assigned to the Artillery Bde supporting the Div. There’s Mortars being established in light Bns now, along with the pioneers and DFS. Would the US welcome the addition or question the value of a light Bn with no ability to protect itself from from armour.

 

[Fabius]

The US Army has continued to develop doctrine around the shift to Divisions for large scale combat operations with a short and sharp White Paper on the Army 2030 Division Fight. Divisions, supported by Corps and Theatre, will be the decisive tactical formations. They will adopt five types of divisions: Armor Divisions (Reinforced); Armor Divisions, Airborne Divisions, Air Assault Divisions and Light/Motorized Divisions. The Armor (Reinforced) Division will be the corps de rupture, so to speak, and will be enabled for wet-gap crossings. These were signaled in early 2022 and some terminology has changed. (no more Penetration Division for instance - now its Armor Division (Reinforced).

Divisions will have their tube artillery centralized (three SP artillery Bns plus an extended range artillery bn) while MLRS will be held at Corps. By design, Corps will dismantle enemy integrated fires commands while Divs mass their tube artillery at the main effort. So maybe only a single ABCT gets the artillery support. What is old is new again! Divisions will have layered cavalry and we see the return of the Div Cav. The battlefield framework sees a Division with an 18 to 25 km frontage and 25 km forward and back of the FEBA. This is much closer to Cold War battlespaces and definitely a shift from some of the very wide and deep AOOs assigned in recent times on operations and on exercises.

The White Paper has two vignettes to show how a Armor Division (Reinforced) and an Airborne Division would fight an engagement. Its not doctrine on its own, but it certainly shows how they envision their army fighting in a few years.

For what it is worth I agree with the premise that the Division is the decisive tactical formation and that dispersing all the combat support does not work in large scale combat operations. I like where they are going.

I enjoy seeing the efforts the US military puts into thinking through how they will fight and then what organization and MTOE they need to do that.
My question is how does the Canadian Army see itself fighting? ADO and Close engagement in the Canadian Army publications do not really offer much in my opinion in comparison to US documents.
Nor does most of the F2025 or managed readiness discussions delve into how we see the Canadian Army fighting.
Maybe it’s because we see us plugging into the US Bdes, Divisions and Corps?
Except we aren’t going to do that in our chosen AOR in Latvia. So as the aFP lead nation and a nation with some influence on MND North in Latvia how do we see that fight going?

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I think we bring our own Arty to the Party, they just get assigned to the Artillery Bde supporting the Div. There’s Mortars being established in light Bns now, along with the pioneers and DFS. Would the US welcome the addition or question the value of a light Bn with no ability to protect itself from from armour.

In addition to the mortars (which have indeed been established), there is the ATGM project and UOR plus a mobility initiative. All that to say I think it’s viable.

Our Mech focus will be Latvia for the foreseeable future. Light Battalions will still have to prepare for REASSURANCE, but they will also need to think about other areas and other partners. So I think it’s useful to track US developments. In any case our light Battalions will continue to validate with US IBCTs.

 

[Fabius]

The structure of the Airborne Division is intriguing as it consists of three Mobile Brigade Combat Teams (MBCTs) that have Infantry Carrier Vehicles (ICVs). Could our light infantry battalions fit in there somewhere? There is work afoot to obtain light vehicles to enable mobility.

In what context would we attach the light Bns into a US MBCT in a US Airborne Division?
The probable scenarios for the commitment of the light Bns as the Cdn GRTFs and the same for the US airborne formations don’t really line up do they?
Our forces are permissive entry based where as the US forces are expressly for joint force entry. Does Canada see us participating in the lead waves of a non permissive JFE?

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I enjoy seeing the efforts the US military puts into thinking through how they will fight and then what organization and MTOE they need to do that.
My question is how does the Canadian Army see itself fighting? ADO and Close engagement in the Canadian Army publications do not really offer much in my opinion in comparison to US documents.
Nor does most of the F2025 or managed readiness discussions delve into how we see the Canadian Army fighting.
Maybe it’s because we see us plugging into the US Bdes, Divisions and Corps?
Except we aren’t going to do that in our chosen AOR in Latvia. So as the aFP lead nation and a nation with some influence on MND North in Latvia how do we see that fight going?

Good points, but who is the “we” in your statement about how we see the Canafian Army fighting? The Army.ca crowd or the serving army?

Our Latvia commitment indeed sees us in a multinational brigade within a multinational division. Which in turn will be under a multinational corps. I expect that our collective doctrine/practice will be shaped by various forces and constraints. It won’t be as neat and tidy as US doctrine, but it will likely be influenced by US developments if not ruled by them. We have a very active bilateral program with the US Army, ranging from low-level training to Bde participation in future Warfighter serials. Interoperability is a means to an end, but we work closely to develop it with the US Army along with ABCANZ and NATO.

Stating the obvious, but as we look at our own doctrine we need to stay abreast of that of our allies. That does not mean we have to copy theirs, but we should at least understand it. Especially those aspects dealing with assets above unit level.

 

[markppcli]

In addition to the mortars (which have indeed been established), there is the ATGM project and UOR plus a mobility initiative. All that to say I think it’s viable.

Our Mech focus will be Latvia for the foreseeable future. Light Battalions will still have to prepare for REASSURANCE, but they will also need to think about other areas and other partners. So I think it’s useful to track US developments. In any case our light Battalions will continue to validate with US IBCTs.

In which case it would make sense to align them to a division I don’t disagree. The ATGM project, UOR notwithstanding, won’t be delivering until the end of the decade, I’m not sure that’s really tolerable to any partners. As it stands they require a great deal of effort in integration, just the communications piece alone has been problematic (Vulos vs HAVQUICK). The issue of anti armour defence, as I understand it, has been raised as well. We are there but a junior partner.

Just read your more recent post, and the comms piece plays into that. We are hamstrung by laws in Canada but we need to be training our sigs folks, all 7 that aren’t VRing, in what our allies are doing so we aren’t a comms liability.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

In what context would we attach the light Bns into a US MBCT in a US Airborne Division?
The probable scenarios for the commitment of the light Bns as the Cdn GRTFs and the same for the US airborne formations don’t really line up do they?
Our forces are permissive entry based where as the US forces are expressly for joint force entry. Does Canada see us participating in the lead waves of a non permissive JFE?

JFE is not part of the current GRTF thought process, but that does not automatically rule out the GRTF working within a US Airborne or Light/Motorized Division for all operations.

 

[FJAG]

... As it stands they require a great deal of effort in integration, just the communications piece alone has been problematic (Vulos vs HAVQUICK). The issue of anti armour defence, as I understand it, has been raised as well. We are there but a junior partner....

I think the more time we spend in efforts like having light battalions exercising in the US and having our battle group in Latvia, the more we understand the issues and either find the workarounds or acquire the essential enablers.

In Afghanistan we operated under US command 2006 and subsequently commanded US units within an ISAF framework. Much of that taught false lessons because of the permissive communications and logistics environment.

I've always been concerned when we go our own way in the matter of communications and logistics although that is the way of NATO nations notwithstanding STANAGs to smooth that out. I sometimes wonder whether finding the perfect Canadian solution for things is just being contrarian. I know running a Canadian battalion within an American BCT is possible because we use the same ammo, can eat MREs in a pinch and use the same fuels. However, the maintenance chain for a LAV, for example, will not go through the BCT's BSB. That needs some unique Canadian add-on component. I'm not sure how well that gets exercised - do we have log nodes tailored to plug into BSBs and US Div Sustainment Bde. I have the same reservations about the Latvian NSE structure which is even more complex because of the various countries there and the highly mechanical nature of the force. It will work in peacetime but how well will it function under pressure?

I have less concerns about equipment. Assuming that there is the will to become part of a serious operational force, I would expect that we could relatively quickly UOR the key capability deficiencies needed for a given operational task. I say that notwithstanding I consider Latvia a "serious" operational commitment and yet we have acquired very few of the essential enablers needed within the battalion.

Some day I would like to see a RAND evaluation report on communications and logistics within Multinational Division North.

 

[Fabius]

Good points, but who is the “we” in your statement about how we see the Canafian Army fighting? The Army.ca crowd or the serving army?

Our Latvia commitment indeed sees us in a multinational brigade within a multinational division. Which in turn will be under a multinational corps. I expect that our collective doctrine/practice will be shaped by various forces and constraints. It won’t be as neat and tidy as US doctrine, but it will likely be influenced by US developments if not ruled by them. We have a very active bilateral program with the US Army, ranging from low-level training to Bde participation in future Warfighter serials. Interoperability is a means to an end, but we work closely to develop it with the US Army along with ABCANZ and NATO.

Stating the obvious, but as we look at our own doctrine we need to stay abreast of that of our allies. That does not mean we have to copy theirs, but we should at least understand it. Especially those aspects dealing with assets above unit level.

Agree 100% on understanding our allies doctrine in this particular American and I do get that interoperability is a means to an end. I don’t think we are keeping up on interoperability with the US, the digitalization of their forces is quickly hindering our ability to integrate effectively without US SFAB personnel and equipment.
In terms of how we fight I do mean the CAF and the CA. I would like to see a firm well informed and broadly discussed doctrine established that informs TO&E ORBATS and force structures vs current discussion of those items without the doctrine of how we will fight.

JFE is not part of the current GRTF thought process, but that does not automatically rule out the GRTF working within a US Airborne or Light/Motorized Division for all operations.

Fair point. Obviously a Light or motorized IBCT has a different msn set than the IBCT (Airborne) that is more in line with the capabilities of the Light Bns but I grant that it’s possible that a light Bn could end up beside a 82nd BCT doing something Hati or Kabul like.
Again though I will highlight that to me the expected msn sets drive TO&E and ORBAT and then training something that to me gets forgotten often.
A potential example is the light Bn mobility project. Currently I understand it to be focused for use in the Cdn North in the current threat environment there, hence not armoured or armed. All good but if we expect to drop that same Bn into Latvia to hold a village maybe it should be armoured and armed as a relatively random example.

 

[FJAG]

... I would like to see a firm well informed and broadly discussed doctrine established that informs TO&E ORBATS and force structures vs current discussion of those items without the doctrine of how we will fight.

100%. Doctrine should drive organization. Canada does not have a doctrine-based army. It is a capability-based army. Our organization is based around building task-based battlegroups with available sub-units. We do exercise at higher levels but operationally we are focused on ad-hoc battle groups.

Fair point. Obviously a Light or motorized IBCT has a different msn set than the IBCT (Airborne) that is more in line with the capabilities of the Light Bns but I grant that it’s possible that a light Bn could end up beside a 82nd BCT doing something Hati or Kabul like.
Again though I will highlight that to me the expected msn sets drive TO&E and ORBAT and then training something that to me gets forgotten often.
A potential example is the light Bn mobility project. Currently I understand it to be focused for use in the Cdn North in the current threat environment there, hence not armoured or armed. All good but if we expect to drop that same Bn into Latvia to hold a village maybe it should be armoured and armed as a relatively random example.

I think one has to take a look at the US Army's BCT organizations to see where IBCTs fit in.

The Active Army has 31 BCTs of which only 14 are IBCTs. Of those 14, 5 are Airborne, 3 are Air assault and 6 are pure IBCTs. Of those 6, 3 are with the 10th Mountain aimed at true light leg operations, 2 are with the 25th Inf Div in Hawai'i and 1 with the 11th Airborne in Alaska. IBCTs but with clear focii.

The Active Army IBCTs, even the straight leg ones, are oriented to entry operations.

On the other hand of the 27 ARNG BCTs, 20 are pure leg IBCTs. The ARNG IBCTs are oriented and equipped to be an economy of cost force in peacetime, to provide domestic support and to add mass in a wide variety of roles in wartime.

By comparison Canada's RegF has 1/3 of its infantry in our 3 "BCT's" as light with a minor airborne capability. OTOH, we have no ResF BCTs and little capability to form any.

It is hard to discern any specific role for the RegF light battalions. One can't help but conclude their formation was to turn the late 20th Century 10/90 battalions into something a little more robust in order to create the base of 12 manoeuvre units that the army felt it needed in the early versions of Advancing with Purpose and the managed readiness plan that it was developing. It was obviously something that could be done without spending money on more LAVs. (I'm a bit of a cynic as IMHO any LAV battalion can operate as light infantry if the mission or task requires it)

As for the 10 ResF CBGs; they have zero operational value. At most they form a pool of partially-trained individuals and with much effort, tasked sub-subunits. They are, at best, a wasted opportunity.

Let me simply say that I value light infantry highly. But only when it has a clear purpose and is organized and equipped for the role. I actually think Canada has a great need for real IBCTs. It could form a RegF IBCT and two Mechanized BCTs right now if RegF regimental politics and the managed readiness system didn't stand in its way. It could also form several real ResF IBCTs and combat support and combat service support brigades if it didn't let the antiquated ResF structure stand in its way and if it learned to better blur the line between the RegF and the ResF.

Any change would need a change in government direction and a doctrine to support well defined defence objectives. Unfortunately, trying to be a small jack-of-all-trades military does not provide that sorely needed focus.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Again though I will highlight that to me the expected msn sets drive TO&E and ORBAT and then training something that to me gets forgotten often.
A potential example is the light Bn mobility project. Currently I understand it to be focused for use in the Cdn North in the current threat environment there, hence not armoured or armed. All good but if we expect to drop that same Bn into Latvia to hold a village maybe it should be armoured and armed as a relatively random example.

Be careful, it sounds suspiciously like an effort to respawn the Canadian Airborne Regiment