Colin Parkinson
Army.ca Myth
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by the time this contract is wrapping up, maybe it will be a perfect time to jump aboard.
Australian navy's hunt for new sub to replace Collins class
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Oldgateboatdriver
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S.M.A. said:
All snorkelling systems are all-weather so long as you are willing to live with the discomfort associated with temporary shut-down of the inflow pipe and you are ready to handle vacuum-in-the-boat situations.
The real question is, with a submarine, why on earth would you want to be anywhere less than two hundred feet deep during a typhoon ?
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France's counter offer to Japan's Soryu and Germany's Endeavour sub projects to Australia:
Navy Recognition
Navy Recognition
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2 major updates that may influence Australia's future sub competition:
Defence Aerospace
A winning move by the Germans which will win over the shipbuilding lobbyists in Australia?
Financial Review
Defence Aerospace
A winning move by the Germans which will win over the shipbuilding lobbyists in Australia?
Financial Review
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Um, it wouldn't be very intelligent for a serving seaman and engineering RAN bubblehead to write an article for publication, but somehow this one, just published, aligns to the tune of 100 per cent with the views of RAN sub country on the garbage consistently published on the Soryu boats.
From Aust. Defence Monthly.
The submarine problem - deeper than meets the eye
ADM writers
It’s been said so often but never actually examined in great detail – the Future Submarine Program is strategic for Japan and Australia. In speaking to the submarine community, past and present, what comes through is that cooperation with Japan results in a Future Submarine that can approach the performances of Collins but only with a completely new design and one that will definitely not be regionally superior post 2030. This is alarming and requires pause for thought.
The root-cause of this problem is that Japan does not have any technology that is, well, regionally superior. Indeed it is the reverse situation - Japan’s relative submarine capability is improved by the Future Submarine Program but not Australia’s.
The Future Submarine is strategic for Japan, but not for Australia.
The Australian Government tells us that the next generation of RAN submarines will be regionally superior because they will have higher performances in stealth, sensors, range and endurance, and of course the US-origin combat system and weapons. With superior performances in these areas, the Future Submarine can outmatch any other submarine the RAN might conceivably fight, including the nearly silent nuclear attack submarines emerging from Russia and in the future, China. In the decades to come these submarines will hunt, and be hunted by, Australian submarines and it’s important to note that the RAN may not get to choose who to fight or when – they might choose us.
To say it in plain English, if the Collins were to fight the Soryu today Collins would kill it every time.
But what if the international partner for Australia has no better technology than we already have access to? The undeniable logic is the Future Submarine will offer performances no better than the Collins Class Submarine it replaces. An ‘Australianised’ Soryu will not be regionally superior beyond 2030. This is the critical issue.
And there is no technology offered by Japan to suggest any evolution of the Soryu can change this situation in the future.
None.
In lobbying Australia to accept their submarine, Japan has disclosed enough about its own capabilities in open literature to prove this. The Soryu Class, Japan’s most modern submarine, offers no improvement over Collins in any capability area – not stealth, not sonar, not range nor endurance and not combat system or weapon. Moreover, there is no objective evidence that Japan can overcome these problems with a new design. Let's examine the case for the Soryu point by point.
Stealth
Stealth in submarines is mostly determined by the noise of the submarine, making it vulnerable to detection by the enemy (the noise of machinery, vibration, the flow of water over the hull and the propeller at all speeds) as well as the echo the submarine may return from enemy active sonar. For a submarine to be detected by active sonar its position is generally already localised by an adversary.
The extent to which the noise generated by on-board machinery is reduced is determined by the vibration of the equipment in the first instance, followed by the effectiveness of acoustic isolation treatments. Submarine designs since the 1980s, including the Collins, isolate vibration by a combination of treatments at each and every interface between the equipment, the hull of the submarine and the deck itself. However at least one technical paper made public by Kawasaki confirms that the Soryu does not have acoustic isolation between the deck and the hull.
This problem is clear as the production process described by Kawasaki in its own literature is incompatible with any conceivable method for acoustic isolation of the deck from the hull. Without isolation of the deck from the hull, acoustic isolation is incomplete and will result in higher acoustic signatures and loss of stealth capability. Alarmingly, the acoustic signature of the Soryu is very likely to be higher than that of the Collins and the problem is literally welded in. Fixing the problem is not straight forward as the Soryu's double hull sections constrain the available internal volume for installation of the acoustic systems. Even before the problems of range and endurance are considered, a complete redesign of the Soryu based on technology from outside Japan is required - perhaps Australia will donate this technology to Japan from the Collins?
As the phrase suggests, a double hull creates one small submarine inside a larger one. Only the internal hull, with the smaller diameter, is designed to resist the external seawater pressure. The external hull is comprised of tanks for fuel and ballast. A double hull can save weight but can introduce other problems.
Whole article via the link, here - http://www.australiandefence.com.au/news/the-submarine-problem-deeper-than-meets-the-eye
From Aust. Defence Monthly.
The submarine problem - deeper than meets the eye
ADM writers
It’s been said so often but never actually examined in great detail – the Future Submarine Program is strategic for Japan and Australia. In speaking to the submarine community, past and present, what comes through is that cooperation with Japan results in a Future Submarine that can approach the performances of Collins but only with a completely new design and one that will definitely not be regionally superior post 2030. This is alarming and requires pause for thought.
The root-cause of this problem is that Japan does not have any technology that is, well, regionally superior. Indeed it is the reverse situation - Japan’s relative submarine capability is improved by the Future Submarine Program but not Australia’s.
The Future Submarine is strategic for Japan, but not for Australia.
The Australian Government tells us that the next generation of RAN submarines will be regionally superior because they will have higher performances in stealth, sensors, range and endurance, and of course the US-origin combat system and weapons. With superior performances in these areas, the Future Submarine can outmatch any other submarine the RAN might conceivably fight, including the nearly silent nuclear attack submarines emerging from Russia and in the future, China. In the decades to come these submarines will hunt, and be hunted by, Australian submarines and it’s important to note that the RAN may not get to choose who to fight or when – they might choose us.
To say it in plain English, if the Collins were to fight the Soryu today Collins would kill it every time.
But what if the international partner for Australia has no better technology than we already have access to? The undeniable logic is the Future Submarine will offer performances no better than the Collins Class Submarine it replaces. An ‘Australianised’ Soryu will not be regionally superior beyond 2030. This is the critical issue.
And there is no technology offered by Japan to suggest any evolution of the Soryu can change this situation in the future.
None.
In lobbying Australia to accept their submarine, Japan has disclosed enough about its own capabilities in open literature to prove this. The Soryu Class, Japan’s most modern submarine, offers no improvement over Collins in any capability area – not stealth, not sonar, not range nor endurance and not combat system or weapon. Moreover, there is no objective evidence that Japan can overcome these problems with a new design. Let's examine the case for the Soryu point by point.
Stealth
Stealth in submarines is mostly determined by the noise of the submarine, making it vulnerable to detection by the enemy (the noise of machinery, vibration, the flow of water over the hull and the propeller at all speeds) as well as the echo the submarine may return from enemy active sonar. For a submarine to be detected by active sonar its position is generally already localised by an adversary.
The extent to which the noise generated by on-board machinery is reduced is determined by the vibration of the equipment in the first instance, followed by the effectiveness of acoustic isolation treatments. Submarine designs since the 1980s, including the Collins, isolate vibration by a combination of treatments at each and every interface between the equipment, the hull of the submarine and the deck itself. However at least one technical paper made public by Kawasaki confirms that the Soryu does not have acoustic isolation between the deck and the hull.
This problem is clear as the production process described by Kawasaki in its own literature is incompatible with any conceivable method for acoustic isolation of the deck from the hull. Without isolation of the deck from the hull, acoustic isolation is incomplete and will result in higher acoustic signatures and loss of stealth capability. Alarmingly, the acoustic signature of the Soryu is very likely to be higher than that of the Collins and the problem is literally welded in. Fixing the problem is not straight forward as the Soryu's double hull sections constrain the available internal volume for installation of the acoustic systems. Even before the problems of range and endurance are considered, a complete redesign of the Soryu based on technology from outside Japan is required - perhaps Australia will donate this technology to Japan from the Collins?
As the phrase suggests, a double hull creates one small submarine inside a larger one. Only the internal hull, with the smaller diameter, is designed to resist the external seawater pressure. The external hull is comprised of tanks for fuel and ballast. A double hull can save weight but can introduce other problems.
Whole article via the link, here - http://www.australiandefence.com.au/news/the-submarine-problem-deeper-than-meets-the-eye
Colin Parkinson
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Are the other countries offering anything that much different in ability than the Japanese. Can Australia afford to go to far beyond the Collin's class abilities?
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The decision on the new sub will be announced next week. A lot of press lately seems to suggest that Japan is out of the race.
ABC News (Australia)
ABC News (Australia)
