Big Thinkers Wanted - a View of the next 10 years in Iraq

[54/102 CEF]

Check it out and start studying their languages

http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050901faessay84508/andrew-f-krepinevich-jr/how-to-win-in-iraq.html?mode=print

 

[Old Ranger]

I had to print this one.
Do you know how reliable this paper is?
(Edit: Opened the eyes. thanks Infanteer)

I'll get back to you with thoughts.

Cheers.

 

[Infanteer]

Do you know how reliable this paper is?

Well, considering the source is Foreign Affairs, you should be okay.

 

[Old Ranger]

Wow,
Had to go to an all you can eat buffet so I would be able to sit down afterwards to read again in entirety.

Is the "Oil Spot" in practice in Afghanistan?  Sounds like a well thought out and possible effective strategy for that domain in the Middle East.  Has someone sent a copy to the White House?  This should be a required reading for all going overseas, at least bring a copy to pass on to the Bosses.  Do you think the Americans are going to try this approach?  Maybe in effort to avoid another Vietnam.

Above all, this strategy seems to take into account fewer casualties.  Maybe more dollars in the long run, but a stable Middle East seems well worth it.

Any other thoughts?

 

[Edward Campbell]

As the article pointed out, the recommended strategy is nothing more than an update of the technique used by Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer in Malaya in the '50s.  See, especially, MGen (Ret'd) Richard Clutterbuck's "The Long, Long War" which ought to be required reading for everyone before they are allowed to even use the words counter-insurgency.

(See: http://www.kcl.ac.uk/lhcma/locreg/TEMPLER.shtml and  http://www.kcl.ac.uk/lhcma/locreg/CLUTTERBUCK.shtml )

A lot of people, especially a lot of American people with uniforms and stars need to go all the way back to square one: back to a time before they developed a horrid fascination with Bernard Fall and Street Without Joy and Trinquier and the whole French Revolutionary Warfare thing.  Counter-insurgency campaigns are winnable - it is just that the French never knew how.  (Trinquier was advocating a very specific tactic for a 'war' which never reoccurred, if it even occurred in the first place.)  The Brits, and indeed the Filipinos did know how (in the late '40s and early '50s) and they did win.

We (North Americans, especially) have become fascinated with the here-and-now; we want instant results - better profits every quarter, that sort of thing.  Fighting and winning a counter-insurgency campaign takes, as Clutterbuck said, a long, long time - declaring victory and going home is not the same as winning.

 

[Infanteer]

Another good Malaya book is The War of the Running Dogs.  The basic premise of all insurgency/revolutionary war is that it is a political battle, not a military one.

 

[Dare]

There are many flaws in this article. Notibly, the "three sources" not including external influences, placing the blame for each source on the shoulders of the U.S.

The plan itself seems almost silly. It's as though he is selectively ignoring the methods of an insurgency entirely. The Coalition could sweep through all the streets of Iraq and there would still be insurgents and terrorists left behind, yet now embedded in their "green zone". It doesn't matter how well you map the tribes or how many marines you embed with Iraqi units. The idea of "protecting the population" is certainly a noble one, yet he doesn't seem to go in detail on just how he would like the U.S. to do that any more than they are now (How do you stop a suicide bomber? It's not as easy as strolling through the streets looking badass.) A lot of what he speculates the Coalition should be doing, is exactly what they ARE doing. Most of the problems addressed in this paper are attributable, not to a problem in strategies/tactics in Iraq, but to strategies/tactics in media relations on the homefront. This war should have been an easy sell (to be blunt). Don't think Iraqis don't watch CNN, as well. They hear the lopsided criticisms and tell their friends. It's virtually a self-fulfilling prophecy battered through the echo-chamber of mass media and through the empty skulls of journalists. The first thing the U.S. Gov. should do is reverse their policy of ignoring the small vocal minority and refute all idiotic anti-War anti-Bush anti-Republican propaganda, rather than letting the (typically) insulting and aggressive right wing commentators bungle it. When most people in and out of the U.S. still think the Iraq war was illegal, there has been a collossal screw up in P.R. Unity can not be met on the basis of protection alone. The "grand bargain" can not simply be "We'll keep you safe", it's insufficient. The "green zone" can not be beyond their current walls until the whole country is a "green zone". To promise the population protection that can not be possibly provided is a *set up* for *failure*. Especially after a reduction of 20,000 U.S. soldiers.

Beware of the CFR's pitches.

 

[Edward Campbell]

The centerpiece of successful counter-insurgency operations has been deciding that victory belongs to the people - the ordinary people, the farmers and shopkeepers.  That's one of the reasons so many insurgencies end up with countries worse off than when they started; neither the insurgents nor the government had any idea about what they were fighting for; everyone knows what they are against, but that's not good enough.

We need to get back to Maslow and give the people the physiological and safety needs, first and, as part of safety, the liberty to decide, for themselves, how to meet their other needs.

This means, most often, not just 'sweeping the streets' with the army but making the army â “ as a security (safety) service- part of each community.  The army is not the whole answer, however.  It is the local, indigenous, honest (which means well paid and safe (protected by the army)) police and civil services which are central to success.

The American are doing right by re-establishing Iraqi police and government services but it is not clear to me that they are establishing a useful police and civil service â “ one which will serve (and protect) the people.

Another aspect of successful counter-insurgency operations is that while most of the army â “ national and foreign was engaged in community building another smaller, quiet but deadly part was engaged in pacification: finding and killing (never capturing) the insurgents and, thereby, 'winning' the hearts and minds of the disaffected by stilling both.

 

[tomahawk6]

http://www.nationalreview.com/hanson/hanson200509230813.asp

Good Victor Hanson article.

Looking into my crystal ball I see some form of US presence in Iraq for 10 year's. The US will want to maintain a superbase including
an airbase and probably an armored brigade near Basra which would protect Kuwait. For the next 2-3 year's I see a multi-division presence in Iraq until the Iraqi security forces are able to function on their own.