Blitzkrieg

[gate_guard]

Alright, I'm writing a history term paper on the use of Blitzkrieg tactics by the germans. I know of a couple of reasons why the Germans decided to adopt this tactic at the beginning of WW2 but I know I've got more than a few history buffs lurking these boards so I'm open to comments (c'mon Dorosh and Infanteer). So the question is "Why did Hitler choose to adopt the strategy of Blitskrieg at the beginning of the war in Europe?" Was it Hitler who chose this strategy or his general corp?

 

[Infanteer]

Ha; "Blitzkrieg" is a myth invented by reporters (I can find the actual paper that invented it if you want), it was not anything new.  The doctrine for German tactical and operational maneuver the Germans used in World War II was theoretically complete in 1918 and executed in the St Michael Offensive.  It took Guderian, under the tutelage of von Seekt, to adapt Armoured vehicles as the method of exploiting tactical breakthroughs into operational success.

Gate Guard; PM me your phone number and I'll give you a call.

 

[dutchie]

First off, Hitler was a poor military strategist. Any success of his plans (militarily) was due to the excellence of his General Staff, the tenacity of the troops, the incompetence/unpreparedness of some Allied armies, or a combonation of these. In Poland, the forces opposing the Germans were of low calibre, and combined with the surprise nature of the attack (although looking back, it shouldn't have been a surprise), the Polish Army had no chance. The Polish Cavalry charged Panzers on horseback in some cases. So for starters, blitzkrieg was successful, but a lot of the German Army's sucess was due to surprise, numbers, and poor quality allied forces.

Having said that, it was the German General Guderian who 'invented' Blitzkrieg. I believe that if this Blitzkrieg was launched against a prepared, quality force, then it would have been far less effective. Blitzkrieg is more a result of technological advances in tank design than some mystical genius masterplan of the German's (as indicated by Infanteer's post). However, it's number one advantage is that it exploits indecisiveness. By the time the Allies reacted, the battle was over. Quick, decisive action can overcome this tactic, as demonstrated in North Africa and following the Normandy invasion. As well, once the battle lines stabilized, and front lines were established, the Germans weren't able to hold the ground they gained. In this area, Hitler's incompetence really was the downfall of the Third Reich. Look at Stalingrad. Hitler's decisions, and Paulus' inability to either stand up to him or disobey his orders, allowed an almost beaten, severely diminished Russian force to encircle and annihilate them.

I suggest you refer to 'The Rise and Fall of the Thrid Reich'....it is perhaps the most comprehensive, detailed histroy of WW2 ever written. Not the most exciting read, but very heavy on detail. I know you can find the answers there (as I have read it), I just can't remember all of the nitty-gritty details.

Good luck

Caeser

 

[Michael Dorosh]

Blitzkrieg in its current form isn't even a German word; there are references to it in some German literature in the 1920s but it was not a specific term, and probably few if anyone in the German Army in 1939 would have recognized it as a description of what they were doing.

Best book to read is Matthew Cooper THE GERMAN ARMY, available in most university libraries or by inter-branch loan.   It is an older title, but addresses this point well.

As Infanteer points out, the Germans used older concepts - the encirclement battle, and the battle of annihilation, and they date back to the 1870 war at least.   The Germans were actually quite timid with their armour, certainly in Poland, but even in France in 1940.   They never really exercised the "armoured concept" that Guderian envisioned until 1941 in Russia.

They were far from being tactical or strategic geniuses, but the Allies were so much worse, they looked brilliant by comparison.

Hitler certainly didn't help things much, but German generals were quite capable of mucking things up on their own, too.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Ditch the search for "blitzkrieg".  As mentioned already, you should be concentrating on the evolution of Germany's combined arms operational doctrine, starting in the latter half of WWI.  If you're not locked in, you might find a paper on the evolution of operational doctrine in Russia in the 1920s-'30s more interesting.

Polish forces were not of "low calibre"; the Polish army was respected in Europe.  Poland's problem was that it was strategically outflanked by East Prussia and Czechoslovakia and had the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and a Russian disregard for Poland's existence with which to contend.  The status of the "cavalry charges vs tanks" story is currently "myth".  It may have happened in one or two isolated incidents, but appears to mostly be a conflation of stories based on the engagement of Polish cavalry formations with German mechanized formations.

 

[dutchie]

Brad: Yes, I agree that the Polish defeat was primarily due to Political maneuvering between Germany and Russia (and indirectly Britain). Russia viewed Poles as poorly as Hitler did, and also as a 'buffer' for the Soviet Union. Stalin didn't mind giving up a part of it, but wished to retain 'ownership' over the eastern part. Poland was carved up by Molotov-Ribbentrop/Stalin-Hitler much like Czechoslovakia was by Chamberlain-Hitler.

However, the remobilization of Germany saw some technological improvements in design (although most of the best technology came out during the war), which probably would have resulted in German victory, even without outside interference. The Poles were not building towards war in the same manner that Germany was. As well, history tells us that nations that prepare for war will usually defeat those that do not, and can usually overcome numerical superiority.

Regarding the cavalry charge, I used this reference to indicate the futility of Polish defence, not as a 'snapshot' of a common battle.

 

[Infanteer]

Having said that, it was the German General Guderian who 'invented' Blitzkrieg.

Seeing how "Blitzkrieg" is a myth (ie: something that is not real), I don't see how it can be invented by Guderian.  He pioneered intergration of mechanized forces into the largely 19th century-ish, horsedrawn, foot-marching Heer, but he did not invent the tactical and operational employment of armoured warfare; the Germans simply adapted to their doctrine that, as Michael pointed out, was developed between 1870-1918.

I believe that if this Blitzkrieg was launched against a prepared, quality force, then it would have been far less effective.

Like the French?

The French Army had more troops, heavier tanks (and more of them), and was entrenched in one of the most extensive and intricate defence systems ever constructed.  However, they had some organizational and institutional flaws that the Germans were able to exploit, ultimately rendering the French irrelevant.  Essentially, they got into the decision cycle of the French Army.

Blitzkrieg is more a result of technological advances in tank design than some mystical genius masterplan of the German's (as indicated by Infanteer's post).

I disagree.  Until the later models of the PzKmpfWgn Mark IV armed with the long barrelled 75mm gun, German tanks were quite inferior to most Allied tanks (the superior Russian designs in particular).  As well, there was never more then 20% of the German Army that was actually motorized or mechanized in any way; essentially, the snazzy looking Tigers and Panthers, although dominating tactically, were too few in numbers to be a factor operationally against Allied armies which were for the most part completely mechanized.

Another fact that jumps out from looking at the successful campaigns in France and early North Africa is that the true strength in the German Army was their Anti-Tank Guns.  The 50, 75, and 88mm were all superior designs; when combined with well trained crews and commanders who could employ them quite well (Rommel in many cases), they were able to nullify any advantages that the Allies possessed with their superior armoured vehicles.

I think that another note of historical relevance that deals with German armour addresses a key weakness of the German military; production.  While the Soviets were for the most part able to take a successful design and stick with it (sure, they had ISUs, KVs, tankettes, and lend-lease; but the T-34 was the mainstay) German industry was forced by Hitler's tinkering to constantly retool its armoured production to his various ideas on armament, armour, overall design, rush to production, etc, etc.  Just look at the number of versions of the T-34 (three or four) to the number of versions of German armour (5-6 for 6-8 different Marks).  Not only does this seriously strain the logistic and maintenance system (which the Germans, in their ubiquitous pursuit of the decisive battle, were never really good at anyways), but it forced many poor or flawed designs to the front.  The Panther and the Tiger, for all their press, were seriously constrained by their mechanical problems.  In the Western Front, where a lumbering Tiger II was essentially a moving blockhouse, this problem was not as obvious; but when needed for decisive tactical and operational maneuver, such as Kursk, it proved disastrous.

Thus, in their successful campaigns the Germans were able to use their "mystical genius" (I would call it a different approach to employment of doctrine) to out maneuver their opponents in time and space with relatively technologically inferior forces.

However, it's number one advantage is that it exploits indecisiveness. By the time the Allies reacted, the battle was over.

This is referred to by theorists as "getting into an opponents decision cycle"; essentially, by the time the Allied armies would orient and decide on a reaction to a German maneuver, the Germans would already have changed to a new action, rendering the choice of Allied command irrelevant and thus spreading panic and confusion and breaking down cohesion.

Quick, decisive action can overcome this tactic, as demonstrated in North Africa and following the Normandy invasion.

I wouldn't say that the campaigns in North Africa and Normandy were examples of "quick, decisive action".  Both were examples of plodding, methodical advances that relied on superior Allied material strength and an abundance of firepower to destroy the German Forces.  Montgomery, sneaking a close victory out of El-Alamein, was able to build 8th Army to great strength.   Rommel, on the other had, was plagued, for many reasons, with no supplies or reinforcements and basically did what he could with what he had.  The fact that the Americans were coming from Morocco helped as well.  I certainly wouldn't call Kasserine an example of "quick, decisive action".

Normandy was much the same.  The landing of over 100,000 soldiers with total control of the air and naval support from the largest flotilla ever formed allowed them to smash through the German defences (or "kick in the door").  Even then, their lack of "quick, decisive action" led to failure to close the Falaise Pocket and permitted an orderly withdrawl of German forces to the Rhine.

As well, once the battle lines stabilized, and front lines were established, the Germans weren't able to hold the ground they gained. In this area, Hitler's incompetence really was the downfall of the Third Reich. Look at Stalingrad. Hitler's decisions, and Paulus' inability to either stand up to him or disobey his orders, allowed an almost beaten, severely diminished Russian force to encircle and annihilate them.

I think there is a bit of confusion between notions of tactical and operational defence and strategic defence.  German doctrine regarding defence was based upon the notion of the counterattack.  As such, it never really focused around holding "battle lines" and "front lines" (again, this came out of the WWI experience).  A good example of this would be Manstein's 1943 counterstroke.  A bad example of this would be the '44 Ardennes Offensive.

When you refer to Hitler's decisions to "hold at all costs", I think you are correct in pointing out how it contributed to overall German failure.  In many cases, the notion of a mobile defence was stifled in favour of attritional defence due to the ideological rational of Hitler (don't give up the Lebensraum); fighting an attrition war with the Russians was something Germany had no chance in winning.  However, I don't think Hitler can share all the blame.  At Stalingrad, failure in operational intelligence was responsible for allowing a German Army to get drawn into a city while leaving poor quality Romanian armies to guard both flanks essentially led German commanders to become the victim of their own Kessel (cauldron) battles.

However, I wouldn't characterize the Soviets at the Stalingrad to be a an "almost beaten, severely diminished force".  Although reeling from a surprise shift from Moscow to the Caucasus, the Soviets had managed to amass quite the strategic reserve.  As well, new work by Col. David Glantz has shown that Stalingrad, for the Soviets at least, was only the sideshow until late December.  Zhukov, with Stalin's blessings, put the main focus of Soviet forces into an attempt to encircle 9th Army in the Ryzev Salient.  Since Ryzev was out of the spotlight from the German perspective, it did not achieve the cult status and attention from Hitler and Model was allowed to successfully defend the Salient without much interference.  

Stalingrad, on the other had, soon gained the attention and resources of the Soviets when they realized that just as Operation Mars (the attack on the Ryzev Salient - Zhukov's pet project), was approaching disastrous failure, Vasilevsky's success in Stalingrad was more then they had expected.   They subsequently sought to exploit their success by shifting Soviet strategic reserves south and Zhukov, in typical Soviet revisionism, later downplayed Operation Mars and claimed Operation Uranus (Stalingrad) as his own.

The point is, the numbers of fresh resources and troops that the Soviets funneled into two massive and simultaneous offensives intended to encircle and destroy two seperate German Armies (no small task - encirclement requires a "double-sided" defence to keep the encircled in and their friends out) seems to indicate that in 1942 the Soviets were far from being an "almost beaten, severely diminished force".  

I suggest you refer to 'The Rise and Fall of the Thrid Reich'....it is perhaps the most comprehensive, detailed histroy of WW2 ever written. Not the most exciting read, but very heavy on detail. I know you can find the answers there (as I have read it), I just can't remember all of the nitty-gritty details.

Shirer's history, although excellent in it's own respects, is mostly a socio-political one.  I think its use in a study of operational doctrine and tactical employment of maneuver forces would be quite limited.

 

[T.I.M.]

I take serious issue with any claim of "excellence" on the part of the German General Staff.  That particular war-myth has not stood the test of historical scrutiny, and we now know that after the war many of the German generals made every effort to pass their own blunders off as Hitlers.

In fact it can be said that the German General Staff did more harm overall to the German war effort than Hitler did.  For a perfect example of their "abilities" one need look no further than than the disaster of Kursk, which was planned and executed by the General Staff with almost no input from Hitler.  On their own, with no meddling from the Furher, the General Staff managed to come up with a plan for a senseless offensive that ignored virtually every military principle, and courted utter strategic disaster for the prospect of only modest operational gain.

When Guderian, who was horrified by the plan came to Hitler, asking why Germany needed to launch an offensive at all, and pointing out that if an offensive HAD to be launched doing it into the teeth of the Kursk salient was madness, Hitler responded, "I know, the thought of it turns my stomach."  Nevertheless, perhaps remembering how his meddling had led to Stalingrad the previous year Hitler did not interfere, save to reccomend that the offensive wait for the new Panther and Tiger tanks to arrive in greater numbers.

So the Kursk offensive proceeded, ran headlong into line after line of prepared numerically superior defenders, resulted in the largest tank battle in history and became the swan-song of the German panzer arm.  In that battle died all German hopes for stabilizing the Eastern front.  It is often said that Stalingrad determined Germany would not win the war, but Kursk determined that Germany would lose it.  A great deal of that responsibility rests squarely on the shoulders of the German General Staff, whose fabled "genius for war" must be seen as the fiction it was.

 

[Infanteer]

I take serious issue with any claim of "excellence" on the part of the German General Staff.   That particular war-myth has not stood the test of historical scrutiny, and we now know that after the war many of the German generals made every effort to pass their own blunders off as Hitlers.

You have to be more specific when referring to the "German General Staff", as in World War II the German forces were plagued with a messy tangle of high command (much different then its earlier Prussian and Imperial German predecessors).   Not only was their a General Staff responsible for the Army, but there was also the OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht), a unified command of all military branches.   As well, authority of the Army General Staff was diffuse, with the position of the Army Commander, a left-over from Versailles, being occupied by Hitler in '41.

I would also challenge the claim that "historical scrutiny" has shown the German Officer system (which I suspect to be the thrust of your criticism of "The German General Staff") to be inferior.   Although I think you are correct in pointing out that certain German commanders "padded" their exploits in their memoirs (Guderian and Manstein come to mind) their record of operational success throughout the war indicates that the Germans had some aspects of command and staff planning figured out.

Even when hamstrung by Versailles restrictions, the overall product of the German Officers Corps was superior to the average product coming out of a British or French system.   History gives us the "proof in the pudding".   The German Army possessed numerous commanders who very capabely commanded from beginning to end.   They went to war prepared, and even in 1945, commanding shattered remnants that could scarcely be called a professional fighting force, were able to fight cohesive tactical battles.

Meanwhile, the Allied armies were plagued with their own "peace dividend".   America was shackled by isolationism and the traditional apathy to the military in American society.   Britain was concerned with the small level defence of it's far-flung colonies while France occupied itself with big guns and concrete enclosures.   Canada had its amateurish nature reinforced by the Militia politics and McNaughton's poor peacetime fascination with subjects irrelevant to preparing for war.   The Soviet's lost all aspects of the professional reforms of Tukachevski when Stalin purged most of the Officer Corps in the late 1930's.

As a result, while the Germans had a solid core of professional officers that were prepared to fight a war, the Allied countries, which insisted on amateur notions of the military profession, were essentially forced to start from scratch and build professional leadership the hardway at the cost of blood.   Almost every Army experienced extreme turbulence at all levels of high command due to the fact that a poor professional atmosphere in the 1920s and '30's led to an entire generation of officers being unsuited to fighting and winning wars.

When Guderian, who was horrified by the plan came to Hitler, asking why Germany needed to launch an offensive at all, and pointing out that if an offensive HAD to be launched doing it into the teeth of the Kursk salient was madness, Hitler responded, "I know, the thought of it turns my stomach."   Nevertheless, perhaps remembering how his meddling had led to Stalingrad the previous year Hitler did not interfere, save to reccomend that the offensive wait for the new Panther and Tiger tanks to arrive in greater numbers.

So the Kursk offensive proceeded, ran headlong into line after line of prepared numerically superior defenders, resulted in the largest tank battle in history and became the swan-song of the German panzer arm.   In that battle died all German hopes for stabilizing the Eastern front.   It is often said that Stalingrad determined Germany would not win the war, but Kursk determined that Germany would lose it.   A great deal of that responsibility rests squarely on the shoulders of the German General Staff, whose fabled "genius for war" must be seen as the fiction it was.

I've read the situation a little differently.   Manstein, commander of Army Group South, urged an immediate counteroffensive aimed at the Kursk Salient as a follow up to his "counterstroke" at Kharkov which smashed a brazen Soviet Army that thought the German were through after Stalingrad.   Hitler overruled the decision for the counteroffensive on account of his desire to get his new wonder weapons into the field (Elefants, Tigers, etc).   As a result, the offensive was delayed for two months.

The Soviets, not being dummies themselves, figured out the obvious and turned the Kursk Salient into a ring of steel.   When the Germans did the obvious and attacked (against the protests of Guderian and Manstein) they flung troops into heavily prepared positions.

This would be another example of the "Hitler-Meddling" theory.   I think it is given a little too much weight due to the fact that it derives from the works of Generals who, quite frankly, lost the war and may have "padded" their memoires.   However, I do think that the "Hitler-Meddling" theory is valid, as it shows how disfunctional the civil-military relations in Nazi Germany were.   Ideology replaced sound military approaches to many problems and inferior Officers were selected to high command for political grounds (Jodl being the obvious example).   As Huntington points out in The Soldier and the State, the professional nature of the German Army was corrupted due to this relationship and as a result, professional performance duly suffered.

 

[dutchie]

Seeing how "Blitzkrieg" is a myth I don't see how it can be invented by Guderian. - which is why I put invented in quotation marks.However, Guderian is widely attributed to 'inventing' Blitzkrieg.

The French Army had more troops, heavier tanks (and more of them), and was entrenched in one of the most extensive and intricate defence systems ever constructed. - The French were beat when Germany decided to invade via Holland and Belgium, side stepping the 'inpenetrable' Maginot Line. The ability to go around the defences like this would not have been possible without motorized transport.  This is NOT an example, however, of 'Blitzkrieg', or what is commonly referred to as such, but the near-defeat of Russia is.

Blitzkrieg is more a result of technological advances in tank design than some mystical genius masterplan of the German's (as indicated by Infanteer's post).

I disagree.  Until the later models of the PzKmpfWgn Mark IV armed with the long barrelled 75mm gun....  - I think you may have missed my point. What I meant was not that German armour was superior, but that Armour in any form allowed the rapid armoured thrusts indicative of early German success (I won't refer to it as 'Blitzkrieg' for your sake, Infanteer). It was the spearhead thrusts, rear attack, and redeployment,  all supported by close air support and indirect fire that made the Germans so successful. Again, however, none of this would have been possible without incompetence and indecision by the Allies.

Another fact that jumps out from looking at the successful campaigns in France and early North Africa is that the true strength in the German Army was their Anti-Tank Guns. - agreed.

I think that another note of historical relevance that deals with German armour addresses a key weakness of the German military; production...... - excellent points, and I fully agree.

Thus, in their successful campaigns the Germans were able to use their "mystical genius"  to out maneuver their opponents in time and space with relatively technologically inferior forces. - this is exactly what I meant when I stated, "Blitzkrieg is more a result of technological advances in tank design than some mystical genius masterplan of the German's",  "By the time the Allies reacted, the battle was over." and "can usually overcome numerical superiority."

When you refer to Hitler's decisions to "hold at all costs", I think you are correct in pointing out how it contributed to overall German failure. - I would also refer to his orders to redeploy whole Panzer Corps' (really not much more than Divisions in most cases) 'whilly-nilly' against all direction from his General staff, and in particular against the Commanders on the ground (except usually Paulus).

However, I wouldn't characterize the Soviets at the Stalingrad to be a an "almost beaten, severely diminished force".  - the Russians themselves told the Stavka that 'the city might still not fall'....they were left, as you know, with just a sliver on the west bank of the Volga, one division was cut off in the industrial district in the north, the landing area for the ferry was under direct machine gun, mortar, and artillery fire, and they couldn't resupply ammo or rations. The artillery was pulled back to the East bank, and command elements were often cut off from their troops. Zhukov told Stalin that any meaningful attack from the enemy would probably result in total loss of all forces on the west bank. That is when Hitler redirected forces to other sectors, and failed to provide clothing for a second winter in Russia.......

I think its use in a study of operational doctrine and tactical employment of maneuver forces would be quite limited. - overly political for his purposes, yes, but it is still the most complete history of the Third Reich. It also has would give the reader the basis of Hitler's disdain for the General staff and the Army in general. This understanding would be useful when dissecting his operational and tactical decisions.

 

[Infanteer]

The French were beat when Germany decided to invade via Holland and Belgium, side stepping the 'inpenetrable' Maginot Line. The ability to go around the defences like this would not have been possible without motorized transport.   This is NOT an example, however, of 'Blitzkrieg', or what is commonly referred to as such, but the near-defeat of Russia is.

Actually, the German thrust by Army Group B into Holland and Belgium was a diversion (I think you are referring to the original Schlieffen Plan).   The real thrust was through the Ardennes by Army Group A.   Motorized transport wasn't required to "get around" the Maginot Line (it was a heavy forest) but motorized transport was required to push through the breakthrough at Sedan and exploit the fact that they had outflanked the French and British forces.   As such, it would be a perfect example of "Blitzkrieg".   The point I am trying to make is that "Blitzkrieg" as a representative of a high-speed "lightning war" of tanks and planes was historically false.   It was the application of operational techniques and ideas on doctrine that were the driving point for success in the campaign against France.   Ironically, you'd probably find alot of the same techniques and doctrine used in 1870-1871 when the Germans, surprise of surprises, beat the French.

The German operational techniques employed in the breakthrough and exploitation were only minorly dependent on mechanization (ie: having the right tool for the job) but the main reason for the success goes deeper then that.   Technology is not absolute, it is only relative to the technical advantage one has over an opponent ie: If you are at "3" and your opponent is at "1" in technological levels, then their is a clear advantage (The British against the Zulu or the Mahdi would be a good example; although these examples show where relying totally on technology at the outset gets you).   When the technological correlation is more level; say a 1:1 or a 1:1.5, then you have to use other methods to defeat your opponent.   This is what the Germans did in their early campaigns that are carry the erroneous baggage that comes with the term "Blitzkrieg".   They attacked the cohesion and morale of a French Army that placed all its eggs in one basket and subsequently came up short.   I think Len Deighton gives us a good look at the notion of the nature of "Blitzkrieg" as a theoretical system of ideas (a paradigm) as opposed to a technological wrecking machine when he refers to Guderian's breakthrough on the Meuse at Sedan:

"Guderian now had to make a decision of such vital importance that it was more a strategic one than a tactical one.   His three armoured divisions had ripped a large gap in the French defences.   To what extent should he consolidate and guard that crossing place?   Should he fight the big reserves, which anyone could guess must be moving northward to the gap?   Should he batter at the broken edges of the armies on his flanks and thus "roll up" those defenders?   Guderian did none of these things.   He paused only to make sure the somewhat mauled Grossdeutchland Regiment and 10 Pz. Div. were in possession of the high ground at Stonne, a few miles due south of his crossing place.   Guderian took 1 Pz. Div. and 2 Pz. Div., and disregarding all the theories of war, moved due west, away from the battle areas, across the flat open land of the Aisne and the Somme."

Conversely, I would argue that on the Strategic level the attack against Russia was the very opposite of German doctrine.   Despite great operational successes (yes, this was "blitzkrieg") with grand envelopments (Minsk, Smolensk, Kiev, Vyazma) these were not decisive in the fact that they did not surround and destroy the Soviet Army.   Instead, they were trying to fight a Soviet strength in its manpower reserves.   As well, strategically, the German war effort was divided.   The small armoured resources of the German Army were parcelled out amongst the three Army Groups and there was not one, but three main efforts (Leningrad, Moscow, and the Donbas).   This violated principles that the German Army had long since enshrined in their doctrine.   I believe both Guderian and Manstein touch upon this in their post-war writing; the fact that they state they objected to the overall German strategy might be an example of the "padding" discussed earlier.   Who knows.

this is exactly what I meant when I stated, "Blitzkrieg is more a result of technological advances in tank design than some mystical genius masterplan of the German's",   "By the time the Allies reacted, the battle was over." and "can usually overcome numerical superiority."

I'm confused.   You state that Blitzkrieg is not grounded upon some mythical "masterplan" but rather on "technological advances".   I argued against that statement on the grounds that the advant of the dive bomber and the tank were irrelevant to German doctrine; which was theoretically complete in the trenches of the Western Front.

The key of the technology was not its overall effectiveness, but how it was incorporated into the organizational structures and doctrine of the German Army.   In the case of the Germans, armour and close air were incorporated under the idea of the combined arms assault.   This did not require a big adjustment as the Germans had developed this with the Stosstruppe tactics in WW I, which used combined arms of Pioneers, Infantry, Mortars, Flamethrowers and precision artillery to attack at specific points of the enemy trench system.   Ultimately, I believe that it was this approach to the idea of combined arms doctrine withing the paradigm of the German operational art that led to the success of Blitzkrieg.

the Russians themselves told the Stavka that 'the city might still not fall'....they were left, as you know, with just a sliver on the west bank of the Volga, one division was cut off in the industrial district in the north, the landing area for the ferry was under direct machine gun, mortar, and artillery fire, and they couldn't resupply ammo or rations. The artillery was pulled back to the East bank, and command elements were often cut off from their troops. Zhukov told Stalin that any meaningful attack from the enemy would probably result in total loss of all forces on the west bank. That is when Hitler redirected forces to other sectors, and failed to provide clothing for a second winter in Russia.......

Okay, you are referring to the Soviets at the tactical level within the actual city.   However, I don't think the fate of the Soviet Union and its armies was dependant on the Soviets holding out at Stalingrad.   They had plenty of more men to throw into that inferno if they needed to (as shown by the 200,000-300,000 men they threw away at Ryzev at the same time).

overly political for his purposes, yes, but it is still the most complete history of the Third Reich. It also has would give the reader the basis of Hitler's disdain for the General staff and the Army in general. This understanding would be useful when dissecting his operational and tactical decisions.

I guess if you wanted to look at Hitler's role in the operational employment of German forces and his relationship with Army command, fair enough.   However, it is a large book and much of the information would be extraneous to a college paper that would focus on the development of German Operational techniques.

 

[T.I.M.]

As you point out the German High Command was a tangled mess.  I find it easier to forgo extensive tables and line diagrams and simply say "The General Staff" when talking about the strategic planning level of the German military.

I would also challenge the claim that "historical scrutiny" has shown the German Officer system (which I suspect to be the thrust of your criticism of "The German General Staff") to be inferior.   Although I think you are correct in pointing out that certain German commanders "padded" their exploits in their memoirs (Guderian and Manstein come to mind) their record of operational success throughout the war indicates that the Germans had some aspects of command and staff planning figured out.

Infact that was not my point.  The Germans had a deserved reputation for tactical expertise, and on the lower end of the operational scale were quite capable of elegant and effective plans and operation.  In no way was I questioning the deserved reputation of German battlefield commanders, or the professionalism of their officer corps.

Where my issue with the German military legend lies is area where Operational Art blurs into Grand Strategy.  There the Germans were singularly inept.  This was not simply a trait of Hitler's Germany - many of the failings of Germany in WWI can also be laid be at the feet of the General Staff.  This was due not to insufficient training or unprofessional officers, but to basic and fundamental flaws in German military thought that were never identified and never corrected.

Even in WWI German strategic planning failed to grasp the relationship of of objectives to resources, a phenomenon that carried into WWII.  Thus time and again the Germans would undertake well constructed, well executed operational plans, that nevertheless were irresponsible given the overal strategic situation.  The end result being that the German army won many battles, but still was unable to get appreciably closer to its strategic goals.  This attitude of operations before strategy was so pervasive it was never questioned, and the German military went to its death without conducting systematic strategic planning (some historians think that all serious strategic planning by the military stopped in the late 1930's).  This is a gross staff error, and one that cannot just be brushed aside.

It's one of many.  The fact is that the German Generals bear as much, or more, blame as  Hitler for the military defeat of Nazi Germany.  That their army performed superbly on the tactical level, and the lower end of the operational scale cannot be denied - but what is also increasingly apparent as the myths spun by post-war Generals intent on ingratiating themselves into NATO finally dissolve is that its tactical abilityl was inversely proportional to its strategic ability.   And it is strategy, not tactics, that ultimately wins wars.

An excellent book that deals with this issue is "Inside Hitler's High Command" by Geoffrey P. Megargee.  I don't have it on me, so I can't quote it in full, but we have a copy of it back in the unit library and I'd reccomend it to anyone who considers themselves a WWII buff.

 

[T.I.M.]

I've read the situation a little differently.   Manstein, commander of Army Group South, urged an immediate counteroffensive aimed at the Kursk Salient as a follow up to his "counterstroke" at Kharkov which smashed a brazen Soviet Army that thought the German were through after Stalingrad.   Hitler overruled the decision for the counteroffensive on account of his desire to get his new wonder weapons into the field (Elefants, Tigers, etc).   As a result, the offensive was delayed for two months.

Forgive the second post, but I don't like mixing different rebuttals together.

The General Staff's plan for Kursk bore no relation to Manstein's earlier proposed March counter offensive.   Manstein in fact wanted to attack south from Karkhov and attempt to trap the southern portion of the Red Army against the Black Sea.   It was in fact OKW, not Hitler, who overruled him, putting forth instead the plan for a direct attack on the Kursk salient, to the north of Karkhov.

We now know that Hitler gave the General Staff uncharacteristic freedom in developing this plan, and so the fact that they managed to bungle it so spectacularly is entirely their fault, and goes a long way to explaining his utter (and justified) dissilusionment with them later in the war.   The delays from May into June were initiated by the General Staff, and it was only the final delay into July that Hitler had any hand in.   By then the issue had long been decided.   The Russians had been fortifying the salient since April (they had initially held off because they were certain it was a trick - it was simply too obvious), and while the additional delay of another three weeks did not help the Germans given the underwhelming performance of the new "wonder weapons", it is hard to see how going earlier would have markedly changed the eventual outcome.   It was an attack into a place where the enemy was numerically superior, prepared, with no possibility of surprise, and the only prospect that of a grinding head to head battle of attrition.   Simply put, it was more like a WWI offensive than WWII armoured warfare.   That it utterly ignored the limits of the German military machine and the shifting strategic balance in an attempt to take an operational objective of only modest import made an uninspired plan into a criminal blunder.

No, responsibility for the Kursk disaster lies squarly at the feet of the German General Staff.   It is not a failure that can be blamed on Hitler.

 

[Infanteer]

Thanks for the response TIM.  I apologize for mistaking your argument for a critique of the German Officer Corps; I thought you were saying "A" when you were saying "B".

I think you've got it right on alot of points.  Not to nit-pick, but with regards to operational level blurs into Grand Strategy.  You're missing the level of Strategy (Or perhaps we're defining the same thing with different terms).  The way I understand it is that Grand Strategy involves using the political, economic, military, and social factors of the state to protect the national interest.  This is done through the policies of statesmen and war and military power is only one factor of this.  The Strategic dimension is the art of winning wars according to the ends, ways, and means defined at the Grand Strategic level.  Further down, the operational level is the art of winning wars through victory in campaigns while the tactical level is the art of winning campaigns through battles.

It is the way in which a state mixes the political and the military involvement in these four areas that defines civil-military relations.  I think you are right when you point out that the Germans characteristically failed at this throughout the 20th century.  However, I would caution that many of the factors of civil-military relations are national in character and are out of the scope of this context.  Although it is important when discussing operational doctrine to reflect on the interchange that played out with higher levels, I think it is unfair to judge the operational art of the Germans through a lens that is coloured by other factors.  Just because the Germany was dominated by dictators and launched itself into hopeless two-front wars (twice) does not mean that the German war experience is fundamentally flawed (I think you understand this, I just wanted to clarify).

 

[T.I.M.]

Just because the Germany was dominated by dictators and launched itself into hopeless two-front wars (twice) does not mean that the German war experience is fundamentally flawed (I think you understand this, I just wanted to clarify).

Well, no, I don't agree.   Yes, much of that was the fault of the political leadership, but the military leadership was heavily intertwined in that process.   The Strategic miscalculations or the High Command in WWI and WWII were in large part responsible for supporting poor decisionmaking made by the political leadership.

In WWI Moltke can be directly credited with comitting Germany to a two front war.   In last minute negotiations on the eve of war, the British ambassador suggested that were Germany not to attack France, Britain would not declare war, and would pressure France not to attack Germany.   The Kaiser was ecstatic at this potential for a way out, and told Moltke to cancel the mobilization against France and instead focus on Russia.   Moltke refused, threatening to resign if the Kaiser persisted in his demands.   France had to be attacked, Moltke maintained; not to follow through on the Schlieffen plan was to cripple the mobilization process and invite disaster (he was wrong, there were indeed workeable plans to redirect the mobilization against Russia, detailed after the war by the General in charge of mobilization who was furious with Moltke for suggesting otherwise).   But Molke prevailed, and so Germany launched herself into a two front war that any reasoned strategic analysis would have led Moltke to do his utmost to try to avoid.

Prior to Barbarossa OKH conducted an assessment of Russian military strength and that was complete fantasy.   Attached to this was an assessment of Germany's offensive potential across Russia that ignored key areas (like logistics) or just assumed away what should have been realized to be serious potential problems.   It was all quite literally pulled from the air and based on wild assumptions, with barely a hint of decent staff work.   But this assessment was part of the body of evidence of an easy victory ("Easier than France," his Generals told him) that convinced Hitler to go forward with the ill-fated invasion of the Soviet Union.   The decision was Hitlers but the High Command supported, even encouraged it (their statements to the contrary after the war are in many cases bald-faced lies, as studies of the records now show).   Had they stopped to consider the immense gaps in their knowledge and the potential problems that might arise they could at least have taken steps to mitigate against them, even if they could not sway Hitler to a different course.   They did not try to do either.

These are just a couple of examples in a long line of poor strategic thinking on the part of the German military establishment.   That this establishment was part of dictatorial political system that maginfied its flaws certainly didn't help - but it doesn't excuse it either.

I'm not arguing that Operationally the system was fundamentally flawed (though strategic flaws inevitably impacted upon operations - see Kursk).   What I AM arguing that on the Strategic level the German military suffered from some deep and abiding flaws, inherant to the attitudes and training of its officer corps and the nature of its military thought, and that these flaws were NOT imposed upon it simply due to the unreasoning demands of a single madman.   So in that regard I do think that on a strategic level the German military experience in both world wars suffered from fundamental flaws.

 

[Infanteer]

I understand and agree with you on most of the points related to your last thread.   I can see we agree with the "meddling-Hitler" myth.

The arguement is slowly leaving the realm of military employment of doctrine (Gateguard's paper topic) and moving to national employment of strategy (which may be out of the context).

I guess the next logical question would be how did the Germans do so well in their campaigns up to Barbarossa?   What went wrong with regards to the level where "operations and strategy collide", as you put it.   Did they just fluke out in Poland, Norway, France, and the Balkans?

I have my own thoughts, I'm interested to see what you think.

 

[Infanteer]

Well, no, I don't agree.   Yes, much of that was the fault of the political leadership, but the military leadership was heavily intertwined in that process.   The Strategic miscalculations or the High Command in WWI and WWII were in large part responsible for supporting poor decisionmaking made by the political leadership.

I will disagree here.   I fail to see how strategic miscalculations in WWII, or any war for that matter, are directly related to the theoretical approaches of operations and tactics that military approaches a specific conflict with.   I don't see how High Command failure is relevent to Guderian's operational maneuver at Sedan.   Likewise; the fact that Trudeau did his best to shirk from NATO responsibilities and reduce commitment levels in Germany does not affect the way in which Canada would fight.   Sure, decisions like this affect where the brigades would be employed but not how they would.

We are discussing two very different concepts here; one is a theoretical view of military force and its tactical and operational employment and the other is historical levels of civil-military relations and their effects on the employment of armed force.

 

[T.I.M.]

Well, the Germans were exceedingly cautious in the invasion of Poland, perhaps too much so.  Being the first major combat venture they analyzed and assessed it to death, to the point where they were actually too pessimistic.  Similarly the High Command did not expect a quick victory over France, and the intial plans it presented to Hitler were highly unsatisfactory (added to this was the fact that a copy of the plan fell into Allied hands).  It was then that von Manstein tabled a new plan for an offensive through the Ardennes.  I should point out that a sizeable percentage of the High Command opposed Manstein's plan, and had it not been for Hitlers support it is questionable whether it would have been approved.

The plan itself was a massive gamble that while history records as a stunning success actually came dangerously close to failure at multiple points, rescued at these critical junctures by relatively small-scale tactical actions by batallions and regiments, and the independant success of agressively led divisions.  The High Command had not expected such success and initially considered the six-week victory something of a miracle.  A miracle that had happened more in spite of, rather that because of, its efforts.

And then the High Command began to believe its own hype.  It caught victory fever, and began looking for shortcuts to difficult tasks.  One was an amphibious invasion across the English Channel.  The High Command was terrified of an invasion of Britain, since it had conducted no planning for the eventuality that it might actually find itself at the Channel with France prostrate behind it, but Britain defiant before it (if you look at the actual plans they cobbled together for Sealion they're a joke - totally unworkeable).  So it did followed a path of reasoning that to many in the High Command seemed completely rational.  Britain could not win on her own, so she must be holding out for allies to come to her aid.  If Britain's potential allies could be destroyed, then Britain would be forced to come to terms, sparing them the risk of an invasion.  The Soviet Union was a potential ally of Britain. . .  From there followed an assumption that to us now looks like lunacy: Russia would be easier to defeat that trying to fight Britain outright, and would be the best way to drive Britain to the negotiating table.  That this happened to co-incide and support Hitler's own plans for Liebensraum and was exactly the kind of thing he wanted to hear led to a marriage of strategic miscalculations made in hell.

The fact is these strategic miscalculations were always present, often manifesting as poor contingency planning, and a lack of foresight or consideration of the bigger picture.  However until Barbarossa ablility at the tactical and operational levels had served to mitigate, or at least defer the effects of these flaws, but the flaws were still there.  It was the vastness of Russia that was most unforgiving to the saving graces of superior tactics and brilliant operational manuevers, and made success or failure a strategic affair from which the High Command could no longer hide.

 

[T.I.M.]

I will disagree here.   I fail to see how strategic miscalculations in WWII, or any war for that matter, are directly related to the theoretical approaches of operations and tactics that military approaches a specific conflict with.   I don't see how High Command failure is relevent to Guderian's operational maneuver at Sedan.

Never said it was.

My point was simply to address the specific statement: "Hitler was a poor military strategist.   Any success of his plans (militarily) was due to the excellence of his General Staff. . ."

I stongly disagree with this, for the reasons previously stated.   To wit: the General Staff sucked.

I basically picked a single statement I disagree with out of a larger argument and excessively epanded my point.    


Now that doesn't directly address the larger point at hand - that being the development of Blitzkrieg - though it does have some tertiary relevance.   As I think has been mentioned German military did not formally developed any "blizkrieg" doctrine at the start of WWII.   Rather it was something formulated for general consumption and applied at lower levels, or through a gradual evolution of existing doctrines.   The High Command stumbled into it as a formed thought after the fact, and used in retrospect to justify victories it actually didn't quite understand how it had achieved.

This goes some way to explaining its spotty history of applying the principles of "blitzkreig" through the course of WWII (Kursk!).   With an improper understanding of how previous success had been achieved (basically by tossing its strategic plans aside), the High Command was routinely unable to replicate that success.   After all, had its own plans and staff processes been followed in France 1940, WWII would likely have degenerated into a second WWI.   Of course the High Command was never going to admit this, and a lack of any serious strategic review never forced it to do so.

 

[pbi]

Right, then. Skipping smartly backwards, time for a jolly good histo-geek rant:

In Poland, the forces opposing the Germans were of low calibre, and combined with the surprise nature of the attack (although looking back, it shouldn't have been a surprise), the Polish Army had no chance. The Polish Cavalry charged Panzers on horseback in some cases.

I just wanted to comment on the amazing longevity of this apocryphal tale. IIRC, this story was actually first propagated by Italian journalists brought   after the fact to the scene of an engagement in which a Polish Cavalry Brigade had suffered heavy casualties, allegedly against German tanks. This military folly, the German hosts were quick to point out to the paparazzi, merely displayed the laughable backwardness of the Poles who stupidly thought they could defeat armour with lances and sabres. Of course, the romantic hoplessness of it fitted well with the current Allied propaganda about the Poles and seems to have survived quite well, like its twin: "The Polish Air Force was destroyed on the ground".

This doesn't really make much sense for several reasons. First of all, the Poles were not stupid or "backward". They were extremely brave and talented fighters at the lower levels, and on a number of occasions gave the German invaders at least a bloody nose and on some occasions a good kick in the ***. Sadly, none of these were sufficient to turn the tide of strategic imbalance that they faced. As for being backward, the Poles were the first country in Europe to put an all-metal monoplane fighter into service, and by 1939 had developed (but not fielded) a new main battle tank prototype (similar to the US Christie or Soviet BT series of vehicles) known as 10TP. 10TP, although never proven in battle, would likely have given a respectable account of itself if handled correctly. We will never know.

Second, the Poles were quite familiar with mobile warfare, and with the application of armor to mobile operations. They had fought a very mobile war against the Bolsheviks that ended with an amazing last-ditch victory outside Warsaw, and an embarassing loss of territory for the Reds. Both sides employed tanks, although the Poles were considerably outnumbered. The Poles posessed about 1200 AFVs of various types in September 1939, organized into two Cavalry Mech Bdes (10 BKM and Warszawa BKM), a number of independent armoured battalions and squadrons, as well as in the organic tank or amoured car squadrons of   the 13 Cavalry Bdes. There were also a number of heavily armoured "Pociag Pancerni" or armoured train units, some of which had organic tanks carried on rail cars. IIRC, at least one of these armoured train units successfully defeated a German armoured attack, since its armour and its guns were considerably heavier than those of the opposition.

Third, in my opinion the Poles probably understood anti-armour warfare, at least as well as most other European nations in 1939. Although their re-equipment program was not completed in September 1939, they had fielded a number of very good modern 37mm AT guns as well as 40mm AA guns, both of which were drawn by trucks or armoured prime movers. Both of these systems could be used to good effect against German armour. A Cavalry Brigade normally included an AT battery and sometimes an AA battery. It is extremely unlikely that the Poles suddenly forgot all their training and began behaving stupidly. After all, the Poles knew very well that Germany was their enemy. The Poles had fought the Germans by proxy in three uprisings in Silesia in the 1920s and regarded them as a threat (as the Germans equally regarded the Poles). They had been preparing for the German invasion since the spring of 1939 (despite the interference of the British and French who feared Polish mobilization would provoke the Germans...)

So, I think the perception of stupid but brave Poles pointlessly charging Panzers is probably wrong. However, there is an incident that could have provided a factual basis. In the opening days of the war, the 18th Uhlans (Grudziadz) were engaged against German infantry advancing into Western Poland near the village of Krojanty. Although they fought most of their engagements as mounted rifles ("dragoon" tactics) encountering a German infantry element in the open, they overran it (as Russian cavalry did later in WWII). As they completed their charge, the Uhlans ran into armoured vehicles that were either a) the APCs of the dismounted infantry (not so likely that early in the war) or b) an armoured unit moving to counterattack(IMHO more likely). The charging squadrons were in disarray following their assault, took heavy casualties, and withdrew.

The entire Polish Campaign is IMHO still viewed to a great extent through the lenses of both German and Allied wartime propaganda. I have read everything I could find on it over the years, and I find it a fascinating campaign, if for no other reason than it provides an object lesson in the divergence between pop history and facts.  Cheers.