Building Better Officers (merged)

[Journeyman]

You cannot make war safely but no dead general has ever been criticised so you have that way out always.

Perhaps we need to see the occasional General, dead on operations......

    :dunno:   

    ^^
...added because I'm not overly concerned

 

[Edward Campbell]

Maybe ...

But being KIA will not make one immune to unjustified criticism nor will it guarantee that one is remembered.

Brig John Lawson ~ killed in Hong Kong in 1941.
Just recently I had to remind the most senior members of one regiment that Col Geoff Parker was not the highest ranking officer of his Regiment killed in action ...  :not-again:

MGen Malcolm Mercer ~ killed at Mount Sorrel, Belgium in 1916.
And John Lawson wasn't the highest ranking Canadian killed in action.

 

[Old Sweat]

Maybe ...

But being KIA will not make one immune to unjustified criticism nor will it guarantee that one is remembered.

There were two other Canadian brigadiers killed in action in the Second World War - JN Lane, the CRA of 4th Canadian Armoured Division, and EL Booth, the Comd of 4th Armoured Brigade. Some of you may recall that Booth had been found sleeping* on the floor of his tank while his brigade was attempting unsuccessfully to advance down the Caen-Falaise Road in Phase 2 of Totalize. He was killed on 14 August in Operation Tractable when his tactical headquarters drove at right angles to the axis of advance until it encountered some German anti-tank guns. Why he was not fired immediately after the Totalize incident still baffles me. He was a menace who was grossly over-promoted.

* An euphenism for passed out drunk.

 

[GnyHwy]

Only read the exec summary, but this is not much different that what we already do.  Is it a necessary evil?  Maybe, but I don't think so.  We do the same thing with NCMs too.  The big pitfall I see is if the operational and enterprise staff stovepipe their own efforts to avoid friction with each other.

If they don't stovepipe, then you have two different cultures and priorities constantly in friction with each other, which is good in my eyes, but very bad in other peoples eyes; especially when they have an agenda.

This is philosophy of picking your horses for their end position and guiding them through the necessary hoops to get there.  I don't necessarily subscribe to this, mostly because you are creating quasi-knowledgeable (theory and classroom, but no practical application) leaders at best , but it is a fairly simple time appreciation if you think about it.  If you want some to be a 4 star by the age of 55, add up the prerequisite positions needed prior and you'll probably come up with the person needing to be a LCol around the age of 30.

 

[Navy_Pete]

Not sure about the other elements, but this sounds similar to what we already do in the navy, with MARS as the operators and the NTOs and Logs as the support trades.

To be really good at whatever your trade is you need a solid understanding of the needs of the other two.  Not sure about logs, but they've recently promoted some engineers up to RAdm, and are increasingly filling some senior operational type billets with engineers as well (by changing them to purple type jobs).

Again, not sure about the various american elements, but at least in the USN there isn't a good comparison between the trades, as they are much more specialized then we are (ie they have techs dedicated to a single piece of equipment, vice ours that maintain a suite, and their officer corp on a ship are all MARs, with the senior NCMs providing the technical expertise for navigation, engineering, etc).

The only way I can see this actually working for them is to completely overhaul their occupation structures and how they generally do business, which is probably not too likely to ever happen.  Nice to see someone can get paid for writing utter drivel though.  Wonder if I could somehow translate all my crap postings here into internet dollars somehow? ;D

 

[tomahawk6]

Unfortunately selection to general officer is somewhat political at BG and MG,but becomes very political at the 3 and 4 star ranks.Until selection to general officer an officer works in his branch and staff assignments.This is felt to mold a future leader with varied assignments.

 

[pbi]

I suspect that the Israeli's are probably closest to training for the next war.....they know they are going to have one periodically....

IIRC their last foray into Lebanon proved exactly the opposite: a decade or more of focus on limited security operations (anecdotally...maybe others here have references...) found the IDF sadly lacking against a surprisingly capable and well-prepared enemy. This prompted some serious IDF soul-searching on just what had happened to their focus and their capability set.

You start every war with what you've got, including experience and outlook.

To be a successful soldier you must know history. Read it objectively–dates and even the minute details of tactics are useless. What you must know is how man reacts. Weapons change but man who uses them changes not at all. To win battles you do not beat weapons–you beat the soul of man of the enemy man. To do that you have to destroy his weapons, but that is only incidental. You must read biography and especially autobiography. If you will do it you will find that war is simple. Decide what will hurt the enemy most within the limits of your capabilities to harm him and then do it. TAKE CALCULATED RISKS. That is quite different from being rash. My personal belief is that if you have a 50% chance take it because the superior fighting qualities of American soldiers lead by me will surely give you the extra 1% necessary.

This, to me, is the real heart of it, technocrats and "Popular Science" warriors to the contrary.  There was much, far, more intelligence and insight in Patton's character than popular wisdom and that stupid movie would ever suggest. IMHO one of his greatest traits was his understanding of people, which along with his encyclopedic knowledge of history, no doubt helped him be the commander he was.

IMHO there is a reason why a General like Hillier stands out so vividly in our military senior leadership culture and upsets so many people, for better or worse. GOFOs like him (and Dextraze) are brief splashes of bright colour on an otherwise pretty dull canvas of bureaucratic mediocrity. This has been what our system has historically produced, with a few exceptions now and then.

 

[Edward Campbell]

It seems to me that the most important part of a CF member's career ~ officer or other rank ~ is near the start.

I remain convinced that the single most important thing the military does is to train junior leaders: subaltern officers and small team leaders. That foundation training will be the firm base upon which everything that officer or soldier does ~ good and bad, all the way up to the most senior ranks ~ is built. If there is a bad CDS or your unit RSM is a disgrace then we can, almost certainly, blame it on whatever happened during the first few years of their careers, especially during their initial leadership training.

Not everyone will be or can be a leader. As many members here know, leading is hard: it is hard to lead a small team in an aircraft maintenance unit; it is hard to lead a platoon; it's hard to command a ship or a helicopter squadron or a whole brigade. Not everyone who joins can learn to lead and some of those who learn all the lessons cannot seem to apply them. The notion that everyone should be promoted to a rank (as opposed to, say, a specialist pay grade) is nonsense - some people do not, because they cannot, pass basic officer training; some people do not, because they cannot, pass junior leader training. But most people who can jump over those hurdles will find that everything else - staff college, senior leadership training, etc - is easier: not easy, just not as hard as that first, HUGE step up the ladder.

(There are a lot of things for which Paul Hellyer should be blamed and devaluing the junior leadership ranks is by far the worst thing he did. As I have explained before, his motive and the motives of the military leaders who supported him were good: he wanted to give us a pay raise that he, and our leaders knew we needed.)

So, my message is: don't worry about streaming admirals and generals, focus on training really first rate junior leaders and the rest will sort itself out.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

It seems to me that the most important part of a CF member's career ~ officer or other rank ~ is near the start.

I remain convinced that the single most important thing the military does is to train junior leaders: subaltern officers and small team leaders. That foundation training will be the firm base upon which everything that officer or soldier does ~ good and bad, all the way up to the most senior ranks ~ is built. If there is a bad CDS or your unit RSM is a disgrace then we can, almost certainly, blame it on whatever happened during the first few years of their careers, especially during their initial leadership training.

Not everyone will be or can be a leader. As many members here know, leading is hard: it is hard to lead a small team in an aircraft maintenance unit; it is hard to lead a platoon; it's hard to command a ship or a helicopter squadron or a whole brigade. Not everyone who joins can learn to lead and some of those who learn all the lessons cannot seem to apply them. The notion that everyone should be promoted to a rank (as opposed to, say, a specialist pay grade) is nonsense - some people do not, because they cannot, pass basic officer training; some people do not, because they cannot, pass junior leader training. But most people who can jump over those hurdles will find that everything else - staff college, senior leadership training, etc - is easier: not easy, just not as hard as that first, HUGE step up the ladder.

(There are a lot of things for which Paul Hellyer should be blamed and devaluing the junior leadership ranks is by far the worst thing he did. As I have explained before, his motive and the motives of the military leaders who supported him were good: he wanted to give us a pay raise that he, and our leaders knew we needed.)

So, my message is: don't worry about streaming admirals and generals, focus on training really first rate junior leaders and the rest will sort itself out.

:goodpost:

 

[tomahawk6]

The big office and minions at your beck and call,who wouldn't want that ? ;D

 

[Old Sweat]

Re our penchant for bureaucratic mediocrity PBI mentioned, I recall a couple of statements by ex-Chiefs of the Defence Staff at about the time I retired back in 1994. One said that we should have more generals, not less, as our people were so good that NATO was continually asking for more to fill the various staff posts that were being created. The other ex-CDS, or he may still have been serving, when asked to comment on the closing of NDC, replied that it wasn't that important an institution as those destined for the highest ranks really couldn't afford to take a year out of the system to attend. Thus it was a place to send those officers who might make MGen/RAdm at best. He then added [I am paraphrasing] that you could pick out the real movers and shakers by looking at their chests. They did not have a lot of ribbons, as once again they could not afford the time out of the system to go on operational tours.

I dare say events have proven both of those gentlemen mistaken in their opinions.

 

[pbi]

I dare say events have proven both of those gentlemen mistaken in their opinions.

Yes, but how utterly typical of their ilk.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Perhaps we need to see the occasional General, dead on operations......

    :dunno:   

    ^^
...added because I'm not overly concerned

Nothing is so good for the morale of the troops as occasionally to see a dead general.

    - Field Marshal Bill Slim

 

[The Bread Guy]

From a counterpoint addendum to the OP's article:

.... If we are going to be as bold with our new doctrine and its embracing of new technology, then we need to be as bold and create an institutional culture that creates officers that can handle the tempo the doctrine writers are advocating future technology will create. This is a different culture from the one we have now. We cannot continue to write glowing documents advocating an “agile” officer, yet subtly support peacetime practices which uphold bureaucratic qualities, rather than battlefield qualities, when officers come up for promotion.

To prepare the Army for the 21st Century and create the officer corps of the future, we must

- Replace the organizational model bureaucracy with a flatter more autonomous organization, including reducing the officer corps from 14.3% of the force to 3-5% of the force.
- Replace the individual personnel system with a unit personnel system. Revolve all personnel policies around a unit system, and move to an Army force structure that can be supported by a unit replacement system.
- Eliminate the “up or out” promotion system and replace it with an “up or stay” promotion system.
- Replace the specific branches, and place officers on a track or category system at the O-3 or O-4 level. Make officer management more flexible.
- Revise the officer evaluation system to involve a narrative OER on character with a periodic examination to enter the officer corps as well as attendance at Command and General Staff College.
- Revise the education system, where mid-level education is conducted earlier in an officer’s career, as well as moving to an education system that emphasizes the art of war, including the study of military history as the basis for all professionalism.
- Do away with the “all-or-nothing” retirement system.

The purpose of all of these reforms is to change the incentive system. They seek to reward strength of character, especially as manifested in a willingness to make decisions and take action, and penalize those who get by, by doing nothing controversial. It does no good to call for promoting the risk-takers when the incentives all work the other way. Once strength of character is rewarded, then loyalty to the nation, the Army, and unit can be established over loyalty to self, which is the centerpiece of management science. It is the reasoning behind the personnel system’s advocacy of the individualistic focus “be all you can be,” the belief that people must be constantly moved, promoted and several make-work opportunities exist for numerous officers to be promoted ....

 

[The Bread Guy]

1)  Merged a series of "making better officer" threads (those not focusing on RMC/university itself), so ...
2)  I could include the attached from the U.S. Congressional Research Service as very-recent (this week) food for further thought from our southern neighbours - their summary: 

Congress and the executive branch are currently considering changes to the officer personnel management system.  Some of these proposed changes would require changes to the laws, including provision enacted by the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) and the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA).

Contemporary debates over officer personnel management policy often revolve around the fundamental questions of “what type of officers do we need to win the next war?” and “what skills does the officer corps need to enable the military services to perform their missions?” These questions are implicitly oriented towards future events.  Their answers are therefore somewhat speculative.  Still, contemporary trends and military history can provide valuable insight.  Additionally, a set of broader questions can help focus the analysis:
-- What will be the key security interests and priorities of the United States in the future?
-- What conflicts will likely arise in the pursuit of these interests?
-- What opponents will we face in these conflicts?  How will they fight?
-- What military strategy will the United States employ to secure its interests?  How will we fight?
-- What knowledge, skills, and abilities must the officer corps possess to effectively carry out these roles and missions?  How do we attract and retain individuals with the necessary potential for service as officers?
-- How should the officer corps be prepared so it can effectively adapt to unforeseen crises and contingencies?
-- Given limited resources, what are the most critical areas for improvement?
-- Where should the nation accept risk?

Policymakers often have divergent answers to these questions and thus come to different conclusions about the most appropriate officer personnel management policies.  Examples of diverging views can be found in debates on the criteria for accepting or rejecting people for military service; required training and education over the course of a career; assignments to be emphasized; distribution of officers by grade; retention of experienced and talented individuals; and the criteria for selecting individuals for promotion and for separation. 

In the exercise of its constitutional authority over the armed forces, Congress has enacted an array of laws governing military officer personnel management and periodically changes these laws as it deems appropriate.  This report provides an overview of selected concepts and statutory provisions that shape and define officer appointments, assignments, grade structure, promotions,
and separations.  It also provides a set of questions that policymakers may wish to consider when discussing proposed changes to current law.

 

[a_majoor]

I was struck by the observation in "The Sling and the Stone" that American personal policy was still based on reforms introduced by Elihu Root between 1899 and 1904. I don't have a comparable date for our system, but it certainly mimics a lot of the principles of our American counterparts.

Hammes himself advocates for a "3600" assessment rather than top down assessments, and I know that several members here have mentioned more than once that a system of competitive exams should be used to determine promotions as well.

Probably the key, though, is the suggestion that we focus less on "process" and more on "product" (or outcome), and 3600 assessments and competitive exams are two possible tools for doing so.

- mod edit to fix link -

 

[daftandbarmy]

I was struck by the observation in "The Sling and the Stone" that American personal policy was still based on reforms introduced by Elihu Root between 1899 and 1904. I don't have a comparable date for our system, but it certainly mimics a lot of the principles of our American counterparts.

Hammes himself advocates for a "3600" assessment rather than top down assessments, and I know that several members here have mentioned more than once that a system of competitive exams should be used to determine promotions as well.

Probably the key, though, is the suggestion that we focus less on "process" and more on "product" (or outcome), and 3600 assessments and competitive exams are two possible tools for doing so.

- mod edit to fix link -

Just a caution around the use of civilian inspired tools like the 360, which my company administers for various clients: it ain't all it's cracked up to be.

If not used in the right way the results can be disastrous. e.g., "you're doing a lousy job so we are going to give you a 360 ... or else".
Obviously, we avoid doing assessments under those conditions.

The military already has a great leadership development culture, enshrined in the OPP process e.g., Prepare, delegate, supervise, AAR, do it again, assign increasingly challenging tasks when ready etc. Coaching and mentoring, all cool buzzwords these days, is built in already.

 

[dapaterson]

Agreed, but I think a formal evaluation by subordinates can also be effective if it is done across the board - and if it is used for development, and not in a threatening or punitive manner (as you describe). 

For example, when I am asked for work-related references, I generally provide one superior, one peer, and one subordinate.