• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

C3 Howitzer Replacement

Kirkhill said:
Going to contest the costing of the Missile as "expensive".

Is it more expensive than a Fighter Squadron or wing with replacement aircraft and long, clean runways?
Is it more expensive than all the moving parts and people associated with the gun batteries of a cannon regiment?

The cannon rounds are cheaper but how about cost of getting the round from the factory to the target?
Click to expand...
There are a lot of factors but in general, a given missile costs more than a given cannon launched round. For some missions only a missile will do so cost isn't a factor. In other situations only a round, or flurry of rounds will do, - try to do an area neutralization with missiles.

Things are changing. As we move to more and better and more survivable surveillance systems that can bring guided munitions onto point targets, the more economical missiles will become. We're currently in an in-between state. We'll also get to a point where guided munitions will become cheaper as they are mass produced (unless we continue to treat ammunition manufacturers like the pharmaceutical industry and let them charge outrageous sums for relatively cheap commodities)

The trick is to find the right time to get off of one bandwagon and climb on to the next one. Personally, IMHO, we should have climbed onto the HIMARS system a decade ago and should now also be looking for a good, small, loitering anti-armour munition system in the very near future (preferably one where the launcher system stays stable for a decade or so but the munition can be improved year-to-year).

I don't think that the age of tube artillery is dead, but I really think that the Army really needs to sit down and figure out what it wants to be and not just go out and find some crappy antique gun out there to replace the ones we have. We need a much more rational indirect fire suite of weapons.

🍻
 
FJAG said:
There are a lot of factors but in general, a given missile costs more than a given cannon launched round. For some missions only a missile will do so cost isn't a factor. In other situations only a round, or flurry of rounds will do, - try to do an area neutralization with missiles.

Things are changing. As we move to more and better and more survivable surveillance systems that can bring guided munitions onto point targets, the more economical missiles will become. We're currently in an in-between state. We'll also get to a point where guided munitions will become cheaper as they are mass produced (unless we continue to treat ammunition manufacturers like the pharmaceutical industry and let them charge outrageous sums for relatively cheap commodities)

The trick is to find the right time to get off of one bandwagon and climb on to the next one. Personally, IMHO, we should have climbed onto the HIMARS system a decade ago and should now also be looking for a good, small, loitering anti-armour munition system in the very near future (preferably one where the launcher system stays stable for a decade or so but the munition can be improved year-to-year).

I don't think that the age of tube artillery is dead, but I really think that the Army really needs to sit down and figure out what it wants to be and not just go out and find some crappy antique gun out there to replace the ones we have. We need a much more rational indirect fire suite of weapons.

🍻
Click to expand...


What I am taking from the Ukrainian experience is their ability to achieve what they have while working with the tools they have to hand - often using them in unusual, if not extraordinary ways.

Did any of our battle plans focus on eliminating tactical caches of ammunition to the extent the Ukrainians have? Or lines of communication and logistics?

Anciently all of the effort I remember was on the FEBA and meeting engagements - and beating the enemy in a straight, gentlemanly toe to toe.
 
Kirkhill said:
What I am taking from the Ukrainian experience is their ability to achieve what they have while working with the tools they have to hand - often using them in unusual, if not extraordinary ways.

Did any of our battle plans focus on eliminating tactical caches of ammunition to the extent the Ukrainians have? Or lines of communication and logistics?

Anciently all of the effort I remember was on the FEBA and meeting engagements - and beating the enemy in a straight, gentlemanly toe to toe.
Click to expand...
What was the context of your experience of this effort on the FEBA and meeting engagements? How much experience did you have? On what are you basing this impression?

You don't think that planning for the interdiction of lines of communication was an effort during the Cold War? That was a major feature of Air Land Battle. The concept of the Deep Battle has been around for some time. The identification and neutralization of specific enemy capabilities is central to the targeting effort. We tend to see targeting as Hellfire or SOF strikes on compounds, but there are HPTs and HVTs in conventional warfare.

High Value Targets (HVTs) are things that, if destroyed/neutralized etc, will affect the enemy's ability to achieve his plan. High Payoff Targets (HPTs) are those HVTs that, if destroyed/neutralized, will help us achieve our plan. So targeting enemy ammunition stores can simply be a function of assessing the enemy to determine that they are HPTs and finding the means to effectively target them. Not to take anything away from the folks doing the business right now.
 
TangoTwoBravo said:
What was the context of your experience of this effort on the FEBA and meeting engagements? How much experience did you have? On what are you basing this impression?

You don't think that planning for the interdiction of lines of communication was an effort during the Cold War? That was a major feature of Air Land Battle. The concept of the Deep Battle has been around for some time. The identification and neutralization of specific enemy capabilities is central to the targeting effort. We tend to see targeting as Hellfire or SOF strikes on compounds, but there are HPTs and HVTs in conventional warfare.

High Value Targets (HVTs) are things that, if destroyed/neutralized etc, will affect the enemy's ability to achieve his plan. High Payoff Targets (HPTs) are those HVTs that, if destroyed/neutralized, will help us achieve our plan. So targeting enemy ammunition stores can simply be a function of assessing the enemy to determine that they are HPTs and finding the means to effectively target them. Not to take anything away from the folks doing the business right now.
Click to expand...

Low rank and part timer long ago T2B. And I forgot about the Deep Battle references.

Perhaps I'm just giving the Ukrainians too much credit.
 
A twin powered 25mm towed AA gun with optics and thermals and Manpad simulators for the Reserves would be very doable right now. That would help fill the SHORAD gap and we could also produce them for Ukraine at the same time.
 
Kirkhill said:
Low rank and part timer long ago T2B. And I forgot about the Deep Battle references.

Perhaps I'm just giving the Ukrainians too much credit.
Click to expand...
Its not a zero-sum game in terms of recognizing ability/capability. The Ukrainians deserve all the credit they receive, although I think they would prefer to receive ammunition rather than credit. They are in a life and death struggle where they need to adapt. Their experience is informing our own force development.
 
TangoTwoBravo said:
What was the context of your experience of this effort on the FEBA and meeting engagements? How much experience did you have? On what are you basing this impression?

You don't think that planning for the interdiction of lines of communication was an effort during the Cold War? That was a major feature of Air Land Battle. The concept of the Deep Battle has been around for some time. The identification and neutralization of specific enemy capabilities is central to the targeting effort. We tend to see targeting as Hellfire or SOF strikes on compounds, but there are HPTs and HVTs in conventional warfare.

High Value Targets (HVTs) are things that, if destroyed/neutralized etc, will affect the enemy's ability to achieve his plan. High Payoff Targets (HPTs) are those HVTs that, if destroyed/neutralized, will help us achieve our plan. So targeting enemy ammunition stores can simply be a function of assessing the enemy to determine that they are HPTs and finding the means to effectively target them. Not to take anything away from the folks doing the business right now.
Click to expand...

Whatever else we do artillery-wise, I'm hoping we're introducing a 'Magyar' like capability. This guy's a genius ;)

https://twitter.com/x/status/1628546751677300736
 
It would be nice to harness the skills, flexibility and energy of the Reserves to do something like this. Right now we should stand up a UAV troop and AD troop at every Reserve Artillery unit and let them experiment in how to do the job using lessons from Ukraine and learning how fly, repair and adapt these type of drones/UAV's. The AD troop gets Manpad simulators and learn the basics and the field crafts associated with the job.
 
Colin Parkinson said:
It would be nice to harness the skills, flexibility and energy of the Reserves to do something like this. Right now we should stand up a UAV troop and AD troop at every Reserve Artillery unit and let them experiment in how to do the job using lessons from Ukraine and learning how fly, repair and adapt these type of drones/UAV's. The AD troop gets Manpad simulators and learn the basics and the field crafts associated with the job.
Click to expand...
That's what a military that is worried about fighting would do... In the CAF they would never be able to staff the paperwork through the right chains to get anything they came up with approved.
 
I jumped through the right hoops to get permission to have a licensed drone pilot within my training Coy fly his drone in one of our exercises last fall. It was an uphill battle to get it approved, but the imagery was really really cool.

And that fact that it's been done once means that I'll be able to get it approved again next time with a lot less effort.

:-)
 
NavyShooter said:
I jumped through the right hoops to get permission to have a licensed drone pilot within my training Coy fly his drone in one of our exercises last fall. It was an uphill battle to get it approved, but the imagery was really really cool.

And that fact that it's been done once means that I'll be able to get it approved again next time with a lot less effort.

:)
Click to expand...

You need to publish a paper of some kind on that. Seriously!
 
GK .Dundas said:
Basically an updated version of the RH 202 zwilling.
Click to expand...
Yes that was the gun I was using as inspiration. Could be pulled by a crewcab milcot. Use the GDLS 25mm Chaingun instead. Each gun detachment could have one of these and a Manpad simulator. Two gun detachments make up a Troop with a TSM and Troop Officer with their own vehicle. So 10 people, 3 vehicles, two guns and two Manpads.
The detachments learn the fieldcraft. The TSM's oversess that, the Troop Officer focuses on the integration with the Gun Battery and HQ which determines the placement and movements of the Troop. Regular Force focuses on the integration of the SHOAD into the whole AD and aviation net. Do the same with the UAV Drones, starting with one detachment and then growing it to a Troop as well. It's not like Reserve artillery is going to have any guns left by the next decade anyways (Maybe they give them the old 60mm mortars to play with). At least here Reserve Artillery can be useful.

For reference
20_mm_anti-aircraft_gun_of_the_Bundeswehr.JPEG
 
You can portee mount them on Milvardos ala technicals . Cheap,useful effective.
It would turn into a real game changer.. which probably means we'll never do it.
 
KevinB said:
And the 35mm cannon have ammunition that actually works for that role too...
Click to expand...
That would be nice, I just keeping it doable. The 35mm would bump up the tractor requirements and all the storage/stores ammunition handling. Maybe get them reactivated by the Regs as the start of their SHORAD program. GLDS can design a gun mount for the same guns used by the LAV's. This means Canadian work and dollars spent in Canada, more politically doable. It's the 75-85% solution. The footprint fits what we can expect for Armoury floor storage, vehicles, manpower and technical/maintenance support.
 
You must log in or register to reply here.

Similar threads

bossi
Real war story from Iraq (not Hollywood)
Replies
2
Views
5K
Fruss
F
Back
Top