C3 Howitzer Replacement

[FJAG]

It is not a fetish, it simply is a decent platform we have that is built domestically.

I agree in part. It was a fetish when we started down this road. The idea of rapidly deploying quick reaction forces around the world to failed state scenarios were all the rage at the turn of the century when both the Stryker and LAV III came into vogue. It's a bifurcated thing these days.

Most of the world runs Wheeled armored vehicles. So why cant we continue to do so?

That's kind of the "Johnny has a water pistol. Why can't I?" thing. One needs to have a close look at the tactical needs of the force and go with that.

I'm fully with @KevinB on the issue that heavy armoured forces need tracked IFVs. I formed that opinion on numerous live-fire battle runs with the Germans in Shilo using Leos and Marders. No one can change that belief in me.

On the other hand, I do see the utility of the LAV 6.0. IMHO while I would strongly advocate for tracked IFVs for our Latvia brigade and at least one additional brigade back in Canada I would equally argue for keeping all the LAVs to equip at least two brigades back here in Canada and further that we have at least one light brigade. I think LAV 6.0 is good and you should never throw out good. You should just ensure it is used in a way commensurate with its functions. I even feel that way about the TAPV which has an anticipated life-cycle until appx 2042 or thereabouts.

If we buy a track system then so be it. But we don't so we need to buy systems to adapt to what we have.

I'm 100% on board with a tracked IFV but not as a replacement for the LAV 6.0. As an additional system.

My understanding is that BAE is restarting production of the M119.

I saw the article last fall. Not sure if the new production ever happened. An insitu repair/refit contract for Ukraine was awarded this spring. Regardless, its a range and terminal effects issue of the 105mm projectile for me. Comparable range and effects can be obtained by 120mm mortars which , IMHO, what a battalions mortar pl should be equipped with (preferably mounted on an ACSV chassis.)

Artillery gets its strength from being able to mass its fire across a broad front. Tat's even more important in an ADO environment. Our artillery should be equipped to do that within a divisional framework.

 

[Maxman1]

I am going to disagree (again), buy 200x new M119's fit them with the same FCS as any 155 that you get. Almost none the ARes arty units are capable of maintaining and storing and moving the M777. Nor will the support units be there for them. Issue the existing units 6 guns each and buy dedicated gun tractors that aren't behemoths. (Wonder if the Roshel could make a gun tractor version?)
The rest of the guns go into preserved storage and as issues develop, pull a gun from the unit, refurbish, preserve and issue a stored one, so you cycle the fleet. This gives some depth to our artillery park.
At the same time work on the SPG and MRLS systems, a few of the ARes units get M777 if it makes logistical sense. If MRLS gets sent to a Reserves unit, let them keep 1x M119 for basic gunnery training
My guess is that a M119 buy could be done faster than most of the 155 buys as they be less of a lineup. With some effort we could push the number of newish artillery guns for the CAF up to 300+ active and stored. That allows us to support ourselves, have war stock and help our allies.

My thoughts as well, except 500 or more would seem like it would meet our needs and avoid the same issues we've had with the C3.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I saw the article last fall. Not sure if the new production ever happened. An insitu repair/refit contract for Ukraine was awarded this spring. Regardless, its a range and terminal effects issue of the 105mm projectile for me. Comparable range and effects can be obtained by 120mm mortars which , IMHO, what a battalions mortar pl should be equipped with (preferably mounted on an ACSV chassis.)

Artillery gets its strength from being able to mass its fire across a broad front. Tat's even more important in an ADO environment. Our artillery should be equipped to do that within a divisional framework.

I just don't see the units getting anything more than 1x155mm if they are lucky and far fewer gun camps and adhoc training. Fewer opportunities for Gun Commanders. Fewer rounds allocated for the year and absolutely no support to maintain them in a timely manner. I think the loss of the 105 will be the death knell for Reserve Arty units.

 

[Kirkhill]

There's only what, several hundred airports in Canada? Im sure we can generate a force pro company per, no big deal.

26 airports in the National Airport System.

Effectively one for each province and territory with a back up.

Organize them on the same terms as the Alaska Air Guard.

 

[FJAG]

I just don't see the units getting anything more than 1x155mm if they are lucky and far fewer gun camps and adhoc training. Fewer opportunities for Gun Commanders. Fewer rounds allocated for the year and absolutely no support to maintain them in a timely manner. I think the loss of the 105 will be the death knell for Reserve Arty units.

What really galls me is that this shit isn't new. We had problems with the G1 and the C3 since the mid 00s and the LCMMs have been cobbling solutions together as best that they could. That a 70-year-old gun might need replacement has been a known known for years but the army has seen fit never to allocate enough funds to address the problem. As one senior gunner told me "Thank God we had a war. It saved the artillery." But for the UOR'd M777s and the enthusiasm those brought as the first "Danger Close" missions came in they'd still be screwing around with LG1s and C3s even in the RegF.

I get your point, 100%. It was working those C1s at Meaford that made me catch the army bug and go RegF. In the numerous interviews I've done for WAFG, I've been quite surprised as to how many of the RegF I've interviewed, especially officers, got their start in the ResF. I always felt alone in that - for some reason, I was the only reservist on my 10-man Basic Arty Offr Crse.

Doing "army" is basically a hands on outdoor experience. You either like it or you walk. Making things go boom is very much a gunner thing.

I've said before that with the current authorized strength for the joint RegF and ARes army (give or take 40,000) we should be able to organize two divisions and the training and support system for that. Same for the RegF and ResF artillery strength which should let us form, give or take, eight regiments. In my mind that's 9 x six-gun batteries of 155mm tracked SPs (54 + 12 spares): 6 x six-gun batteries of 155mm LWTH M777 (36 + 10 spares); 6 x tactical batteries (FOOs, JTACs, STA - no guns); 3 x six-launcher batteries of LRPR (18 launchers + 6 spares); 6 x nine-launcher OWUAS batteries (54 launchers + 10 spares); and 3 x 12-system GBAD batteries (36 systems + 10 spares) (Note that spares include tech spares, equipment at the RCAS, and a small stock of replacements)

That's not exorbitant: 66 x 155mm SPs; 46 x 155mm M777; 24 x LRPR launchers; 64 x OWUAS launchers; and 46 x GBAD systems. A total of 182 x expensive systems and 64 x relatively cheap OWUAS launch systems. That gives each battery, RegF and ResF the equipment it trains on and would go to war with.

Live firing is essential, but much of the training can and should be done with simulation systems and sub calibre/practice munitions.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

That's all logical, but people are already working in their lives with simulations and virtual communication. They are joining the Reserve Forces to do things hands on. By all means have lot's of simulator and such. But people now want that visceral experience to feel alive and different and have something to brag about when they show up Monday morning at the office/school/work site. This is the same thing that Museums are grappling with, the old way of just having static display's is not good enough to bring people through the doors.

 

[ueo]

Singing from my hymn book.


And the doxology.


Why every group of missile throwers needs its own spotters. Sacrificial UAVs with 2 to10 x the range of the primary weapons allows the government to react immediately, without thought, buy time to think and then decide how to act.

The concept works with 60mm mortars and Maviks as well as PrSMs and 5000 km drones.

Govs think?

 

[Kirkhill]

Govs think?

Hive minds.

 

[FJAG]

That's all logical, but people are already working in their lives with simulations and virtual communication. They are joining the Reserve Forces to do things hands on. By all means have lot's of simulator and such. But people now want that visceral experience to feel alive and different and have something to brag about when they show up Monday morning at the office/school/work site. This is the same thing that Museums are grappling with, the old way of just having static display's is not good enough to bring people through the doors.

Understood. And there is no reason why they can't - even with simulation. Simulators are not just a laptop with a program. The US has an excellent M109 Paladin simulator that sits on an armoury floor and let you do all the essential drills (except drive it around) indoors. Then there are turretless driving simulators.

I was with 7th Toronto and we went out shooting twice a year for a day at Meaford and a week in either Meaford of Pet in the summer. The rest of the time (maybe ten times per year) we were doing dry deployments at Cherry Beach or at the CNE. There's no reason why you can't do that with M777s.

SPs are a bit harder but even in Toronto, the guns could be stored at Downsview and trucked up to Meaford or Borden by HET or, even left at Meaford. It's an easy bus trip from Toronto or Brantford or Guelph to Meaford for a weekend shoot. Ditto Edmonton to Wainwright and Winnipeg, Regina and Brandon to Shilo.

All of this is possible, and easily possible. One doesn't need an M119 or some such training gun. It's so much easier just to train folks in the first place on the kit that they'll take to war then to have to convert them. Just ask the ARNG and USAR. Not only does it ease training, but it means you actually have the kit when needed.

Sorry If I sound like I'm pontificating, but to me this issue just seems so obvious. Yes. Cost is an issue but the reality is Canada needs to properly arm, if for no other reason than to provide a credible deterrent. I can't see how having two dozen M777s and a couple or more hundred M119s to support a half dozen LAV battalions creates any degree of credibility. The US currently has 20 divisions both active and ARNG. If Canada fielded two we'd be in balance with our population ratios as well as our RegF to ResF ratios.

 

[FJAG]

I'll throw out one more issue that really concerns me. As an example 10th Fd Regt in Regina/Yorkton, 26th Fd Regt in Brandon/Portage La Prairie and 116 Ind Fd Bty in Kenora are combined into a gaggle called the 38th Brigade Artillery Tactical Group. The Group participated in three live fire exercises throughout the year, had deployed individuals on 19 different operational tasks including Op Palaci, Op Perseverance and Op Impact and yet the five batteries that make up this group have a total of 118 personnel on paper including 22 still in basic training. The most recent ARE available to me shows that they should have a total of 426 all ranks albeit I expect that the paid ceiling is considerably less than that.

So they do have some training guns; they're relatively close to ranges; they have operational deployment opportunities and yet five batteries (2.5 regiments) can't muster enough people to even man one ARE-based gun battery. That's a huge problem.

A gun battery is a simple thing. In the US a six-gun Paladin battery is 90 folks, an M119 battery - 87, and an M777 battery - 114. In each case its commanded by a captain.

Bn HQ, including all the FSCC and FO elements and an STA platoon, numbers at around 110 while the CSS forward support companies (Fires Bn) range from a low of 92 for an SBCT to 98 for an IBCT and 155 for an ABCT arty bn.

So a full, all-up IBCT fires bn with two M119 batteries and an M777 battery is 496 all ranks and a full-up ABCT fires bn with three Paladin batteries is 535 all ranks and an SBCT fires bn with three M777s batteries is 550.

I'll complicate the math a little more. 550 all ranks gives you an active or ARNG 18-gun M777 SBCT CS fires battalion with an STA platoon while 550 RegF all ranks in Canada gives you an 8-gun M777 regiment with an STA element. We need to question our own RegF organization but I'm relatively comfortable with the fact that 550 all ranks should allow you to man an 18 system battalion/regiment.

Do you see where I'm going with this rant?

The bottom line here isn't the type of gun we give the reserves. It doesn't matter how many live-fire exercises they get each year. The problem is that our reserve concept from the ground up is seriously out of whack. We would need three full ARE-based regiments (even if they were all authorized pay) to equal the personnel strength of one ARNG fires bn. And there is barely any friggin' equipment. Nor is there a proper dedicated maintenance system to support it. Nor is there a purpose or mission other than occasionally offer someone a deployment opportunity. And folks don't come out for the training opportunities that they are offered.

I've offered some thoughts in "Unsustainable at Any price" about the many of the reforms needed but I'll only touch on organization here.

We have 4 RegF arty regts at roughly 550 each. We also have 16 ResF fd regts of 36 batteries plus 3 independent fd batteries for a total ARE-based 3,317 all ranks (assuming my meatball math is alright). So those 17 ResF regts (grouping the three independent batteries as a "regt"), at 550 per regiment should give us just 6 full establishment regiments. Considering that we do not provide pay for the whole ARE we are probably talking 4 regiments worth of authorized reservists scattered across the country. This is where I draw the conclusion that Canada could probably, if properly organized and trained, field 8 full-establishment artillery regiments in total which coincidentally matches the doctrinal organization that the total Canadian army should be able to man i.e. 2 divisions.

Bottom line - Canada needs to reorganize its artillery (RegF and ResF) into a total of 8 regiments and equip them fully with the operational systems that they need to go to war with.

 

[PrairieFella]

I'll throw out one more issue that really concerns me. As an example 10th Fd Regt in Regina/Yorkton, 26th Fd Regt in Brandon/Portage La Prairie and 116 Ind Fd Bty in Kenora are combined into a gaggle called the 38th Brigade Artillery Tactical Group. The Group participated in three live fire exercises throughout the year, had deployed individuals on 19 different operational tasks including Op Palaci, Op Perseverance and Op Impact and yet the five batteries that make up this group have a total of 118 personnel on paper including 22 still in basic training. The most recent ARE available to me shows that they should have a total of 426 all ranks albeit I expect that the paid ceiling is considerably less than that.

So they do have some training guns; they're relatively close to ranges; they have operational deployment opportunities and yet five batteries (2.5 regiments) can't muster enough people to even man one ARE-based gun battery. That's a huge problem.

A gun battery is a simple thing. In the US a six-gun Paladin battery is 90 folks, an M119 battery - 87, and an M777 battery - 114. In each case its commanded by a captain.

Bn HQ, including all the FSCC and FO elements and an STA platoon, numbers at around 110 while the CSS forward support companies (Fires Bn) range from a low of 92 for an SBCT to 98 for an IBCT and 155 for an ABCT arty bn.

So a full, all-up IBCT fires bn with two M119 batteries and an M777 battery is 496 all ranks and a full-up ABCT fires bn with three Paladin batteries is 535 all ranks and an SBCT fires bn with three M777s batteries is 550.

I'll complicate the math a little more. 550 all ranks gives you an active or ARNG 18-gun M777 SBCT CS fires battalion with an STA platoon while 550 RegF all ranks in Canada gives you an 8-gun M777 regiment with an STA element. We need to question our own RegF organization but I'm relatively comfortable with the fact that 550 all ranks should allow you to man an 18 system battalion/regiment.

Do you see where I'm going with this rant?

The bottom line here isn't the type of gun we give the reserves. It doesn't matter how many live-fire exercises they get each year. The problem is that our reserve concept from the ground up is seriously out of whack. We would need three full ARE-based regiments (even if they were all authorized pay) to equal the personnel strength of one ARNG fires bn. And there is barely any friggin' equipment. Nor is there a proper dedicated maintenance system to support it. Nor is there a purpose or mission other than occasionally offer someone a deployment opportunity. And folks don't come out for the training opportunities that they are offered.

I've offered some thoughts in "Unsustainable at Any price" about the many of the reforms needed but I'll only touch on organization here.

We have 4 RegF arty regts at roughly 550 each. We also have 16 ResF fd regts of 36 batteries plus 3 independent fd batteries for a total ARE-based 3,317 all ranks (assuming my meatball math is alright). So those 17 ResF regts (grouping the three independent batteries as a "regt"), at 550 per regiment should give us just 6 full establishment regiments. Considering that we do not provide pay for the whole ARE we are probably talking 4 regiments worth of authorized reservists scattered across the country. This is where I draw the conclusion that Canada could probably, if properly organized and trained, field 8 full-establishment artillery regiments in total which coincidentally matches the doctrinal organization that the total Canadian army should be able to man i.e. 2 divisions.

Bottom line - Canada needs to reorganize its artillery (RegF and ResF) into a total of 8 regiments and equip them fully with the operational systems that they need to go to war with.

I can speak to 38 ATG as I work with them pretty frequently. Their big issues are two-fold, kit and communities. They are so short of serviceable guns in 38ATG that I doubt they could field a doctrinal battery if they even wanted to. Last time we did a brigade kinda-concentration, they could only find 3 guns and 1 went down mid AACFF. No guns, no training. No training, no interest.

Second problem is communities. Most of the ATG is in very small communities with large distances between neighbouring communities. They are naturally inhibited due to geography, especially since so few people have any interest in the military anymore. In this 21st century context, I doubt Kenora or Portage should even have reserve units anymore, since they will never be close to finding enough people to get them to establishment. Brandon is large enough to squeak by but they don't do nearly enough COMREL to let people know they exist. Sad fact but unless there's a war, they ain't filling up that drill hall.

Anyways, not a repudiation or rebuttal on your point, just thought I'd add some context.

 

[markppcli]

I am going to disagree (again), buy 200x new M119's fit them with the same FCS as any 155 that you get. Almost none the ARes arty units are capable of maintaining and storing and moving the M777. Nor will the support units be there for them. Issue the existing units 6 guns each and buy dedicated gun tractors that aren't behemoths. (Wonder if the Roshel could make a gun tractor version?)
The rest of the guns go into preserved storage and as issues develop, pull a gun from the unit, refurbish, preserve and issue a stored one, so you cycle the fleet. This gives some depth to our artillery park.
At the same time work on the SPG and MRLS systems, a few of the ARes units get M777 if it makes logistical sense. If MRLS gets sent to a Reserves unit, let them keep 1x M119 for basic gunnery training
My guess is that a M119 buy could be done faster than most of the 155 buys as they be less of a lineup. With some effort we could push the number of newish artillery guns for the CAF up to 300+ active and stored. That allows us to support ourselves, have war stock and help our allies.

I think it’s fundamentally flawed to suggest we should procure 200 artillery pieces that we have no intention to employ operationally, to maintain training. If the goal is to train gun drills we might as well just build mock ups of the systems in use by the reg force.

I don’t see why a reserve unit couldn’t store an m777. Infact we have lent out M777s to reserve units to run det memeber courses to build depth for deployments.


@KevinB is asking the right question:

1. What is the purpose of the Canadian Artillery and what do we want them to do? How do the reserves fit into that picture and what are their tasks.

2. Given those tasks what units get what tasks? What organization of Artillery Bty and Regiments enables those tasks.

3. What allotment of equipment allows these units to accomplish the tasks they’ve been given.


To @PrairieFella ‘s point this is why I often rant about our very silly reserve regiment structures. Portage should parade in Brandon (actually Shilo), Kenora should parade in Winnipeg. I actually disagree with the idea 26 doesn’t do enough comrel’s, I think the actual problem is that anyone with an interest in the Army knows they can join the artillery and get posted back home. No reason to do the reserves

 

[KevinB]

I think it’s fundamentally flawed to suggest we should procure 200 artillery pieces that we have no intention to employ operationally, to maintain training.

110%.
Fraud waste and abuse IMHO.

If the goal is to train gun drills we might as well just build mock ups of the systems in use by the reg force.

I don’t see why a reserve unit couldn’t store an m777. Infact we have lent out M777s to reserve units to run det memeber courses to build depth for deployments.

Any unit that has C3’s should be able to take some 777’s. If they can’t crew a full battery or if they can’t store a full Bty worth of guns if they can crew them, well that needs to be solved.

@KevinB is asking the right question:

1. What is the purpose of the Canadian Artillery and what do we want them to do? How do the reserves fit into that picture and what are their tasks.

2. Given those tasks what units get what tasks? What organization of Artillery Bty and Regiments enables those tasks.

3. What allotment of equipment allows these units to accomplish the tasks they’ve been given.

I don’t see M109’s or HIMARS being practical to store in the typical Res armories — but simulators absolutely a must.

 

[FJAG]

I can speak to 38 ATG as I work with them pretty frequently.

I was RSSO of 26th Fd back in '76-'78 at the time the two batteries - 71 in Brandon could field a four to five gun battery and 13 Bty in Portage could add one gun and a recce party. 116 in Kenora could add another gun and sometime a recce party or a small FOO party. They drew from a population base of around 65,000 in total. 26th Fd alone had about 120 all ranks on paper albeit it generally went to the field with under 70 but with six serviceable C1 howitzers.

10 Fd which comes from Regina and Yorkton - which collectively have close to 250,000 people but have competition from other units - could rarely field a three gun battery with a single FOO. It's been a weak unit for a long time.

They've all gone down significantly since then.

Converting the C1 to a C3 was a poor decision in hindsight. The extra range provides zero benefit for training. The gun did still have a residual operational role when the conversion was made in the late 1990s but unfortunately the company doing the conversion in the Netherlands - RDM - went bankrupt not long after and the IP went to another company which also went bankrupt leaving the CAF in IP lawyer limbo. Some smaller parts can be manufactured within the CAF system, but there are now a number of components that can't. It's both a dog's breakfast and so far down the army's priority list that little gets done. It is currently being handled simply by shuffling guns around as required for training while other solutions are sought.

It's one of the underlying reasons that I'm against a ResF "training" gun acquisition as it will put the purchase of any additional "operational" guns off the agenda.

Not all is lost. Indirect fires modernization was high on the last army commanders priority list but when last I had an update, both the Indirect Fires Modernization project and the Long Range Precision Fires project remained unfunded. There are some key UORs moving along for Latvia but those are limited numbers of systems for equipping Latvia and predeployment training.

On the project side, besides GBAD, there are also two other funded arty centric projects advancing. Joint Fires Modernization digitizes fires command and control and provides interoperability not only within the CAF but our allies as well. Land ISR Modernization will upgrade our CS and GS STA suite of capabilities.

 

[Maxman1]

I think it’s fundamentally flawed to suggest we should procure 200 artillery pieces that we have no intention to employ operationally, to maintain training. If the goal is to train gun drills we might as well just build mock ups of the systems in use by the reg force.

Who said anything about not deploying them operationally? The M119 has been used in Afghanistan and currently in Ukraine.

 

[markppcli]

Who said anything about not deploying them operationally? The M119 has been used in Afghanistan and currently in Ukraine.

Well @Colin Parkinson implied it when mentioning buying guns for reserve training. I don’t think we’re going to get to a point where we deploy 5 Fd as a Bg or Bde artillery contingent on their own.

If we bought 200 m119s for the artillery en masse I’d have other issues with it.

 

[FJAG]

Who said anything about not deploying them operationally? The M119 has been used in Afghanistan and currently in Ukraine.

You're conflating "have been used operationally" with "Canada has no intention to use operationally."

Technically the 105mm C3 is used operationally on avalanche control in Rogers pass. The LG-1 was used operationally in Bosnia and Kabul in 2004/5. But. The M777 is deployed operationally in Latvia and there is no plan to use either the LG-1 or C3 operationally in the future.