Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives Gets It Wrong - Tanks are Right for Afghanistan

[ruxted]

Shared in accordance with the "fair dealing" provisions, Section 29, of the Copyright Act - http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/info/act-e.html#rid-33409

  Link to Original Article on Ruxted.ca


Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives Gets It Wrong

A newly released  report by the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives requires an informed rebuttal.

Ruxted commends thye author, Prof. Michael Wallace, for presenting his views but we assert they are ill informed and will serve only to confuse Canadians.

Prof Wallace begins by presenting an erroneous assumption (that the Leopard tanks were deployed because the other Canadian vehicles are too vulnerable) as a fact.  The Leo is over there for its ability to put accurate and effective fire onto targets that were, previously, impenetrable to even the LAV III’s cannon.  The only additional protection the leopard tank provides is to its own crews but it provides superior striking power in battle.  Since Prof. Wallace missed this not so subtle distinction at the start it is not surprising that the rest of his essay misses the mark.

What Prof. Wallace fails to address is the fact that tanks are simply pieces of military hardware designed to do a particular set of jobs on the battlefield. The desire of commanders to add tanks to the toolkit is really the same desire (in a different context) of a contractor to have a range of tools to build houses. Tanks cannot win battles by themselves, but then again, neither can any piece of military hardware you care to name; only soldiers with the proper training and experience can make intelligent use of the equipment their governments provide.

Anyone who reads and believes Prof. Wallace’s dissertation on tank tactics - which even includes a reference to a Hollywood movie! – will be less well informed than he was before.  Prof. Wallace appears to believe that the Canadian Army learned nothing at all during the 65+ years it has pondered and practised tank tactics.  He is wrong.

With regard to airpower Prof. Wallace offers but fails to support a strawman: airstrikes = more Afghan civilian casualties = less support for ISAF.  As a general rule ISAF does not use airstrikes when civilian casualties are the likely outcome but, in Afghanistan, as in all new, 4th generation conflicts, it is hard for anyone – including the infantry soldier who is “up close and personal” - to identify friend and foe.  Ruxted believes that Canadian (and NATO) commanders are, constantly and consistently striving to get the job done with minimum damage – especially to innocent civilians.  Ruxted also believes that Canadians, here at home, must learn to accept that some civilian casualties are inevitable – not matter how undesirable.  It was ever thus.

The tank in Afghanistan is the main focus of Prof. Wallace’s paper.  He is rather like the preacher in an old story about the farmer who could not go to church one Sunday.  He asked his wife: “What did the preacher talk about?”  “Sin,” she replied.  “What did he say?”  “He’s against it.”  Prof. Wallace is, equally, against tanks but he appears opposed for two reasons: they are vulnerable and they create the wrong image.  “How,” Prof. Wallace wonders, “are regional development teams likely to be perceived if they are preceded by a 55-tonne mechanical monster that could pulverize their village with a single shot?”  He is, bluntly, wrong in his assessment.

Clearly Prof. Wallace knows nothing at all about the PRTs and their operations.  If he did he would know that the PRT is, normally, quite remote from the tanks – doing its work after the tanks and LAV IIIs have done theirs.

The pressing need in this particular war is to deal with insurgents who will take violent action against people and property that are in conflict with the narrow interpretation of Islam and society that they espouse.  The individual soldier on the ground can interact with the local population, identify the insurgents and protect the local people, but he can not do everything.  Insurgents can hide in houses, cave complexes and other places which are impervious to the weapons inherent to an infantryman.  With a tank, the soldiers can direct accurate fire against strong points.  With artillery and aircraft, the soldiers have the ability to bring heavy firepower rapidly against strong points and caves complexes which tanks cannot reach.  All modern weapons, no matter how sophisticated, rely on the sharp eye and quick thinking of soldiers to identify the enemy so this firepower can be quickly and effectively applied.

The Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives’ article is flawed not only by such a superficial analysis of the use of tanks, but also in neglecting the many and varied tools Canadians are bringing into the fight in Afghanistan.  In addition to the traditional tools of war, soldiers are also using tools such as clinics, local employment projects and road building.  To concentrate only on the use of tanks is similar to suggesting Mike Holmes skill at home repair is due to his trademark coveralls.

So long as commentators limit themselves to facile examination of weapons such as tanks in isolation, the true nature of the war in Afghanistan will remain unknown to Canadians. Without knowledge, the Canadian public cannot make intelligent decisions about the war in Afghanistan. Our victory will be the result of the skilful and patient use of many tools and techniques, not simply the addition of a singular item in our inventory.

Ruxted understands that many Canadians are disquieted by the nature of the combat in Afghanistan.  They have difficulty reconciling our stated goal of helping the Afghan people with images of Afghan civilians killed by Canadian soldiers – in tanks or not.  Prof. Wallace has added some heat but little light to the subject.  He does not understand tanks or tank tactics, not even why we sent tanks to Afghanistan in the first place.  He is dismayed at what he, erroneously, believes are the tank’s insurmountable vulnerabilities – so dismayed that he ignores the tank’s capabilities.  Prof. Wallace does not understand the differences between the combat forces and the aid/reconstruction forces.  His lack of understanding renders his analysis useless, at best.  The fact that the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives has an energetic public relations staff and has already ensured that Prof. Wallace’s misguided missiles received national media attention means that his analysis goes beyond being useless and ends up doing real damage to any hopes of a thoughtful, considered debate about why we are fighting in and reconstructing Afghanistan and how we are doing both.

 

[armyvern]

Excellent points raised by the Ruxted Group here.

 

[The Bread Guy]

It appears the Toronto Star doesn't read Ruxted - maybe time to send an exec summary of the Group's editorial to TorStar to see if they have the testicular fortitude to publish it? - shared, as usual, in accordance with the "fair dealing" provisions, Section 29, of the Copyright Act.

Tank power: Leopards cannot change spots
Deployment will only make Canadians more vulnerable and less popular, argues Michael D. Wallace
Michael D. Wallace, Toronto Star, 4 Mar 07
Article Link

At the end of last September, the Department of National Defence began to deploy a contingent of Canada's 28-year-old Leopard tanks to the battlefield in Afghanistan, three years after claiming they were "obsolete."

The rationale for this abrupt reversal was the vulnerability of Canadian light armoured vehicles to insurgency attack. DND soon realized the old Leopards were themselves vulnerable and set about to acquire newer, more heavily armoured Leopard 2's from Germany.

Deploying tanks in Afghanistan is wrong-headed for two reasons: First, all tanks, old or new, are vulnerable to weapons easily obtained or manufactured by insurgent forces; second, their deployment is incompatible with the spirit of the civilian reconstruction mission envisaged by the Atlantic alliance in authorizing the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). It is a truism that even the largest, most modern armoured vehicles are almost totally helpless when deployed alone against advanced anti-tank missile systems.

During the Israeli incursion into Lebanon in the summer of 2006, its tanks – perhaps the most powerful and safest in the world – proved vulnerable to Russian-made Hezbollah anti-tank missiles and rocket-propelled grenades.

Lighter tanks, such as the Leopard, are even more vulnerable. Newer rocket-propelled grenades are capable of penetrating as much as a metre of modern armour and may be fired from concealment anywhere from point-blank range to a kilometre away.

Afghan insurgents equipped with these light, infantry-portable weapons could destroy a Leopard with a single shot, quite literally before its crew knew what hit it.

Russian officials admit that a variety of these deadly anti-tank weapons have found their way onto the global black market, and no doubt will migrate across the Pakistani border. In any case, even older rocket-propelled grenades have ambushed and put U.S. tanks out of action in Iraq. Thus far, air power has been the only effective counter to such ambushes against armoured ISAF forces. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has relied extensively on "close air support" to attack insurgent positions.

In June 2006, the U.S. Central Command reported that it had flown more than twice as many air strikes in Afghanistan than in Iraq. But observers on the scene claim the heavy use of air power has increased civilian casualties dramatically but has not stopped insurgent attacks on ISAF armour.

Simple common sense suggests deploying tanks into a combat zone replete with effective anti-tank weapons in the hands of fighters with nearly three decades of experience in tank-killing against superior armour is not a wise decision. Not to mention the other nasty surprises awaiting tanks: Improvised Explosive Devices.

These "IEDs" now kill far more coalition soldiers in Iraq than any other weapon. Properly constructed IEDs can put even large battle tanks out of action.

Given the ties between the Iraqi Sunni insurgents and their Afghan counterparts, there can be little question that Iraqi "know-how" will soon be used against ISAF forces.

ISAF armoured vehicles must also contend with powerful anti-tank mines used by Afghans against the Soviets.

By their very nature, tanks cannot easily defend or counterattack without risking significant civilian casualties.

The Canada-Afghan website outlining the official view of Canada's ISAF mission emphasizes the need to defeat the insurgent opponents of the official Afghan government, while at the same time stressing the mission goals of extending the rule of law, human rights, and economic development.

In effect, Canadian Forces are fighting a war while civilian personnel seek to rebuild the country by the co-operative efforts of Canadian Afghans.

But ISAF forces have resorted increasingly to weapons and tactics that alienate the Afghan population from those who have travelled far and risk much to pursue the well-being of the Afghan people. How are regional development teams likely to be perceived if they are preceded by a 55-tonne mechanical monster that could pulverize their village with a single shot?

Deploying tanks is symptomatic of the schizophrenic nature of the ISAF mission. Is fighting a counter-insurgency war compatible with reconstructing Afghan civil society?

A newly-released Senate report says that so far, attempting to do both jobs has meant that neither has been done successfully. In that case, tanks seem a most unlikely instrument of assistance.

Michael D. Wallace is a University of British Columbia professor and a senior adviser to the Rideau Institute on International Affairs. He wrote the recent report, Leopard Tanks and the Deadly Dilemmas of the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan, published by the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives.

 

[gordjenkins]

Armoured protection is essential. Although there is no perfect safeguard against roadside bombs, mines and suicide bombers, a tank can handle all but the biggest explosions.

There are places in rural Afghanistan that wheeled vehicles simply cannot go. Irrigation ditches and low walls made of sun-hardened mud are effective obstacles to wheeled vehicles. Leopard tanks can negotiate these and withstand the small arms and rocket-propelled grenade fire that covers these positions.

The tank provides accurate, precise and consistent firepower. A well-trained crew can consistently attain first-round hits on targets as small as a square metre from as far as two kilometres. In doing so, the tank can destroy a precise target without killing civilians or causing the extensive damage that is characteristic of even the most precise air strike. This alone should convince the critics that Canada is doing the right thing by employing tanks.

The facts are clear — in southern Afghanistan, tanks provide Canadian soldiers with mobility, protection, and, most importantly, the ability to destroy targets and kill insurgents without harming innocence. It's hard not to conclude that the critics are either ill informed or motivated by ideology and politics.

Dear Colonel


Tanks have their place - but probably not in Afghanistan.

The Russians found this out the hard way - when they were there in the 1980s - gosh 30 years ago!. Did anyone ever check out their experience before we sent tanks meant for the Cold War European theater over to Afghanistan- obviously not.

Soviet attempts to use main battle tanks proved to be troublesome ..because Afghan terrain was not suited to such large and cumbersome combat vehicles in many areas, except to defend roads and main areas of concentration.Soviet armoured troops were faced with a situation where the use of tanks was often inappropriate. The most obvious problem was the inability of tanks to manoeuvre through much of Afghanistan's mountainous terrain. ....further the additional strain to traverse steep grades.... increased fuel expenditure..30 to 50 % more than on flat ground.

Equally important ,Soviet tanks did not prove effective against most infantry targets in rough (mountainous) terrain..or allow tank crews to deal rapidly with infantry ambushes..tank guns could not be elevated high enough in mountainous terrain 

per Page 149 of Lessons of Modern War Volume 3  by AH Cordesman/A.R.Wagner The Lessons of Modern War Vol 3 1990 with info provided by DARPA and support of RUSI  ISBN  0 8133 -1331-7
[/i]
Also -Check out "Soviet Tanks in Afghanistan " Armed Forces Vol 6 No.2 pp 86-88  Feb 1987 by Lars Gyllenhall.Other references available upon request.[/i]

 

[gordjenkins]

For those who point to the failure of Soviet armour in Afghanistan, were we employing Soviet armour or Soviet doctrine then this would be a concern, but we are not, so how is this relevant?

The point I am trying to make is not to employ the use of Soviet doctrine or soviet armour in Afghanistan -it is why try to employ armour at all in Afghanistan? Surely we can learn from other wars -other countries experiences -particularly "so close to home" in Afghanistan. Called the Lessons of Modern War - the book that is.(see my previous post for reference)
One other conclusion they came to in this Study was ""Soviet tanks also seem to have had similar parts and track modifications- a warning that other nations to include similar mountain and desert conditions if they are to operate properly under such conditions"
And that was written 20 years ago and what are we doing with our tanks now?? - replacing them with ones we hope will be more suitable - lets see
ibid Page 149

 

[McG]

The point I am trying to make is not to employ the use of Soviet doctrine or soviet armour in Afghanistan -it is why try to employ armour at all in Afghanistan?

The point you are missing is that you've over simplified the equation.  The Russians also wore helmets, so should we stop wearing helmets?

The fact is that old Soviet tanks are not the same tanks we have, and old Soviet tactics are not the same tactics we use.  You have looked only at the tool, but you must also look at how the tool was used.  Using tanks the same way that the Soviets used tanks would be bad for us.  However, tanks bring a lot of value to the fight when used properly.

 

[mainerjohnthomas]

The question was asked:
"why try to employ armour at all in Afghanistan? Surely we can learn from other wars"
Well, we not only learn the lessons of other wars (its called doctrine ladies and gentlemen), but we learn the lessons of this one.
Our commanders on the ground in Afghanistan took a look at the problems that they were facing, and looked for the right tool for the job, and the tool they asked for was tanks.
Our old, beat up, POS Leopard 1 C2 proved that a tank WAS the right tool, but they were the wrong tank, a tank that our civilian masters tried hard to make everyone believe we never needed, and didn't need to replace.
Now we have new tanks, not only the right tool (that being a MBT), but the right tank for the job.
Combined arms wins wars, tanks are not the right tool for every job, but trying to use an LAV or that Cougar-with-delusions-of-grandure that we almost had to call an MGS where a tank was required was a good recipe for dead Canadians.
Good on the Canadian commanders for calling in the tanks.
Good on the Conservatives for putting new tanks in the hands of the troops on the sharp end.
Infantry will still do the bulk of the work in Afghanistan, Artillery will still be on call for indirect fire support, but when the mission is direct fire, and exposure to enemy rocket and IED attack, then let the big cats roar.

 

[MarkOttawa]

Do the Danes know something that has escaped Prof. Wallace's profound knowledge?

"Afstan: More Leopards leaping in"
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2007/04/afstan-more-leopards-leaping-in.html

"Stunning Escalation of the War"
http://cjunk.blogspot.com/2007/04/stunning-escalation-of-war.html

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Eland]

I can't resist, so I'm going to take a crack at picking apart Wallace's essay. I may end up stating the obvious in a few places, so if I'm outta my lane, tell me.

First Wallace says,

"The rationale for this abrupt reversal was the vulnerability of Canadian light armoured vehicles to insurgency attack. DND soon realized the old Leopards were themselves vulnerable and set about to acquire newer, more heavily armoured Leopard 2's from Germany."

This is dead wrong. The Leopard C2's are *not* 'more vulnerable'. What they lack is the means to keep their crews cool in temperatures which approach 65ºC. Moreover, the Leopard C2's are finally showing their age in other ways and

Wallace does correctly point out that all tanks, no matter how well armoured, remain potentially vulnerable to mines and IED's. The American experience in Iraq amply bears this out - very heavily armoured M1A2 tanks could be, and have been taken out by IED's.

Next, Wallace opines:

"Deploying tanks in Afghanistan is wrong-headed for two reasons: First, all tanks, old or new, are vulnerable to weapons easily obtained or manufactured by insurgent forces; second, their deployment is incompatible with the spirit of the civilian reconstruction mission envisaged by the Atlantic alliance in authorizing the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). It is a truism that even the largest, most modern armoured vehicles are almost totally helpless when deployed alone against advanced anti-tank missile systems."

The first point is not in dispute. The second point is erroneous. The reconstruction efforts cannot even begin, let alone function properly unless they are protected from Taliban incursions. The Taliban seek to disrupt those efforts as part of their general strategy of regaining control of all Afghanistan. If Wallace (and others) had their way and the ISAF mission was transformed into a classic peacekeeping mission, the Taliban would have won and ISAF/NATO forces would have packed up and left long ago. I'd like to know how Wallace manages to make the leap from 'civilian reconstruction efforts' to 'anti-tank missile systems', which the Taliban (as far as I personally know, I may be wrong) have not yet been deployed. Truly, this is a non-sequitur. Someone like Wallace should know better than to construct an article with such inherently flawed logic.

As for "By their very nature, tanks cannot easily defend or counterattack without risking significant civilian casualties," this is hogwash and reflects Wallace's ignorance of the true role that tanks play. It makes me wonder if Wallace might be thinking that the tanks are going to be trundling along narrow Afghani village streets in search of Taliban forces.

Tanks are generally used in open country at stand-off ranges, in places where civilians are not likely to be present. No matter how hard armies might try to avoid civilian casualties, there will always be situations where civilians get caught in the crossfire because the army seeking to spare their lives didn't know they were there. More to the point, it's tough to figure out who's Taliban and who's an innocent civilian when they dress alike and where even a simple goatherd might be carrying around an AK-47 because that's all he has to protect his flock. In short, if some silly bugger gets in the way of a firefight happening between ISAF forces and the Taliban, there's not a lot that can be done to protect him. Does Wallace seriously expect ISAF troops to stand down in such situations until the errant civilian(s) can exit safely? Sorry, Professor Wallace, but war is hell- and you don't win wars by playing by Marquess of Queensbury rules.

Wallace also says,

"During the Israeli incursion into Lebanon in the summer of 2006, its tanks – perhaps the most powerful and safest in the world – proved vulnerable to Russian-made Hezbollah anti-tank missiles and rocket-propelled grenades."

These losses were mostly the result of poor tactics, poor planning, inadequate intel and placing tanks in close quarters like village streets where Hezbollah would have had a natural advantage. Had the Israelis done a bit better job overall and in trying to locate where Hezbollah would have mounted their ATGM posts, there might have been few or no tank losses. I understand from a number of sources that most of the tanks lost to ATGM and RPG fire were recoverable anyway. In other words, any smart tank crew commander is gong to keep his tank as far away from enemy AT weapons systems as he can while still being able to 'reach out and touch' the enemy. The best way to do that is making use of all the infantry, recce, air and artillery assets at your disposal to take out the biggest threats. Although I will concede that sometimes not even that is enough.

Wallace resorts to hyperbole and even histrionics by arguing,

"But ISAF forces have resorted increasingly to weapons and tactics that alienate the Afghan population from those who have travelled far and risk much to pursue the well-being of the Afghan people. How are regional development teams likely to be perceived if they are preceded by a 55-tonne mechanical monster that could pulverize their village with a single shot?"

Seriously, how do tanks alienate the Afghan population? If I were an Afghan who would only be too happy to see the Taliban eliminated soonest, I'd be happy to see my defenders packing
as much firepower as they could. A tank round is capable of generating a lot of destruction, but a village would have to be pretty tiny and flimsily built for a single 105mm HE or HESH round to completely blow it away!

Wallace resorts to further hyperbole with "Deploying tanks is symptomatic of the schizophrenic nature of the ISAF mission. Is fighting a counter-insurgency war compatible with reconstructing Afghan civil society?" How is the ISAF mission 'schizophrenic'? Wallace doesn't elaborate. Fighting a counter-insurgency war is indeed compatible with reconstructing civil society. It's essentially what the United States tried to do in Vietnam -  win the hearts and minds of dirt-poor, uneducated villagers while fighting Viet Cong irregulars who were organized along guerilla/insurgent lines and who used guerilla tactics. The same thing happened in the former Republic of Yugoslavia where civil society broke down not too long after the Soviet empire fell apart.

Wallace's article strikes me as a classic example of the kind of illogic that gets spewed in an effort to get Canadians to buy into the distorted worldview offered through the lens of leftist ideology. The bottom line is that the tanks are there to give Canadian troops excellent fire support, thereby saving as many of their lives as possible while helping to destroy as many as Taliban as possible.

I wonder, would Wallace accept greater casualties so that his delicate sensibilities and squeamishness about tanks could be assuaged? Thanks to this article, I place him at the same level of Stephane Dion, who tried to argue in the House of Commons recently that it was possible to 'overmilitarize' the Afghan mission by sending in tanks. To which I said, '¿Que?' - it's a bloody war zone, not a garden party!

 

[retiredgrunt45]

It's funny listening to a bunch arm chair general civilians who have had no past military experience or training comment on what military hardware should or shouldn't work in theatre.

Leave the decisons on wether military hardware works or not, to were it belongs, the military.

It's like calling a plumber into repair your electrical problem.

 

[Benny]

If using tanks in Afghanistan is so bad, then why did both the Taliban and their opponents use them prior to western intervention?
Tanks are not a panacea, but if troops + tanks cant do a job, then neither can troops alone.

 

[bily052]

The plain and simple truth is they are the right tool to augment existing capabilities.  I was in Masum G'har middle of Jan when a squad of Leos came rumbling in for food, gas and maint.  One of the Interpreters was there and having a chat.  The question that was posed to him was how the population felt about the tanks.  The Taliban fear them for their lethality and mobility.  The locals fear them for essentially the same reasons BUT know that the safety that will be provided by routing out an destroying the Taliban is an acceptable trade off.  As for the vulnerability of any veh / pers, if you put enough explosives in one location, any armour can be defeated.

Again just a couple cents thrown in...

 

[Greymatters]

Here is Wallace's bio at UBC

http://www.politics.ubc.ca/index.php?id=2502

Having dealt with persons of his background before (persons having degrees or masters in political science) his article makes the same mistake many of the others make: "the military is a political tool, and since I am a master of understanding politics, I must be a master of military tactics as well".

Edit - His areas of expertise appear to be international conflict resolution, peace research and the nuclear arms race.