Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ

[MikeKiloPapa]

Contrary to what you may think, it does not use their modular approach as a cost saving measure.

The rationale behind the Standard Flex concept and its continued usage is well documented AND available online, so i will refrain from posting a wall of text reciting its history. What i can say is that your conclusion is wrong ( StanFlex was and still is ,very much a cost saving measure....among other things. Its also much more than just containerized weapons and equipment)

they simply do not have the financial capability of buying themselves full service frigates right off the bat.

We have plenty financial capability, but not the will to spend it on Defence. Not unlike Canada i suppose ;-) ...
All of which has absolutely nothing to do with StanFlex however.

For instance, right now, of the three Iver Huitfeld in service (which is the totality of the class), only the first one is now fully kited out for AAW.

Actually none of them are yet. We wont get long range Standards (SM-2 or 6) til next year at the earliest. The mk56 ESSM launchers are operational aboard all 3 frigates however so they have basic AAW capability at least.

The other two have their launchers (mechanical boxes portion) in place, but neither missiles nor the electronics, nor their combat system software to carry out any AAW duties.

That is incorrect ! ..electronics and combat systems software is in place, but integration of SM-2/6 into the mk41 will likely take place sometime in 2017.

They will have all that in place and be fully operational on that aspect only in four years from now,

Pardon my french , but bollocks ! Where do you get your info from ?  Regardless i would suggest you get some better sources .

The 4 year plan is not about AAW but the upcoming BMD upgrade which is scheduled for completion in the 2019-20 timeframe.

the actual cost of each frigate will have risen to $900M USD each.

BS!...you would have to cram the mk41s full of SM-3s to get near 900 million USD.

As delivered from the shipyard(OSS) the huitfeldts was $165M USD each in 2010 dollars. That cost is indisputable.
The AAW suite from Thales Netherlands came in at ~$110M USD in same year dollars.  Also indisputable
The Atlas Sonar,Star Safire mk III FLIR, surface and navigational radars,ESM system,link&communications systems,the combat system and the MK41 launchers etc makes up the remainder of the price quoted officially at ~$325-330M USD (2010)
What isnt included is :
2x76mm Oto Melara SR
1x35 mm Millenium CIWS
2xMk56  VLS with 24 ESSM
2xMk141 Harpoon launchers with 16 Harpoon block II missiles.
SM-2 missiles.
2xCEROS 200 Fire control directors
Most of the outfitting and integration of these sensors,weapons and military electronics was carried out by RDN technical personel or civilian subcontractors. As such that work was not accounted for in the acquisitions project but with funds taken from another budget (the navy's operating budget)

All that adds up to another 200-250 million USD on top of the official purchase price.
But even with the $100M USD BMD upgrade (radar and CMS) you are well short of the $900 million you claim.

  a country with a GDP smaller than that of the Province of Quebec

Riiight.....But no
Quebec GDP  : ~360 billion CAD
Denmark GDP : ~420 billion CAD
And Quebec has a population almost 50% larger than Denmarks (8,2 vs 5,6 million)

by spreading the cost of getting them to full capacity over a much longer period of 12 years instead of three or four.

Its actually more like 6 years ....and name me 1 navy (other than the US) that goes from commission to FOC in 3 years ?

 

[GR66]

This probably isn't the ideal topic to post this question in, but it is somewhat related to these discussions on desired CSC capabilities...

How much of the increased cost of modern multi-role Frigate/Destroyer designs is based on increased defensive capabilities (air search radars, AAW missiles, point missile defense, signature reduction technologies, etc.)?  It seems (from an uneducated outsider anyway) that the offensive capabilities of the latest designs are not significantly different than the ships from 1-2 generations ago but the AAW systems and capabilities have increased significantly.

I happened across an article the other day in the Canadian Naval Review by Ken Hansen (Canadian Naval Review Broadsides Forum, "What can be done to salvage the Canadian Surface Combatant program?", posted 07-Jan-2016...I have not included a link because it references an article by "he whom may not be named").  The article references an older (updated 1999) book by Wayne P. Hughes Jr. "Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, 2nd Ed." which Hansen summarizes as:

The survivability of medium-sized warships against modern weapon systems is questionable. Modern anti-ship missiles, and especially torpedoes, are one-shot kill weapons if they hit their intended target. Wayne Hughes, Jr., in his seminal book Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, provides conclusive evidence that modern weaponry has produced what he calls a “fundamental point,” the implications of which are poorly understood:  “modern missiles have brought into question and sometimes overturned the principle of massing forces.” In his section on “Missile Equations” (pp. 268-84), analysis of 222 anti-ship missiles fired in hostilities produced the following probability of achieving a hit per shot:
.913 – against defenseless ships;
.684 – against defendable warships that failed to react; and
.264 – against defendable warships that did attempt to defend themselves.
With a one-shot kill capability and a minimum ‘leaker’ rate of more than 25%, the idea that larger and more expensive ships are more survivable than smaller ships should definitely be challenged. Hughes shows that a warship must be over 10,000 tonnes in displacement before it merits more than one missile hit to put it out of action (the rate is one additional hit per 10,000 tonnes of displacement). Even more challenging anti-ship systems are in the offing and it is unlikely self-defence systems will keep pace. Building very expensive warships that will be vulnerable in combat may not be an effective use of resources and, at the very least, will impose severe restrictions on operators. In a high threat environment, it is likely that only submarines will be able to operate there and be considered ‘survivable’.

Does this older analysis of the effectiveness of AAW systems vs. missile threats still hold true in a modern context?  Are we building ever more expensive ships which may be mission-killed by (on average) four relatively cheap missiles, or are current AAW systems more effective against current anti-ship missiles? 

 

[MikeKiloPapa]

Hey Mike, any idea what the hull speed is on the Huitfeldt?

Yes, its 28 knots, or put another way , the requirement was for a sustained speed of 27,6 knots  at 90% MCR in sea state 3 (IIRC). Just like with the Absalons that are a knot or 2 faster than their design speed(+25 vs23-24kts) , the Huitfeldts have turned out to exceed requirements, achieving +31knots on trial runs. At end of life displacement (~7000t) 26-27 knots is probably max speed.
Contrary to popular belief, the IH's are actually quite different from their older siblings below the waterline despite the apparent similarity. One of the reasons why they achieve a respectable speed despite the relatively modest propulsion power. In pure acceleration however, they cant quite match their gasturbine powered peers. One of the trade-offs in going to an all diesel setup. Gives them unparalleled range though.



 

Also, the MK41 launchers, do you know what size they are, Defense, Tactical or Strike version? I imagine any of the three could be used.

They are Strike length.

 

[Kirkhill]

Thanks for all of that MKP -

On a different tack, are you picking up any sense of why our Canadian pricing may be at such variance compared to the OSS/OMT pricing?

The price you quoted for the vessel seems to me to be reasonable for what I believe the civilian world would know as "a bare bones charter" vessel - before all the tools of the trade and cargo is brought aboard.

Stanflex, in my understanding, separates the cost of the hull from the cost of the tools and cargo to a large extent.  Essentially it makes tools and cargo an "institutional" cost which the "institution", the navy, provides to the vessel as required, and can remove from the vessel to storage.

Cheers.

 

[MikeKiloPapa]

Does this older analysis of the effectiveness of AAW systems vs. missile threats still hold true in a modern context? 

I think it is somewhat overstating the lethality of anti-ship missiles. There are really 2 kinds of ASCM's , the conventional subsonic ones like Harpoon, Exocet, RBS-15, C-802 , NSM etc , and the truck size supersonic seaskimming type like the sunburn/moskit and Brahmos.

The first category missiles are highly maneuverable ( and in NSM's case also stealthy) but slow and relatively small carrying warheads ranging from 125-220kg in size.

Supersonic missiles like the Brahmos  are much larger (though not in warhead size) but also much less maneuverable. So you get shorter time to react and respond, but since these missiles have a more predictable flight path, they are also easier to shoot down. If they hit though i think even an Arleigh Burke would be toast.

Even corvette sized vessels of about 1200 tonnes have survived hits by harpoon class weapons, and in the 4000-9000 tonne range of warships there are numerous examples of vessels surviving hits from similar missiles. Whether a ship remains operational/combat effective is of course dependant upon where the missile impacts.

And while anti ship missiles have evolved greatly since the falklands war , i think you could well argue that the radars,optronics/IRST and ESM/ECM systems protecting modern warships have evolved even more so.

 

[MikeKiloPapa]

author=Chris Pook
On a different tack, are you picking up any sense of why our Canadian pricing may be at such variance compared to the OSS/OMT pricing?

Are you thinking of the AOPS or more in general terms ?

Stanflex, in my understanding, separates the cost of the hull from the cost of the tools and cargo to a large extent.  Essentially it makes tools and cargo an "institutional" cost which the "institution", the navy, provides to the vessel as required, and can remove from the vessel to storage.

Sounds spot on to me. In the real world of course it is a litlle less black and white and we dont always adhere completely to the StanFlex philosophy, but that is another matter.

 

[GR66]

I think it is somewhat overstating the lethality of anti-ship missiles. There are really 2 kinds of ASCM's , the conventional subsonic ones like Harpoon, Exocet, RBS-15, C-802 , NSM etc , and the truck size supersonic seaskimming type like the sunburn/moskit and Brahmos.

The first category missiles are highly maneuverable ( and in NSM's case also stealthy) but slow and relatively small carrying warheads ranging from 125-220kg in size.

Supersonic missiles like the Brahmos  are much larger (though not in warhead size) but also much less maneuverable. So you get shorter time to react and respond, but since these missiles have a more predictable flight path, they are also easier to shoot down. If they hit though i think even an Arleigh Burke would be toast.

Even corvette sized vessels of about 1200 tonnes have survived hits by harpoon class weapons, and in the 4000-9000 tonne range of warships there are numerous examples of vessels surviving hits from similar missiles. Whether a ship remains operational/combat effective is of course dependant upon where the missile impacts.

And while anti ship missiles have evolved greatly since the falklands war , i think you could well argue that the radars,optronics/IRST and ESM/ECM systems protecting modern warships have evolved even more so.

Thanks for the informative reply.  I suspected that the figures in the article could at the very least be "debatable". 

 

[MikeKiloPapa]

From Wiki - but I verify these numbers from reviewing a number of other sources.

Class & type: Absalon-class support ship
Displacement: 6639 tonnes
Length: 137.6 m (451 ft 5 in)
Beam: 19.5 m (64 ft 0 in)
Draft: 6.3 m (20 ft 8 in) Under hull mounted sonar , draft under hull baseline 5,3 m
Propulsion:
2 × MTU 8000 M70 diesel engines;
two shafts
22,300 bhp (16.4 MW)
Speed: 25 knots (44 km/h)
Range: 9,000 nmi (17,000 km) at 15 kn (28 km/h)


Type: (Iver Huitfeldt) Air defence frigate
Displacement: 6,645 tonnes (full load)
Length: 138.7 m (455 ft)
Beam: 19.75 m (64.8 ft)
Draft: 5.3 m (17 ft)- 6,3m under HMS
Propulsion: Four MTU 8000 20V M70 diesel engines, 8,2 MW each.
Speed: 30 knots (56 km/h; 35 mph)
Range: 9,300 nautical miles (17,000 km; 10,000 mi) at 18 knots (33 km/h; 21 mph)

The hull form is supposedly the same for both ships. Look outwardly similar but isnt.  The doubled power increases the speed by 5 knots, from 25 to 30. 

For comparison sake here is the Dutch Zeven Provincien

Class & type: De Zeven Provinciën-class frigate
Displacement: 6,050 tonnes (full load)
Length: 144.24 m (473.2 ft)
Beam: 18.8 m (62 ft)
Draft: 5.18 m (17.0 ft)
Propulsion:
Combined diesel and gas
2 × Wärtsilä 16 V26 diesel engines, 4.2 MW (5,600 hp) each
2 × Rolls Royce Spey SM 1C gas turbines, 18.5 MW (24,800 hp) each
Speed: 30 knots (56 km/h; 35 mph)

A little longer water line, a little skinnier in the beam and with a 4.2 + 4.2 + 18.5 = 26.9 Edit: 4.2+ 4.2+ 18.5+ 18.5 = 45.4 MW of power, a little bit less lot more power to the props than the Huitfeldts.

Edited per Walter's correction.

I have just made some minor corrections , written in bold

 

[GR66]

I think it is somewhat overstating the lethality of anti-ship missiles. There are really 2 kinds of ASCM's , the conventional subsonic ones like Harpoon, Exocet, RBS-15, C-802 , NSM etc , and the truck size supersonic seaskimming type like the sunburn/moskit and Brahmos.

The first category missiles are highly maneuverable ( and in NSM's case also stealthy) but slow and relatively small carrying warheads ranging from 125-220kg in size.

Supersonic missiles like the Brahmos  are much larger (though not in warhead size) but also much less maneuverable. So you get shorter time to react and respond, but since these missiles have a more predictable flight path, they are also easier to shoot down. If they hit though i think even an Arleigh Burke would be toast.

Even corvette sized vessels of about 1200 tonnes have survived hits by harpoon class weapons, and in the 4000-9000 tonne range of warships there are numerous examples of vessels surviving hits from similar missiles. Whether a ship remains operational/combat effective is of course dependant upon where the missile impacts.

And while anti ship missiles have evolved greatly since the falklands war , i think you could well argue that the radars,optronics/IRST and ESM/ECM systems protecting modern warships have evolved even more so.

Related question.  I imagine survivability numbers (like quoted in the original article) are greatly affected by whether the targetted ship is prepared for the attack and I presume has its radars activated to a) detect the incoming missiles in the first place, and b) to direct the AAW weapons and counter-measures launched to defend the ship.

Is there not a bit of a catch-22 in this?  If you don't have your radars active you may not detect the incoming attack in time to be able to effectively counter it which greatly decreases your survivability.  If however, your radars are active you are giving away your position to the enemy and letting them know where to attack...which again presumably decreases your survivability (vs. not being detected in the first place).

In light of advances in things like the sensor fusion in the F-35 where a group of aircraft will share a combined sensor picture of the battlespace, has there been any discussions in the naval world about possibly separating the sensors from the most expensive asset which is the warship and instead putting them on cheaper platforms (manned aircraft, UAV's, cheap drone ships, etc.?) and having those sensor platforms communicate with the warships?  Would that allow you to use smaller (and cheaper?), harder to detect warships as stealthy (or at least stealthier) weapon platforms in conjuction with more numerous (and more easily replaced) sensor platforms?

 

[Kirkhill]

Are you thinking of the AOPS or more in general terms ?

In general terms, although the AOPS immediately springs to mind.

Sounds spot on to me. In the real world of course it is a litlle less black and white and we dont always adhere completely to the StanFlex philosophy, but that is another matter.

Thanks and understood

And I appreciate the modifications to the data comparison.

 

[Lumber]

Related question.  I imagine survivability numbers (like quoted in the original article) are greatly affected by whether the targetted ship is prepared for the attack and I presume has its radars activated to a) detect the incoming missiles in the first place, and b) to direct the AAW weapons and counter-measures launched to defend the ship.

This is one of the fundamentals of Above Water Warfare. Balancing the risk of being detected against the need to have you radars on to detect incoming missiles. There is no straight answer to this. It is all situation dependent. I can give you scenarios if you wish, but there are a ton of different possibilities.

In light of advances in things like the sensor fusion in the F-35 where a group of aircraft will share a combined sensor picture of the battlespace, has there been any discussions in the naval world about possibly separating the sensors from the most expensive asset which is the warship and instead putting them on cheaper platforms (manned aircraft, UAV's, cheap drone ships, etc.?) and having those sensor platforms communicate with the warships?  Would that allow you to use smaller (and cheaper?), harder to detect warships as stealthy (or at least stealthier) weapon platforms in conjuction with more numerous (and more easily replaced) sensor platforms?

This is already standard naval tactics. You have radar pickets deployed away from the force or Long Range Patrol Aircraft (LRPAs) providing radar coverage to a huge area. They pass this information along to the ship's in the force over what is called "Link", which allows everyone radar and tactical picture to look exactly the same.

Using a small/cheaper "off-board" radar vessel is a possibility, but I don't think such a concept yet exists. There a large list of problems with such an idea. If its  a really small craft such as a remote vehicle, who's going to carry it? How fast is it going to be? How are you going to launch and recover it? Up to what sea-state are you going to operate it in? When do you launch it? The biggest issue would be that small vessel like that has a very small radar horizon because it's so low to the water. If you are talking about a small vessel, such as a corvette or even smaller (literally carrying nothing but radars and radios), then you still have some of the issues like speed and endurance (can it keep up with the fleet?), survivability.

 

[MikeKiloPapa]

Is there not a bit of a catch-22 in this?  If you don't have your radars active you may not detect the incoming attack in time to be able to effectively counter it which greatly decreases your survivability.  If however, your radars are active you are giving away your position to the enemy and letting them know where to attack...which again presumably decreases your survivability (vs. not being detected in the first place).

Well thats what your passive ESM systems are for, "listening"for any  emissions from say a missiles targeting radar. On a lot of modern warships you also have Infrared surveillance systems scanning for thermal signatures , like the hot exhaust plume of a missile . In some cases though, say in confined littoral waters close to the coastline, these warning systems will not alert you in time . So you have to go active and use your radars, giving away your presence and position. But trying to hide a +6000 tonne +130 meter warship in that environment is damn near impossible anyway in this day and age so you are not really losing a lot by going active anyways. The most important thing is being alert and ready for action in the first place. You can have your weapons systems ready, your CIWS, and decoy systems on and in automatic mode, all hands at battle stations AND your radar turned on WITHOUT emitting but ready to.

In light of advances in things like the sensor fusion in the F-35 where a group of aircraft will share a combined sensor picture of the battlespace, has there been any discussions in the naval world about possibly separating the sensors from the most expensive asset which is the warship and instead putting them on cheaper platforms (manned aircraft, UAV's, cheap drone ships, etc.?)

Absolutely, UAV's on ships is happening as we speak and is going to become an integral part of future naval warfare, just like a warships organic helicopter capability is used as an ISR asset, qua their very capable sensors.

and having those sensor platforms communicate with the warships?

Already happening ....in grand scale this is what the US CEC( Cooperative Engagement Capability) system is all about. It gathers information from multiple sensors on land, sea,air and space and creates an overall picture of the battle space (sensor fusion) , allowing you to separate sensor and shooter.

Would that allow you to use smaller (and cheaper?), harder to detect warships as stealthy (or at least stealthier) weapon platforms in conjuction with more numerous (and more easily replaced) sensor platforms?

The problems with smaller combatants is the inherent limitations they bring with them, like short range and endurance, lesser habitability and survivability

As a niche weapon used as a supplement to larger warships or for smaller states operating only in the littorals they make sense , but they can never be a substitute for the modern large surface combatant

 

[GR66]

Excellent education.  Thank you both.

 

[Cloud Cover]

The missile conversation is interesting and informative, it should be in another thread though.

I have a question about the CSC program. What steel is being cut, where, and when will it materialize into a useful object? I see lots of paper and RFQ and re-thinking of capabilities, costs, use scenarios etc. But no ships being built, while in half a decade those that still float will be quite close to being older than their XO's. And they still may be flying Sea Kings. Why are the Admirals not pushing this issue as hard as they can, and as publicly as allowable both pre- and post career retirement?   

 

[Edward Campbell]

There's a gloomy report, which I find distressingly believable, on the "predicted failure [in the] introduction of the Canadian Surface Combatant" here.

 

[MikeKiloPapa]

In general terms, although the AOPS immediately springs to mind.

With my limited insight into Canadian industry and shipbuilding practices i can only guess as to disparity in cost. Most obvious would be the difference between a civilian yard accustomed to the build-to cost model and utilizing cheap eastern european/baltic labour in subsidiarys or subcontractors, in contrast with the Halifax based Irving Shipbuilding with its , shall we say , somewhat lesser commercial experience and success(though its hard to argue the fact that OSS no longer exists and Irving is still around) .
Still to survive as long as it did building large container ships and tankers ,in increasing competition with dirt cheap Asian yards, required the Lindø Yard (OSS) to become ever more efficient and develop new cheaper and faster shipbuilding procedures and practices. They were also among the front runners in automation and use of robots in the shipbuilding industry, and by the time they closed, ironically the Odense yard was probably one of the most advanced and efficient in the world. Against heavily subsidized South Korean and Chinese yards, however it was not enough. They could still build far cheaper vessels AND in numbers OSS could not match.

Another difference might be in the detail of the design specifications. For the Absalon/Huitfeldt classes specifications on the hull/platform design itself was actually very general in nature only listing  requirements and then letting the experienced yard decide how to best comply with those requirements. Compared with say Norwegian practice where they(as in the Navy/ project office) specify every single detail of every single nut and bolt and the standard it has to comply with, resulting not only in a much longer and more costly design process but also a much more expensive and troubled build.
As most navies in the anglosphere, as far as i can tell, have design practices much along the lines of the Norwegians, i would imagine Canada does as well.
And the Harry DeWolf is based on the Svalbard afterall.

In the RDN we also often make do with cheaper 90% solutions where best in class performance is not perceived to be vital, for instance in choosing CODAD instead of the more expensive CODAG or CODLAG propulsion.

Emphasis on COTS/MOTS components also help to keep costs down.

And finally , as we have already established , our ships are not always as cheap as they seem, because of hidden costs and a bit of  "creative accounting" ;-)

 

[MikeKiloPapa]

There's a gloomy report, which I find distressingly believable, on the "predicted failure [in the] introduction of the Canadian Surface Combatant" here.

Is the program costs quoted in Canadian or US dollars ?.....30 Million CAD is "only" 20M USD . So 15 CSC would mean ~1,3 billion USD each, expensive to be sure but not totally ludicrous if you are talking about something like a modern "mini-Burke" DDG. 

As to the AOPS, i thought the DeWolf class was going to be bigger and build to a higher spec than the Svalbard?( which is built to purely commercial standards) 

 

[Kirkhill]

With my limited insight into Canadian industry and shipbuilding practices i can only guess as to disparity in cost. Most obvious would be the difference between a civilian yard accustomed to the build-to cost model and utilizing cheap eastern european/baltic labour in subsidiarys or subcontractors, in contrast with the Halifax based Irving Shipbuilding with its , shall we say , somewhat lesser commercial experience and success(though its hard to argue the fact that OSS no longer exists and Irving is still around) .
Still to survive as long as it did building large container ships and tankers ,in increasing competition with dirt cheap Asian yards, required the Lindø Yard (OSS) to become ever more efficient and develop new cheaper and faster shipbuilding procedures and practices. They were also among the front runners in automation and use of robots in the shipbuilding industry, and by the time they closed, ironically the Odense yard was probably one of the most advanced and efficient in the world. Against heavily subsidized South Korean and Chinese yards, however it was not enough. They could still build far cheaper vessels AND in numbers OSS could not match.

Another difference might be in the detail of the design specifications. For the Absalon/Huitfeldt classes specifications on the hull/platform design itself was actually very general in nature only listing  requirements and then letting the experienced yard decide how to best comply with those requirements. Compared with say Norwegian practice where they(as in the Navy/ project office) specify every single detail of every single nut and bolt and the standard it has to comply with, resulting not only in a much longer and more costly design process but also a much more expensive and troubled build.
As most navies in the anglosphere, as far as i can tell, have design practices much along the lines of the Norwegians, i would imagine Canada does as well.
And the Harry DeWolf is based on the Svalbard afterall.

In the RDN we also often make do with cheaper 90% solutions where best in class performance is not perceived to be vital, for instance in choosing CODAD instead of the more expensive CODAG or CODLAG propulsion.

Emphasis on COTS/MOTS components also help to keep costs down.

And finally , as we have already established , our ships are not always as cheap as they seem, because of hidden costs and a bit of  "creative accounting" ;-)

While your ships may not always be as cheap as they seem they still seem to be as cheap as they come - and apparently function. 

On the Irving efficiency front I will tread lightly while pointing out that they have limited current experience in the manufacture of large vessels and the yard is essentially a new one.  A steep learning curve perhaps?

Your point about detailed specs vs general specs I personally find very interesting.  Having worked with Danish and Swedish engineers in a very different design field I find the "general" approach to be very familiar.  Having also worked with Canadian engineers as well I find them detail oriented to a fault.  They show an abundance, and often an over-abundance of caution.   

It is my personal opinion that the zeal shown for detail does not show material benefits.  Again this is only my personal opinion based on some years of observation, it drives timelines to the right, drives budgets higher and does little to guarantee that the end product will be any better than the "general spec" product.

Personally I prefer a 90% solution in my hand that I can trim and craft to achieve my desired endstate, than a 100% solution sometime in the never-never.  But that is just me.

To be fair to the "detail oriented" engineers though the "generalist" approach demands three things:  educated vendors,educated clients and trust.  And in an environment where ships are built once a decade or so I presume it is very hard to find any of those things in Canada.

 

[Kirkhill]

Re the gloomy report - I think the cynical response is - "plan for the worst, hope for the best".  Until a firm CSC plan and schedule is finalized it probably is wise to maintain plans in being based on the Halifax. 

The one thing that continues to bother me is the lack of a Stanflex type plan for all these additional capabilities that the Halifaxes/CSC/AOPSs might share if they were in service at the same time.

With respect the AOPS/Svalbard:  It is my understanding that the AOPS, as designed on the West Coast by Aker/BMT/STX, originally followed Civilian guidelines.  It is also my understanding that when the design was handed off to the East Coast there was considerable discussion about Navalizing the specifications. The final design is apparently civilian.

 

[Cloud Cover]

Re the gloomy report - I think the cynical response is - "plan for the worst, hope for the best".  Until a firm CSC plan and schedule is finalized it probably is wise to maintain plans in being based on the Halifax. 

My money is on the following:
-the CSC project will be killed off as legacy Harper era tomfoolery (which it turned out to be anyway).
-a study will be commenced to determine if we even need a surface fleet with anything more than very light armament, and restrict the vessel to Canadian littoral waters for "surveillance";
- the MCDV's will fill the above role for the next 5 (hundred) years;
-the Halifax fleet will be declared not currently required, a few will be placed in some sort of extended ready reserve, the rest we will be shaving with;
- the subs are literally going to disappear under the surface;
- the JSS/AOR Berlin class will not be built and penalties will be paid;
-The AOPS will be built, then half the fleet laid up and the other half tied up.

The Cyclones and Auroras will be our main maritime assets for patrolling the coasts and if necessary, dropping the odd practice torpedo.

Time will tell, but I have a feeling absolutely NOTHING will be built other than the AOPS.