Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ

[Kirkhill]

Factory Processors and Trawlers generally manage to accommodate processing modifications and capability enhancements in the same hull - just like their on-shore brethren.

And they manage to accommodate shifting loads while operating in high seas at high latitudes.  As I have noted before my work is done in the areas set aside for processing - not in designing the structures that wrap around them - but I have worked enough of those projects to recognize the flexibility and adaptability inherent in their 4000 tonne, 90 m hulls.

Pickup truck or Formula 1?

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Using a hull like that for similar work is not such a stretch, not to mention the approval process for design changes generally follow a shorter loop. but when you want high speed, blue water seakeeping, shallow draft, fast attack craft, that can patrol, sweep for mines that's when you get issues.

 

[Kirkhill]

Using a hull like that for similar work is not such a stretch, not to mention the approval process for design changes generally follow a shorter loop. but when you want high speed, blue water seakeeping, shallow draft, fast attack craft, that can patrol, sweep for mines that's when you get issues.

Seen.

I guess that is what I was getting at in terms of my comments on the "sabotage" of the LCS concept.  A shallow water, high speed, flexible, "sprint and drift" platform that can relocate itself over intercontinental distances is one thing.  A platform that can endure in blue water is something else.  There is certainly a clear differentiation there.

On the other hand tailoring a platform so that it can only perform one role with one set of permanently installed gear appears to me to be swinging the pendulum too far the other way.  Formula 1 cars have very limited useful lives.

 

[Lumber]

Forget the LSC, forget the CSC. Let's just build a fleet of small, sleek, super fast, super stealthy FOO ships.... purpose would be to spot for a network of anti-air and anti-surface space based lasers satellites and ICBMs...  >

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

On the other hand tailoring a platform so that it can only perform one role with one set of permanently installed gear appears to me to be swinging the pendulum too far the other way.  Formula 1 cars have very limited useful lives.

Some times single role is the only option (Landing ships or submarines for instance), but most of the time Navies have general purpose ships as their most numerous class of ships, like frigates or destroyers, which, even when more specialized in one aspect are still well rounded general purpose forces.

Don't confuse not being able to switch basic equipment loads [the launching systems] (as if filling the back of a truck with weapons of different kind for delivery to the front) with lack of flexibility or single role. And don't consider that the lack of facilities in a warship to carry soldiers to combat means that they lack flexibility.

Think of the IRO before retirement. They could handle ASW, AAW, ASuW and self protect from mines. But more than that. While they carried only SM-2 missiles in their Mk-41 launchers, the actual launcher (the Mk41) could have carried quad packs ESSM's, or VL Tomahawk missiles, or ASROC's or any other ones of the SM's as required. Switching your missile load composition as required for the circumstances, now that's flexibility. And the CSC will have that same flexibility.

 

[Lumber]

Some times single role is the only option (Landing ships or submarines for instance)...

Submarines can have multiple roles. Different boats could be geared for one specific role, or rigged for flexibility. For example, SSNs vs SSBNs vs SSGNs vs Special Forces deployers.

Think of the IRO before retirement. They could handle ASW, AAW, ASuW and self protect from mines. But more than that. While they carried only SM-2 missiles in their Mk-41 launchers, the actual launcher (the Mk41) could have carried quad packs ESSM's, or VL Tomahawk missiles, or ASROC's or any other ones of the SM's as required. Switching your missile load composition as required for the circumstances, now that's flexibility. And the CSC will have that same flexibility.

Fixed that for you.

 

[Kirkhill]

Some times single role is the only option (Landing ships or submarines for instance), but most of the time Navies have general purpose ships as their most numerous class of ships, like frigates or destroyers, which, even when more specialized in one aspect are still well rounded general purpose forces.

Don't confuse not being able to switch basic equipment loads [the launching systems] (as if filling the back of a truck with weapons of different kind for delivery to the front) with lack of flexibility or single role. And don't consider that the lack of facilities in a warship to carry soldiers to combat means that they lack flexibility.

Think of the IRO before retirement. They could handle ASW, AAW, ASuW and self protect from mines. But more than that. While they carried only SM-2 missiles in their Mk-41 launchers, the actual launcher (the Mk41) could have carried quad packs ESSM's, or VL Tomahawk missiles, or ASROC's or any other ones of the SM's as required. Switching your missile load composition as required for the circumstances, now that's flexibility. And the CSC will have that same flexibility.

No argument on any of your points OGBD - especially in regards to the inherent flexibility of the VLS system (or a gun that can fire multiple types of bullets. 

I am often hearing that we are a small, impoverished nation with a poor, hard done by defence force that can't afford to do everything.  Then I see us regularly (regardless of service) opt for the most expensive solution available on the lot.  Then I see other smaller, presumably more impoverished nations, like the Danes, the Dutch, the Aussies make different decisions that allow them to upgrade and modernize, while still effectively operating, in a more timely fashion than ourselves.  And I find myself puzzled. 

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Fixed that for you.

You shouldn't fix what ain't broke.

With both hull mounted and VDS sonars, two triple tubes for Mk 46 torpedoes and the capacity to host two Seaking helicopters, the IRO were still pretty reasonable ASW platforms. As for ASuW, I agree that one 76mm gun and six .50 cal. MGs is limited but not inexistant. Also, remember that  there were plans in place and a quite fast capability for fitting two quad-harpoon launchers over the old limbo well should the need arise.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

I am often hearing that we are a small, impoverished nation with a poor, hard done by defence force that can't afford to do everything.  Then I see us regularly (regardless of service) opt for the most expensive solution available on the lot.  Then I see other smaller, presumably more impoverished nations, like the Danes, the Dutch, the Aussies make different decisions that allow them to upgrade and modernize, while still effectively operating, in a more timely fashion than ourselves.  And I find myself puzzled.

First, the only reason we fail to upgrade and modernize in a timely fashion is budgetary/procurement causes that are dictated to us by politician for their own reasons (i.e. the Navy constantly keeps track of the upgrade and modernization needs of the fleet, develop plans for it and put them up - only to see them shot down. The Navy would like nothing better than to be able to constantly upgrade and modernize the equipment  on its ships instead of having to wait twenty years between programs and do all the updates in one big single shot).

I am not sure how you see Australia being different than we are. The Meko design of the  Anzac class was modular, but in practice, they have not modernized or upgraded in any significant different way than we have.

The Dutch, I would not call "impoverished" compared to us, but in any event, they upgrade and modernize even less than we do: they just change classes of ship more frequently.

Finally, the Danes are probably the only ones from your list that have an "upgrade and modernization" ongoing system, but in their case it is for financial reasons: Their fleet is much smaller than ours in terms of major surface combatant so it is a big item to absorb when constructing a new one comes up. That is why they have developed their "build-up-by-pieces" system where they build the hull and machinery, put minimal weapons onboard, and then add weapons and sensors from time to time throughout the lifetime of the ship until it's fully up to specs.

BTW, one of the reason we end up opting for the "most expensive" solution more often than not has to do with the fact that  in the RCN, we see it as a necessity for us to be fully capable to integrate into an American task force or just as seamlessly integrate into a NATO one. Very few nations (and none of the ones you mention, though the Australians are now moving that way) in the world can do that other than us and we have derived great tactical advantages from this capability.

 

[Kirkhill]

OGBD - flexibility comes in many forms.  Sometimes it is a single platform.  Sometimes it is the range of platforms.

The Aussies have Frigates/Destroyers comparable to yours.  Dead right.

The Aussies also have a commercial AOR to bridge the gap.  A solution previously rejected here in Canada.
The Aussies have a pair of Troop Transports that don't show up anywhere in the RCN's shopping list.

The Dutch have Troop Transports and AORs and OPVs that allow them to provide a variety of capabilities in low risk environments (including lifting troops and refugees).

The  Danes - AAWs with ASW capability, Cmd and Spt with ASW capability, Light Frigates and OPVs with ice capabilities and crews smaller than an MCDV.

You don't get to blame the politicians for everything. 

Take a look at your own buttons-and-bows politicians.

Luego.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Kirkhill, you are looking at flexibility from a Navy overall capabilities point of view, not from an individual ship or class of ship perspective. This thread is about  a single class of ships, the combatant ones, not Navies as a whole, and it is this limited perspective I have always used as guiding my posts.

The overall flexibility in a Navy from the combination of all of its ship's type is a strategic decision. In Canada's case, it is not something derived from the Navy's choice alone, but from NDHQ. If NDHQ determined that  having amphibious capability was required of Canada, the Navy would propose what it needs and the "powers that be" would then decide the extent to which it will provide the Navy's request for materiel to do so. Then everybody would get on with the job with what is provided.

Again, though, it is important not to confuse overall flexibility with national requirements. The Australian and the Dutch have amphibious capabilities? Yes, but they live in an area where their own territory has multiple other nations nearby where they may need the capabilities (we are talking a few hundred nautical miles here, particularly for Australia - the Dutch have oversea territories as well where the capability may be needed).

For us in Canada, on the other hand, we have no territory nearby that threaten us from a military point of view (I will except St-Pierre et Miquelon for obvious reasons). The only "military" need for amphibious ships would be for [very] far oversea employment. This requires rather a deployment model based on the US Marines style of permanent forward deployment of soldiers onboard large ships for long period of time. This would be too much of a drag  on scarce defence dollars both from the Naval and the Army point of view (can you see what would be required in Army numbers just to make it possible to  maintain 1,500 soldiers battle groups deployed permanently in 6 months rotations at sea?). If not for that type of deployment, why spend 100's of millions of dollars every year just to make it possible for the Winnipeg Riffles to practice landing on the North shore of lake Superior once in a while for a change of scenery?

Also, you seem to have an unnatural fixation with crew reduction. First of all the Danish OPV's you are talking about do not have a smaller crew than the MCDV's. When they deploy in their ordinary role (coast guard/constabulary), they have a crew of 18, but only carry two .50 cal MG's. If I wanted to deploy the MCDV in a similar role, I could actually better that and sail with a crew of 15. When the Knut Rasmunssen class deploy with more advanced weapons and a military mission, the crew goes up to 43.

But, and I can excuse you here as you have no experience of working with European (unionized or near unionized) navies, you have to consider concept of operation. The continental European navies, unlike us, the Americans and the other Anglo-sphere navies, do not permanently operate AS IF AT WAR, meaning that we have at least 1/3 of the crew manning all the fighting stations at all time, and often more than that. For instance, if they are out for an ASW exercise, it will be scheduled to start in the morning, end in the afternoon, and after its conclusion and until the next exercise the morning after, the ship will just sail around with a minimal crewing of a few seaman per watch akin to  a merchant ship. Some of those nations boast their capability to operate with a duty watch of four: An OOW, a seaman, one engineer (at a remote control console on the bridge) and one signalman. That is fine until a passing merchant ship decides to turn and ram you (which you didn't see coming because the ops room is down for the night and can't quickly escape from when you notice because your sole engineer can only operate the cruise diesel but not flash up the two gas turbines in the engine room) while everybody is asleep. It's a lesson the US learned at Pearl Harbour, and we emulate in large part.

 

[Lumber]

That is fine until a passing merchant ship decides to turn and ram you ..... It's a lesson the US learned at Pearl Harbour, and we emulate in large part.

A merchant ship turned and ramed a USN ship at Pearl Harbour? When did that happen? I think you're thinking about when Winnipeg got rammed in Esquimalt.

 

[GR66]

A merchant ship turned and ramed a USN ship at Pearl Harbour? When did that happen? I think you're thinking about when Winnipeg got rammed in Esquimalt.

He's not talking about a particular incident of ramming.  He's saying that one of the lessons learned from the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour was that you must ALWAYS be operating as if at war which is why we (like the US) have higher manning levels than some European navies.  That both prevents being caught by a sneak attack...as well as being prepared to avoid things like an unexpected "encounter" with a wayward merchant ship.

 

[Lumber]

He's not talking about a particular incident of ramming.  He's saying that one of the lessons learned from the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour was that you must ALWAYS be operating as if at war which is why we (like the US) have higher manning levels than some European navies.  That both prevents being caught by a sneak attack...as well as being prepared to avoid things like an unexpected "encounter" with a wayward merchant ship.

This may grind the gears of some of my former mentors and COs, but as former bridge watchkeeper, I did not feel I needed an Ops room backing me up for collision avoidance. A closed up Ops room for collision avoidance was made even more unnecessary with the introduction of CMS330. With data fusion, having any trackers at all in the Ops room is just redundant. They don't track anything; they just report what the system generates on their screens, which is the same things displayed on the bridge MFW. You have more people on the bridge of a CPF than merchant vessels have on their entire ship! Two OOWs, two look-outs, two radars, AIS, GPS and VHF. If you can't keep the ship safe with that, the Ops room isn't going to save you.

 

[Good2Golf]

I must have missed the part where OGBD said CIC was needed for collision avoidance.  Perhaps I misunderstood, but I thought his reference to the Ops room was with regard to having SA on the entire space within which the Ship was operating....and it's ability to respond capably...no? ???

 

[Lumber]

I must have missed the part where OGBD said CIC was needed for collision avoidance.  Perhaps I misunderstood, but I thought his reference to the Ops room was with regard to having SA on the entire space within which the Ship was operating....and it's ability to respond capably...no? ???

I was responding to GR66:

....as well as being prepared to avoid things like an unexpected "encounter" with a wayward merchant ship.

 

[Kirkhill]

OGBD: wrt "an unnatural fixation with crew reduction"

It is what I do. 

A worker employed at a rate of $12/hr is a battery of stored energy that they sell to me at a rate of $68,390/GigaJoule, assuming a labour efficiency of 70% while they are operating on my clock.

Natural Gas sells for $3/GJ
Electricity sells for $14/GJ
Diesel sells for $17/GJ
Gasoline sells for $20/GJ

Buddy also is fully discharged in 8 hours and requires 16 hours to recharge daily, a deep cycle recharge of 48 hours every 7 days and an annual maintenance period of 2 to 5 weeks (older batteries take longer to recharge).

Buddy better be doing more for me than eating my groceries and scanning the horizon.  I can get a PLC to do that for me for a lot less.

Thus the Danish Navy, thus Maersk, thus every manufacturing facility in the world.

I need people to do the things machines can't do.  And machines can effectively keep islands in position and relocate them when necessary. Without me having to worry about widows and orphans.

By the way, 1 GJ = 272 kWh ($17 for diesel or $68,390 for Buddy) and an electric motor or a Combined Heat and Power plant are upwards of 90% efficient.

 

[Baz]

I was responding to GR66:

I think he meant while doing other warship like things.

I'd have to look up the details, but there was (is?) a Canadian Cdr who was RN, who was on board (the XO?) a UK Destroyer (Frigate?) during the tanker wars.  The whole bridge got so involved in trying to spot something on the engaged side, including both lookouts, that they missed the scheduled turn of the escorted force, in the Straights Of Hormuz.  As the story was told to me the lookout on the unengaged side went back to have a peek and was confused because there were no lights or stars; and then hit the alarm when he realized that was because they were about to be run over by a super tanker.  Almost lost the ship...

Not disagreeing with anyone... it's just things get more complex when people are shooting at you so redundancy isn't a bad thing, and that whole train as you fight thing...

Edited to add: story was told to me directly by said Cdr, who was my XO at the time, whom I know by name but won't write.  Disclaimer: that's how I remember him telling it...

 

[Lumber]

OGBD: wrt "an unnatural fixation with crew reduction"

It is what I do. 

...

I once discovered that I had accidently sent half my bridge watch either for coffee or pee-breaks. There were only 4 of us on the bridge (myself, a helsman, bosnsmate and navcom). I wasn't one bit worried about being able to keep the ship safe; I even quickly developped a plan to respond to a man overboard (I would be the one sounding the general alarm and pipping the ship to resuce stations). No, the only thing I was worried about was the CO coming to the bridge and discovering my ineptitude!

 

[Colin Parkinson]

CCG ships generally sail with 1 officer of the watch, 2 quartermasters, which normally one is off the bridge and resting/security checks. In bad vis or on a call, one or more deckhands will be called out to watch sectors. Radars and such are fabulous unless you are looking for a guy in a kayak or standing on a bit of ice.

Merchant ships run with the slimmest of crews for economy reasons, but when things go wrong they have little recourse and the ship and cargo can be lost. accident rates can also be quite high depending on locations and crewing. I have to wonder if the cost of ships, cargo and insurance is really being factored properly against the cost of crewing. I suspect crewing and training is the easiest bit to cut.