Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ

[dapaterson]

ACSO- Advanced Coffee System Operator.

 

[Baz]

ACSO- Advanced Coffee System Operator.

As I don't drink the stuff I never made it for anyone else... I'm not sure I even know how.  I prefer 200lbs of self loading baggage, thank you very much!

 

[dapaterson]

Well, it's not as if you can trust a pilot with complex technology like a Keurig, after all...

 

[Good2Golf]

I understood both the RFA and the USN use contracted helicopters based on their vessels?

Erickson Helicopters has a contract with the US Navy’s Military Sealift Command to supply embarked AS330 Puma Helicopters on a number of T-KAE and other USNS replenishment vessels.  A friend of mine is a retired-USN bos’n now a civilian mate on a T-KAE and the Pumas are in integral part of the Ship’s VERTREP capability.

:2c:

Regards
G2G

 

[Colin Parkinson]

 

[Kirkhill]

What the heck....

Hand all the tankers, auxilliary support and Coast Guard navigation aids over to civilian companies - Federal Fleet Services, CHC, Provincial Airlines,  NavCan.

Unless there are missiles with launchers on board why on earth do you need people in uniform?

You could even hire IMP to put maintenance teams on ships at sea.

 

[Edward Campbell]

What the heck....

Hand all the tankers, auxilliary support and Coast Guard navigation aids over to civilian companies - Federal Fleet Services, CHC, Provincial Airlines,  NavCan.

Unless there are missiles with launchers on board why on earth do you need people in uniform?

You could even hire IMP to put maintenance teams on ships at sea.

Considering the capabilities of some private military contracting firms, there is some merit in that notion.

It is not, of course, without risk ...

... consider the FRA Sir Galahad which was sunk by Argentine Skyhawks during the Falklands war with the loss of 48 sailors and soldiers.

 

[Kirkhill]

Considering the capabilities of some private military contracting firms, there is some merit in that notion.

It is not, of course, without risk ...

... consider the FRA Sir Galahad which was sunk by Argentine Skyhawks during the Falklands war with the loss of 48 sailors and soldiers.

With respect, I believe that was more down to The Taffs' deciding to stay warm and dry for a bit longer rather than disembarking and letting the Sir Galahad getting underway again.  I don't think it would have made much difference if the ship had been flying a Red, White or Blue Ensign or the Jolly Roger. 

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Erickson Helicopters has a contract with the US Navy’s Military Sealift Command to supply embarked AS330 Puma Helicopters on a number of T-KAE and other USNS replenishment vessels.  A friend of mine is a retired-USN bos’n now a civilian mate on a T-KAE and the Pumas are in integral part of the Ship’s VERTREP capability.

:2c:

Regards
G2G

Just a minor correction, G2G: It's T-AKE, not T-KAE.  ;D

The "T-" indicates that the ship is operated by the Military Sealift Command (hence, by civilians), while the AKE is the ship's type designator, indicating a "advanced dry cargo ship" as the type.

 

[Kirkhill]

Considering the capabilities of some private military contracting firms, there is some merit in that notion.

It is not, of course, without risk ...

... consider the FRA Sir Galahad which was sunk by Argentine Skyhawks during the Falklands war with the loss of 48 sailors and soldiers.

Further to the discussion of civilian support -

A Call To Serve

Trevor Lane was helping to paint his neighbor's house when the news came over the
radio that Argentina had occupied the Falklands.  He had been with P&O for eight years
and had risen to navigator on CANBERRA.  He was now home on leave while the ship
completed her annual world cruise.  "I almost instinctively knew that that was going to
affect me."
Lane knew that in times of war, the government had authority to requisition merchant
ships and had seen Royal Navy personnel coming on board CANBERRA from
time-to-time for inspections and to see how the ship operated.  Thus, it was apparent
that CANBERRA was part of the Royal Navy's contingency planning.
Although the navigator who was on CANBERRA at the moment was senior to Lane,
Lane had been with CANBERRA since he had been a cadet.  "I was part of the
establishment, if you like, on the CANBERRA."  Furthermore, his colleague was just
completing a lengthy world cruise.  If Lane did not relieve him, his friend would have to
continue on with the ship.  Moreover, the town in which Lane lived along the south
coast of England was known as "P&O Village" because so many P&O officers and
employees lived there. It would have been difficult to show his face at the local pub, if
he did not volunteer.  Thus, when the personnel department called, Lane agreed to go.
"Military personnel joined the ship in Gibraltar and they were already making plans
aboard the ship.  When they got to Southampton and discharged the passengers, an
amazing refit that took place, which implied that they had plans in place to convert the
ship very quickly.  They cut off large parts of it and built three helicopter decks in three
days.  They took things like cocktail bars in the forward end of the ship and put
scaffolding jacks throughout the bar [to act as pillars to support the weight.] Then they
extended the deck above it and took down all the rails and that became the main
helicopter deck.  They took one of the main swimming pools in the middle of the ship
and put huge girders in the middle, covered that and cut down the side rails.  They had
another helicopter deck up by the funnels.  They did this fantastic conversion in three or
four days."

Although CANBERRA normally carried 1,700 passengers on a cruise, "they embarked a
whole brigade - - nearly 4,000 troops.  It was called Three Commando Brigade, and it
was made up of paratroopers, marines and some naval auxiliary staff and some RAF and
helicopter pilots."

The ship set out from England with the ship's P&O captain and a Royal Navy officer
sharing command.  Lane was not a member of the Royal Navy Reserve and thus
technically, he was only under the command of the civilian captain.  However, the navy
wanted direct authority over the ship's navigator.  P&O did not want to cede full
authority.  "They ended up giving me Royal Navy stripes on one shoulder and regular
merchant navy stripes on the other.  That was the compromise."

http://beyondships.com/PO-Canberra-Falklands.html

And not to forget Atlantic Conveyor and the Norland - all civilian crews - all exposed to enemy fire.  The RFA were at least hired with the expectation that they could be bombed.

 

[Good2Golf]

Just a minor correction, G2G: It's T-AKE, not T-KAE.  ;D

The "T-" indicates that the ship is operated by the Military Sealift Command (hence, by civilians), while the AKE is the ship's type designator, indicating a "advanced dry cargo ship" as the type.

OGBD, I plead autocorrect by some crappy DJ, dang’it! ;D

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

At least it didn't come out as TKO then. 

 

[MarkOttawa]

See the timelines for the Royal Navy's two types (Type 31e smaller) of new frigates:

1) Type 26:

Why will the Royal Navy not have its first Type 26 frigate operational until 2027 [when will first CSC be ready?]

Defence Procurement Minister, Guto Bebb stated in Parliament on 23rd April that the first Type 26 frigate, HMS Glasgow is due to be accepted from the builders in the summer of 2025. Eighteen months of further trials and training should see her become operational in 2027. Here we ask why the navy must tolerate such a leisurely eight-year construction schedule.

The Type 26 promises to be a superb submarine hunter and, if adequate investment is made in equipping them with the right weapon fit, they have the potential to be one of best surface combatants in the world. They will be the backbone of our anti-submarine capability and escort for the QEC aircraft carriers, in a world that everyone agrees is becoming more dangerous...

A lack of urgency

Not only should these vessels have been ordered at least 5 years ago, we now find that an extraordinarily leisurely build schedule has been agreed upon. Since the 2015 SDSR, the in-service date for the first T26 has been officially described as in the “mid-2020s”. Using historical precedent, many had assumed a construction time of around 5-6 years, expecting HMS Glasgow would probably begin sea trials in 2023. A comparable complex warship HMS Daring, the first Type 45 destroyer, was laid down March 2003 and accepted by RN in December 2008, a build time of 5 years and 9 months. The Type 45 was arguably more complex and innovative than the T26, with 80% of its equipment new to RN service. T26 is a sophisticated design but relatively low risk. The ‘mission bay’ concept and Mk 41 VLS are new to the RN but already in use with other navies. Significant de-risking work on the design and major components has already been conducted using virtual reality and land-based test rigs. There will be some challenging systems integration work and a bespoke propulsion system but the majority of its key weapons, sensors, decoys, combat system and engines are already proven, and in many cases, already in service on other platforms.

...Whatever the reason for the slow construction, it does not look good in the brochure for the T26 Global Combat Ship design that BAE Systems is looking to export to Australia and Canada. As a light cruiser-sized vessel, T26 comes with space and power generation facilities to support future upgrades but the £3.7Bn build contract for the first three ships certainly does not allow for major changes during construction.

Why won’t these frigates be built faster?

There are no problems with the available space or manufacturing facilities in Glasgow, neither are there issues with the supply chain or the overall complexity of the ship. It is not BAE Systems dragging their feet, rather the MoD is deliberately slowing delivery. The shipbuilding facility and workforce has therefore been sized and scaled to meet the requirements of the customer. The reality is that constricted annual budgets force the MoD to make short-term savings by spreading the cost over a longer time period [emphasis added]. Stretching out procurement programmes with artificially-induced delays may reduce the annual expenditure, but over the lifetime of the project always adds significant additional costs...
https://www.savetheroyalnavy.org/why-will-the-royal-navy-not-have-its-first-type-26-frigate-operational-until-2027/

2) Type 31e:

Making sense of the Royal Navy’s frigate building schedule

In an earlier article [see above], we examined the slow build and delivery schedule for the first Type 26 frigates. With this infographic [please go to link below], we attempt to assess how the projected construction schedule fits with the decommissioning of the Type 23 frigates.

This is very much an outline projection using elements of guesswork, based on the limited information available today and is likely to change. There are several important assumptions made in the timeline. Type 31s will be laid down in a drumbeat of approximately 1 per year and as simpler ships, their trials and introduction into service should be much faster than the Type 26. It has been stated that the first three Type 26s will be under construction for about 8 years with first of class trials and work up lasting almost 2 years. The first three ships are being laid down at around 18-24 month intervals. It is assumed the later ships will be laid down at about the same rate but constructed and brought into service slightly faster, although this would appear to be imperative, it is uncertain at this time.

Conclusions

Each of the five Type 31e frigates will have to be constructed, complete sea trials and worked up in around 4 years (the contract will be awarded in early 2019) if they are to be ready to replace the first five Type 23s on time. This is very demanding and does not provide any slack, should any significant construction snags or technical problems arise [first to be laid down 2019, in service 2023]...
https://www.savetheroyalnavy.org/making-sense-of-the-royal-navys-frigate-building-schedule/

Mark
Ottawa

 

[JMCanada]

Now compare that to the fact that V. de Quebec is nowadays deployed in eastern med. along with De Ruyter ( zeven provincien class) and C. Colon (F-100).

How much risk and delay is the MOD ready or willing to take?

 

[MarkOttawa]

Most of what you need to know from FrontLine Defence, excerpt:

CSC 2018 Evaluation Stage
...
Although rumours are swirling about the possibility of two variants on a common platform, a DND spokesperson confirms that “the current requirement is that all 15 CSC ships will have the same capabilities: anti-air warfare, anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, electronic warfare as well as command and control.”

The DND email to FrontLine goes on to say that “Funding has been set aside to deliver the full complement of ships the Royal Canadian Navy needs, in order to provide capability across the full range of operations. This will replace both the recently retired Iroquois-class destroyers and the Halifax-class frigates with a single class of ship capable of meeting multiple threats on both the open ocean and the highly complex coastal (littoral) environment.”

One rumour suggests that an initial tranche would be built “to facilitate narrowing the production gap at Irving.” But the official word from DND is that “In recognition of the duration of the design and construction for the ships, the competitive procurement required bidders to bid on major equipment for the first three ships. These competitive prices will then be used as the basis for negotiation of equipment which will be installed in subsequent ships.”

How the Government expects to receive the best pricing for the most expensive single procurement in Canadian military history based on only 3 of the 15 was not explained.

Whichever way quantities and variants play out, the chosen design must be cost-effective and fully capable in the current global environment, be adaptable to the future maritime threat environment, and have growth margins to allow for role changes and upgrades in technology, particularly weapon systems (hence the criticality of this process).

Insiders are saying the estimated completion of the winning design and contractor team selection process is now expected to be in November 2018 (though more likely early 2019), with ship construction to start the early 2020s [emphasis added].

A note of caution comes from Jean-Denis Fréchette, the Parliamentary Budget Officer. For every year that the awarding of the contract is delayed beyond 2018, his staff estimates the program will cost taxpayers an extra $3 Billion due to inflation...
https://defence.frontline.online/article/2018/5/10490-CSC-2018-Evaluation-Stage

Mark
Ottawa

 

[AirDet]

In fact, I heard a very depressing statement the other day that rings some what true. Essentially this person said:

"The entire MARLANT organization, with all its schools, personnel management, maintenance facilities, intelligence facilities, HQs, and support units, totalling over 5000 people, is here just to put 1 Frigate to see on deployment for 6 months out of the year."

That sounds about right. But I'll take that to it's natural conclusion for you...

The only reason that Frigate even exists is to provide a heliport for the Helo!  :evilrifle:

 

[kratz]

[quote author=AirDet]
The only reason that Frigate even exists is to provide a heliport for the Helo!  :evilrifle:
[/quote]

Stand down Trigger.  :cowboy: /s
Aircrew enjoy SDA added on top of their other allowances.

 

[Good2Golf]

Stand down Trigger.  :cowboy: /s
Aircrew enjoy SDA added on top of their other allowances.

Yeah!  Double-dipping Internet-surfing crew-resting Prima Donnas!


(Said the ex triple-dipping (PLT/AIRCRA/LDA) semi(on account of doing some (air)field time)-Prima Donna...  ;D )

 

[NavyShooter]

In fact, I heard a very depressing statement the other day that rings some what true. Essentially this person said:

"The entire MARLANT organization, with all its schools, personnel management, maintenance facilities, intelligence facilities, HQs, and support units, totalling over 5000 people, is here just to put 1 Frigate to see on deployment for 6 months out of the year."

This is only somewhat accurate - in terms of major international deployers, yes, one at a time, in serial is the way we do it.  Usually.


However, if you actually look at what we support, our MARLANT organization in the Halifax area (plus the NFS(A) det here that belongs to MARPAC) actually has a frigate on deployment to a NATO/UN/Etc tasking for 11 out of 12 months in a year. 


We also support FDU deploying 4-5 times a year on various tasks and deployments, as well as MCDV's doing an average of 3x deployments (2+ months for 2x ships) per year, plus the other 6 Frigates undergoing their TRP's getting them on the road to readiness for deployment to replace the one that's gone.  On top of that we have the submarines, with the specialized work that goes into supporting and maintaining them.  (We had a sub deployed on the west coast for over 4 months which got considerable support from the MARLANT area as well.)


You are severely understating the availability of spots in the parking lot in HMC Dockyard.


NS

 

[Lumber]

This is only somewhat accurate - in terms of major international deployers, yes, one at a time, in serial is the way we do it.  Usually.


However, if you actually look at what we support, our MARLANT organization in the Halifax area (plus the NFS(A) det here that belongs to MARPAC) actually has a frigate on deployment to a NATO/UN/Etc tasking for 11 out of 12 months in a year. 


We also support FDU deploying 4-5 times a year on various tasks and deployments, as well as MCDV's doing an average of 3x deployments (2+ months for 2x ships) per year, plus the other 6 Frigates undergoing their TRP's getting them on the road to readiness for deployment to replace the one that's gone.  On top of that we have the submarines, with the specialized work that goes into supporting and maintaining them.  (We had a sub deployed on the west coast for over 4 months which got considerable support from the MARLANT area as well.)


You are severely understating the availability of spots in the parking lot in HMC Dockyard.


NS

Yes yes, all of these things... but what are all of these things?... could we say categories most of them as Force... Generation?

We're sending 3 ships to Europe in the fall, for example  (and that's from the unclassified fleet schedule, so no one get your panties in a bunch about opsec), which is impressive, but they're going for Force Generation, not Force Employment.

So, yes, we have more that one ship sailing 6 months out of the year, but all of that sailing is for the purpose of force generating in preparation to force employ 1 Frigate 6 months out of the year.

If we had to, how many ships do you things we could deploy together on a 6-8 months named operation?