dapaterson said:
The history of R v Dutil started with COS to JAG filing a complaint, with the MJIC rejecting the complaint because, apparently, military offences are not judicial ones - it's perfectly all right, apparently (and allegedly) for judges to carry on with subordinates to the detriment of the good order and discipline of the wider institution and not disclose that relationship, as they are required to do as members of the CAF.
The learned judges and equally learned counsel forget entirely in their pleadings that there is a profession of arms. Professions must either self-regulate or be regulated externally. As officers and members of the CAF, judges remain subject to the terms of that profession (as well as their own). Carving themselves out a safe space because the evil CDS might punish them is venturing into the realm of hypotheticals and far from the actuals. Judges, in their capacity as military members (and not as judges) require a chain of command which is able to enforce military discipline. (This goes back to my earlier complaint - the judge who later recused himself and all other military judges permitted the accused in a military proceeding to appear in civilian clothes, rather than a uniform, showing that he fails to understand the concept of the military profession and the CSD as a tool of self-regulation for that profession.)
The judge concludes that the CSD applies to officers, but once a judge you're some odd third species still military but not really since the CSD does not apply, but if you choose to give up your lavish pay and low workload and return to being a JAG officer, well, then, you're subject to the CSD again.
To which again I say bollocks. If military judges are indeed military, then they are subject to the same self-regulation of the military profession as any other military member. If they are not, then they are not military. And thus we can scrap the military bench entirely, and refer then caseload directly to the federal court to address.
The learned judge should have tossed the DDCS argument out on its ear. Instead, he embraced it, and extended it. Perhaps I should have said "The problem is not only the CAF's underworked defence lawyers wasting the court's time..."
The problem here is that DND is trying to suck and blow at the same time. Believe me that the judges and legal officers fully understand the military disciplinary system and its purposes. I sometimes think they understand it much more than the chain of command which sometimes has a cavalier attitude in balancing the constitutional rights of every citizen (including their soldiers) and the perceived needs of unit discipline.
In Canada an accused has an absolute right to be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal under s 11(d) of the Charter. As far as judges are concerned independent and impartial as defined in Valente v R [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673 as security of tenure, financial security, and institutional independence in administrative matters relevant to the functioning of the judge. If these requirements are not met any decision rendered by the tribunal can be quashed. Military trial judges are not "carving out a safe space" for themselves but are trying to predict, based on previous appellate decisions as to whether or not a particular argument before them has merit and how it will be interpreted at a higher (non military) appellate level.
Whether or not a tribunal is independent is eventually decided by an appellate court or the SCC, however, arguments respecting judicial independence are almost always first addressed at the trial level as a pre-trial motion (or plea in bar of trial in the case of a CM) There's absolutely no value in judge holding in favour of the "disciplinary system" if the CMAC will just overturn the decision.
Military judges are pretty well off respecting the first two securities but are running a ragged edge when it comes to the
"administrative matters" one.
Much as you might like a judge to be an officer first and a judge second, it's exactly that attitude (which is shared by a large number of your peers) that risks having military judges declared a tool of the executive and as a result their decisions invalidated. Wearing civilian clothes is a very minor symbol of independence and is well worth the bother to ensure that in fact military personnel are tried in front of judges who are part of the military, learned their craft within the system, and understand the need for military discipline.
If you insist that military judges be officers first, be subject to all the minutiae of military life and as you say be subject to a chain of command for discipline (which by inference will be a non judge CoC) then you are absolutely ensuring that a higher court will strike down the military justice system as it now stands.
We've been fine tuning the military judicial system ever since the Charter came out and we've been successful at it. But it wasn't a one time correction. We've had some major revisions but in large part it's been minor issues coming out of the woodwork that made us improve things bit by bit over time. This time we've been hit out of left field. No one ever gave thought to a judge committing an offence (we did predict improper conduct and set up a system to deal with that.)
As I said before, we can easily fix the Dutil-like issue with an amendment to s161.1 of the NDA and by providing for the calling in of an ad-hoc trial judge from a superior court to try cases where the military judges are conflicted out.
I'm actually much more concerned about how to deal with the CDS (a s161.1 fix should do) or the DMP and PM for which there is no internal workaround at the present (I expect it would need ad hoc investigators and/or special prosecutors)
Believe me when I tell you that the concepts of a chain of command and judicial independence are mutually exclusive. Civilian judges are not part of a chain of command. Chief judges are administrative leaders but have no disciplinary role over their puisne judges. judges are subject to hearings before disciplinary councils for improper conduct and the ordinary criminal legal system for crimes. There are systems in place to bring in special prosecutors and ad hoc judges when needed to prosecute and try a judge. It may take some thought within DND (now that someone is finally addressing their minds to the issue) but one should easily be able to put into play a system that would allow a military judge to be charged and tried under the CSD without the necessity of involving the chain of command. The judge in this case is suggesting a system (which incidentally I think sucks as much as you do). It should be simpler than that. Amending s161.1 is the start.
What you want is akin to pushing on a rope. If you're ever out my way we need to share a beer or two or three and rationally discuss this issue until we're both p*ssed.
:cheers: