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Chinese bases in NW Pakistan?

midget-boyd91

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Not entirely sure how credible this is, but thought I'd post for the "what if" factor..
Chinese PLA wants bases in the tribal regions on Pakistan?

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/10/china-pakistan-bases/?mbid=ob_ppc_dangerroom

Washington just got a golden opportunity to end its decade-long excursion into central Asia and deplete the power of its Pacific rival/banker, all in one fell swoop. The Chinese are seeking bases in the tribal regions of Pakistan, precisely where the U.S. fights its drone war.

The plugged-in Asia Times Online reports that China wants to set up military hubs in Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa, formerly known as the Northwest Frontier Province. China’s reasoning will sound familiar to American ears: That’s where anti-Chinese terrorists operate. Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa abuts the restive, non-Han Chinese province of Xinjiang, home to ethnic Uighur separatists. With the People’s Liberation Army getting a foothold in tribal Pakistan, the Chinese reason, it can crush separatism, and make sure that terrorist factions can’t hide out across the border.
 
There is a sort of unstated assumption amongst some that the Chinese are terminally stupid, à la e.g. the "occupiers." Perhaps they are but I wouldn't count on it.

The Chinese do want a naval base somewhere on Pakistan's Arabian Sea coast.

China does want a "listening post" in the region to try to track Islmaic extremists - remember Xinjiang Province (autonomous region) is a (relative) hotbed of Muslim separatism and the Chinese do not like it one little bit. But they, the Chinese, have "listening posts" in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan so it's not clear to me why they would want something father away in Pakistan, except in those far North-East regions of Pakistan that border both Xinjiang and Tibet Provinces ~ areas of little to no interest to the Americans.

 
This sounds a bit like the so called "string of pearls" strategy of Chinese bases across the Indian Ocean and African coast.

Most of these "bases" are port facilities the Chinese finance to gain access to the mineral and oil resources in the region and facilitate Chinese trade. There is the possibility of using them as dual purpose facilities, after all they are deep water ports capable of docking large ships, but without dedicated military logistics the best you could do is sail in and fuel up (which is still better than nothing at all). The Chinese have also placed large contingents of "security contractors" in places like the Sudan to guard their oil interests, and the occasional PLA construction battalion is reported to have been put into action for some of these projects when the local contractors cannot get the job done, so there is a military presense of some sort (along with the occasional PLAN ships cruising the waters).

If you are a fan of Robert Kaplan, he sees activities like this and similar "handshake" deals by US military personnel across Asia (See Imperial Grunts, Hog Pilots, Blue Water Grunts: The American Military in the Air, at Sea, and on the Ground and Monsoon) as the future of force projection; rather than build expensive and exposed bases you make friends and have the ability to gain quick access where and when you need it without a lot of prior preparation. (This would be more like a series of FARPs rather than FOBs, you go in, do the deed and quickly leave).
 
Why bother asking. The norther border between Pakistan and China has been under dispute for so long, why not just exert your claim and set up bases in the disputed region.
 
With the amount of anti-Chinese extremism in Pakistan even a listening post in the frontier provinces, or a FARP on the coast it would seem quite likely that the post would become a target of one of the any number of groups targetting China? Could an action like that force the Chinese to deploy a larger number of "security contractors" to protect the installations?

Even if China does not occupy foreign nations as a general rule, I could see a scenerio like this having China "accidently" occupying different regions of the country.
 
uncle-midget-Oddball said:
Even if China does not occupy foreign nations as a general rule, I could see a scenerio like this having China "accidently" occupying different regions of the country.


And I'd bet the Paki's would not be long wishing the West was back in the area too.  A more tolerant form of Devil you know.  ;)
 
In my opinion, we must be aware that the Chinese are playing a "long" game - their goals are long term (they have a long term, strategic vision) and their domestic political system does not require them to show short term results, and they are great believers in "soft power." The "listening posts" in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, for example, are truck plants or textile factories and their role is not to "occupy" but, rather, to "learn" and "influence." The "learning" is important because the Chinese really do not understand religion ~ they may have guys with PhDs in theology or religious studies but religion, as we understand it is foreign to the Chinese. Neither Taoism nor the Chinese implementation of Buddhism are "like" Christianity or Islam.

The Chines have, do and will make mistakes and we must be ready and able to exploit those mistakes to pursue our advantage but, first, we need to understand what the Chinese are trying to accomplish.
 
The Chinese don't have to "accidentally" do anything. They are already building a multi billion dollar port facility on the coast of Pakistan (see Robert Kaplan's "Monsoon" for some details), but may or may not have plans to occupy it, perhaps because it is in a region of ethnic tension and dispute. See this:

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/05/27/chinas_port_in_pakistan?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full

China's Port in Pakistan?

China's dream of Indian Ocean ports -- the so-called string of pearls -- is heightening geopolitical tensions in a rough neighborhood.
BY ROBERT D. KAPLAN | MAY 27, 2011

Pakistani officials have announced that the Chinese look favorably on taking over the operation of the Arabian Sea port of Gwadar close to the entrance of the Strait of Hormuz, and perhaps building a naval base for the Pakistanis there as well. The Chinese have apparently contradicted these claims, indicating that they have made no such decisions on these matters.

The fact that Pakistan should want deeper Chinese involvement with this strategically located port, even as the Chinese are hesitant to do just that, should surprise no one. Gwadar is where dreams clash with reality.

The Chinese have already invested $200 million in building a modern port in Gwadar. Furthermore, a presence of some sort at Gwadar makes estimable sense for Beijing in the abstract. China faces what has been called a "Malacca dilemma." It is too dependent on the narrow and congested Strait of Malacca between Indonesia and Malaysia for its oil and natural gas shipments from the Middle East to Chinese ports.

Thus, China has been engaged in port-building projects in Pakistan and Burma, which, someday, may be linked by roads and energy pipelines directly to China. Besides offering an alternative route for energy supplies, such new ports will be the 21st-century equivalent of 19th-century British coaling stations for China's budding maritime empire spanning the Indian Ocean. Once China has developed a blue-water navy to protect its sea lines of communications, it will require port access along the global energy interstate that is the Indian Ocean. For Pakistan's part, a robust Chinese presence at Gwadar would serve to check India's own strategic ambitions, as Islamabad leverages Beijing against New Delhi.

The problem is that these are all long-range plans -- and dreams. They conflict with messy ground-level realities. Visiting Gwadar for a week in 2008, I was struck not only by how isolated it was, between pounding sea and bleak desert, but how unstable was the region of Baluchistan, which lies immediately beyond the port in all landward directions. Ethnic Baluchi rebel leaders told me that they would never permit roads and pipelines to be built there, until their grievances with the Pakistani government in faraway Islamabad were settled.

The security situation is indeed fraught with peril. The Chinese know this. They know that a pipeline network from Gwadar into Central Asia and China must await the political stabilization of Afghanistan -- and Pakistan, too. Until such a day, Gwadar, while a potentially useful coaling station for a budding Chinese navy, constitutes, in essence, a road to nowhere.

Bottom line: The Chinese may be as frustrated and aghast at the dysfunction of the Pakistani state as are the Americans. Yes, they built the port, with hopes of using it someday. But it seems from their latest statements that they have reservations for the moment. True, they seem to have moved closer to Pakistan to take advantage of Islamabad's estrangement from Washington in the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, but they are nevertheless still being cautious. And the caution, I believe, comes not from a lack of geopolitical ambition regarding Gwadar, but from the present security situation in Pakistan, with a government that frankly cannot control its own territory, whether it be the lawless frontier with Afghanistan, or Baluchistan.

Furthermore, just as the Pakistanis want to use China as a bulwark against India, China -- while not shying away from strategic competition with India -- must at the same time be careful not to unduly antagonize India. For China is building or upgrading ports not only in Pakistan and Burma, but in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, too. The point must be emphasized that it is unclear exactly what China intends for these Indian Ocean ports -- China's so-called "String of Pearls." India already feels surrounded by China and has greatly enlarged its own naval base at Karwar, in the country's south, partly in response to Chinese construction work in Gwadar. Given that India and China may soon constitute the world's largest bilateral trading relationship, China must tread carefully. After all, it has always claimed to its neighbors that its rise is benevolent and non-hegemonic.

Indeed, Gwadar is important: not for what it is today, but for what it will indicate about Beijing's intentions in the coming years and decades.

Robert D. Kaplan is a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and the author of Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power.
 
uncle-midget-Oddball said:
The Chinese are seeking bases in the tribal regions of Pakistan, precisely where the U.S. fights its drone war.

Seems to me the Wired writer answered his own question regarding what exactly the PLA listening posts plan to be listening in on.

Also, when did the Chinese start using Walther P1/P38 pistols?  ???
 
I happily support Pakistan become allied with China, I have no doubt they will stab the Chinese in the back just as they have done to everyone else. Plus it would be good that Pakistan becomes a drain on the Chinese rather than the US. It's not that they really listen to the west anyways. It also highlights the fact that we should have invested way more on improving Afghanistan's western road and rail connections.
 
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