Chinese Military,Political and Social Superthread

[Edward Campbell]

What about the 1.5 million strong People's Armed Police/PAP, which essentially a dissent-crushing, internal security army? If I can recall correctly, they recently sent the "Snow Leopard commando unit," which specializes in counterterrorism and riot control, to Xinjiang.

Yes, but I liken it to the French Groupe d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale - they are more "police" than military, but more than sufficient, in my opinion, for how I think Chinese COIN should be done - quickly, ruthlessly and highly visibly to the locals (albeit all but invisible to outsiders).

 

[CougarKing]

And it appears that the death toll was higher than originally stated. Given the state media's propensity to downplay such events, the fact they've come out with this at all when it first came out suggests the situation was worse than originally thought and the higher death toll is one indication of that...

link

China calls Xinjiang unrest a 'terrorist attack', ups death toll to 35

BEIJING (Reuters) - China's state media has raised to 35 the death toll from unrest this week in far western Xinjiang region, and denounced the clashes, the deadliest in four years, as a "terrorist attack".

Xinjiang is home to a large Muslim Uighur community and violence focusing on its discontent had been confined recently to southern districts. The altercations in Shanshan county on Wednesday marked a return of unrest to Xinjiang's north.

Many Uighurs, Muslims who speak a Turkic language, chafe at what they call Chinese government restrictions on their culture, language and religion. China says it grants Uighurs wide-ranging freedoms and accuses extremists of separatism.

On Wednesday, gangs with knives attacked a police station and a government building and set fire to police cars. Twenty-four people died in clashes with police, including 16 Uighurs, state news agency Xinhua said.

According to Xinhua's latest dispatch on Thursday night, eight more died in the police response. It called the incident a "violent terrorist attack" and said the overall situation was now "on the whole, stable".

An officer at Shanshan county's public security, or police, bureau told Reuters by telephone that the cause of the riots and the ethnic origin of the attackers remained unclear.

(...)

 

[Edward Campbell]

And it appears that the death toll was higher than originally stated. Given the state media's propensity to downplay such events, the fact they've come out with this at all when it first came out suggests the situation was worse than originally thought and the higher death toll is one indication of that...

This, suggesting a foreign, terrorist element, is smart domestic politics - the Chinese are notable xenophobic. It also fires a shot across the bows of the 'Stans who are members of the Shnaghai Cooperation Organization.

But they are being cautious; note the foreign ministry statement from the article:

    "Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying condemned the incident, though she stopped short of saying who was behind it.

      This is a violent terrorist surprise attack. There is no doubt about that," she said at a daily ministry briefing. "But with regard to who they are, or whether foreign forces were involved ... local public security is
      vigorously investigating."

 

[CougarKing]

Did Chinese Steal The Blueprints For Russia's First Stealth Fighter?
asitimes.blogspot.com
June 28, 2013

Quote:

Project 1.44 was meant to be the Soviet Union (and later Russia's) super-fast, super-maneuverable answer to the United States' premier fighter, the F-22 Raptor. However, the jet was underfunded in the days following the collapse of the Soviet Union. When the plane finally took its maiden flight in 2000, its designers found multiple flaws with the aircraft and the project was abandoned.

The 1.44 was designed with stealth-like angles, an internal weapons bay and supposedly used electronic countermeasures and special coatings to help reduce its radar signature. It also featured digital flight controls along with thrust vectoring engines and canards (little wings) on the front of the fuselage aimed at making the jet incredibly maneuverable.

But, in 2001, Russian officials shelved Project 1.44 in favor of a more modern design from MiG's rival Sukhoi -- the T-50 PAK FA. The 1.44 supposedly disappeared into storage after that. A quick Google Images search reveals recent-looking photos of the jet in storage -- some of which claim they are from 2009 and taken near Moscow. (Google Maps also shows grainy satellite imagery the plane sitting on the ramp at Zhukovsky airfield.)

(...)

Full Article >>

 

[Edward Campbell]

This, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from The Diplomat, could, equally well, fit in the North Korea (Superthread) but it's about China so it belongs here:

http://thediplomat.com/china-power/china-and-the-denuclearization-of-the-korean-peninsula/

China and the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

By  Scott A. Synder

June 30, 2013

People’s Republic of China president Xi Jinping has taken a noticeably stronger rhetorical stand against North Korea’s nuclear program since he came to office in March on the heels of North Korea’s third nuclear test on February 12, 2013. China backed a new UN Security Council resolution condemning North Korea’s test and clearly distanced itself from North Korea, in contrast to its decision to embrace and defend North Korea as a strategic asset following North Korea’s second nuclear test in 2009. There has been a slowdown in high-level contacts with Kim Jong-un and a striking chilliness to Sino-DPRK interaction following meetings in July and November 2012 between Kim Jong-un and high-level Chinese officials in Pyongyang. Last week DPRK Vice Minister held a “strategic dialogue” with his PRC foreign ministry counterpart Zhang Yesui that was devoid of the party-to-party interaction that has long made China-DPRK interactions “special” rather than “normal.”

The rhetorical shift has emerged clearly since President Xi first stated at the Boao Forum in March that “no one should be allowed to throw a region and even the world into chaos for selfish gains.” Moreover, Xi delivered a harsh message to North Korea’s top military figure Choe Ryong-hae during Choe’s late May visit to Beijing days prior to the Xi-Obama Sunnylands summit. During that meeting, Xi emphasized that “all the parties involved should stick to the objective of denuclearization, safeguard peace and stability on the peninsula, and resolve disputes through dialogue and consultation.”

President Xi reiterated China’s commitment to the unacceptability of North Korea as a nuclear weapons state in his summit discussions with President Obama in Sunnylands in June, aligning China’s policy priority on denuclearization with the respective positions of the United States and South Korea. The clarity of this statement bolstered the confidence of the Obama administration that the United States and China might actually be able to cooperate in achieving a denuclearized Korean peninsula, and it has become the major concrete hope for better U.S.-China relations that is most directly associated with the idea that the United States and China can forge a “new type of great power relationship,” in which both powers can cooperate to achieve “win-win” results. But North Korea has emerged near the top of the U.S.-China agenda not so much because of a convergence of interests, but because it is the least difficult of an array of regional security challenges facing the United States and China.

The Xi-Obama commitment to build a “new type of great power relationship” provided a big boost to South Korea’s Park Geun-hye, who has come into office with a vision of cooperation in Northeast Asia that involves development of an improved South Korean relationship with China, but not at the expense of the U.S.-ROK alliance. A positive framework for U.S.-China relations provides South Korea with an opportunity to establish much more comprehensive cooperation with China without feeling that it has to choose between China and the United States. It also created hopes that South Korea could finally achieve a strategic breakthrough in its relations with China, at least to the extent that Seoul might be able to win recognition from Beijing that it is likely to be the dominant and most beneficial partner for China on the peninsula. South Koreans have consistently held the yet unrealized hopes for China-South Korea strategic cooperation ever since Roh Tae-woo pursued China-South Korea normalization over two decades ago.

Although South Korea and China may look to build more comprehensive cooperation through a joint statement that expands the scope of Sino-ROK cooperation, and Xi has repeated that it seeks North Korea’s denuclearization, it is still the case that the respective parties have conflicting secondary priorities regarding the end state of the Korean peninsula that are likely to inhibit cooperation. In this respect, it is notable that Xi emphasized to Park that “China resolutely safeguards the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and the region, opposes any party that disrupts peace and stability and adheres to resolving problems through dialogue and negotiations.” Following North Korea’s third nuclear test, China’s declaratory policies regarding North Korea have swung into alignment with those of the United States and South Korea, but China has not sacrificed its priority on stability and there is no indication as of yet that North Korea will return to the path of denuclearization. Park’s outreach to Xi and the joint China-South Korean effort to improve the relationship therefore represent not a breakthrough, but the beginning of an effort that will require considerably more investment before it sees real results.

Scott A. Synder is Senior Fellow for Korea Studies and Director of the Program on U.S.-Korea Policy. He blogs at Asia Unbound where this piece originally appeared.

My sense of Chinese policy remains unchanged. The Korean Peninsula can be reunified, peacefully, under a democratic, capitalist, South Korean government as soon as the US withdraws its armed forces - and see this slightly cheeky proposal to do just that.

South Korea is an important trading partner with and investor in China; North Korea is a drain on China and its only "plus" is that, now and again, it discomfits the USA.

 

[CougarKing]

Thus far the Chinese approach to this insurgency has focused on economic development and police actions. As far as I understand it, and I am anything but well informed about the Chinese military, the Lanzhou military region (one of seven in China), the region that includes Xinjiang province, has two (of 18) corps in it (21st and 47th) both of which are a) stationed in the East of the region - rather far from the major Uyghur cities - and b) "training" formations - undermanned and poorly equipped. The Chinese military, as I understand it, does not think COIN - at least not the way we do. But they do think internal security and development/nation building.

Speaking of Lanzhou military region units in Xinjiang, here are some photos of the stepped security presence that comes with an update below:

China says 'religious extremists' behind Xinjiang attack
Reuters

BEIJING (Reuters) - The deadliest unrest in years in China's western region of Xinjiang was carried out by a gang engaged in "religious extremist activities", state media reported, saying the group had been busy buying weapons and raising money.

Beijing initially called last week's incident in which 35 people were killed a "terrorist attack".

Xinjiang is home to the mainly Muslim Uighur people who speak a Turkic language. Many deeply resent what they call Chinese government restrictions on their culture, language and religion. Beijing accuses extremists of separatism.

The animosity between the majority Han Chinese and the Uighurs poses a major challenge for China's Communist Party leaders. President Xi Jinping, who took office in March, has called for the unity of all ethnic groups in China.

According to reports on the government website of Xinjiang and the state news agency Xinhua, last week's attacks occurred after police arrested a member of the gang.

The next day the same gang went on a rampage in the remote township of Lukqun, about 200 km (120 miles) southeast of Xinjiang's capital of Urumqi.

The group attacked a police station, shops and a construction site. Twenty-four civilians, both Uighur and Han Chinese, and police were killed, along with 11 gang members.

"Since February, Ahmatniyaz Siddiq and others were engaged in religious extremist activities, listening to violent terrorist recordings," said the reports.

"They formed a violent terrorist group of 17 members, and since mid-June were raising money, and buying knives, gasoline and other tools for crime."

Last week's killings marked the deadliest unrest since July 2009, when nearly 200 people were killed in riots pitting Uighurs against ethnic Chinese in the region's capital Urumqi.

"Terrorist organizations should be aware that the Chinese nation and its people are determined to safeguard the country's territorial integrity and national unity against all enemies," Xinhua said in a separate commentary on Sunday.

"Any attempt to sabotage will eventually fail."

Two days after the deadly attack, more than a hundred people, riding motorbikes and wielding knives, attacked a police station in Xinjiang, state media reported.

(Reporting by Li Hui and Terril Yue Jones; Editing by Jeremy Laurence)

 

[Edward Campbell]

Are those Army or para-military police units?

 

[CougarKing]

Are those Army or para-military police units?

Both. The column of APCs on the third picture from the top are clearly in PLA markings though. The ones in white in subsequent pics are PAP.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Both. The column of APCs on the third picture from the top are clearly in PLA markings though. The ones in white in subsequent pics are PAP.

Thanks, beyond a couple of visits to the National Defence University and a serendipitous connection to the Whampoa Military Academy which resulted in an informative visit to the adjacent naval (amphibious) base, I know very little about the PLA. I still have trouble differentiating the Army, proper, from the PAP.

 

[CougarKing]

One of those times when the Chinese state media sounds like North Korea's KCNA in blaming the US. Typical.  :

China's State Media: Syria, US To Blame For Xinjiang Violence
By Zachary Keck
July 2, 2013

China's state media is alternatively blaming opposition forces in Syria and Turkey for the burst of violence in its Western Xinjiang Province that killed 35 people. A commentary piece in the People’s Daily has said that the U.S. encouraging the violence because it "fears a lack of chaos in China." Interestingly, this commentary piece doesn't appear on the English-language website.

link: The Diplomat

 

[CougarKing]

China, Russia to Hold Largest-Ever Naval Drills
By J. Michael Cole
July 2, 2013


The Chinese and Russian will hold their largest-ever joint naval exercise from July 5-12 in the Sea of Japan, a Chinese official announced on July 1.

Zhang Junshe, deputy director of China’s Naval Military Studies Research Institute, told Chinese media that a total of 19 surface ships of various types — seven from China and 12 from Russia — will take part in the exercise, along with one submarine, three fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and special warfare units. According to Zhang, this will also be the first time that a Russian Sukhoi Su-24M Fencer bomber take part in joint exercises with China.

Based on various pictures posted on the Internet, the PLA Navy vessels involved in Joint Sea-2013 are the Type 052C (Luyang II class) Lanzhou (170); Type 052B (Guangzhou class) Wuhan (169); the Type 051C (Luzhou class) Shenyang (115) and Shijiazhuang (116); the Type 054A (Jiangkai II class) Yancheng (546) and Yantai (538) and the Hongze Lake comprehensive supply ship (881). At least three ship-based helicopters will take part in the exercise.

The Diplomat link

 

[CougarKing]

Defense News link

China's New Jet, Radar Complicate US Posture

Russian-made Gear Extends Beijing's Punch


TAIPEI — China’s increasing military musculature continues to crush the margins of how far the US military can conduct operations near the mainland, experts say. Through the purchase of Russian-made equipment, China is attempting to break beyond the current air defense range of 250 kilometers in what US experts refer to as China’s anti-access/area-denial strategy.

China plans to procure two new Russian weapon systems that will extend the range of its air defense strike capability to 400 kilometers. This would place all of Taiwan within the scope of China’s air defense network and endanger the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands, which China also claims.

The first is the much-reported negotiation for the 400-kilometer range S-400 surface-to-air missile (SAM) system with a possible deal after 2017, when the Russian manufacturer, Almaz-Antey, fulfills Russian military orders.

The second is the Sukhoi Su-35S multirole fighter jet. These fighters will not be outfitted with the older Zhuk radar, but with the IRBIS-E radar, said Vasiliy Kashin, a researcher at the Moscow-based Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies.

Built by Tikhomirov NIIP, the 400-kilometer range IRBIS-E multimode X-Band passive electronically scanned array radar can detect and track up to 30 airborne targets and attack up to eight at the same time, according to the company’s website. In addition, in the air-to-ground mode, it can track up to four ground targets, and can track one ground target while preserving air sector surveillance.

The S-400 and Su-35S with the IRBIS-E radar might become “a psychological deterrent to politicians in Washington when they contemplate a Taiwan contingency,” said Alexander Huang, a military specialist at Tamkang University, here.

Kashin said the tactical situation is “bad news for Taiwan,” as the Su-35S will be able to spot Taiwan’s F-16 fighters at 400 kilometers with its new radar. “That means Chinese Su-35s patrolling on the mainland side of the border will be able to see the targets all over Taiwan.”

If anything, these systems will “inspire determination to expedite production, procurement and deployment of the [Lockheed Martin] F-35 fighter by the US and its Asian allies,” Huang said.

The latest information on the Su-35S deal was revealed on June 10, when the director general of Russian Technologies Co., Sergey Chemezov, said the final commercial contract on the fighter sale could be expected by the end of this year.

Kashin said the “contract likely will be signed at the next meeting of the Sino-Russian intergovernmental commission on military technical cooperation, which can be expected to take place in November in Moscow.”

The first procurement contract is expected to include 24 Su-35S fighters, with an option for an additional 24 as things progress. Though 24 to 48 fighters are not a significant threat to US forces, they pose a problem for Taiwan as it retires 56 Mirage 2000 fighters and roughly 50 F-5s. Taiwan is upgrading 126 indigenous defense fighters and 145 F-16A/B fighters, but there has been a significant push by Taiwan to procure 66 F-16C/D fighters to counter reductions. Effective lobbying by China within the US government has blocked new F-16 sales to Taiwan.

With projected reductions in fighters, Taiwan’s military has begun fielding its first land-attack cruise missile, the Hsiung Feng 2E, and is working on a variety of new anti-ship cruise missiles.

However, Douglas Barrie, senior fellow for military aerospace at the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies, said Taiwan’s growing interest in land-attack cruise missiles could be countered by the Su-35’s “potential ability to detect small low-flying targets at ranges suitable to support an engagement.”

The IRBIS system’s 400-kilometer range “could provide a useful gap filler” to support the Chinese air force’s limited number of airborne warning and control system aircraft (AWACS), Barrie said. “It remains to become clear what, if any, long-range air-to-air missile might be supplied with the Su-35.”

Both the S-400 and Su-35S with IRBIS-E radar are “impressive steps in increasing capability,” said Lance Gatling of Nexial Research, a defense consulting firm in Tokyo. However, there are technical challenges to integrating China’s AWACS capability with the S-400 and IRBIS-E. “SAM radars, ground-based, have the radar horizon issue, so they can’t see planes at very low altitude over Taipei.”

Taiwan could use the jamming capabilities of its new early warning radar at Leshan Mountain, near Hsinchu, to play havoc with China’s various radar systems, said a Taiwan defense industry source. The Leshan facility is considered one of the most powerful radars in the world, and unconfirmed sources here indicate it relays data directly to the US military to allow for the monitoring of aircraft and missile activity within China.

Gatling said the ultimate question on China’s procurement of the IRBIS and S-400 systems is: “How advanced is the integrated air defense system, data management and data links” in China? At present, this is difficult to define, as much of China’s military capabilities remain opaque to outsiders.

 

[Edward Campbell]

If you want to know why Hong Kong and China don't get along very well, consider this article which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the South China Morning Post:

http://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/1277645/shanghais-free-trade-zone-puts-hong-kongs-future-spotlight

Shanghai's free-trade zone puts Hong Kong's future in the spotlight
Hong Kong needs to assess what strengths can help maintain its financial hub status, as the rival mainland city bids to usurp it with its latest deal

George Chen

Monday, 08 July, 2013 although I'm posting this on Sun, 7 Jul, it is alread Mon, 8 Jul in HK)

Will the new Shanghai free-trade zone be a game changer?

This question popped up in my mind when I read the breaking news on Wednesday evening about Beijing’s landmark approval to set up a free-trade zone in Shanghai.

To my surprise, when I looked for related reports the following day, the news about Shanghai’s latest victory in winning policy support from the central government had not made it to the front pages of any major Chinese-language newspapers in Hong Kong.

“Is Hong Kong too self-confident or too self-centred?” I asked my colleagues.

For Shanghai, things moved quickly after Premier Li Keqiang visited the Pudong New Area and trade and port facilities in the city in late March. By the end of June, Li had made his decision, and on July 3, state broadcaster CCTV said the State Council had issued an announcement after a meeting chaired by Li that the free-trade zone in Shanghai would be a snapshot of an “upgraded Chinese economy”.

Shanghai’s ambitions to become the nation’s economic engine, leapfrogging Hong Kong as the dominant financial hub in the region, are already an open secret. Shanghai mayor Yang Xiong said after the announcement that the city’s future hinged on the free-trade zone, which could give it a leg up over rivals.

Rivals? Who? Yang did not name any.

To be more realistic, the new free-trade deal for Shanghai, which the cabinet wants to be run on a trial basis in the first phase and then see if such a special zone model can be expanded or copied to other mainland cities, would not immediately threaten Hong Kong’s leading position as one of the world’s most important financial centre cities and also one of the busiest ports.

But in the long run, the Hong Kong government must ask itself what competitive strengths and advantages are unique to the city; and whether these can be kept for the next decade or two. If not, then how can Hong Kong stay competitive, rather than becoming just another mainland city, lagging behind top-tier cities like Shanghai.

The central government is keen to use the free-trade zone in Shanghai as a testing ground for more financial liberalisation, as it supports the city’s ambition to grow into one of the world’s three most important financial centres – on a par with New York and London – by 2020.

Qianhai, just an hour’s drive from Hong Kong, has already been picked by Beijing to explore the possibilities of full convertibility of the yuan, which the government wants to turn into a global currency. Purely from an economic perspective, the time left for Hong Kong to rethink its future is obviously quite limited.

On Wednesday evening, before the news about Shanghai came out, I was watching television at home. I saw Chief Secretary Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor talking again about budget issues for the West Kowloon arts project.

Time is money, and we spend way too much time just talking about things like West Kowloon when other cities are already taking action and know with crystal clarity what they want to achieve.

The threat is real but not imminent. Shanghai will siphon money away from Hong Kong but it will be dodgy money and HK will not miss it ~ the issue of corruption is still a paramount problem for China's paramount leader, and little "clean" money is likely to move from HK to Shanghai ... yet.

But consider, also, the issue of the Kra Isthmus Canal across Thailand which China is considering building at a cost of $(US)25 Billion or more and which could do real serious damage to Singapore's position as East Asia's favourite entrepôt.

 

[CougarKing]

The Senkakus/Diaoyus "saga" continues:

China's East China Sea Gas Exploration Latest Flare-Up In Japan-China Senkaku/Diaoyu Island Dispute


The serious and increasingly dangerous rupture with China gained a new dimension–and regained the headlines–on July 5 when Abe, appearing on a Fuji Television program, expressed “deep regret” that China was moving undersea gas field exploration equipment into an area of the East China Sea “in violation of a bilateral agreement.”   “I must ask China to honor our agreement,” said Abe.Abe’s criticism produced a brief flutter of comment in the Japanese media, but was quickly passed over.

In Beijing, however, there was a multi-day thunderstorm.

Forbes link

 

[Flaker]

New U.S. weapons have China worried

When the United States carried out a successful test recently of an advanced high-speed, long-range weapon ostensibly designed to reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear arms in a crisis, it set alarm bells ringing in China. Far from reassuring Beijing, the May 1 test of the sleek hypersonic unmanned aircraft, known as the X-51A WaveRider, has added to China’s concerns that U.S. superiority in conventional weapons may make nuclear conflict more, not less, likely.

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/05/30/commentary/new-u-s-weapons-have-china-worried/#.Ud9VKqRraUk

 

[Edward Campbell]

China, Russia to Hold Largest-Ever Naval Drills
By J. Michael Cole
July 2, 2013

The Chinese and Russian will hold their largest-ever joint naval exercise from July 5-12 in the Sea of Japan, a Chinese official announced on July 1.

Zhang Junshe, deputy director of China’s Naval Military Studies Research Institute, told Chinese media that a total of 19 surface ships of various types — seven from China and 12 from Russia — will take part in the exercise, along with one submarine, three fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and special warfare units. According to Zhang, this will also be the first time that a Russian Sukhoi Su-24M Fencer bomber take part in joint exercises with China.

Based on various pictures posted on the Internet, the PLA Navy vessels involved in Joint Sea-2013 are the Type 052C (Luyang II class) Lanzhou (170); Type 052B (Guangzhou class) Wuhan (169); the Type 051C (Luzhou class) Shenyang (115) and Shijiazhuang (116); the Type 054A (Jiangkai II class) Yancheng (546) and Yantai (538) and the Hongze Lake comprehensive supply ship (881). At least three ship-based helicopters will take part in the exercise.

The Diplomat link

The New York Times puts these exercises, and Sino-Russian relations, in general, into the correct perspective in this article which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from that newspaper:

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/12/opinion/global/the-wary-chinese-russian-partnership.html?_r=0

The Wary Chinese-Russian Partnership

By JEFFREY MANKOFF

Published: July 11, 2013

Russia and China wrapped up joint military exercises on Wednesday in the Sea of Japan, the largest naval drills China has ever conducted with a foreign partner. The exercises took place amid mounting U.S. frustration over Russian and Chinese efforts to block United Nations Security Council action against the Assad regime in Syria and fuel U.S. concern about an anti-American axis between the two authoritarian great powers.

Chinese warships heading to naval drills with Russia.                    Color China Photo, via Associated Press

Although Chinese-Russian relations have improved in recent years as trade has expanded, old border disputes have been resolved, and the tempo of meetings between top leaders has increased, their collaboration masks serious differences. Only major missteps by the United States could make American fears a reality.

Moscow and Beijing characterize their relationship as a comprehensive strategic partnership, but their cooperation is mostly tactical. The two countries approach the world from quite different vantage points. China is a rising power, with a fast-growing, export-driven economy eager to benefit from globalization. Russia is a stagnating petro-state seeking to insulate itself from the forces of change.

Moscow touts its partnership with Beijing mostly to prove to the rest of the world that Russia still matters, while China views it as a low-cost way of placating Russia. Lacking much of a common agenda, cooperation is limited to areas where their interests already overlap, like bolstering trade.

In the parts of the world that matter most to them, Russia and China are more rivals than allies. Take Southeast Asia. Beijing’s assertive claims to maritime boundaries in the South China Sea have rattled America’s regional partners and led Washington to deepen its security cooperation with Vietnam, the Philippines and other states whose territorial claims China disputes. But to Beijing’s frustration, Moscow has remained silent on the territorial disputes, even as Russian energy companies have signed deals with Vietnam to develop oil and gas resources in the South China Sea — in waters claimed by China. Meanwhile, Russia’s defense industry is expanding its weapons sales throughout Southeast Asia, including selling advanced attack submarines to the Vietnamese Navy.

In Central Asia, Chinese economic power is rapidly pushing Russia aside. Chinese capital is paying for new roads, railroads and pipelines that lock the Central Asian states ever tighter into the Chinese embrace. Last year, all the Central Asian nations save Uzbekistan traded more with China than with Russia. Thanks to the opening of a gas pipeline from Central Asia to China in late 2009, Beijing has been able to take a hard line with Moscow on negotiations to build a new Russia-China pipeline. Russia’s push to bring Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan into its customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan, along with Vladimir Putin’s call to establish an Eurasian Union by 2015, are based heavily on a desire to limit the reorientation of the Central Asian states’ economies toward China.

Nor does sporadic cooperation between the Russian and Chinese militaries alter the fact that China’s assertiveness worries Russia at least as much as it worries the United States. Russian military commanders acknowledge that they see China as a potential foe, even as official statements continue to focus on the alleged threat from the United States and NATO. In July 2010, Russia conducted one of its largest ever military exercises, which aimed at defending the sparsely populated Russian Far East from an unnamed opponent with characteristics much like those of the People’s Liberation Army.

The only sense in which Russia and China are truly aligned is in their shared belief that the post-Cold War international order, designed by and for the United States, denies them their rightful place at the table, while allowing Washington to throw its weight around without regard for the interests of others.

This sense of exclusion underpins their support for new institutional mechanisms like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the so-called BRICS countries and the Group of 20, as well as their portrayal of the U.N. Security Council as the sole legitimate arbiter of war and peace.

Much Chinese-Russian cooperation, especially at the U.N., is based on defending the right of states to be fully sovereign within their own borders and opposing intervention in internal affairs without Security Council approval. Even this stand is less about high principle than about protecting concrete interests. Moscow ignored Georgia’s sovereignty to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008 — to which China objected less from principle than because of the potential precedent for Taiwan.

Beijing and Moscow also abstained when the Security Council authorized a no-flight zone in Libya, a country of little strategic significance for either of them. Their harder line on Syria is a reflection of Russia’s political stakes in that country, with China happy to hide behind Russian objections to prevent another instance of U.S. intervention.

The lesson for the United States is that the more it dismisses Russian and Chinese demands that their concerns be taken into account, the more its fears about a Chinese-Russian axis become self-fulfilling. Where Moscow or Beijing have real interests at stake — as Russia does in Syria — Washington should be prepared to listen, and to engage in a real give-and-take before acting.

Washington also should take seriously the argument that institutions designed for the post-Cold War world do not reflect the real distribution of power today. It should also be open to new formats, such as the G-20, that place Russia and China on equal footing with traditional U.S. partners. This is especially relevant in Asia, where a new security architecture is still being designed.

Giving Beijing and Moscow more of a stake in the running of the world might be uncomfortable, but the alternative is bringing the Chinese-Russian axis that U.S. policy makers fear closer to reality.

Jeffrey Mankoff is a fellow and deputy director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in Washington.

One point where I disagree with Jeffrey Mankoff is that I think America can and should marginalize Moscow even as it agrees to give Beijing "more of a stake in the running of the world." The Chinese are exploiting Russian weakness - mostly governmental ineptitude - to acquire technology (the Russians still have some) and to try to counterbalance the USA, but the Chinese despise the Russians as barbarians. (It is fair to say that the many Chinese (too often) use the term barbarian to describe all non-Chinese but, when challenged, most will conceded that not all foreigners are barbarians, but Russians are.)

 

[Edward Campbell]

I normally take the Good Grey Globe's Doug Saunders with a big grain of salt, but this article, and the linked paper, which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the Globe and Mail, does raise a good question:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/us-and-china-smile-for-cameras-prepare-for-war/article13196146/#dashboard/follows/

U.S. and China smile for cameras, prepare for war

DOUG SAUNDERS
The Globe and Mail

Last updated Saturday, Jul. 13 2013

Rarely have relations between China and the United States been so cordial. On Wednesday, the superpowers agreed to an impressive slate of measures to fight climate change by cutting emissions. Last month’s summit between Barack Obama and Xi Jinping saw the leaders finally agree on an approach to North Korea. China is allowing its currency to rise in value, reducing the danger of global imbalances. And while spying and dirty tricks are rife, recent revelations about U.S. Internet surveillance have placed the countries on a level playing field. It’s a period of peaceful cohabitation.

So why are the two countries’ militaries preparing to do battle with each other?

Both the Pentagon and the People’s Liberation Army are arming for an all-out war and pursuing enormously expensive master strategies that assume that such a war will occur.

In the case of the United States, this appears to be taking place without any authorization or approval from the White House or Congress. The Pentagon is now basing its global strategy on a detailed plan known as the AirSea Battle concept, in which the U.S. Army and Air Force defend the presence of 320,000 U.S. troops in the area by readying themselves for a full-scale land and air assault on China in the event of a threat in the South China Sea or its surroundings.

In a detailed analysis paper in this summer’s issue of the Yale Journal of International Affairs, the famed sociologist and military-policy expert Amitai Etzioni asks, “Who authorized preparations for war with China?” His answer is stark: Mr. Obama has spoken of a “pivot to Asia,” but there has been no political intent or desire to have such an active military confrontation with China – in fact, the politics and diplomacy have been moving in the opposite direction.

“The United States is preparing for a war with China, a momentous decision that so far has failed to receive a thorough review from elected officials, namely the White House and Congress,” Prof. Etzioni writes. “In the public sphere there was no debate – led by either think tanks or public intellectuals – like that which is ongoing over whether or not to use the military option against Iran’s nuclear program, or the debate surrounding the 2009 surge of troops in Afghanistan.”

But the AirSea Battle plan has far more expensive and dangerous implications. “The imagined result of ASB is the ability to end a conflict with China in much the same way the United States ended WWII: The U.S. military defeats China and dictates the surrender terms.” This is a drastic change from Cold War approaches, where nuclear-scale conflict was carefully avoided.

The plan scares the heck out of many military figures. “AirSea Battle is demonizing China,” James Cartwright, the former vice-chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned last year. “That’s not in anybody’s interest.” A Marine Corps assessment warned that the concept is “preposterously expensive to build in peace time” and, if used as intended, would “cause incalculable human and economic destruction,” in good part because it makes escalation to nuclear war far more likely.

And the Chinese have responded in kind: “If the U.S. military develops AirSea Battle to deal with the [People’s Liberation Army],” Col. Gauyue Fan warned, “the PLA will be forced to develop anti-AirSea Battle.”

And that is now taking place. Soon after assuming power last year, Mr. Xi abandoned his predecessor’s commitment to “peaceful rise,” took direct command of the Central Military Commission and commanded the military to focus on “real combat” and “fighting and winning wars.”

As Jeremy Page of The Wall Street Journal noted recently, Mr. Xi has rehabilitated a group of ultra-hawkish generals and military advisers who have advocated a military strategy based on preparing for direct confrontation with the United States. He has particularly embraced Col. Liu Mingfu, whose calls for direct China-U.S. military competition had led his books to be banned, but are now back on the bookstore shelves in droves. Also widely published now is air force Col. Dai Xu, who wrote last year, according to Reuters, that China’s neighbours are “running dogs of the United States in Asia” and “we only need to kill one, and it will immediately bring the others to heel.”

So we are in the absurd position of having the two superpowers at peace with one another while their armies prepare for total war. It is a dangerous state of affairs – something we ought to remember as we approach the centenary of 1914, when just such a mismatch led the world to war.

Oh, and the good question ...

... who the hell is in charge in Washington? Is it Obama or the admirals?


More on AirSea Battle here and here.

 

[Flaker]

Not sure how legitimate this may be

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/is-nazi-china-emerging/4/

Is a Nazi China Emerging?

"Only by using special means to “clean up” America will we be able to lead the Chinese people there. This is the only choice left for us. This is not a matter of whether we are willing to do it or not. What kind of special means is there available for us to “clean up” America? Conventional weapons such as fighters, canons, missiles and battleships won’t do; neither will highly destructive weapons such as nuclear weapons. We are not as foolish as to want to perish together with America by using nuclear weapons, despite the fact that we have been exclaiming that we will have the Taiwan issue resolved at whatever cost. Only by using non-destructive weapons that can kill many people will we be able to reserve America for ourselves. There has been rapid development of modern biological technology, and new bio weapons have been invented one after another."

 

[Edward Campbell]

Not sure how legitimate this may be

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/is-nazi-china-emerging/4/

Is a Nazi China Emerging?

"Only by using special means to “clean up” America will we be able to lead the Chinese people there. This is the only choice left for us. This is not a matter of whether we are willing to do it or not. What kind of special means is there available for us to “clean up” America? Conventional weapons such as fighters, canons, missiles and battleships won’t do; neither will highly destructive weapons such as nuclear weapons. We are not as foolish as to want to perish together with America by using nuclear weapons, despite the fact that we have been exclaiming that we will have the Taiwan issue resolved at whatever cost. Only by using non-destructive weapons that can kill many people will we be able to reserve America for ourselves. There has been rapid development of modern biological technology, and new bio weapons have been invented one after another."

The last paragraph of Rajinder Puri's piece is the key:

    "The question is: Is this speech authentic? If not, why does not Beijing forcefully repudiate it? There is no doubt at all about the authenticity of the nuclear threat issued by General Zhu Chenghu. He was even mildly
      reprimanded by the Chinese government. So what does Beijing have to say about Chi Haotian? President Hu Jintao may be titular Chairman of China’s powerful Central Military Commission. But he never served in
      the army. Chi Haotian is a former army general."

Opinion on the authenticity of Chi Haotian's "speech" are mixed. Some people suggest it is, indeed, consistent with 2,500 years of Chinese strategic thinking while others suggest that it is crude US disinformation. The problem, for me, is that I cannot find - using my native Chinese friends as searchers - find one, single reliable source for the speech. The most common original "source" cited is the Epoch Times which is affiliated with the Falun Gong movement and which I do not regard as credible.

 

[CougarKing]

Another source to meet China's natural gas needs as well as another bone of contention with Japan...

link

Exclusive: China in $5 billion drive to develop disputed East China Sea gas
Reuters

By Chen Aizhu

BEIJING (Reuters) - Chinese state-run oil companies hope to develop seven new gas fields in the East China Sea, possibly siphoning gas from the seabed beneath waters claimed by Japan, a move that could further inflame tensions with Tokyo over the disputed area.

Beijing had slowed exploration in the energy-rich East China Sea, one of Asia's biggest security risks due to competing territorial claims, but is now rapidly expanding its hunt for gas, a cheaper and cleaner energy to coal and oil imports.

State-run Chinese oil and gas firm CNOOC Ltd will soon submit for state approval a plan to develop Huangyan phase II and Pingbei, totaling seven new fields, two industry officials with direct knowledge of the projects told Reuters.

The approval would bring the total number of fields in what is called the Huangyan project to nine.

China is already working on Huangyan I which has two fields approved. The Huangyan project is expected to cost more than 30 billion yuan ($4.9 billion), including 11 production platforms now under construction at Chinese shipyards.

If approved, the seven new gas fields would not see a big jump in China's total gas output, supplying only a fraction of last year's 106 billion cubic meters (bcm) and dwarfed by operations in the disputed South China Sea and Bohai Bay off north China. Chinese geologists said gas deposits in the East China Sea region were much smaller and more scattered.

The greater issue is the political risk if Beijing approves the new gas fields. Tensions over the East China Sea have escalated this year, with Beijing and Tokyo scrambling fighter jets and ordering patrol ships to shadow each other, raising the fear that a miscalculation could lead to a broader clash.

"It's a sign of impatience on the side of the Chinese, stemming from a lack of movement on the Japanese side on the gas fields issue," said Koichi Nakano, associate professor of political science at Sophia University in Tokyo.

China and Japan in 2008 agreed to jointly develop hydrocarbons in the area, but Tokyo wishes to settle the issue of maritime boundaries before developing the gas fields.

"The question is what will be Japan's response and whether they would be able to talk China out of a unilateral move," said Nakano. "But escalation of tensions leading to a war? I don't think so. The Americans will be watching this situation with grave concern and may play a role of a mediator here."

A spokesman for Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said: "Our understanding is that Japan and China should continue to have dialogue on the issue of joint exploitation of this area, so any unilateral action should not be accepted".

Even if the National Development Reform Commission gives approval for the new gas fields, the pace of the development could be determined by China's Foreign Ministry which requests oil companies to seek its approval before every drilling. Such permission may be influenced by tensions with Japan at the time.

MAJOR EAST CHINA SEA EXPANSION

China and Japan disagree on where the maritime boundary between them lies in the East China Sea. Beijing says its activities are in the Chinese territories, while Tokyo is worried the Chinese drilling near the disputed median line would tap into geological structures in its waters.

Japan lodged a protest early this month after detecting well construction works at Huangyan I about 26 kms (16 miles) west of the disputed median line. China's foreign ministry rejected the protest as a baseless, saying Beijing had the right to drill in its sovereign waters.

U.S. Energy Information Administration estimated in 2012 that the East China Sea has between 1 and 2 trillion cubic feet (28-57 bcm) of proven and probable natural gas reserves, a modest gauge versus estimates by Chinese sources at up to 250 tcf in undiscovered gas resource.

If approved, the new gas fields would supply China's manufacturing hub of Zhejiang province, about 400 km (249 miles) away on the east coast, with production slated to start in the fourth quarter of 2015, said the officials.

The fields would have a combined annual production capacity of nearly 4 bcm, up from the region's current output of less than 1 bcm, and would account for about 2 percent of China's estimated gas output by the end of 2016.

CNOOC and partner Sinopec Corp are already developing Huangyan I, which was officially approved by the National Development & Reform Commission in June 2012 and is due to start producing gas in September next year. Also on the planning board is Pingbei II, expected to come on line in 2016.

CNOOC media officials declined to comment on the new developments and industry sources quoted for the story declined to be identified due to the sensitive nature of the topic.

CHINA FAST-TRACKING HUNT FOR GAS

China, the world's top energy user, is on a fast track to boost the use of natural gas, with demand for gas forecast to grow more than four fold by 2030 from the 147 bcm last year. China is the world's fourth biggest gas consumer.

China first started pumping gas in early 2006 from the Chunxiao field, part of the massive Xihu trough, but territorial disputes have hindered an industry keen to explore and develop the region, Chinese industry experts said.

"China has made compromise, having slowed down the works quite a few years," said a state oil official, "The cards are in the hands of Chinese, as companies are capable of developing (this area) after all the explorations done over the years."

China's plan to expand East China Sea operations comes after a near six-year lull in investment in the area, since the 2008 agreement to jointly develop hydrocarbons in the area.

"Since 2008 when the two nations reached a consensus for joint development, Japan has barely made any sincere diplomatic moves towards that direction...It seems that Japan wants to settle the boundaries first before moving to cooperations, which is totally unrealistic," said Liu Junhong, research fellow at China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations.

Under the proposed expansion plan, Huangyan II, which is adjacent to the disputed maritime border, would consist of two gas fields. Huangyan I has two fields.

Pingbei, an uncontested area located in the western side of the Xihu trough, would have three fields under phase I and another two under phase II.