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Chinese Military,Political and Social Superthread
- Thread starter nULL
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My own personal take is that while Genghis Khan is important he is a continuation of a line of nomads - warriors, pastoralists and traders - that can be continuously dated back to the Maykop Bronze Age of 3700 BC-3000 BC.
The culture includes all the modern Stans and Mongolias, but it also includes Khazars, Magyars, Bulgars, Avars, Alans, Huns, Cimmerians and Scythians as well as the Yamnaya. That culture is not a creation of Genghis and it is certainly not dependent on the Han Chinese, or Islam for that matter, for its identity.
The culture created Temujin and turned him into Genghis Khan.
- Reaction score
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Dr Richard Haass is always worth a read - in my opinion he is spot on, here.
"What we saw was a reaction – more accurately, an overreaction – of choice. The scale and complexity of the response indicates that it had long been planned, suggesting that if the Pelosi trip had not taken place, some other development would have been cited as a pretext to “justify” China’s actions.
China’s increasingly fraught internal political and economic situation goes a long way toward explaining Xi’s reaction. His priority is to be appointed to an unprecedented third term as leader of the Communist Party of China; but the country’s economic performance, for decades the principal source of legitimacy for China’s leaders, can no longer be counted on as growth slows, unemployment rises, and financial bubbles burst. Xi’s insistence on maintaining a zero-COVID policy is also drawing criticism domestically and reducing economic growth.
Increasingly, it appears that Xi is turning to nationalism as a substitute. When it comes to generating popular support in China, nothing competes with asserting the mainland’s sovereignty over Taiwan."
"The danger is obvious. With China indicating that its military activities close to Taiwan are the new normal, there is greater risk of an accident that spirals out of control. Even more dangerous is that China will determine that “peaceful reunification” is fading as a real option – in no small part because China alienated many Taiwanese when it violated its commitment to “one country, two systems” after it regained control of Hong Kong. In such a scenario, China may decide that it must act militarily against Taiwan to bring an end to the democratic example Taiwan sets and to head off any perceived move toward independence."
"The US also needs a sensible and disciplined Taiwan policy. The US should continue to stand by its one-China policy, which for over 40 years has finessed the ultimate relationship between the mainland and Taiwan. There is no place for unilateral action, be it aggression by the mainland or assertions of independence by Taiwan. Final status will be what it will be; what should matter from the US perspective is that it be determined peacefully and with the consent of the Taiwanese people."
"What we saw was a reaction – more accurately, an overreaction – of choice. The scale and complexity of the response indicates that it had long been planned, suggesting that if the Pelosi trip had not taken place, some other development would have been cited as a pretext to “justify” China’s actions.
China’s increasingly fraught internal political and economic situation goes a long way toward explaining Xi’s reaction. His priority is to be appointed to an unprecedented third term as leader of the Communist Party of China; but the country’s economic performance, for decades the principal source of legitimacy for China’s leaders, can no longer be counted on as growth slows, unemployment rises, and financial bubbles burst. Xi’s insistence on maintaining a zero-COVID policy is also drawing criticism domestically and reducing economic growth.
Increasingly, it appears that Xi is turning to nationalism as a substitute. When it comes to generating popular support in China, nothing competes with asserting the mainland’s sovereignty over Taiwan."
"The danger is obvious. With China indicating that its military activities close to Taiwan are the new normal, there is greater risk of an accident that spirals out of control. Even more dangerous is that China will determine that “peaceful reunification” is fading as a real option – in no small part because China alienated many Taiwanese when it violated its commitment to “one country, two systems” after it regained control of Hong Kong. In such a scenario, China may decide that it must act militarily against Taiwan to bring an end to the democratic example Taiwan sets and to head off any perceived move toward independence."
"The US also needs a sensible and disciplined Taiwan policy. The US should continue to stand by its one-China policy, which for over 40 years has finessed the ultimate relationship between the mainland and Taiwan. There is no place for unilateral action, be it aggression by the mainland or assertions of independence by Taiwan. Final status will be what it will be; what should matter from the US perspective is that it be determined peacefully and with the consent of the Taiwanese people."
- Reaction score
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In that regard, Mr. Campbell, perhaps Xi is testing the waters by applying a dab of Putinism to his portfolio…outward confrontation to galvanize domestic support?
Spencer100
Army.ca Veteran
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RCN sails through the Straight. HMCS Vancouver sail with a USN destroyer
news.usni.org
USS Higgins Joins Canadian Warship to Transit Taiwan Strait - USNI News
USS Higgins (DDG-76) conducted a Taiwan Strait transit on Tuesday, the Navy announced. Higgins performed the transit in cooperation with Royal Canadian Navy Halifax-class frigate HMCS Vancouver (FFH-331), according to a Tuesday Navy news release. The strait transit was done outside of any...
news.usni.org
OldSolduer
Army.ca Relic
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You sir are a wealth of knowledge. I'm infantry so a bit ADHD and tend not to focus on any one subject - but Ghengis fascinates me.
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Canada, finally, gets a wee bit serious - or less comical, anyway: "Trudeau to name career diplomat Jennifer May as Canada’s first female ambassador to China."
The article says that "The sources said Foreign Affairs Minister Mélanie Joly pushed Mr. Trudeau to approve the appointment of Ms. May because she speaks fluent Mandarin and handled human rights and political issues as first secretary at the Canadian embassy in Beijing from 2000-2004." I'm about 99% sure that's rubbish. Ms Joly pushed no-one for anything except, maybe, for a bigger limo. Marta Morgan, the Deputy at Global Affairs, has been negotiating steadily with the Chinese Foreign Ministry and Ms May is the logical choice.
Beijing may not be through lashing Canada but they also want better diplomatic and trade relations and that means that both Canada and China need a more senior Canadian diplomat in Beijing.
The article says that "The sources said Foreign Affairs Minister Mélanie Joly pushed Mr. Trudeau to approve the appointment of Ms. May because she speaks fluent Mandarin and handled human rights and political issues as first secretary at the Canadian embassy in Beijing from 2000-2004." I'm about 99% sure that's rubbish. Ms Joly pushed no-one for anything except, maybe, for a bigger limo. Marta Morgan, the Deputy at Global Affairs, has been negotiating steadily with the Chinese Foreign Ministry and Ms May is the logical choice.
Beijing may not be through lashing Canada but they also want better diplomatic and trade relations and that means that both Canada and China need a more senior Canadian diplomat in Beijing.
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Ukraine’s success spurs call for rapid reform of Taiwan’s defence strategy
Retired admiral Lee Hsi-ming, once the top military officer in Taiwan, has written a book urging Taiwan to speed up reforms that embrace the same guerrilla warfare strategies that Ukraine is using to thwart Russia’s invasion
www.theglobeandmail.com
I wonder if Xi and China might not be more worried about Taiwan adopting a Home Guard type of defence, after the style of the Ukrainians.
If Taiwan gets into the business of building cheap, high quality knock offs of AT4s and NLAWs to equip its own Home Guard, along with lots of drones, it occurs to me it is not only Chinese tanks in Taiwan that might be put at risk. It is a lot easier to smuggle a container of them across borders than fighters and tanks. And if Poland, Turkey and Korea got into the game as well it might put a new slant on people's liberation armies. Getting weapons like that, even M72s, into the hands of Uyghurs, Tibetans and Hong Kongers could make for interesting times.
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Some experts say that "The year 2027 looms large for Taiwan, which Chinese President Xi Jinping has vowed will one day be brought under Beijing’s control. That’s when, as U.S. Admiral Philip Davidson, then-head of Indo-Pacific Command, informed a Senate committee in 2021, China will have acquired the capacity to take Taiwan by force. Last week, CNN reported CIA deputy director David Cohen as saying that while Mr. Xi has not made the decision to invade Taiwan, he wants the People’s Liberation Army to have the capability by 2027."Ukraine’s success spurs call for rapid reform of Taiwan’s defence strategy
Retired admiral Lee Hsi-ming, once the top military officer in Taiwan, has written a book urging Taiwan to speed up reforms that embrace the same guerrilla warfare strategies that Ukraine is using to thwart Russia’s invasion
I wonder if Xi and China might not be more worried about Taiwan adopting a Home Guard type of defence, after the style of the Ukrainians.
If Taiwan gets into the business of building cheap, high quality knock offs of AT4s and NLAWs to equip its own Home Guard, along with lots of drones, it occurs to me it is not only Chinese tanks in Taiwan that might be put at risk. It is a lot easier to smuggle a container of them across borders than fighters and tanks. And if Poland, Turkey and Korea got into the game as well it might put a new slant on people's liberation armies. Getting weapons like that, even M72s, into the hands of Uyghurs, Tibetans and Hong Kongers could make for interesting times.
We were taught - I think it's an almost universal staff college notion - that the two most complex operations in war are:
1. An opposed amphibious assaut; and/or
2. An opposed airborne assault.
My guess is that PLA senior staff know that, too.
I haven't actually spoken to any PLA officers for more than 10 years. Back then I guessed that they were focused on converting a levée en masse into a useful professional army that could invade Taiwan (or someplace else) but I also guessed that they saw it as the work of a generation. Maybe the generation is up and 2027 is the right time but I really don't envy the guys who may have to implement it.
The way the US-led West has supported Ukraine - however imperfectly - must also give the Chinese pause.
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Whether Chinese, Russian or even Westerners (based on Iraq and Afghanistan), life doesn't seem to be getting any easier for "invaders/liberators" anywhere.
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Another look at the China-Russia "partnership," this time from Konrad Yakabuski in there Globe and Mail:
"When Vladimir Putin paid a visit to Xi Jinping just before the opening of the Beijing Winter Olympics in February, the two leaders made a show of solidarity that led many Western analysts to conclude that Russia had China’s tacit backing when it invaded Ukraine only days later ... [but] ... By the time the two leaders met again last week in Uzbekistan, where they were attending a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the tone of their exchanges had shifted dramatically. Mr. Putin found himself having to account for his bad behaviour in Ukraine ... “We highly appreciate the balanced position of our Chinese friends in connection with the Ukrainian crisis,” Mr. Putin said at the opening of their meeting. “We understand your questions and concerns in this regard.”"
I agree fully with Mr Yakabuski when he says that "China is Russia’s natural ally only to the extent the two countries have a shared interest in countering U.S. hegemony in international affairs. But Mr. Putin has turned out to be a far less stable “friend” than Mr. Xi had likely ever bargained for. He may even feel burned by the Russian President’s February promise of a swift and easy victory in Ukraine."
Both Xi and Putin "clearly underestimated the extent to which Mr. Biden, so soon after pulling U.S. troops out of Afghanistan, would risk putting U.S. credibility on the line again. The U.S. President has insisted that his country will not put boots on the ground in Ukraine. That, he has said, would be a precursor to a Third World War. But U.S.-supplied weapons and intelligence have made all the difference in Ukraine up to now." And this gives Xi Jinping cause to worry about how the US might lead the West if Taiwan is attacked.
He concludes that "the relationship between Mr. Xi and Mr. Putin appears to have entered a new phase. The Chinese leader is clearly none too impressed with his Russian counterpart’s strategic errors and has likely grown wiser to Mr. Putin’s shortcomings. The alliance the two men struck in February is now unlikely to lead to the degree of co-operation between their countries that they had predicted then. That is good news for the rest of the world."
While that might be "good news," the bad news is that Russia is increasingly dependent on China as its nearly only source of finance - the unconvertible RMB. That gives China unfettered access to Russia enormous natural resource base. China, IF it can improve its own technological/innovative/creative industrial base (i.e. make chips that work, etc), would be very nearly self-sufficient - something that some analysts think is a sort of strategic nirvana; the only other places that I can think of that could be "self sufficient" would be:
"When Vladimir Putin paid a visit to Xi Jinping just before the opening of the Beijing Winter Olympics in February, the two leaders made a show of solidarity that led many Western analysts to conclude that Russia had China’s tacit backing when it invaded Ukraine only days later ... [but] ... By the time the two leaders met again last week in Uzbekistan, where they were attending a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the tone of their exchanges had shifted dramatically. Mr. Putin found himself having to account for his bad behaviour in Ukraine ... “We highly appreciate the balanced position of our Chinese friends in connection with the Ukrainian crisis,” Mr. Putin said at the opening of their meeting. “We understand your questions and concerns in this regard.”"
I agree fully with Mr Yakabuski when he says that "China is Russia’s natural ally only to the extent the two countries have a shared interest in countering U.S. hegemony in international affairs. But Mr. Putin has turned out to be a far less stable “friend” than Mr. Xi had likely ever bargained for. He may even feel burned by the Russian President’s February promise of a swift and easy victory in Ukraine."
Both Xi and Putin "clearly underestimated the extent to which Mr. Biden, so soon after pulling U.S. troops out of Afghanistan, would risk putting U.S. credibility on the line again. The U.S. President has insisted that his country will not put boots on the ground in Ukraine. That, he has said, would be a precursor to a Third World War. But U.S.-supplied weapons and intelligence have made all the difference in Ukraine up to now." And this gives Xi Jinping cause to worry about how the US might lead the West if Taiwan is attacked.
He concludes that "the relationship between Mr. Xi and Mr. Putin appears to have entered a new phase. The Chinese leader is clearly none too impressed with his Russian counterpart’s strategic errors and has likely grown wiser to Mr. Putin’s shortcomings. The alliance the two men struck in February is now unlikely to lead to the degree of co-operation between their countries that they had predicted then. That is good news for the rest of the world."
While that might be "good news," the bad news is that Russia is increasingly dependent on China as its nearly only source of finance - the unconvertible RMB. That gives China unfettered access to Russia enormous natural resource base. China, IF it can improve its own technological/innovative/creative industrial base (i.e. make chips that work, etc), would be very nearly self-sufficient - something that some analysts think is a sort of strategic nirvana; the only other places that I can think of that could be "self sufficient" would be:
1. A largely united Western Europe with control over Africa's resource base; or
2. A politically united - from the Rio Grande to the North Pole - North America.
RangerRay
Army.ca Veteran
- Reaction score
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Whiskey Tango Foxtrot?
I know the Chinese Communist Party is running all kinds of agents and other bad actors in Canada, but police stations?
/cloudfront-us-east-1.images.arcpublishing.com/tgam/FQ6UZAZQURBOJLDCCGMPKJHF5E.JPG)
www.theglobeandmail.com
I know the Chinese Communist Party is running all kinds of agents and other bad actors in Canada, but police stations?
Chinese police establish stations overseas in ‘worrying’ crackdown on citizens abroad
A recent report by Safeguard Defenders reveals China has opened up unofficial police stations across five continents, including Canada, ‘persuading’ more than 230,000 people to return from abroad
www.theglobeandmail.com
- Reaction score
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Good read from dissident scholar (both word matter a lot) Cai Xia in the current Foreign. Affairs.
"Not long ago, Chinese President Xi Jinping was riding high ... [but, now, while] ... Outwardly, Xi still projects confidence. In a speech in January 2021, he declared China “invincible.” But behind the scenes, his power is being questioned as never before. By discarding China’s long tradition of collective rule and creating a cult of personality reminiscent of the one that surrounded Mao, Xi has rankled party insiders. A series of policy missteps, meanwhile, have disappointed even supporters. Xi’s reversal of economic reforms and his inept response to the COVID-19 pandemic have shattered his image as a hero of everyday people. In the shadows, resentment among CCP elites is rising."
There is no way to guarantee leadership transitions in autocracies - Xi proved that in China by overturning Deng's plan for term limits.
"At the CCP’s 20th National Party Congress this fall, Xi expects that he will be given a third five-year term. And even if the growing irritation among some party elites means that his bid will not go entirely uncontested, he will probably succeed. But that success will bring more turbulence down the road. Emboldened by the unprecedented additional term, Xi will likely tighten his grip even further domestically and raise his ambitions internationally. As Xi’s rule becomes more extreme, the infighting and resentment he has already triggered will only grow stronger. The competition between various factions within the party will get more intense, complicated, and brutal than ever before ... [and] ... At that point, China may experience a vicious cycle in which Xi reacts to the perceived sense of threat by taking ever bolder actions that generate even more pushback. Trapped in an echo chamber and desperately seeking redemption, he may even do something catastrophically ill advised, such as attack Taiwan. Xi may well ruin something China has earned over the course of four decades: a reputation for steady, competent leadership. In fact, he already has."
A primer, from an expert former in sider, one how the Chinese power structure works - she likens it to the Mafia:
"In many respects, the CCP has changed little since the party took power in 1949. Now, as then, the party exercises absolute control over China, ruling over its military, its administration, and its rubber-stamp legislature. The party hierarchy, in turn, answers to the Politburo Standing Committee, the top decision-making body in China. Composed of anywhere from five to nine members of the broader Politburo, the Standing Committee is headed by the party’s general secretary, China’s paramount leader. Since 2012, that has been Xi ... [while] ... The details of how the Standing Committee operates are a closely guarded secret, but it is widely known that many decisions are made through the circulation of documents dealing with major policy questions, in the margins of which the committee’s members add comments. The papers are written by top leaders in ministries and other party organs, as well as experts from the best universities and think tanks, and to have one’s memo circulated among the Standing Committee members is considered a credit to the writer’s home institution. When I was a professor, the Central Party School set a quota for the production of such memos of about one a month. Authors whose memos were read by the Standing Committee were rewarded with the equivalent of roughly $1,500—more than a professor’s monthly salary ... [but] ... Another feature of the party system has remained constant: the importance of personal connections. When it comes to one’s rise within the party hierarchy, individual relationships, including one’s family reputation and Communist pedigree, matter as much as competence and ideology ... [and] ... That was certainly the case with Xi’s career. Contrary to Chinese propaganda and the assessment of many Western analysts that he rose through his talent, the opposite is true. Xi benefited immensely from the connections of his father, Xi Zhongxun, a CCP leader with impeccable revolutionary credentials who served briefly as propaganda minister under Mao ... [Xi had many stumble but, finally] ... family connections intervened. In 1992, after Xi’s mother wrote a plea to the new party leader in Fujian, Jia Qinglin, Xi was transferred to the provincial capital. At that point, his career took off ... [and] ... As all lower-level cadres know, to climb the CCP ladder, one must find a higher-level boss. In Xi’s case, this proved easy enough, since many party leaders held his father in high esteem. His first and most important mentor was Geng Biao, a top diplomatic and military official who had once worked for Xi’s father. In 1979, he took on the younger Xi as a secretary. The need for such patrons early on has knock-on effects decades down the line. High-level officials each have their own “lineages,” as insiders call these groups of protégés, which amount to de facto factions within the CCP. Indeed, disputes that are framed as ideological and policy debates within the CCP are often something much less sophisticated: power struggles among various lineages. Such a system can also lead to tangled webs of personal loyalty. If one’s mentor falls out of favor, the effect is the professional equivalent of being orphaned ... [finally] ... Outsiders may find it helpful to think of the CCP as more of a mafia organization than a political party. The head of the party is the don, and below him sit the underbosses, or the Standing Committee. These men traditionally parcel out power, with each responsible for certain areas—foreign policy, the economy, personnel, anticorruption, and so on. They are also supposed to serve as the big boss’s consiglieres, advising him on their areas of responsibility. Outside the Standing Committee are the other 18 members of the Politburo, who are next in the line of succession for the Standing Committee. They can be thought of as the mafia’s capos, carrying out Xi’s orders to eliminate perceived threats in the hope of staying in the good graces of the don. As a perk of their position, they are allowed to enrich themselves as they see fit, seizing property and businesses without penalty. And like the mafia, the party uses blunt tools to get what it wants: bribery, extortion, even violence."
I think that, 25ish+ years ago, Deng Xiaoping actually wanted to democratize China - not make it a liberal democracy, not even to make it a conservative democracy like Singapore, but to give the rapidly emerging middle class some greater say in managing their own country. I also think that his views were shared by some, but not a majority, of senior officials, including by his successors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. But the opposition was always strong and Xi was parti of it.
Cai Xia continues: "Although the power of personal connections and the flexibility of formal rules have remained constant since Communist China’s founding, one thing has shifted over time: the degree to which power is concentrated in a single man. From the mid-1960s onward, Mao had absolute control and the final say on all matters, even if he exercised his power episodically and was officially merely first among equals. But when Deng Xiaoping became China’s de facto leader in 1978, he chipped away at Mao’s one-man, lifelong dictatorship ... [and] ... Deng restricted China’s presidency to two five-year terms and established a form of collective leadership, allowing other officials—first Hu Yaobang and then Zhao Ziyang—to serve as head of the party, even if he remained the power behind the throne. In 1987, the CCP decided to reform the process for selecting members of the Central Committee, the party’s nominal overseer and the body from which Politburo members are chosen. For the first time, the party proposed more candidates than there were seats—hardly a democratic election, but a step in the right direction ... [and] ... Seeking to avoid a repeat of the disastrous Cultural Revolution, when Maoist propaganda reached its apogee, Deng also sought to prevent any leader from forming a cult of personality ... [thus] ... In 1982, China’s leaders went so far as to write into the party constitution a ban on cults of personality, which they viewed as uniquely dangerous."
"Deng’s successor, Jiang Zemin, deepened the political reforms. ... [and] ... When Hu Jintao took over from Jiang in 2002, China moved even further toward collective leadership. Hu ruled with the consent of the nine members of the Standing Committee, a clique known as the “nine dragons controlling the water.” There were downsides to this egalitarian approach. A single member of the Standing Committee could veto any decision, driving the perception of Hu as a weak leader unable to overcome gridlock. For nearly a decade, the economic reforms that began under Deng stalled. But there were upsides, too, since the need for consensus prevented careless decisions. When SARS broke out in China during his first year in office, for instance, Hu acted prudently, firing China’s health minister for covering up the extent of the outbreak, and encouraging cadres to report infections truthfully."
Xi, who, ironically, rose towards power under the "reformed" system, has turned back the clock.
Then, " When Xi took the reins, many in the West hailed him as a Chinese Mikhail Gorbachev. Some imagined that, like the Soviet Union’s final leader, Xi would embrace radical reforms, releasing the state’s grip on the economy and democratizing the political system. That, of course, turned out to be a fantasy. Instead, Xi, a devoted student of Mao and just as eager to leave his mark on history, has worked to establish his absolute power. And because previous reforms failed to place real checks and balances on the party leader, he has succeeded. Now, as under Mao, China is a one-man show ... [but, Cai Xia adds, very correctly] ... The more a political system centers on a single leader, the more the flaws and peculiarities of that leader matter. And in the case of Xi, the leader is thin-skinned, stubborn, and dictatorial ... [and] ... In any political system, unchecked power is dangerous. Detached from reality and freed from the constraint of consensus, a leader can act rashly, implementing policies that are unwise, unpopular, or both. Not surprisingly, then, Xi’s know-it-all style of rule has led to a number of disastrous decisions. The common theme is an inability to grasp the practical effect of his directives."
After analyzing the probably outcome of another Xi Jinping political history, Cia Xia concludes: "The only viable way of changing course, so far as I can see, is also the scariest and deadliest: a humiliating defeat in a war. If Xi were to attack Taiwan, his likeliest target, there is a good chance that the war would not go as planned, and Taiwan, with American help, would be able to resist invasion and inflict grave damage on mainland China. In that event, the elites and the masses would abandon Xi, paving the way for not only his personal downfall but perhaps even the collapse of the CCP as we know it. For precedent, one would have to go back to the eighteenth century, when Emperor Qianlong failed in his quest to expand China’s realm to Central Asia, Burma, and Vietnam. Predictably, China suffered a mortifying loss in the First Sino-Japanese War, setting the stage for the downfall of the Qing dynasty and kicking off a long period of political upheaval. Emperors are not always forever."
It's a long article, I know many of you don't subscribe to Foreign Affairs but every single library worthy of the name does. If your library doesn't then you need a new Base Commander or mayor.
"Not long ago, Chinese President Xi Jinping was riding high ... [but, now, while] ... Outwardly, Xi still projects confidence. In a speech in January 2021, he declared China “invincible.” But behind the scenes, his power is being questioned as never before. By discarding China’s long tradition of collective rule and creating a cult of personality reminiscent of the one that surrounded Mao, Xi has rankled party insiders. A series of policy missteps, meanwhile, have disappointed even supporters. Xi’s reversal of economic reforms and his inept response to the COVID-19 pandemic have shattered his image as a hero of everyday people. In the shadows, resentment among CCP elites is rising."
There is no way to guarantee leadership transitions in autocracies - Xi proved that in China by overturning Deng's plan for term limits.
"At the CCP’s 20th National Party Congress this fall, Xi expects that he will be given a third five-year term. And even if the growing irritation among some party elites means that his bid will not go entirely uncontested, he will probably succeed. But that success will bring more turbulence down the road. Emboldened by the unprecedented additional term, Xi will likely tighten his grip even further domestically and raise his ambitions internationally. As Xi’s rule becomes more extreme, the infighting and resentment he has already triggered will only grow stronger. The competition between various factions within the party will get more intense, complicated, and brutal than ever before ... [and] ... At that point, China may experience a vicious cycle in which Xi reacts to the perceived sense of threat by taking ever bolder actions that generate even more pushback. Trapped in an echo chamber and desperately seeking redemption, he may even do something catastrophically ill advised, such as attack Taiwan. Xi may well ruin something China has earned over the course of four decades: a reputation for steady, competent leadership. In fact, he already has."
A primer, from an expert former in sider, one how the Chinese power structure works - she likens it to the Mafia:
"In many respects, the CCP has changed little since the party took power in 1949. Now, as then, the party exercises absolute control over China, ruling over its military, its administration, and its rubber-stamp legislature. The party hierarchy, in turn, answers to the Politburo Standing Committee, the top decision-making body in China. Composed of anywhere from five to nine members of the broader Politburo, the Standing Committee is headed by the party’s general secretary, China’s paramount leader. Since 2012, that has been Xi ... [while] ... The details of how the Standing Committee operates are a closely guarded secret, but it is widely known that many decisions are made through the circulation of documents dealing with major policy questions, in the margins of which the committee’s members add comments. The papers are written by top leaders in ministries and other party organs, as well as experts from the best universities and think tanks, and to have one’s memo circulated among the Standing Committee members is considered a credit to the writer’s home institution. When I was a professor, the Central Party School set a quota for the production of such memos of about one a month. Authors whose memos were read by the Standing Committee were rewarded with the equivalent of roughly $1,500—more than a professor’s monthly salary ... [but] ... Another feature of the party system has remained constant: the importance of personal connections. When it comes to one’s rise within the party hierarchy, individual relationships, including one’s family reputation and Communist pedigree, matter as much as competence and ideology ... [and] ... That was certainly the case with Xi’s career. Contrary to Chinese propaganda and the assessment of many Western analysts that he rose through his talent, the opposite is true. Xi benefited immensely from the connections of his father, Xi Zhongxun, a CCP leader with impeccable revolutionary credentials who served briefly as propaganda minister under Mao ... [Xi had many stumble but, finally] ... family connections intervened. In 1992, after Xi’s mother wrote a plea to the new party leader in Fujian, Jia Qinglin, Xi was transferred to the provincial capital. At that point, his career took off ... [and] ... As all lower-level cadres know, to climb the CCP ladder, one must find a higher-level boss. In Xi’s case, this proved easy enough, since many party leaders held his father in high esteem. His first and most important mentor was Geng Biao, a top diplomatic and military official who had once worked for Xi’s father. In 1979, he took on the younger Xi as a secretary. The need for such patrons early on has knock-on effects decades down the line. High-level officials each have their own “lineages,” as insiders call these groups of protégés, which amount to de facto factions within the CCP. Indeed, disputes that are framed as ideological and policy debates within the CCP are often something much less sophisticated: power struggles among various lineages. Such a system can also lead to tangled webs of personal loyalty. If one’s mentor falls out of favor, the effect is the professional equivalent of being orphaned ... [finally] ... Outsiders may find it helpful to think of the CCP as more of a mafia organization than a political party. The head of the party is the don, and below him sit the underbosses, or the Standing Committee. These men traditionally parcel out power, with each responsible for certain areas—foreign policy, the economy, personnel, anticorruption, and so on. They are also supposed to serve as the big boss’s consiglieres, advising him on their areas of responsibility. Outside the Standing Committee are the other 18 members of the Politburo, who are next in the line of succession for the Standing Committee. They can be thought of as the mafia’s capos, carrying out Xi’s orders to eliminate perceived threats in the hope of staying in the good graces of the don. As a perk of their position, they are allowed to enrich themselves as they see fit, seizing property and businesses without penalty. And like the mafia, the party uses blunt tools to get what it wants: bribery, extortion, even violence."
I think that, 25ish+ years ago, Deng Xiaoping actually wanted to democratize China - not make it a liberal democracy, not even to make it a conservative democracy like Singapore, but to give the rapidly emerging middle class some greater say in managing their own country. I also think that his views were shared by some, but not a majority, of senior officials, including by his successors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. But the opposition was always strong and Xi was parti of it.
Cai Xia continues: "Although the power of personal connections and the flexibility of formal rules have remained constant since Communist China’s founding, one thing has shifted over time: the degree to which power is concentrated in a single man. From the mid-1960s onward, Mao had absolute control and the final say on all matters, even if he exercised his power episodically and was officially merely first among equals. But when Deng Xiaoping became China’s de facto leader in 1978, he chipped away at Mao’s one-man, lifelong dictatorship ... [and] ... Deng restricted China’s presidency to two five-year terms and established a form of collective leadership, allowing other officials—first Hu Yaobang and then Zhao Ziyang—to serve as head of the party, even if he remained the power behind the throne. In 1987, the CCP decided to reform the process for selecting members of the Central Committee, the party’s nominal overseer and the body from which Politburo members are chosen. For the first time, the party proposed more candidates than there were seats—hardly a democratic election, but a step in the right direction ... [and] ... Seeking to avoid a repeat of the disastrous Cultural Revolution, when Maoist propaganda reached its apogee, Deng also sought to prevent any leader from forming a cult of personality ... [thus] ... In 1982, China’s leaders went so far as to write into the party constitution a ban on cults of personality, which they viewed as uniquely dangerous."
"Deng’s successor, Jiang Zemin, deepened the political reforms. ... [and] ... When Hu Jintao took over from Jiang in 2002, China moved even further toward collective leadership. Hu ruled with the consent of the nine members of the Standing Committee, a clique known as the “nine dragons controlling the water.” There were downsides to this egalitarian approach. A single member of the Standing Committee could veto any decision, driving the perception of Hu as a weak leader unable to overcome gridlock. For nearly a decade, the economic reforms that began under Deng stalled. But there were upsides, too, since the need for consensus prevented careless decisions. When SARS broke out in China during his first year in office, for instance, Hu acted prudently, firing China’s health minister for covering up the extent of the outbreak, and encouraging cadres to report infections truthfully."
Xi, who, ironically, rose towards power under the "reformed" system, has turned back the clock.
Then, " When Xi took the reins, many in the West hailed him as a Chinese Mikhail Gorbachev. Some imagined that, like the Soviet Union’s final leader, Xi would embrace radical reforms, releasing the state’s grip on the economy and democratizing the political system. That, of course, turned out to be a fantasy. Instead, Xi, a devoted student of Mao and just as eager to leave his mark on history, has worked to establish his absolute power. And because previous reforms failed to place real checks and balances on the party leader, he has succeeded. Now, as under Mao, China is a one-man show ... [but, Cai Xia adds, very correctly] ... The more a political system centers on a single leader, the more the flaws and peculiarities of that leader matter. And in the case of Xi, the leader is thin-skinned, stubborn, and dictatorial ... [and] ... In any political system, unchecked power is dangerous. Detached from reality and freed from the constraint of consensus, a leader can act rashly, implementing policies that are unwise, unpopular, or both. Not surprisingly, then, Xi’s know-it-all style of rule has led to a number of disastrous decisions. The common theme is an inability to grasp the practical effect of his directives."
After analyzing the probably outcome of another Xi Jinping political history, Cia Xia concludes: "The only viable way of changing course, so far as I can see, is also the scariest and deadliest: a humiliating defeat in a war. If Xi were to attack Taiwan, his likeliest target, there is a good chance that the war would not go as planned, and Taiwan, with American help, would be able to resist invasion and inflict grave damage on mainland China. In that event, the elites and the masses would abandon Xi, paving the way for not only his personal downfall but perhaps even the collapse of the CCP as we know it. For precedent, one would have to go back to the eighteenth century, when Emperor Qianlong failed in his quest to expand China’s realm to Central Asia, Burma, and Vietnam. Predictably, China suffered a mortifying loss in the First Sino-Japanese War, setting the stage for the downfall of the Qing dynasty and kicking off a long period of political upheaval. Emperors are not always forever."
It's a long article, I know many of you don't subscribe to Foreign Affairs but every single library worthy of the name does. If your library doesn't then you need a new Base Commander or mayor.
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Question - What role, if any, does the resources of S. America play in this new 'Great Game'? Could these resources replace those of Africa?
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Off the top of my head: China tried South America circa 1995-2000 with proposals for seaports in Brazil and Peru and even a canal across Nicaragua to rival Panama but then switched to Africa because the political situations in Latin America are too difficult, even for the Chinese.
South America is resource rich and it is more sophisticated than Africa but the political situation is nightmarish.
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Good read, Mr. Campbell. Thanks for that. So would you see that a critical window would be Post-Congress and lead-up/telegraphing of intent to act against Taiwan? Assessment and parsing of I&Ws against Taiwan will be key, one would think.
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Is S. America even an option to the Chinese due to the Monroe Doctrine? Is only Africa 'up for grabs' because of this?
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Religion is more of an issue in SA than our interference.
Africa is a mess, but it’s a mess that we nor Europe really want to get involved in (again). I’m curious if a renewed Uk will push back into Africa to attempt to dislodge the Chinese.
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I worry that Xi, likes almost all autocrats, is a less than really good manager and, again like most autocrats, has ended up being surrounded by yes-men rather then by good advisors.
It's been a looooong time since I was in the staff college but I still remember the complexity of both airborne and amphibious operations. I'm not sure the PLA is up for either, much less both ... there's been no Jubilee, no Husky, no Torch where Chinese forces might have tried both. But I'm guessing that many top Chinese admirals and generals are talking Xi that they can do it ... just like some Russian generals told Putin "we can do it, boss."
IF Xi invades Taiwan and fails then there may be another Chinese civil war.
It's been a looooong time since I was in the staff college but I still remember the complexity of both airborne and amphibious operations. I'm not sure the PLA is up for either, much less both ... there's been no Jubilee, no Husky, no Torch where Chinese forces might have tried both. But I'm guessing that many top Chinese admirals and generals are talking Xi that they can do it ... just like some Russian generals told Putin "we can do it, boss."
IF Xi invades Taiwan and fails then there may be another Chinese civil war.
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@Edward Campbell I suspect that there are an equal number of PLA and PLN brass saying it will not work.
If they believed it would work, I suspect they would have jumped off shortly after Russian forces crossed into Ukraine.
I also believe the Chinese have seen exactly how well Western weaponry work versus Russian systems, looked at their systems similarities to Russia, and done calculations based on the range of their objective, and come back with, let’s table this for the foreseeable future.
I don’t think Xi wants to gamble his future and the future of CCP like he’s seen VVP do in Russia. He may need a win, but he also doesn’t want to jump into a near guaranteed loss either.
If they believed it would work, I suspect they would have jumped off shortly after Russian forces crossed into Ukraine.
I also believe the Chinese have seen exactly how well Western weaponry work versus Russian systems, looked at their systems similarities to Russia, and done calculations based on the range of their objective, and come back with, let’s table this for the foreseeable future.
I don’t think Xi wants to gamble his future and the future of CCP like he’s seen VVP do in Russia. He may need a win, but he also doesn’t want to jump into a near guaranteed loss either.
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