Chinese Military,Political and Social Superthread

[a_majoor]

Small street revolts in China get big attention:

http://apnews.myway.com/article/20110227/D9LL35H00.html

China uses whistles, water, police on protests

Feb 27, 6:17 AM (ET)

By ELAINE KURTENBACH

SHANGHAI (AP) - Large numbers of police - and new tactics like shrill whistles and street cleaning trucks - squelched overt protests in China for a second Sunday in a row after more calls for peaceful gatherings modeled on recent democratic movements in the Middle East.

Near Shanghai's People's Square, uniformed police blew whistles nonstop and shouted at people to keep moving, though about 200 people - a combination of onlookers and quiet sympathizers who formed a larger crowd than a week ago - braved the shrill noise. In Beijing, trucks normally used to water the streets drove repeatedly up the busy commercial shopping district spraying water and keeping crowds pressed to the edges.

Foreign journalists met with tighter police controls. In Shanghai, authorities called foreign reporters Sunday indirectly warning them to stay away from the protest sites, while police in Beijing followed some reporters and blocked those with cameras from entering the Wangfujing shopping street where protests were called. Plainclothes police struck a Bloomberg News television reporter, who was then taken away for questioning.

Police also detained several Chinese, at least two in Beijing and four in Shanghai, putting them into vans and driving them away, though it was not clear if they had tried to protest.

While it isn't clear how many people - if any at all - came to protest, the outsized response compared with last week shows how the mysterious calls for protest have left the authoritarian government on edge. Unlike Egypt and Tunisia where popular frustrations with economic malaise added fuel to popular protests to oust autocratic leaders, China has a booming economy and rising living standards. Still, the leadership is battling inflation and worries that democratic movements could take root if unchallenged.

"Rapid inflation affects people's livelihoods and may affect social stability," Premier Wen Jiabao said in an online chat Sunday. While he did not mention the Middle East, he later added: "I know the impact that prices can cause a country and am deeply aware of its extreme importance."
Online posts of unknown origin that first circulated on an overseas Chinese news website 10 days ago have called for Chinese to gather peacefully at sites every Sunday in a show of people power meant to promote fairness and democracy. A renewed call this week expanded the target cities to 27, from 13.

People reached by phone at businesses in the cities of Tianjin, Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Shenyang and Harbin said no demonstrations occurred.
Beyond the several Web postings, the calls lack a clear leader or organization and a well-defined agenda - ingredients experts say are crucial to the success of protest movements. China's extensive Internet filtering and monitoring mean that most Chinese are unaware of the appeals, effectively limiting the audience.

Police have questioned, placed under house arrest and detained more than 100 people, according to rights groups. At least five have been detained on subversion or national security charges, in some cases for passing on information about the protest calls.

Pressure to tamp down protest is higher in Beijing. Senior politicians from around the country converge on the capital this week for the legislature's annual session and a simultaneous meeting of a top advisory body - events that always bring high security.

Police seemed to outnumber pedestrians at Wangfujing. Groups of men with earpieces crowded the seats near the window of a KFC outlet scanning the street outside.

After blocking entrance to Wangfujing, police took away foreign news photographers, camera crews and reporters from The Associated Press, the BBC, Voice of America, German state broadcasters ARD and ZDF, and others. They were taken to an office where they were told special permission was needed to report from Wangfujing. In doing so, the government appears to be extending a ban on reporting at Tiananmen Square and reinterpreting more relaxed rules put in place ahead of the 2008 Beijing Olympics.

 

[a_majoor]

And more on the Jasmine Revolution (long article, full edition on link):

http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/first-hand-report-from-a-jasmine-rally-in-shanghai/?print=1

A First-Hand Report from a ‘Jasmine Rally’ in Shanghai
Posted By John Parker On February 27, 2011 @ 3:33 pm In Asia,China,World News | 1 Comment

In mid-February, as the anti-authoritarian wave sweeping the Middle East continued to gather momentum, a Twitter user using the account name of Shudong posted a tweet announcing that “Jasmine Revolution” rallies would be held on February 20th in every large city in China, and announced that the details would be posted later elsewhere. This information was indeed posted as promised, apparently on the U.S.-based website Boxun.com; it called for rallies to be held on the 20th in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Nanjing, and other major cities around the country, and repeated every seven days thereafter, until such time as the organizers’ concerns were met.

According to a translation posted on the China Digital Times website, which often reports on dissident and other pro-democracy activities, the Jasmine organizers cited a number of grievances as the reason for their action, including:

corruption (“a government that grows more corrupt by the day…”)
high inequality (“Why is it that in just the last few decades China has gone from being a country with the smallest gap between the rich and the poor to one with the largest?”)
high inflation (“The excessive printing of currency is recklessly diluting the value of the people’s wealth.”)
lack of judicial independence (“we are resolute in asking the government and the officials to accept the supervision of ordinary Chinese people, and we must have an independent judiciary.”)
the one-party system itself (“China belongs to every Chinese person, not to any political party…. The Chinese people’s thirst for freedom and democracy is unstoppable”.)
Interestingly, the “freedom and democracy” language was a direct quote from China’s current premier, Wen Jiabao, and acknowledged as such. Premier Wen spoke those words during a remarkable CNN interview last year, where he appeared to support the idea of political reform, triggering speculation of a rift within China’s top leadership over fundamental political issues. On the morning of February 26th, in an action that seemed clearly timed to pre-empt the second weekly Jasmine Rally (scheduled for the afternoon of the 27th), Wen conducted a highly unusual web chat with Chinese citizens, in which he promised to address a number of the grievances raised by the Jasmine Rally organizers, including taming inflation, runaway property prices, and environmental damage. This chat was heavily covered by Xinhua, the Chinese Communist Party-controlled news service, but tellingly, no mention was made of political reform.

It was unclear whether this extraordinary chat was instigated by Wen himself, or by China’s top leaders as a whole. Regardless of which is the case, the lack of any similar action by President Hu Jintao was very conspicuous. This was consistent with Hu’s reputation: his unwillingness to consider even the most timid political reforms has been duly noted by China’s people, who have begun referring to him in sardonic Internet postings as “Hu-barak” or (more recently) “Hu-ammar Qaddafi.” These appellations are partly a response to the Chinese regime’s pervasive Internet censorship, which has cracked down heavily on postings that mention the fallen Arab dictators by name.

Unfortunately, the Wen chat was only the nice-guy public face of Beijing’s response to the Jasmine Rallies — the mere suggestion that its top leaders could end up like Hosni Mubarak appears to have given the CCP a serious case of the vapors, and its response was strikingly disproportionate to the actual act which triggered the rallies. Within hours of the first postings, according to Chinese sources cited by CDT, police were requesting server logs to hunt down “Shudong,” who had posted anonymously. Detentions of several top dissidents soon followed, while others were put under house arrest. CCP goons even threatened to rape the wife of one dissident, according to technology blogger Jason Ng. Ng also cited claims on some websites that the army had been issued live ammunition to deal with the protests.

In addition, the regime directed a number of employees (the so called “fifty cent party,” named for the amount of money they receive for each pro-regime Internet posting) to register with Twitter; these individuals immediately began cranking out posts denouncing the “Jasmine Revolution” as illegal and claiming it was a secret plot by the United States. Search terms related to the “Jasmine Rallies,” including the word “Jasmine” itself, were rapidly banned from Chinese websites. Ironically, “Jasmine” is the name of a Chinese folk song that was a favorite of Jiang Zemin, and was publicly sung by Hu Jintao, meaning that censorship of the word also wiped out “patriotic” posts meant to praise CCP leaders.

All this, and many other repressive measures both in cyberspace and the real world, took place before the first actual rallies. When the initial Jasmine Rallies finally did occur on the 20th, most observers found them to be somewhat anticlimactic. In the capital, the appointed site was in front of a McDonald’s in the Wangfujing neighborhood; hundreds of people appeared, but it was impossible to know how many were demonstrators and how many were accidental passersby or simply gawkers (according to Ng, some people thought that a Chinese movie star was in the area). However, there were at least three arrests, according to the Los Angeles Times, and one attendee was questioned after he attempted to photograph jasmine flowers with his mobile phone. Police presence in the area was heavy, with hundreds of officers guarding both ends of the streets and physically pushing away foreign journalists with cameras, according to an AFP report. In Shanghai, at least three people were detained, and staff at a popular Starbucks next to the appointed rally site were apparently directed to remove chairs and tables from the sidewalk outside the store.

 

[a_majoor]

Part 2:

http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/first-hand-report-from-a-jasmine-rally-in-shanghai/?print=1

Visiting a Shanghai “Jasmine Rally”

In light of all these events, this writer, who happened to be in Shanghai on business on February 27th (the appointed day for the second Shanghai “Jasmine Rally”), decided to visit the rally site, a plaza in front of the “Peace Cinema” in the People’s Square neighborhood, and see what, if anything, was happening there.

People’s Square, the site of Shanghai’s horse racing track in pre-revolutionary days, has become a symbolic center of gravity in Shanghai, not unlike Times Square in New York. This, and the fact that it is at the intersection of three metro lines, making it easily accessible to millions of residents, is undoubtedly the reason why it was chosen as the rally site. As I approached the area, I noticed that the metro exit closest to Peace Cinema was blocked, with a sign saying (in Chinese) “This area is closed for maintenance. Please use another exit. Thank you for your cooperation.” I therefore used another exit, leading to a large shopping mall, Raffles City, which directly joins onto the Peace Cinema and contains the Starbucks immediately adjacent to the rally site. The Starbucks looked normal from within the mall except that the outdoor tables had been moved inside the mall. Quite strangely for a pleasant Sunday afternoon, the entrance to Peace Cinema was blocked, and the theater itself was completely closed. Entering Starbucks from the mall, I found the door to the outside was also blocked, with a sign saying, obviously falsely, “This door is out of order. Please use the back door.”

There was nothing else to do except go outside, using the mall’s main entrance. As I reached the sidewalk, I had no idea what to expect, and would not have been surprised to find nothing, or find the entire area fenced off. Instead, to my amazement, it was immediately very obvious that something unusual was going on. A crowd of perhaps three to four hundred had gathered in the rally area. It was clear that most of them were not just pedestrians, because they were just standing around, as if they were waiting for something to happen. In fact, this was more or less what the Jasmine organizers had requested — for people to simply show up at the appointed place and time, without saying or doing anything in particular. There were also hundreds of pedestrians just passing by coincidentally, some of whom, as in Beijing last week, were attracted by the crowd and stopped to gawk (an instinct to join crowds, rather than avoid them, is one noticeable characteristic of Chinese culture which differentiates it from American culture).

Several people had cameras and were very conspicuously videotaping the rally. The obvious question is whether these people were demonstrators or working for the government; my guess would be mostly the latter, although it’s impossible to be sure. The police presence was indeed heavy, just as it had been at the first Jasmine rally last week, according to reports. There seemed to be several different kinds of police; some wore standard police uniforms, while others had private security badges, and there seemed to be some rough-looking individuals on the periphery of the crowd without any uniform at all observing everything. It is certainly possible that the latter were plainclothes policemen. I also saw a few foreigners.

The mood at this event was odd, difficult to describe, and very different from the last major political gathering I witnessed in China, which was the 10th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre, held in Hong Kong in 1999. At the Shanghai Jasmine Rally, the people who looked like demonstrators were mostly older Chinese; their facial expressions were a peculiar combination of determination, curiosity, and cynicism. The cops seemed slightly jumpy but also bored, because at least during the short time I was there, it was apparent that nothing very dramatic was happening.

Oddly, a small street sweeper was moving down the sidewalk, apropos of nothing. I later learned that last week, the same faintly ludicrous tactic was used in Beijing to clear the rally area there. After lingering in the mall for a while, I checked the area again before leaving. The only change was that a police officer was walking up and down repeating a Chinese phrase into a megaphone; I was unable to get this phrase translated before filing this article, but it is likely that he was ordering the area to be cleared, aided by the street sweeper.

Significance

Few would dispute that the PRC is a vastly better-governed country than Libya, and probably much better than Egypt as well. But similarities nevertheless exist. China’s ruling party took power by force, with Stalin’s help, and has never once dared to test its legitimacy at the ballot box. The party constantly asserts that it has invented a new “Confucian” model of government which is superior to “Western democracy,” even though, as the democratic revolutions sweeping the Arab world have so forcefully demonstrated, the appeal of democratic governance obviously extends beyond the limits of Western civilization; indeed, in today’s world, most people living under democratic governments are not “Western,” as the term has been traditionally understood.

The CCP and its defenders also claim that it has wide public support, although if this is really the case, why does the party need to hire tens of thousands of low-paid drones to defend its record on public Internet sites? Why, indeed, does the CCP feel the need to undertake its massive Internet censorship program — by far the most aggressive, intrusive and expensive in the world — which focuses special attention on any site where individual people can give uncensored opinions? (Youtube, Blogspot, WordPress, IMDb, Twitter, and Facebook are among the most prominent targets of the “Great Firewall.”) The CCP’s own actions demonstrate beyond doubt, to any thinking person, that the Party knows it is losing popular support, and therefore seeks to muzzle anyone who cannot be bought off or intimidated (the roster of foreign companies and even governments who fit in one of the latter two categories is depressingly long).

The basic problem with the Chinese system, whether one calls it neo-Confucianism, market-Leninism, “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” or any other label, is actually quite simple. Compared to the Western-democratic model, it lacks two basic features: freedom of speech, and public accountability.

Without freedom of speech, problems invariably fester until they become so serious that they result in mob violence. This is the basic reason why China now has serious incidents of public disorder nearly 100,000 times every year, even by the government’s own reckoning — and the number has been steadily rising. China actually has many excellent journalists who would be happy to expose local problems, as they do in other countries; instead, these reports are usually suppressed. Even in the rare cases where they become so well known that the official media are forced to discuss them, the Party line is always that disasters, such as plastic baby formula, or shoddily built schools killing thousands of children in an earthquake, are the fault of a few inexplicably depraved local scapegoats, not the inevitable result of the system itself, or (God forbid) the ultimate responsibility of China’s unelected Politburo. The intent of the Party’s death grip over the media is to protect the CCP’s reputation, but this cannot work in the long run, because a failure to deal with the underlying causes of problems simply guarantees their repetition in the future, and a lack of credible media causes exaggerated rumors and conspiracy theories to be accepted as fact by the population.

Without public accountability, government officials will invariably do the rational thing, which is to ignore what the public wants and curry favor with their superiors instead. This is why Hu Jintao, the former governor of Tibet, became China’s leader even though he was hated by most Tibetans: it made no difference what his subjects thought of his performance — only the opinion of the CCP higher-ups carried any weight. And this is also why corruption has exploded out of control: as long as government officials make enough money to keep their superiors and other officials happy, it makes no difference if ordinary people think that their taxes and bank deposits are being wasted. It is no coincidence that one key demand of the Jasmine organizers is this: “the details of tax collection [must] be published, and that taxes [should be] genuinely ‘collected from the people, and used for the people.’”

Perhaps the most fundamental problem with dictatorship, as a form of government, is that dictators, for the reasons just mentioned, always end up surrounded by fawning lackeys who tell them whatever they want to hear, and insulate them from the real concerns of the population. The result is that eventually, the dictator begins to lose touch with the reality in his country, and is especially prone to believe a claim that has never been true — indeed, cannot be true — in any human society: that the dictator, or his political organization, are indispensable to the nation. Events in Libya over the last few days have provided a very clear example of where this phenomenon can lead.

Unfortunately for the Communist Party of China, it shows every indication of falling victim to all these syndromes. Hu Jintao delivers condescending lectures to the Chinese people about the need to “solve prominent problems which might harm the harmony and stability of the society,” as though they are children who could not possibly be aware that Hu himself, as the leader of the CCP, is the single individual most directly and personally responsible for the “problems which are harming the harmony and stability of the society.”At the same time, China’s prosperity and integration with the global economy have created a huge middle class which has no patience for, and no interest in, the patronizing lessons of a self-appointed philosopher-king.

As for the myth of indispensability, this is practically the foundation stone of the CCP regime, which constantly, and ridiculously, refers to itself as “China,” an arrogant inanity reminiscent of precisely the feudal system Marx sought to overthrow (e.g., the alleged claim of Louis XIV that “L’État, c’est moi”). For example, the CCP defends Mao Zedong’s monstrous democide with this shibboleth: “Without Chairman Mao, there would be no New China.” But the term “New China,” when it was originally used, meant nothing except China ruled by the CCP, headed by Chairman Mao — so the statement is logically equivalent to the moronically circular “Without Chairman Mao, there would be no China ruled by Chairman Mao.” Even after years living in China, it remains unclear to me how the country was improved by forcing people to regurgitate this kind of idiocy.

Furthermore, the CCP was never “chosen” by the Chinese people but rather imposed on China by the defunct Soviet Union; does not represent “Chinese” ideas, but rather a totally discredited and colossally destructive detour in Western philosophy; has never included more than a tiny fraction of Chinese people as members; is directly responsible for catastrophic policies which killed at least fifty million Chinese citizens; and delayed China’s economic modernization by at least three decades, among countless other crimes. (The regime’s foreign policy misdeeds, such as propping up Kim Il-Sung and Pol Pot, are simply too extensive to discuss here.) For such an organization to claim identity with the 5000-year-old Chinese civilization, to say nothing of the 1.2 billion Chinese people now living, who have never once endorsed its leadership in a free vote, is more than just false — it is, in fact, profoundly insulting to the intelligence of any patriotic Chinese person, and ought to make them livid with rage.

In reality, the CCP not only is not now, but never was, indispensable to China. The historical record shows clearly that China would have been much better off under almost any conceivable alternative government, starting with the rival Kuomintang, which managed to develop Taiwan 25 years faster than the mainland and without any government-manufactured famines or mass political psychosis. The Qing dynasty was backward and corrupt, but certainly lacked the creativity or murderous ruthlessness to produce a “Great Leap Forward” catastrophe. And putting the British in charge would have created an environment far more amenable to prosperity for the ordinary Wang on the street, as Hong Kong’s gold-plated success has irrefutably proved. In fact, so extreme was the murderous incompetence of Mao and his vile cronies, like Kang Sheng and Lin Biao, that the Shanghai Green Gang probably could have run China better than they did.

The Beijing regime’s Qaddafi-like disconnect with reality was very apparent in the recent statements of CCP officials like Chen Jiping, deputy secretary general of the party’s Political and Legal Affairs Committee, who told a journalist: “the schemes of some hostile Western forces attempting to Western[ize] and split us are intensifying, and they are waving the banner of defending rights to meddle in domestic conflicts and maliciously create all kinds of incidents.” In actuality, leaving aside the obviously indigenous origins of the Jasmine Rallies and the many other anti-regime movements of recent years, there is no Western government that could possibly hope to damage China as much as depraved CCP officials like Lin Jiaxiang [1], who attempted to molest an 11-year-old girl in a restaurant in late 2008, then threatened bystanders when he was caught, screaming, “Do you know who I am? I was sent here by the Beijing Ministry of Transportation, my level is the same as your mayor. … You dare f**k with me? Just watch how I am going to deal with you!”

Although the Lin case is extreme, basically similar incidents are not rare; this writer has lived in several countries and visited many more, but has never seen one where government officials, at every level, are as despised by ordinary people as they are in mainland China. There are tens of millions of Chinese, maybe hundreds of millions, who silently bear a deep, bitter hostility towards the CCP that, if it is ever unleashed, could create a convulsion that would make Libya’s pale into insignificance.

One noteworthy manifestation of these sentiments was a rapidly banned poem called “You, Us [2]” that appeared online sometime in 2009 (the following is a translated excerpt):

You needn’t struggle to find work, nor live under high real estate prices,

You needn’t pay for your medical expenses, nor piteously rush about.

You eat at banquets, live in villas, drive nice cars, receive plush benefits, and travel abroad.


You spend our money and monopolize our dreams with power,

Daily you curse us uncultured, implacable commoners.

You have cannons and bayonets, but develop our waters with others,

And you use them [weapons] only against your own people who give birth to and raise you.

You have high walls and iron fences, yet evil-doers remain far outside the law,

Those who speak loudly in the name of justice are put in prison.


…


Our housing resembles that of slaves,

Our cars must yield to yours,

We are busier and busier at work,

Our pay is unchanging year after year.

Our doctor’s fees are more and more expensive,

Our food is filthier and filthier,

Our taxes are heavier and heavier,

Our days pass tenser and tenser.

Our injustices have already nowhere to appeal,

Our power has already been forgotten.


…


Your policies pay our assertions no mind,

Your lives are unlike ours!

Can a party that evokes such bone-deep loathing really remain in power forever? Perhaps CCP leaders, as they tremble in their fortified compounds, are fortunate that the Jasmine Rally movement has repeatedly stressed nonviolence, saying, for example, “We do not support violent revolution; we continue to support non-violent non-cooperation.” As the Jasmine Rallies are suppressed, and the CCP sinks ever deeper into political quicksand of its own making, will every future opposition group be so generous?

Article printed from Pajamas Media: http://pajamasmedia.com

URL to article: http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/first-hand-report-from-a-jasmine-rally-in-shanghai/

URLs in this post:

[1] Lin Jiaxiang: http://www.chinasmack.com/2008/videos/government-official-attacks-11-year-old-girl.html
[2] You, Us: http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2010/12/online-poem-you-us/

 

[Edward Campbell]

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from the Globe and Mail is a sampling of some expert opinion:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/unrest-in-china-six-experts-weigh-in/article1921713/singlepage/#articlecontent

Unrest in China? Six experts weigh in

MARK MACKINNON

Globe and Mail Update
Sunday, Feb. 27, 2011 2:32PM EST


Jin Canrong, deputy director of the School of International Studies at the Renmin University of China

What are the chances of the wave of antiauthoritarian unrest spreading from the Middle East to China? It is impossible, says Prof. Jin. “The call [last weekend for a Tunisia-inspired Jasmine Revolution in China] on boxun.com is evidence that there are no social conditions that compare to the Middle East.”

But why, then, does the government expend so much energy suppressing any hint of dissent?

“Chinese politicians are always very nervous. That’s their problem. But as an observer, I consider China’s situation very different from that of the Middle East.”

Prof. Jin said there are several reasons that China would not see a popular uprising in the near future. China is successful economically, he said, and its power structure more diverse and less corrupt than the regimes of Hosni Mubarak or Moammar Gadhafi. China’s population is also much older than the young and anxious nations of the Middle East. And while there is widespread popular consensus in the Arab world about the need to throw off dictatorship, there is heated debate even among China’s 450 million Internet users about the merits of one-party rule, he said.

Daniel Bell, professor of ethics and political philosophy at Tsinghua University in Beijing

Prof. Bell says a pro-democracy uprising in China is not only unlikely, it may also be undesirable from the West’s point of view. “I think it’s important to cheer for some things: more freedom of speech, more social justice – but multiparty democracy might not be what we should be cheering for, at least not now.”

He said he worried that if a popular revolution took place in the China of 2011, it could quickly deteriorate into “chaos, followed by a populist strongman (coming to power). It could be something like Vladimir Putin in Russia, it could be something worse.”

The Montreal-born Prof. Bell added that while the Chinese have many of the same grievances as the Egyptians did (a lack of political freedoms, corruption, a widening gap between rich and poor, as well as rising food prices), China’s power structure, with its nine-man Politburo atop many smaller, localized centres of authority, is also very different from the strictly top-down dictatorships of the Middle East. It is thus more flexible in its ability to respond to and manage unrest.

Zhang Yajun, 29-year-old Beijing-based blogger (from her post this week “A Chinese Perspective on the ‘Jasmine Revolution’ ” on granitestudio.org):

“The chances of a ‘Jasmine Revolution’ – never mind anything on the scale of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests – are quite small, at least for the foreseeable future. The main reason being that discontent towards the government in China hasn’t translated into meaningful opposition.

“Yet.

“China today is different from 1989. Over the last 20 years, rapid economic growth has raised the standard of living to an unprecedentedly high level. Most families enjoy a lifestyle that previous generations couldn’t have even imagined. For example, my mom could only afford a small piece of sugar for lunch during the Great Famine in 1960, but her daughter travelled in three continents before she turned 25. Few urban Chinese seem eager to trade their chance at prosperity for dreams of revolution. …

“[But] with so many people in China having access to televisions, cellphones, and the Internet, information is more available than ever before in our history. Ordinary people can learn about their rights. If their rights are violated by officials or government, they want to fight to protect them. If the government doesn’t find solutions, and fails to reform a political system that is the root cause of many of these problems, then eventually these smaller, local issues will link together and trigger national discontent, or even revolution.”

Gordon Chang, author of the 2001 book The Coming Collapse of China:

“In the middle of December, no one thought that protesters could mass in the streets of any Arab nation. Now, two autocrats have been toppled and more are on the way out.  Pundits can give you dozens of reasons why the Communist Party looks invulnerable, but they are the same folks who missed the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the toppling of governments in the colour revolutions (in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan), and the recent uprisings in the Arab world.

“All the conditions that existed in the Arab states are present in China. Keep an eye on inflation, which brought people out in the streets in 1989. People think that an economy has to turn down for revolution to occur. In China, all you need is the mismanagement of growth.

“The essential problem for the Communist Party is that almost everyone believes the country needs a new political system.  That thought has seeped into people’s consciousness and is shared across society.  So China can ‘tip,’ to use the phrase popularized by Malcolm Gladwell, because enough people think the same way. …

“The only precondition for mass demonstrations is that people lose their fear.  If some event crystallizes emotions, like the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia in the middle of December, then China’s people will take to the streets.”

Perry Link, emeritus professor of East Asian Studies at Princeton University and co-editor of The Tiananmen Papers:

“I think it is quite unlikely.  If you add up the portions of the population that are a) part of the [Chinese Communist Party] vested-interest group, b) bought off, c) intimidated, and d) perhaps mad as hell but unorganized – because the CCP decapitates any organization before it gets far – then you’ve got, by far, most of the population.

“The key [to an uprising] – but I don't know how it would happen – would be to have the elite-dissident level hook up with the mass discontent over things like corruption, bullying, land seizures, environmental stew, etc.  If that happened, the regime could flip. I think the regime knows this, which is why they are so nervous, and so assiduous about repressing things like Charter 08 [the pro-democracy manifesto penned by jailed Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo and others], news from North Africa, and the like.”

Wang Dan, student leader during the 1989 protests on Tiananmen Square, now living in exile in Taiwan and the United States

Wang Dan has been in prison or exile for nearly all of the 22 years that have passed since pro-democracy demonstrations were crushed by the People’s Liberation Army on June 4, 1989. Nonetheless, the 41-year-old was one of the first to jump on board when a mysterious group called for the Chinese to stage a “Jasmine Revolution” inspired by recent events in the Middle East.

On his Facebook page, Mr. Wang posted the call for Chinese citizens to gather at designated locations in 13 cities and call for change.

“I think it was quite successful, because this was an experiment and a beginning, and we all saw how nervous the government was. I never expected that there will be huge number of people [who] went to those locations, but I believe that his kind of event can be a model for further potential revolution.”

Mr. Wang said the surest sign that new unrest in China was plausible was the government’s overreaction to the small “Jasmine” gatherings last weekend. Key dissidents were detained ahead of time, and hundreds of police officers were deployed to the designated protest sites.

“Nobody knows exactly under what conditions there will be a revolution, that’s the reason the government [is] worried.”

Asked what he thought it would take for people to take to the streets again as they did in 1989, Mr. Wang pointed to the same thing that triggered much of the recent unrest in the Middle East – food prices, which have risen sharply in recent months in China.

“If the inflation situation gets worse, there must be social disorder,” he said.

My own guesstimate is that Profs. Bell and Link are closest to the truth.

My own observations – I recently had a chance to meet with/talk to people in some small towns and villages in (central) Anhui province – is that people are most concerned with getting ahead: renovating their home (apartment); buying new furniture; buying a scooter or a car; and so on. Yes there is unhappiness about inept and corrupt officialdom but, as nearly as I could tell, that unhappiness was more about practical performance issues than about (relative) abstractions like liberty. In my estimation and as Prof. Jin says, “there are no social conditions that compare to the Middle East.” That is not to suggest that China has few problems and that all is sweetness and light – that’s clearly not the case but, as I see it anyway, “ordinary” people still have confidence that they, through their own efforts, can improve their families’ lots in life.

 

[a_majoor]

More financial news that will give some people the jitters:

http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Chinas-holdings-of-US-debt-apf-3118302220.html?x=0&sec=topStories&pos=3&asset=&ccode=

China's holdings of US debt jump 30 percent
Treasury: China's holdings of US debt jump 30 percent based on annual revision of data
Martin Crutsinger, AP Economics Writer, On Monday February 28, 2011, 5:13 pm EST

WASHINGTON (AP) -- China, the biggest buyer of U.S. Treasury securities, owns a lot more than previously estimated.
In an annual revision of the figures, the Treasury Department said Monday that China's holdings totaled $1.16 trillion at the end of December.
That was an increase of 30 percent from an estimate the government made two weeks ago.

The government made the change to its monthly report based on more accurate information it obtains in an annual survey. That survey more
does a better job of determining the actual owners of Treasury securities.

China was firmly in the top spot as the largest foreign holder of U.S. Treasury debt even before the revisions. But the big increase in Chinese
holdings could ease fears that Chinese investors might begin dumping their U.S. holdings. Such a development could send U.S. interest rates
rising. That would slow America's economic recovery and increase Washington's costs for financing the $14.3 trillion national debt.
China and Britain were the countries with the biggest revisions in the new report.

The amount of U.S. Treasury securities held by Britain fell to $272.1 billion in the new report. That's a drop of $269.2 billion from the last
monthly report which put the Britain's holdings of U.S. debt at $541.3 billion. The holdings of the two countries often show big revisions
when the annual report is released.

The reason for the change is that Chinese investors who purchase their Treasury securities in London are often counted as British investors.
The more detailed annual report does a better job of tracking the countries in which investors reside as opposed to the location where
investors make their purchases.

Even with the revision, Britain remained the third largest holder of U.S. Treasurys.
Japan had the second highest foreign holdings, totaling $882.3 billion at the end of December. The revision was only slightly below the
original estimate.

The total foreign holdings of Treasury debt stood at $4.44 trillion at the end of December, according to the new report. That's up 1.5 percent
from the estimate made two weeks ago. About two-thirds of U.S. Treasurys owned overseas are held by foreign governments and central
banks.

The U.S. government is selling huge amounts of debt to finance record-high budget deficits. The Obama administration in its new budget
released on Feb. 14 projected that this year's deficit will reach a record $1.65 trillion. It would be the third consecutive year the federal deficit
has exceeded $1 trillion.

 

[PanaEng]

big budget increase:
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2011/03/04/china-defense.html

The increase to just over $91.5 billion Cdn would go toward "appropriate" hardware spending and salary increases for the 2.3 million members of the People's Liberation Army, spokesman Li Zhaoxing told a news conference in Beijing.

Chinese media reports said members of the PLA, the world's largest standing military, will receive raises of up to 40 per cent his year, their third pay increase in six years.

Are they having retention issues?

Although new fighter planes and aircraft carrier may make the Taiwanese more nervous, do the Chinese military have the capability to actually assault and land troops in Taiwan, successfully?
Additionally, although unification with Taiwan still being their ultimate goal, I think they are focusing more on projecting their influence in Africa and Middle East - with the AC - than taking steps to actually invade Taiwan.

cheers,
Frank

 

[Edward Campbell]

My impressions, from talks with Chinese people and a couple of recent visits:

big budget increase:
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2011/03/04/china-defense.html

Are they having retention issues? Yes; and recruiting issues, too. The PLA must compete with a (still) hot economy for the sorts of people it wants. The PLA, especially the land forces, are much smaller and much better equipped than, say, 25 years ago; they need concomitantly "better" people to use and maintain that equipment.

Although new fighter planes and aircraft carrier may make the Taiwanese more nervous, do the Chinese military have the capability to actually assault and land troops in Taiwan, successfully? No, not yet; but they plan to have that capability. Taiwan matters - even to "ordinary" Chinese people, but the Chinese plan is to become a great global power - and to have enough "hard power" to magnify their growing (and in their eyes more important) "soft power."

Additionally, although unification with Taiwan still being their ultimate goal, I think they are focusing more on projecting their influence in Africa and Middle East - with the AC - than taking steps to actually invade Taiwan.
I agree with you, but you must remember that, in the Chinese minds, Taiwan is not an independent country; it is a province, comme les autres that will rejoin the Motherland. that's not something any Chinese government can negotiate - not if it wants to survive.

cheers,
Frank

 

[tingbudong]

big budget increase:
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2011/03/04/china-defense.html

Are they having retention issues?

Although new fighter planes and aircraft carrier may make the Taiwanese more nervous, do the Chinese military have the capability to actually assault and land troops in Taiwan, successfully?
Additionally, although unification with Taiwan still being their ultimate goal, I think they are focusing more on projecting their influence in Africa and Middle East - with the AC - than taking steps to actually invade Taiwan.

cheers,
Frank

I believe it is more of a loyalty payment (possibly with the majority going to the officer corps) than a retention bonus.  Keep in mind that the P.L.A is not like their western counterparts.  Their primary mandate is to defend the Communist Party of China.  They need to be kept happy

I've read pieces (can't remember the sources) where there there were rumblings regarding difficulties acquiring high level research talent, and attrition in highly valued commercial trades (aircraft maintenance and pilots, for example) but for the most part a military profession is a fairly highly regarded profession in China with all members being awarded considerable fringe benefits (easy access to rail tickets being a major perk and ample real estate opportunities for the higher ranks).  I've spoken to the odd soldier when I was living there and retention doesn't really seem to be a problem and military academies are apparently very exclusive. 

 

[Edward Campbell]

It is true that the (current defined) missions of the PLA are:

• Consolidate the ruling status of the Communist Party
• Help ensure China's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and domestic security in order to continue national development
• Safeguard China's expanding national interests
• Help maintain world peace*

But the first “mission” is, de facto, political window dressing.

The second third and fourth missions look remarkably like the missions of most national armed forces, including the CF.

Indeed, the PLA is rather like most other national armed forces: it faces similar challenges and it approaches them in ways that we might find familiar.

In my outsider’s opinion the biggest problem facing the PLA is the same as the biggest problem facing China as a whole: institutional corruption. I believe that the PLA has been more active than many sectors of the Chinese establishment in dealing with corruption – it is no longer possible for a below average officer to rise to the top and to achieve great wealth just by being a politically loyal toady. A series of recent appointments (which have been discussed here on Army.ca, I think) illustrate that technical and professional competence are overtaking institutional loyalty as a main prerequisite for promotion to and within the most senior ranks. All is not perfect and there are, for all the steps forward, too many missteps, sidesteps and steps back, but the progress is, I believe real, measurable and, above all, irreversible. This brings with it a disincentive for some bright, ambitious young Chinese: you cannot get rich in the PLA.

Modernizing and professionalizing a force as large as the PLA and, especially, one with its unique political history is a daunting process. We must all hope that the PLA leadership succeeds because China does not need a highly politicized (unprofessional) military and the world doesn’t need China without a professional military.

__________
* See: http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2009/RAND_CT332.pdf page 3

 

[tomahawk6]

I thought the PLA still used the draft .

 

[Edward Campbell]

The draft is still on the books but, as far as I know, it hasn't been used for, maybe, ten years.

They used to require university students to do a two or three week "indoctrination" course - mostly some physical training and a bit of "Mr. Dress-up."



Edit: typo

 

[a_majoor]

Chinese rocket science:

http://www.china.org.cn/china/2011-03/04/content_22051663.htm

Massive rocket base to be built The world's largest design, production and testing base for rockets is being built in Tianjin, Liang Xiaohong, deputy head of the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology, said Thursday.

The first phase of the rocket industrial base in Tianjin's Binhai New Area will be completed within the year. Rocket parts will be designed, manufactured, assembled and tested at the base, Liang told the Xinhua News Agency.

Twenty of the 22 plants have been completed, and some of them are ready for operation. The base is designed to meet China's growing demand in space technology research and development for the next 30 to 50 years, he added.

By integrating the industrial chain, the base will be able to produce a whole spectrum of rockets of different sizes and types for China's lunar probe project, space station and other projects, he said.

China's new rockets, including Long March IV, will be designed and manufactured in the 200-hectare base, he said.

Liang also said the research and development of China's new generation of carrier rockets, Long March V, were going according to plan, and expected to catch up with the US Delta-4H rockets in payload capacity.

With a maximum low Earth-orbit payload capacity of 25 tons and high Earth-orbit payload capacity of 14 tons, Long March V rockets would reach the world top level in payload capacity, said Liang.

Long March V rockets are designed for missions following the country's manned space program and lunar exploration program, said Liang, also a member of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).

Meanwhile, the unmanned space module Tiangong-1 that China plans to launch this year will be sent into space by a modified Long March II-F carrier rocket, Liang said.

The 8.5-ton Tiangong-1 is expected to be launched in the second half of this year to perform the nation's first space docking.

It will dock with the unmanned Shenzhou-8 spacecraft, which will be launched two months after Tiangong-1.

"Both Tiangong-1 and Shenzhou-8 will be launched by a Long March II-F carrier rocket," said Liang.

Researchers have made nearly 170 technological modifications to the original Long March II-F model, Liang said.

The Long-March II-F rocket has successfully sent seven spaceships into space.

 

[CougarKing]

Publication: China Brief Volume: 11 Issue: 4 March 10, 2011 06:55 PM Age: 2 days By: Jyh-Perng Wang

Is Russia Helping Taiwan Build Submarines?

Taiwan Submarine

On January 27, a Taiwanese weekly, Next Magazine, reported that the Republic of China (Taiwan) Navy had plans to introduce Russian Kilo-class submarine technology. According to the report, a task force was organized by Taiwan’s National Security Council (NSC) and the Taiwan Navy, which contacted Russian government authorities back in October 2010 and reached a consensus on technical cooperation to construct pressure hulls for submarines. Russia reportedly will send a technical team to Taiwan for evaluation before signing a memorandum of cooperation (Next Magazine [Taiwan], January 27). The Taiwan Navy denied the report and stated that, “The [Taiwan] navy has no plans to acquire submarines from sources other than the United States,” and that, "there has been no change of such policy and position" (Taipei Times, December 9, 2010; Taiwan's MND, January 26).

The Taiwan Navy appears to be approaching a crossroads in its 40-year quest for a fleet of modern diesel electric submarines. As the Obama administration evaluates the former George W. Bush administration's approval of eight diesel-electric submarines for Taiwan in April 2001, senior ROC political and military leaders are weighing three options: First, continue to lobby the Obama administration to notify Congress of its intent to implement the program as authorized by the former Bush administration; second, give up the 40 year quest for conventional submarines that former defense minister and president, Chiang Ching-kuo, began in 1969; or direct the ROC's domestic industry to take the lead, with United States and other foreign assistanc, in designing, developing and manufacturing diesel electric submarines (The Taiwan Link, October 30, 2008). Since President Barack Obama has not yet agreed to sell submarines to Taiwan, such reports suggest that the Ma administration may be leaning toward option 3.

Background

Against the backdrop of China’s growing naval power, one of the most effective assets for deterrence available to the Taiwan Navy is arguably the submarine. Many defense planners in Taiwan believe that additional submarines are essential for preventing an occupation of Taiwan proper, since the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) does not currently have sufficient amphibious landing capability. Yet, since former U.S. President George W. Bush authorized the release of eight diesel-electric submarines to Taiwan in April 2001, this military sale has not yet materialized.

During the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration under Chen Shui-bian from 2000 to 2008, the Kuomingtang (KMT), which had a majority in Taiwan's Legislative Yuan, blocked the procurement of submarines on grounds that the acquisition was too expensive. After President Ma Ying-jeou took office on May 20, 2008, however, the NSC, formerly headed by Secretary General Su Chi, revealed that since August 2008 a series of closed-door meetings were held on submarine procurement. No conclusions from those meetings have been released to the public in the past two years.

In February 2010, after Su Chi resigned from his post as secretary general of the NSC, he indicated that, "[He] had learned on private occasions that both civilian and military U.S. officials hold reservations on the sale of submarines to Taiwan, including former director of national intelligence and former commander of the Pacific Command, Admiral Dennis Blair. According to Su, there appear to be two major reasons against the sale. First, at least four deep-water harbors would be required, and the fact that the expansion projects of Kaohsiung and Tsoying sea ports are still not completed indicate that Taiwan does not have enough harbors for additional submarines. Second, Taiwan does not have the ability to maintain submarines. The United States believes that Taiwan has no logistic capability even once submarines are acquired (China Times [Taiwan], February 12, 2010). While the validity of such arguments is debatable, the current administration in Taipei may be shifting its position on submarines.

Russian Cooperation?

In another article published on December 8, 2010, Next Magazine reported that the Taiwan Navy organized a delegation visit with Taiwan Shipbuilding Corporation (CSBC) to Russia from October 10-18, 2010, to seek Moscow's cooperation in developing submarines (Next Magazine, December 9, 2010). Taiwan's Navy Command Headquarters held a press conference to respond to that report and stated, "the procurement of diesel-electric submarine procurement in process through the source of U.S. arms sale. There has been no change of such policy and position, nor has the Navy sent any personnel to Russia" (Taiwan's MND, December 8, 2010). Assistant Manager Yin Tzu-hsiang of CSBS explained that he led colleagues from the company's Design Department and Business Department to Russia for business purposes. The visit was to explore business opportunities, find new customers, buy cheaper raw materials and cooperate with Russians in building icebreakers and fishing vessels. Yin specifically pointed out that there were no Navy personnel whom accompanied his team (Taiwan's Navy, December 9, 2010).

It is interesting to note that in the same month, KMT Legislator Shuai Hua-ming responded to a media interview about Mr. William Stanton, director of the Taipei Office, American Institute in Taiwan, stating that there have been hidden changes in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, and that Taiwan's national defense needs deliberate thinking and self-reflection, and that it can not always rely on the United States (China Times, October 29, 2010). This statement from a senior lawmaker from the ruling party suggests that Taiwan needs to shore up its own indigenous capabilities and may need to look elsewhere for assistance for its defense needs.

Furthermore, when President Ma met the Chairman of American Institute in Taiwan, Mr. Raymond Burghardt, on January 25, Ma stated that, "With the growing cross-strait military imbalance, it is expected the United States could agree to sell F-16C/D jet fighters and diesel-electric submarines as soon as possible. It is emphasized that cross-Strait military imbalance is not considered a positive factor of the development of cross-strait relations and regional stability. Taiwan does not intend to expand its military capability but only hope to replace outdated equipment. The new asset will be used for defensive purposes" (Office of the President, Republic of China [Taiwan], January 25). This is President Ma Ying-jeou's first public pronouncement to the United States that Taiwan needs submarines.

Coincidentally, during his recent visit to the United States, Taiwan's Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-Pyng told the House of Representatives Speaker John Boehner on January 26 that Taiwan need not only F-16C/D fighters but also 8 to 12 new diesel-electric submarines. According to Wang: In light of the growing military imbalance, cross-Strait political negotiations would not be on equal footing, which would be detrimental to both Taiwan and the United States (Liberty Times, January 28).

Conclusion

Whether the reports from Next Magazine are true remains to be seen. It should be noted, however, that the Taiwan Navy denied these reports, which is also consistent with the Ma administration’s policy in recent years. Nevertheless, Ma's calls upon the Obama administration to release the submarines seem to indicate that the administration has shifted its defense policy in favor of submarines. 


If the Taiwan Navy had indeed secretly sent personnel to Russia with President Ma's approval, then the underlying meaning and implications are manifold. First, it would mark a reversal in the current administration's position that submarines are offensive weapons. Second, the report that Taiwan and Russia will cooperate in reverse engineering technology to solve the hull problem of two 70 year-old GuppyⅡ-class submarines was false. The true intention appears to be to acquire new submarine hull from Russia or the ability to build submarines in Taiwan. Third, under the circumstances that the United State cannot obtain a submarine hull blue print from a third country or is not willing to allow Taiwan’s acquisition of submarines, with or without Russia’s assistance—Taiwan is demonstrating its determination of self-resilience defense policy to the United States. Fourth, both Next Magazine’s reports and President Ma’s emphasis on replacing outdated submarines could help in reducing the possibility of retaliation from the PRC through taking an indirect route. Finally, if a submarine production line could be established in Taiwan, in addition to upgrading Taiwan’s technological capability and increasing employment opportunity in southern Taiwan, it could help Ma win support from the people. Whether the Taiwan Navy is willing to stand behind this "development" remains to be further observed.


link

 

[a_majoor]

Note the use by Arab dictators as well:

http://www.technologyreview.com/web/37074/?p1=A3

How China and Others Are Altering Web Traffic
"Invisible" servers let governments quietly intercept and modify their citizens' online communications.

THURSDAY, MARCH 24, 2011BY ROBERT LEMOS E-mail|Audio »|Print

Google leveled new charges against China this week, claiming that the country has interfered with some citizens' access to the Internet giant's Gmail service, disguising the interference as technical glitches.

Security experts say that China is most likely using invisible intermediary servers, or "transparent proxies," to intercept and relay network messages while rapidly modifying the contents of those communications. This makes it possible to block e-mail messages while making it appear as if Gmail is malfunctioning.

Companies regularly use transparent proxies to filter employees' Web access. Some ISPs have also used the technique to replace regular Web advertisements with those of their own. But it's becoming increasingly common for governments to use transparent proxies to censor and track dissidents and protestors. All traffic from a certain network is forced through the proxy, allowing communications to be monitored and modified on the fly. Intercepting and relaying traffic is known as a "man in the middle" attack.

"What you are doing is rewriting the content as it is delivered back to the user," says Nicholas J. Percoco, the head of SpiderLabs, which is part of the security firm Trustwave. Percoco said China's ISP could track everyone who uses Gmail. To do this, it would "inject a JavaScript keystroke logger, which would record every keystroke they typed on the service."
 
Defenses against the attack are few, especially if the Internet service provider has a valid cryptographic certificate, which all major national ISPs should have. Using a protocol known as HTTPS can prevent a man-in-the-middle attack, because it encrypts information in transit. However,, Microsoft revealed in a security advisory issued today that it had detected nine fraudulent certificates for popular Web sites, including Google Mail, Microsoft's Live service, and Yahoo's services. These fake certificates could also be used to intercept encrypted communications.

The Chinese government is thought to have tightened communications in response to political unrest in the Middle East. Google discovered that problems with Gmail from within China came in the form of an attack that caused the Web application to freeze when a user took certain actions, such as clicking the "send" button.

"There is no technical issue on our side—we have checked extensively," a Google spokesperson said in an e-mail statement. "This is a government blockage carefully designed to look like the problem is with Gmail."

The attack appears to block the site only sporadically, halting access to the Web application for a few minutes and then allowing the user to again connect to Gmail, Google says.

Other nations have used man-in-the-middle tactics to interfere with Web traffic. Tunisia took a similar approach to grabbing Facebook logins in order to perform surveillance on its citizens after widespread protests of the reign of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. The protests followed massive unrest in other countries such as Yemen and Tunisia's next door neighbor, Libya.

Facebook has become a major communications hub for protestors in many countries. The Tunisian government was "using the transparent proxy to hijack the sessions of the users' accounts and post positive things about the government to the people's Facebook accounts," says Percoco.

 

[CougarKing]

Nan Zhongguo Hai/南中国海 (the South China Sea) in the news again:

New York Times link

China Hedges Over Whether South China Sea is a ‘Core Interest’ Worth War

By EDWARD WONG
Published: March 30, 2011

BEIJING — When President Hu Jintao of China dropped in on Washington this winter, one hot-button topic was notably absent from the agenda: the South China Sea. Nor will Chinese officials be keen to discuss it during a summit meeting between the countries planned for May in Washington.

In the past year, it has been one of the most delicate diplomatic issues between China and the United States. Perhaps no other point of tension has been as revealing of the difficulties American officials have reading and responding to Chinese foreign policy. But in recent months, Chinese leaders have apparently been happy to let the issue quiet down, perhaps for the sake of smoothing over relations with the Obama administration.

China, Taiwan and four Southeast Asian nations have been wrangling for years over territorial claims to the South China Sea. Then last July, amid heightening tensions in the waters, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton rallied with Southeast Asian nations to speak out against China. She bluntly said in Hanoi that the United States had a “national interest” in the area, and that China and other countries should abide by a 2002 agreement guaranteeing a resolution of the sovereignty disputes by “peaceful means.”

Chinese officials were shocked that the United States was getting involved, analysts say. A public debate erupted in China over this question: Should China officially upgrade the South China Sea to a “core interest,” placing it on par with other sovereignty issues like Tibet, Taiwan and Xinjiang that could justify military intervention?

Some Chinese officials appeared to have floated that idea in early 2010 in private conversations with their American counterparts. Several American officials told reporters in Beijing and Washington last year that one or more Chinese officials had labeled the South China Sea a “core interest.” But despite those remarks and the public debate that came later, Chinese leaders have not explicitly come out with a policy statement describing the South China Sea as such — nor have they denied it.

“It’s not Chinese policy to declare the South China Sea as a core interest,” said Zhu Feng, a professor of politics and international relations at Peking University. “But the problem is that a public denial will be some sort of chicken action on the part of Chinese leaders. So the government also doesn’t want to inflame the Chinese people.”

The Foreign Ministry and the State Council, China’s cabinet, did not answer questions on the issue, despite repeated requests.

Michael Swaine, an analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, has published a paper with the China Leadership Monitor looking at China’s growing use of the term “core interest.” Since 2004, Chinese officials, scholars and news organizations have increasingly used the term to refer to sovereignty issues. Initial references were to Taiwan, but the term now also encompasses Tibet and Xinjiang, the restive western region. After examining numerous Chinese print sources, Mr. Swaine concluded that China had not officially identified the South China Sea as a “core interest.” Some “unofficial differences in viewpoint, along with the likely dilemma involved in confirming whether the South China Sea is a core interest, together suggest the possibility of disagreement among the Chinese leadership on this matter,” Mr. Swaine wrote.

That is not to say that China has refrained from asserting its sovereignty claims. On March 24, a Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Jiang Yu, said at a news conference that China held “indisputable sovereignty” over the Spratly Islands.

By spring 2010, it seemed to some American officials that Chinese officials were pushing beyond the standard sovereignty claims, calling the South China Sea a “core interest.” In a November interview with The Australian, Mrs. Clinton said Dai Bingguo, the senior foreign policy official in the Chinese government, told her that at a summit meeting in May 2010.

“I immediately responded and said, ‘We don’t agree with that,’ ” Mrs. Clinton said, though some scholars in the United States and China question whether Mr. Dai made the remark. Then in July 2010, at a meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in Hanoi, Mrs. Clinton made the statements that enraged the Chinese. M. Taylor Fravel, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who studies China’s territorial issues, said Mrs. Clinton’s move was in reaction to a long series of episodes in the South China Sea that American officials believed reflected greater assertiveness by China.

After Mrs. Clinton’s statements, the English-language edition of Global Times, a populist Chinese newspaper, published an angry editorial that linked the South China Sea to China’s core interests — “China will never waive its right to protect its core interest with military means,” it said. Senior military officers weighed in on both sides. Han Xudong, an army colonel and a professor at National Defense University, wrote in Outlook, a policy magazine, that “China’s comprehensive national strength, especially in military capabilities, is not yet enough to safeguard all of the core national interests. In this case, it’s not a good idea to reveal the core national interests.”

The Web site of People’s Daily, the official mouthpiece of the Communist Party, posted a survey asking readers whether it was now necessary to label the South China Sea a “core interest.” As of January, 97 percent of nearly 4,300 respondents had said yes.

Muddying the whole issue has been the parallel use of “core interests” advanced by Mr. Dai. In 2009, he broadened the definition of the term by saying China had three core interests: maintaining its political system, defending its sovereignty claims and promoting its economic development. Some Chinese officials might now see the South China Sea and all other sovereignty disputes as falling under “core interests.”

The debate in the Chinese news media seemed to reflect a divide among Chinese officials. Then in the fall, news organizations were ordered to stop writing about it.

“Now I think they are backing away and downplaying the question because of the trouble it is causing with the U.S. and the ASEANs,” said Joseph Nye Jr., a professor of international relations at Harvard and a former Pentagon official.

Li Bibo contributed research.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Part 1 of 3

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from Foreign Affairs is an interesting article by Prof. Wang Jisi about China’s foreign policy:

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67470/wang-jisi/chinas-search-for-a-grand-strategy?page=show

China's Search for a Grand Strategy
A Rising Great Power Finds Its Way

By Wang Jisi
March/April 2011

Any country's grand strategy must answer at least three questions: What are the nation's core interests? What external forces threaten them? And what can the national leadership do to safeguard them? Whether China has any such strategy today is open to debate. On the one hand, over the last three decades or so, its foreign and defense policies have been remarkably consistent and reasonably well coordinated with the country's domestic priorities. On the other hand, the Chinese government has yet to disclose any document that comprehensively expounds the country's strategic goals and the ways to achieve them. For both policy analysts in China and China watchers abroad, China's grand strategy is a field still to be plowed.

In recent years, China's power and influence relative to those of other great states have outgrown the expectations of even its own leaders. Based on the country's enhanced position, China's international behavior has become increasingly assertive, as was shown by its strong reactions to a chain of events in 2010: for example, Washington's decision to sell arms to Taiwan, U.S.-South Korean military exercises in the Yellow Sea, and Japan's detention of a Chinese sailor found in disputed waters. It has become imperative for the international community to understand China's strategic thinking and try to forecast how it might evolve according to China's interests and its leaders' vision.

THE ENEMY WITHIN AND WITHOUT

A unique feature of Chinese leaders' understanding of their country's history is their persistent sensitivity to domestic disorder caused by foreign threats. From ancient times, the ruling regime of the day has often been brought down by a combination of internal uprising and external invasion. The Ming dynasty collapsed in 1644 after rebelling peasants took the capital city of Beijing and the Manchu, with the collusion of Ming generals, invaded from the north. Some three centuries later, the Manchu's own Qing dynasty collapsed after a series of internal revolts coincided with invasions by Western and Japanese forces. The end of the Kuomintang's rule and the founding of the People's Republic in 1949 was caused by an indigenous revolution inspired and then bolstered by the Soviet Union and the international communist movement.

Since then, apprehensions about internal turbulences have lingered. Under Mao Zedong's leadership, from 1949 to 1976, the Chinese government never formally applied the concept of "national interest" to delineate its strategic aims, but its international strategies were clearly dominated by political and military security interests -- themselves often framed by ideological principles such as "proletarian internationalism." Strategic thinking at the time followed the Leninist tradition of dividing the world into political camps: archenemies, secondary enemies, potential allies, revolutionary forces. Mao's "three worlds theory" pointed to the Soviet Union and the United States as China's main external threats, with corresponding internal threats coming from pro-Soviet "revisionists" and pro-American "class enemies." China's political life in those years was characterized by recurrent struggles against international and domestic schemes to topple the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership or change its political coloring. Still, since Mao's foreign policy supposedly represented the interests of the "international proletariat" rather than China's own, and since China was economically and socially isolated from much of the world, Beijing had no comprehensive grand strategy to speak of.

Then came the 1980s and Deng Xiaoping. As China embarked on reform and opened up, the CCP made economic development its top priority. Deng's foreign policy thinking departed appreciably from that of Mao. A major war with either the Soviet Union or the United States was no longer deemed inevitable. China made great efforts to develop friendly and cooperative relations with countries all over the world, regardless of their political or ideological orientation; it reasoned that a nonconfrontational posture would attract foreign investment to China and boost trade. A peaceful international environment, an enhanced position for China in the global arena, and China's steady integration into the existing economic order would also help consolidate the CCP's power at home.

But even as economic interests became a major driver of China's behavior on the international scene, traditional security concerns and the need to guard against Western political interference remained important. Most saliently, the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989 and, in its wake, the West's sanctions against Beijing served as an alarming reminder to China's leaders that internal and external troubles could easily intertwine. Over the next decade, Beijing responded to Western censure by contending that the state's sovereign rights trumped human rights. It resolutely refused to consider adopting Western-type democratic institutions. And it insisted that it would never give up the option of using force if Taiwan tried to secede.

Despite those concerns, however, by the beginning of the twenty-first century, China's strategic thinkers were depicting a generally favorable international situation. In his 2002 report to the CCP National Congress, General Secretary Jiang Zemin foresaw a "20 years' period of strategic opportunity," during which China could continue to concentrate on domestic tasks. Unrest has erupted at times -- such as the violent riots in Tibet in March 2008 and in Xinjiang in July 2009, which the central government blamed on "foreign hostile forces" and responded to with harsh reprisals. And Beijing claims that the awarding of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo, a political activist it deems to be a "criminal trying to sabotage the socialist system," has proved once again Westerners' "ill intentions." Still, the Chinese government has been perturbed by such episodes only occasionally, which has allowed it to focus on redressing domestic imbalances and the unsustainability of its development.

Under President Hu Jintao, Beijing has in recent years formulated a new development and social policy geared toward continuing to promote fast economic growth while emphasizing good governance, improving the social safety net, protecting the environment, encouraging independent innovation, lessening social tensions, perfecting the financial system, and stimulating domestic consumption. As Chinese exports have suffered from the global economic crisis since 2008, the need for such economic and social transformations has become more urgent.

With that in mind, the Chinese leadership has redefined the purpose of China's foreign policy. As Hu announced in July 2009, China's diplomacy must "safeguard the interests of sovereignty, security, and development." Dai Bingguo, the state councilor for external relations, further defined those core interests in an article last December: first, China's political stability, namely, the stability of the CCP leadership and of the socialist system; second, sovereign security, territorial integrity, and national unification; and third, China's sustainable economic and social development.

Apart from the issue of Taiwan, which Beijing considers to be an integral part of China's territory, the Chinese government has never officially identified any single foreign policy issue as one of the country's core interests. Last year, some Chinese commentators reportedly referred to the South China Sea and North Korea as such, but these reckless statements, made with no official authorization, created a great deal of confusion. In fact, for the central government, sovereignty, security, and development all continue to be China's main goals. As long as no grave danger -- for example, Taiwan's formal secession -- threatens the CCP leadership or China's unity, Beijing will remain preoccupied with the country's economic and social development, including in its foreign policy.

End of Part 1

 

[Edward Campbell]

Part 2

THE PRINCIPLE'S PRINCIPLE

The need to identify an organizing principle to guide Chinese foreign policy is widely recognized today in China's policy circles and scholarly community, as well as among international analysts. However, defining China's core interests according to the three prongs of sovereignty, security, and development, which sometimes are in tension, means that it is almost impossible to devise a straightforward organizing principle. And the variety of views among Chinese political elites complicates efforts to devise any such grand strategy based on political consensus.

One popular proposal has been to focus on the United States as a major threat to China. Proponents of this view cite the ancient Chinese philosopher Mencius, who said, "A state without an enemy or external peril is absolutely doomed." Or they reverse the political scientist Samuel Huntington's argument that "the ideal enemy for America would be ideologically hostile, racially and culturally different, and militarily strong enough to pose a credible threat to American security" and cast the United States as an ideal enemy for China. This notion is based on the long-held conviction that the United States, along with other Western powers and Japan, is hostile to China's political values and wants to contain its rise by supporting Taiwan's separation from the mainland. Its proponents also point to U.S. politicians' sympathy for the Dalai Lama and Uighur separatists, continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, U.S. military alliances and arrangements supposedly designed to encircle the Chinese mainland, the currency and trade wars waged by U.S. businesses and the U.S. Congress, and the West's argument that China should slow down its economic growth in order to help stem climate change.

This view is reflected in many newspapers and on many Web sites in China (particularly those about military affairs and political security). Its proponents argue that China's current approach to foreign relations is far too soft; Mao's tit-for-tat manner is touted as a better model. As a corollary, it is said that China should try to find strategic allies among countries that seem defiant toward the West, such as Iran, North Korea, and Russia. Some also recommend that Beijing use its holdings of U.S. Treasury bonds as a policy instrument, standing ready to sell them if U.S. government actions undermine China's interests.

This proposal is essentially misguided, for even though the United States does pose some strategic and security challenges to China, it would be impractical and risky to construct a grand strategy based on the view that the United States is China's main adversary. Few countries, if any, would want to join China in an anti-U.S. alliance. And it would seriously hold back China's economic development to antagonize the country's largest trading partner and the world's strongest economic and military power. Fortunately, the Chinese leadership is not about to carry out such a strategy. Premier Wen Jiabao was not just being diplomatic last year when he said of China and the United States that "our common interests far outweigh our differences."

Well aware of this, an alternative school of thought favors Deng's teaching of tao guang yang hui, or keeping a low profile in international affairs. Members of this group, including prominent political figures, such as Tang Jiaxuan, former foreign minister, and General Xiong Guangkai, former deputy chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army, argue that since China remains a developing country, it should concentrate on economic development. Without necessarily rebuffing the notion that the West, particularly the United States, is a long-term threat to China, they contend that China is not capable of challenging Western primacy for the time being -- and some even caution against hastily concluding that the West is in decline. Meanwhile, they argue, keeping a low profile in the coming decades will allow China to concentrate on domestic priorities.

Although this view appears to be better received internationally than the other, it, too, elicits some concerns. Its adherents have had to take great pains to explain that tao guang yang hui, which is sometimes mistranslated as "hiding one's capabilities and biding one's time," is not a calculated call for temporary moderation until China has enough material power and confidence to promote its hidden agenda. Domestically, the low-profile approach is vulnerable to the charge that it is too soft, especially when security issues become acute. As nationalist feelings surge in China, some Chinese are pressing for a more can-do foreign policy. Opponents also contend that this notion, which Deng put forward more than 20 years ago, may no longer be appropriate now that China is far more powerful.

Some thoughtful strategists appreciate that even if keeping a low profile could serve China's political and security relations with the United States well, it might not apply to China's relations with many other countries or to economic issues and those nontraditional security issues that have become essential in recent years, such as climate change, public health, and energy security. (Beijing can hardly keep a low profile when it actively participates in mechanisms such as BRIC, the informal group formed by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and the new member South Africa.) A foreign policy that insists merely on keeping China's profile low cannot cope effectively with the multifaceted challenges facing the country today.

HOME IS WHERE THE HEART IS

A more sophisticated grand strategy is needed to serve China's domestic priorities. The government has issued no official written statement outlining such a vision, but some direction can be gleaned from the concepts of a "scientific outlook on development" and "building a harmonious society," which have been enunciated by Hu and have been recorded in all important CCP documents since 2003. In 2006, the Central Committee of the CCP announced that China's foreign policy "must maintain economic construction as its centerpiece, be closely integrated into domestic work, and be advanced by coordinating domestic and international situations." Moreover, four ongoing changes in China's strategic thinking may suggest the foundations for a new grand strategy.

The first transformation is the Chinese government's adoption of a comprehensive understanding of security, which incorporates economic and nontraditional concerns with traditional military and political interests. Chinese military planners have begun to take into consideration transnational problems such as terrorism and piracy, as well as cooperative activities such as participation in UN peacekeeping operations. Similarly, it is now clear that China must join other countries in stabilizing the global financial market in order to protect its own economic security. All this means that it is virtually impossible to distinguish China's friends from its foes. The United States might pose political and military threats, and Japan, a staunch U.S. ally, could be a geopolitical competitor of China's, but these two countries also happen to be two of China's greatest economic partners. Even though political difficulties appear to be on the rise with the European Union, it remains China's top economic partner. Russia, which some Chinese see as a potential security ally, is far less important economically and socially to China than is South Korea, another U.S. military ally. It will take painstaking efforts on Beijing's part to limit tensions between China's traditional political-military perspectives and its broadening socioeconomic interests -- efforts that effectively amount to reconciling the diverging legacies of Mao and Deng. The best Beijing can do is to strengthen its economic ties with great powers while minimizing the likelihood of a military and political confrontation with them.

A second transformation is unfolding in Chinese diplomacy: it is becoming less country-oriented and more multilateral and issue-oriented. This shift toward functional focuses -- counterterrorism, nuclear nonproliferation, environmental protection, energy security, food safety, post-disaster reconstruction -- has complicated China's bilateral relationships, regardless of how friendly other states are toward it. For example, diverging geostrategic interests and territorial disputes have long come between China and India, but the two countries' common interest in fending off the West's pressure to reduce carbon emissions has drawn them closer. And now that Iran has become a key supplier of oil to China, its problems with the West over its nuclear program are testing China's stated commitment to the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Changes in the mode of China's economic development account for a third transformation in the country's strategic thinking. Beijing's preoccupation with GDP growth is slowly giving way to concerns about economic efficiency, product quality, environmental protection, the creation of a social safety net, and technological innovation. Beijing's understanding of the core interest of development is expanding to include social dimensions. Correspondingly, China's leaders have decided to try to sustain the country's high growth rate by propping up domestic consumption and reducing over the long term the country's dependence on exports and foreign investment. They are now more concerned with global economic imbalances and financial fluctuations, even as international economic frictions are becoming more intense because of the global financial crisis. China's long-term interests will require some incremental appreciation of the yuan, but its desire to increase its exports in the short term will prevent its decision-makers from taking the quick measures urged by the United States and many other countries. Only the enhancement of China's domestic consumption and a steady opening of its capital markets will help it shake off these international pressures.

The fourth transformation has to do with China's values. So far, China's officials have said that although China has a distinctive political system and ideology, it can cooperate with other countries based on shared interests -- although not, the suggestion seems to be, on shared values. But now that they strongly wish to enhance what they call the "cultural soft power of the nation" and improve China's international image, it appears necessary to also seek common values in the global arena, such as good governance and transparency. Continuing trials and tribulations at home, such as pervasive corruption and ethnic and social unrest in some regions, could also reinforce a shift in values among China's political elite by demonstrating that their hold on power and the country's continued resurgence depend on greater transparency and accountability, as well as on a firmer commitment to the rule of law, democracy, and human rights, all values that are widely shared throughout the world today.

End of Part 2

 

[Edward Campbell]

Part 3

All four of these developments are unfolding haltingly and are by no means irreversible. Nonetheless, they do reveal fundamental trends that will likely shape China's grand strategy in the foreseeable future. When Hu and other leaders call for "coordinating domestic and international situations," they mean that efforts to meet international challenges must not undermine domestic reforms. And with external challenges now coming not only from foreign powers -- especially the United States and Japan -- but also, and increasingly, from functional issues, coping with them effectively will require engaging foreign countries cooperatively and emphasizing compatible values.

Thus, it would be imprudent of Beijing to identify any one country as a major threat and invoke the need to keep it at bay as an organizing principle of Chinese foreign policy -- unless the United States, or another great power, truly did regard China as its main adversary and so forced China to respond in kind. On the other hand, if keeping a low profile is a necessary component of Beijing's foreign policy, it is also insufficient. A grand strategy needs to consider other long-term objectives as well. One that appeals to some Chinese is the notion of building China into the most powerful state in the world: Liu Mingfu, a senior colonel who teaches at the People's Liberation Army's National Defense University, has declared that replacing the United States as the world's top military power should be China's goal. Another idea is to cast China as an alternative model of development (the "Beijing consensus") that can challenge Western systems, values, and leadership. But the Chinese leadership does not dream of turning China into a hegemon or a standard-bearer. Faced with mounting pressures on both the domestic and the international fronts, it is sober in its objectives, be they short- or long-term ones. Its main concern is how best to protect China's core interests -- sovereignty, security, and development -- against the messy cluster of threats that the country faces today. If an organizing principle must be established to guide China's grand strategy, it should be the improvement of the Chinese people's living standards, welfare, and happiness through social justice.

THE BIRTH OF A GREAT NATION

Having identified China's core interests and the external pressures that threaten them, the remaining question is, how can China's leadership safeguard the country's interests against those threats? China's continued success in modernizing its economy and lifting its people's standards of living depends heavily on global stability. Thus, it is in China's interest to contribute to a peaceful international environment. China should seek peaceful solutions to residual sovereignty and security issues, including the thorny territorial disputes between it and its neighbors. With the current leadership in Taiwan refraining from seeking formal independence from the mainland, Beijing is more confident that peace can be maintained across the Taiwan Strait. But it has yet to reach a political agreement with Taipei that would prevent renewed tensions in the future. The Chinese government also needs to find effective means to pacify Tibet and Xinjiang, as more unrest in those regions would likely elicit reactions from other countries.

Although the vast majority of people in China support a stronger Chinese military to defend the country's major interests, they should also recognize the dilemma that poses. As China builds its defense capabilities, especially its navy, it will have to convince others, including the United States and China's neighbors in Asia, that it is taking their concerns into consideration. It will have to make the plans of the People's Liberation Army more transparent and show a willingness to join efforts to establish security structures in the Asia-Pacific region and safeguard existing global security regimes, especially the nuclear nonproliferation regime. It must also continue to work with other states to prevent Iran and North Korea from obtaining nuclear weapons. China's national security will be well served if it makes more contributions to other countries' efforts to strengthen security in cyberspace and outer space. Of course, none of this excludes the possibility that China might have to use force to protect its sovereignty or its security in some special circumstances, such as in the event of a terrorist attack.

China has been committed to almost all existing global economic regimes. But it will have to do much more before it is recognized as a full-fledged market economy. It has already gained an increasingly larger say in global economic mechanisms, such as the G-20, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. Now, it needs to make specific policy proposals and adjustments to help rebalance the global economy and facilitate its plans to change its development pattern at home. Setting a good example by building a low-carbon economy is one major step that would benefit both China and the world.

A grand strategy requires defining a geostrategic focus, and China's geostrategic focus is Asia. When communication lines in Central Asia and South Asia were poor, China's development strategy and economic interests tilted toward its east coast and the Pacific Ocean. Today, East Asia is still of vital importance, but China should and will begin to pay more strategic attention to the west. The central government has been conducting the Grand Western Development Program in many western provinces and regions, notably Tibet and Xinjiang, for more than a decade. It is now more actively initiating and participating in new development projects in Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Central Asia, and throughout the Caspian Sea region, all the way to Europe. This new western outlook may reshape China's geostrategic vision as well as the Eurasian landscape.

Still, relationships with great powers remain crucial to defending China's core interests. Notwithstanding the unprecedented economic interdependence of China, Japan, and the United States, strategic trust is still lacking between China and the United States and China and Japan. It is imperative that the Chinese-Japanese-U.S. trilateral interaction be stable and constructive, and a trilateral strategic dialogue is desirable. More generally, too, China will have to invest tremendous resources to promote a more benign image on the world stage. A China with good governance will be a likeable China. Even more important, it will have to learn that soft power cannot be artificially created: such influence originates more from a society than from a state.

Two daunting tasks lie ahead before a better-designed Chinese grand strategy can take shape and be implemented. The first is to improve policy coordination among Chinese government agencies. Almost all institutions in the central leadership and local governments are involved in foreign relations to varying degrees, and it is virtually impossible for them to see China's national interest the same way or to speak with one voice. These differences confuse outsiders as well as the Chinese people.

The second challenge will be to manage the diversity of views among China's political elite and the general public, at a time when the value system in China is changing rapidly. Mobilizing public support for government policies is expected to strengthen Beijing's diplomatic bargaining power while also helping consolidate its domestic popularity. But excessive nationalism could breed more public frustration and create more pressure on the government if its policies fail to deliver immediately, which could hurt China's political order, as well as its foreign relations. Even as it allows different voices to be heard on foreign affairs, the central leadership should more vigorously inform the population of its own view, which is consistently more moderate and prudent than the inflammatory remarks found in the media and on Web sites.

No major power's interests can conform exactly to those of the international community; China is no exception. And with one-fifth of the world's population, it is more like a continent than a country. Yet despite the complexity of developing a grand strategy for China, the effort is at once consistent with China's internal priorities and generally positive for the international community. China will serve its interests better if it can provide more common goods to the international community and share more values with other states.

How other countries respond to the emergence of China as a global power will also have a great impact on China's internal development and external behavior. If the international community appears not to understand China's aspirations, its anxieties, and its difficulties in feeding itself and modernizing, the Chinese people may ask themselves why China should be bound by rules that were essentially established by the Western powers. China can rightfully be expected to take on more international responsibilities. But then the international community should take on the responsibility of helping the world's largest member support itself.

I am reluctant to disagree with the great Mencius but I cannot subscribe to the doctrine of “a great nation needs enemies.” But I believe I am on fairly safe ground because, while I am sure Prof. Wang is accurately reflecting what Mencius said, Mencius also, and very often, said “There is a way to win the world win the people and you will win the world. There is a way to win the people; win their hearts and you will win the people,.” and ”A war not justified by human benefit will only lead to more conflict,” and similar things. As with Confucius, his master, one can, and many do, read many things into what Mencius said. The idea that “a great nation needs a great enemy” is more alive and healthier in Washington than in Beijing, I think

I think Prof. Wang is correct on three major points:

1. “A more sophisticated grand strategy is needed to serve China's domestic priorities;”

2. “ If an organizing principle must be established to guide China's grand strategy, it should be the improvement of the Chinese people's living standards, welfare, and happiness through social justice;” and

3. “A grand strategy requires defining a geostrategic focus, and China's geostrategic focus is Asia.”


As Prof. Wang points out, this does not mean that China does not intend to compete with the USA; quite the contrary, in fact, I believe that China intends to displace the USA as the dominant power in all of Asia – from Siberia to the bottom tip of Indonesia and it intends to drive the US military off the Asian mainland.

But, as Prof. Wang also notes, there are many challenges – internal and external – facing China and I suspect Prof. Wang may underestimate the power of some of the internal challenges, like those emanating from people like Col Liu Mingfu and his confreres in the military intelligentsia at the People's Liberation Army's National Defense University.

 

[a_majoor]

I have just started Robert Kaplan's [url-http://www.amazon.com/Monsoon-Indian-Ocean-Future-American/dp/1400067464]"Monsoon"[/url], which should cover much of this ground as well. Should be an interesting book.

 

[CougarKing]

link

Grading China’s Military Plans

By Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson

Following is a guest entry from Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson, co-founders of China Sign Post.

China’s National Defense in 2010 continues the tradition of offering additional bits of information each year, but still refrains from delving into the concrete discussion of China’s military capabilities that foreign defence analysts hope for. To its credit, the 2010 White Paper is a carefully-written document that offers insight into China’s defence policy and some general trends in its military development. Beijing’s ongoing moves toward defence transparency are positive even if they fall short of foreign expectations.

We recognize that China’s Defense White Papers to date have shied away from discussing specific systems and capabilities, but believe that even discussions that might not be as fact-rich as documents published by the United States or other foreign militaries would still help China build strategic trust with other regional powers. In addition, a rapidly modernizing military like China’s that performs an increasing range of activities in its home region has much to gain from greater transparency about capabilities and intentions, as such disclosure could help reduce its neighbours’ incentives to create new negatively-focused security arrangements aimed at counteracting the rising power.


With regard to higher transparency regarding equipment and capabilities among militaries outside of China, the United States military’s Quadrennial Defense Review and Nuclear Posture Review are excellent examples of documents that combine discussion of strategic intentions with more detailed and concrete discourse on hardware and acquisition plans. In addition, other militaries tend to publish a regular flow of official policy statement and documents discussing procurement and other activities. The biannual China Defense White Paper, on the other hand, has covered insufficiently or overlooked entirely key developments in a rapidly changing country where two years of change can be far more momentous than would be the case in the United States, Japan, or the EU.

A number of specific military developments cause significant concern to China’s Asian neighbours, as well as the United States. If the Chinese leadership were to permit a more detailed discussion of these types of matters in future White Papers, it would likely help assuage foreign concerns about China’s military modernization in Asia and beyond.

To help quantify the importance of the systems and developments that are not discussed, but in our opinion should be, we assign them an importance ranking of between 1.0 and 10.0, with a higher number suggesting that an issue is of more pressing concern to foreign analysts of China’s military development.

China’s anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) development (9.0)

The report contains no mention of China’s ASBM programme, which, according to the US Navy, reached the equivalent of initial operational capability (IOC) in late 2010. The timing of this particular announcement might be a bit late for inclusion in the report, especially with Beijing’s official silence on the matter, but for the programme to reach the equivalent of IOC in late 2010, it had been in development for a number of years prior. From the perspective of the United States and regional militaries, an operational Chinese ASBM system with a range that is likely at least 1,500 kilometres is a major event, since it may prompt a re-think of carrier operations within a threat envelope that now potentially extends far into the South China Sea, Northern Indian Ocean, and Western Pacific.

In turn, any restrictions on carrier operations would have two key effects: (1) they could cause US allies in the region to question Washington’s true security commitment during a confrontation with China, since the United States might be perceived as confronting a choice as to whether to expose carriers to serious risk of damage, for example; and (2), the ASBM reinforces the importance of submarines for regional navies, since large capital surface ships may not be nearly as survivable as before, particularly  for  countries other than the United States and Japan that lack advanced ship-based anti-ballistic missile systems.

China rapidly growing space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities (7.0)

In 2010, China’s number of space launches equalled the US launch figure for the first time. More importantly, a significant portion of China’s launches involved satellites that are helping to build up a persistent and survivable ISR capability along China’s maritime periphery and beyond. China has launched 7 Yaogan surveillance satellites since December 2009, suggesting that a more robust spaced-based reconnaissance capability is a high priority for China. Yaogan satellites 9 A, B, C are particularly interesting because they fly in a formation, which suggests that they function as some form of naval ocean surveillance system (NOSS). Jane’s says these satellites carry infrared sensors to help them locate ships, meaning they could probably provide accurately positional locations for ASBM targeting. China is also reportedly preparing to launch a second Tianlian data link satellite in June 2011, which in conjunction with the existing Tianlian-1, could provide coverage over as much as 75 percent of the earth’s surface. Improved data linking capabilities would help strengthen China’s ASBM “kill chain” by further linking sensors with shooters.

ABM/ASAT test in January 2010 (6.5)

In January 2010, China successfully tested a midcourse intercept anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system likely based on the same SC-19 booster system that powered the direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) system the PLA used to destroy an aging weather satellite in January 2007. China’s multiple successful tests indicate that the PLA is becoming proficient at using hit to kill kinetic intercept vehicles that could be launched from Chinese soil and hold valuable U.S. reconnaissance and other military satellites at risk during a conflict.

The J-20 advanced fighter test flight (5.5)

China’s first test of a 4+ generation fighter comes 20 years behind that of the United States (the F-22 Raptor first flew in 1990), but could become an aircraft that makes Washington rue its decision to cap F-22 Raptor production at 187 aircraft. Analysis from Airpower Australia’s Dr. Carlo Kopp strongly suggests that a J-20 with 5th generation characteristics could outperform the F-35 Lightning II at virtually all levels, potentially leaving the United States and allies operating the F-35 at a disadvantage to a PLA Air Force armed with super cruising, stealthy, and manoeuvrable J-20s. Of course, there are a wide variety of other ways to target and mitigate attacks from opposing aircraft.

China’s aircraft carrier development (5.0)

The 2010 China Defense White Paper also contained no mention of China’s aircraft carrier programme. The New York Times has reported that one of the paper’s presenters, Sr. Col. Geng Yansheng, sidestepped questions about the carrier programme during the March 31 news conference at which the paper was unveiled.

China appears to be rapidly refurbishing the ex-Soviet carrier Varyag; the US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) projects that it will be operational by 2012. According to the Asahi Shimbun, China has decided to embark on a national carrier programme in which it would build domestically a 50,000-60,000 tonne conventional carrier by 2014 (ONI projects that it will be completed after 2015) and a nuclear-powered carrier by 2020. China certainly faces substantial challenges in equipping a carrier, training pilots in carrier operations, and building a carrier group. That said, the country’s rising defence budget (officially $91.5 billion in 2011) and the experience of domestic shipyards in building increasingly complex large commercial ships make it likely that physical construction barriers can be overcome in a reasonable amount of time.

Mastering the intricacies of carrier operations will take longer and a Chinese carrier group would likely not survive very long in a direct confrontation with the US Navy. Still, a carrier group would offer immense diplomatic benefits in providing a visible Chinese naval presence in the South China Sea, Southeast Asia, along key sea lanes in the Indian Ocean, and for humanitarian missions such as the response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. Several carrier groups would be necessary for persistent presence in these areas, however, to allow for periodic maintenance.

The PLA’s growing access to and use of foreign ports and airfields (4.0)

The February/March 2011 Libya evacuation operation involved a forward-deployed PLAN missile frigate, Xuzhou, which had recently replenished in Oman, as well as the use of the Khartoum, Sudan airport to refuel IL-76 transports headed to and from Libya to evacuate Chinese nationals trapped there.

For any future military deployments for non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs) or other such expeditionary military activities, port and airfield access in the region concerned is crucial for supporting and sustaining platforms involved in the mission. Areas for potential deepening of PLA logistical support and access during times of crisis that merit close watch in coming years include: Tanzania, Kenya, Madagascar, Djibouti, Salalah (Oman), Aden (Yemen), Gwadar and Karachi (Pakistan), Chittagong (Bangladesh), Hambantota (Sri Lanka), Mauritius (where Port Louis has sufficient draft to accommodate a large warship), Sittwe (Burma), and Singapore.

China’s use of military assets to support Libya rescue & evacuation operation (2.0)

The 2010 Defense White Paper makes no mention of the deployment of PLAN and PLAAF forces to help secure the evacuation of Chinese citizens from Libya, an historical first. It will be interesting to see how Beijing evaluates and portrays such efforts in the future. They are positive and understandable, but may raise expectations among Chinese about what their government can do to address subsequent threats to the security of Chinese citizens overseas. China’s 2008 Defense White Paper didn’t include discussion of the PLA Navy’s precedent-setting Gulf of Aden counter-piracy mission, which began at the very end of 2008, but the deployment made it into the 2010 White Paper. We strongly suspect the 2012 Defense White Paper will include meaningful discussion of the Libya evacuation operation and the PLAN and PLAAF roles in the historic mission.

Andrew Erickson is an associate professor at the US Naval War College and fellow in the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Programme. Gabe Collins is a commodity and security specialist focused on China and Russia. This is an edited and abridged version of the commentary on the white paper. The full version can be read here.