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Col. Stogran re MGS vs Tanks Decision

Kirkhill

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http://www.hfxnews.ca/news.aspx?storyID=29778

Friday, February 18, 2005
Stogran: cash crunch must stop 
By Chris Lambie

 
 
Col. Pat Stogran says troops are suffering.

Canada is â Å“watering downâ ? its infantry for lack of cash, says the man who commanded Canada's first official combat mission in 50 years.

Col. Pat Stogran, who led this country's 850-member battalion for six months in Afghanistan three years ago, spoke in Halifax yesterday at a seminar organized by Dalhousie University's Centre for Foreign Policy Studies.

â Å“You have to have highly trained soldiers. We cannot continue to dismantle our army to the lowest common denominator because of fiscal problems, and send troops off to make a meaningful contribution,â ? Stogran told an audience of students, academics and military personnel.

Canadian success in Afghani-stan was largely because of senior troops who received their training during the Cold War, Stogran said.

Fears the future

â Å“We had a surge capacity. I fear for 10 years from now. Where are we going to be?â ? he said. â Å“Because our centre of gravity in the Canadian Forces is the training of our troops.â ?

The military is expecting a modest infusion of an extra $750-million in next weeks federal budget, but not enough to meet its massive operating shortfall or buy new ships and transport planes.

Stogran was highly critical of Ottawa's â Å“unconscionableâ ? plan to phase out Leopard tanks and replace them with the lighter armoured Stryker mobile gun system.

â Å“There's no way you can bolt as much protection on to eight wheels,â ? he said. â Å“So we're killing people.â ?

Stogran also slammed a military phenomenon he dubbed â Å“management over manoeuvre.â ?

â Å“I've got to say that the most demoralizing thing that has ever happened to me â ” at the risk of being completely disloyal here â ” was being posted to our National Defence headquarters after Afghanistan,â ? he said.

â Å“In the Canadian Forces now we have come to the point where managing what little resources we have is a far higher career determinant than manoeuvring in the face of an enemy.â ?

Raise eyebrows

In what's sure to raise a few sailors' eyebrows, Stogran told the crowd Canada should be re-thinking its â Å“blue waterâ ? navy.

â Å“These are fiscally constrained times,â ? he said.

[email protected]




He has got a pair.


 
As long as  the CAF remains "fiscally constrained" , he's probably right on all points... even the blue water part. :-\
 
I would liked to have read/heard the speech as you are only getting one person's (the reporters) version of it and you lose the context it was presented.
 
CFL said:
Isn't it just the CF now? ;)

The way I read the NDA, it's the Canadian Armed Forces. CF is a PC short form that I intend to start avoiding wherever possible. [anyway, I know that you already know that!!]
 
That took guts to say...They'll probably get him for that (the Libs) but it needed to be said! What a soldier!

I would like to see the whole speech though. Could someone post it if they have access to it please?

Slim
 
On the other hand what kind of message would it send if he got his Brigade?
 
One thing that bugs me lately with the land element officer speaking out about the budget, is that they basically say "give craploads of money for the Army, but cut the Navy and Air Force, we don't need them now."

Sure, buying ships and planes costs money, but if we don't have them, we'll have to keep relying on other countries to get around, which will probably end up just as costly--economically and politically--in the long run.

I do think it's good that an officer is saying the CAF need more money, but...
 
Agreed FredG he should stick in his own lanes when it comes to his opinion of the Air Force and the Navy
 
Ex-Dragoon said:
Agreed FredG he should stick in his own lanes when it comes to his opinion of the Air Force and the Navy

Even our new CDS, Gen Hillier has come out and said that a viable 21st Century force must be Joint and that the Army must have both the Navy and Air Force to project force.  However, just like the Army is "transforming" I suspect that the Navy and Air Force may be asked to focus on different areas.  IMHO, we need the JSS and a C-17 like aircraft to do what has to be done.

CFL,

You may be right.  Col Stogran may have spoken out one too many times.  We'll see...

S6
 
Frederik G said:
One thing that bugs me lately with the land element officer speaking out about the budget, is that they basically say "give craploads of money for the Army, but cut the Navy and Air Force, we don't need them now."

Sure, buying ships and planes costs money, but if we don't have them, we'll have to keep relying on other countries to get around, which will probably end up just as costly--economically and politically--in the long run.

I do think it's good that an officer is saying the CAF need more money, but...

In fairness to the land forces guys, I don't blame them.  In the positions they are being putting into they are far more likely to be killed by enemy attacks due to inadequate equipment than the other services.  That does not excuse rust out, but in particular in the failed nation states world that we live, the army is the pointy tip of the spear while both the air force and navy have the added security of distance.

Bottom Line:  I'd rather rent strategic airlift and keep the tanks we have than buy the strategic airlift and go with MGS/MMEV/TUA cluster____.  They may have been suitable for a cold war, fighting opposing armour, defensive positions only battle, but in an urban area where it is likely the undeclared enemy combatant WILL be successful with the first phase of their attack and score hits with the weapons at their disposal, you have to ensure survivability first, then an ability to respond at close quarters.  MMEV, TUA and MGS are three sitting ducks waiting for those first incoming shots and with two versions you still have an extremely limited abilty to respond after the fact.  

No offence intended to anyone from the other services....I just think NDHQ is setting up a force structure that with one well-planned ambush in place like Afghanistan could get 100's of guys killed in less than an hour, and they deserve better than that.




Matthew.   :salute:
 
My Coyote and I flew from Edmonton to Gander to Ramstein in a USAF C5B Galaxy and from Ramstein to Kandahar in a C17.  Without my Coyote, I flew from Kandahar to Diego Garcia in a C5B, and from DG to Kuala Lumpur to Guam to Hawaii to Edmonton on a Malasia Airways charter. 

If we want to go where our allies want us to, this is fine.  If we want to go somewhere on our own - perhaps we can't.  So, what does Canada want, and what sacrifices are Canadians willing to make to supply it?

If the answers remain "They Don't Know", and "None", then C17s, and C130Js will exist in Canada only as screen savers or wallpaper in Air Command HQ.  This is fine, since we all know that if someone hands us our butts on a plate in some third world paradise, the guvmint won't let us go anywhere on our shiny new airplanes anyway.  UNLESS....we go where the USA will back us up.

Note to the easily offended:  My "wallpaper" is a photo of the Avro Arrow RL 201 rollout.

Tom

 
I was under Col. Stogran's command in Afghanistan and let me just say this...He is for the troops.  He's pretty hardcore (for officer's anyway) He knows the real problems we land types face, fiscally, and as for what CFL said about him retiring.  I doubt it.  Since Op Apollo, he's golden. Destined for great pointy-head things if he stays.  While overseas we thought he was a little crazy.  However upon reflection, for us 031's, he knows what we want. When we received our C-in-C award, he told us that the US invasion force for Iraq, had "penciled" us (3VP Battlegroup) in as an attacking force, just-in-case we could make it.  His time on the international stage has obviously impressed upon somebody in the US.  Is that good???  Time will tell. :warstory:
 
I think having combat experienced people at NDHQ is a good thing. The administrative side can get too involved with itself and lose sight of the reason they exist in the first place. By this I don't mean workers there aren't hard working professionals but that rules and procedures accumulate that hinder achieving all they are capable of. People get evaluated on the result in reference to some rules and internal organizational structure and not what they contribute to the end product. Rules get added that improve the administrative accountability with no regard to the effect they have operationally like delaying procurement so it's not responsive to changing needs. A few people with more operationally based outlooks on the army side can't hurt. It's hard to tell however if the problem isn't one level up in the political realm with rules forced down the line along with a bunch of no's to requests from below.


 
Kirkhill said:
Col. Pat Stogran, who led this country's 850-member battalion for six months in Afghanistan three years ago, spoke in Halifax yesterday at a seminar organized by Dalhousie University's Centre for Foreign Policy Studies.

Stogran was highly critical of Ottawa's â Å“unconscionableâ ? plan to phase out Leopard tanks and replace them with the lighter armoured Stryker mobile gun system.
â Å“There's no way you can bolt as much protection on to eight wheels,â ? he said. â Å“So we're killing people.â ?

[email protected]

He has got a pair.

Truly, as I noted on the following thread:
http://army.ca/forums/index.php?PHPSESSID=701d56d8e5acb65871067b00f69a6f39&topic=26047.0;all

Project File No 300000731-300
'MGS SOR (Mobile Gun System - Statement of Operational Requirements)' Highliights
[One of the few SOR to be written to Exactly fit a piece of equipment - and if thats not enough, due to well known problems - such as Autoloader, well lets reassess so that it still fits.]


4.1.3 Essential Criteria Achievable:  The stipulation of an essential criterion presumes that it is achievable at reasonable cost.  However, should any essential criterion subsequently be determined to be impractical for technical or budgetary reasons, that criterion will be reassessed.
[WTF??  - I've never heard of this type of wishy-washy criteria before, ie. if it still don't work thats OK - we'll make it 'Non-Essential'.  For most any other material acquisition program out there - if it does not meet Essential criteria it is Not acceptable - I guess this Basic Tennant just does not apply to the MGS.  Basically, meaning that the MGS SOR is essentially Worthless as any part of it can be ignored/rewritten to ensure the MGS is acceptable.
Not a very stong assertion for a piece of equipment that is supposed to be the cornerstone of the DFS 'system of systems'.  ]

And confirmed by Lance who pointed out:
"the true definition of 'Essential Criteria' is given by the PWGSC.  And there are no caveats to that definition.  To add caveats, obviously negates the 'essential' part from the 'criteria' part."

As Mathew  Commented:
"P.S.  The part about essential requirements being deemed unessential if the vehicle can't qualify is truly frightening.  I cannot believe the NDHQ would allow such a thing.  To me that reeks of economic interests outweighing the safety of our men in uniform and that is truly unforgiveable."
While Franko noted:
"methinks it's a done deal and the politicians don't give a darn until the body bags come home."
This opinion has repeatedly been confirmed by the Rank and File on this site - hopefully serving officers will follow Col Stograns example and 'step up to the plate'.

[Guantlets Down]

The WishyWashy "Essential Criteria Achievable" Should be setting off RED ALARM bells in serving personnel, especially officers (who are supposed to abide by a certain Above Board CODE OF CONDUCT) and armour personnel (both serving and retired).
I've looked at many other SORs through ATI requests, and Not One has ever been this Accommodating that would allow failure of All Essential requirements and still allow Acceptance of a piece of $@#%.

The fact that a Seriously Flawed SOR has actually been "Approved" by NDHQ
seemingly indicates an Astounding Lack of Ethics in the Officer Corps.
Truly, Not Worthy!

As noted in the 60th anniversary of 'The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps - an illustrated history',
the following are a few of the Important Values as espoused by LCol Worthy himself while commander of the Armoured Fighting Vehicle School at Camp Borden:
4 - When you comment on anything "I want your honest opinion, and not what you think I (or other Senior Officers/Politicians) would like to hear.  In other words, do not become a 'yes man' with me (or HQ).
6 - The following are my pet aversions, which annoy me greatly: c) Stupidity; d) Officers who fail to look after their men; f) Deception."

In Peacetime, as opposed to Wartime, Officers who believe in the preceeding Values have a Moral Compunction to speak up and express their objections - especially when the future welfare of their men is involved.  Or has 'Leading by Example' fallen into some twisted abberation?

Officers should have a Moral/Ehtical Dutyl to speak out against a Fundamentally Flawed piece of equipment, Silence is a major symptom of Point 6-d).
Meanwhile, those who argue in favour of the Flawed MGS are symptomatic of Points 6-c) & 6-f).
Or have all the officers out there decided to become yes-men and roll-over and play dead?
Or possibly looking forward to positions with GDLS-C ??

[Guantlets Up]

Col Stogran is truy a soldiers officer - WORTHY!  :salute:  :tank:

As are those who have dared to question DND direction to replace the tank with the MGS
(or point out 'Transformational' alternatives - such as LCol Summerfield's turreted mortar alternative) through the Armour Bulletin or the CAJ.
Even though DND blindly likes to keep pointing out that "The MGS is not a replacement or substitute for a main battle tank"
(Maybe if they say it enough times nobody will realize they have substituted the MGS as a replacement for the Leopard tank - as the Direct Fire Support Vehicle [DFSV]  :blotto: - a term first coined in the early 70s when they tried to replace the Centurion tank with the lightweight Scorpion tank. )
Hopefully, Gen Hillier will prove himself likewise and withdraw his misdirected MGS support  :-\

 
Like most others, I did not hear/read Colonel Pat Stogran's remarks, but I don't think his reported comments are overly controversial, much less political; they are, in fact, about the norm for most military officers of his age, education and experience.

When we said joint operations most of my air force colleagues had visions of fighter/bombers swooping down to destroy bridges and rail crossings, with great displays of airmanship, bravery and precision before formations of transports dropped paratroopers who mopped up, securing the great air force victory.

My naval friends saw, in their dreams, destroyers and frigates flushing out ballistic missile submarines, aided, to be sure by carefully targeted long range air patrol sorties and supported, always, by fighters flying CAP, up above.   Or they imagined stately amphibious flotillas sailing towards a beach where, after suitable naval preparation troops were put ashore â “ more mopping up.

Most soldiers, like Colonel Stogran, have similarly myopic views: joint usually means something like â ?all the others are there to support me, Me, ME!â ? ... not surprising, really.

For a variety of good and valid reasons we, Canada, do not have to consider the whole range of military power: strategic, operational, tactical.   We have only one service with anything like a strategic capability.   Our navy, like all blue water navies can project power wherever we can send it, for as long as we can sustain it.   The power we project can be enhanced if the naval force has organic (to a joint task force) air and even land forces ... but even a fully joint force is only strategic if it is based on a naval force â “ neither the army nor the air force can project power in the proper sense of that term because neither can stand to on anything like a full time basis without being on the ground, at which time the power is no longer being projected, it has already been applied.   The situation is no longer strategic. it has devolved through the operational 'down' to the tactical level.

If we, Canada, want a strategic voice in the world â “ and I have argued that we, Canada, as one of the world's 'top ten' countries, now, and destined to remain in the top 10% throughout the next century, must have a such a strategic presence - then we must have a navy: a real, blue water navy.   To argue that the army's temporary problems must be solved by shelving the only service which 'works' right now is militarily irresponsible â “ which means it's about par for the course in Ottawa.

That doesn't mean that the army's problems are not serious, nor does it mean that the army should not be accorded some priority for whatever 'new' funding might materialize; it does mean that we must, at the very least, maintain the navy and prevent further erosion of the air force while we try to rebuild the army.

We need joint forces â “ almost everything above ship, battalion/regiment and squadron can, indeed should be joint â “ which means that all elements must be able to provide their components.

Robbing Peter to pay Paul is poor theology, worse economics and unsound military planning.   I hope that's not what Colonel Stogran advocated ... if he did then he is wrong.
 
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