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Col. Stogran re MGS vs Tanks Decision

Rusty Old Joint said:
Like most others, I did not hear/read Colonel Pat Stogran's remarks, but I don't think his reported comments are overly controversial, much less political; they are, in fact, about the norm for most military officers of his age, education and experience.

When we said joint operations most of my air force colleagues had visions of fighter/bombers swooping down to destroy bridges and rail crossings, with great displays of airmanship, bravery and precision before formations of transports dropped paratroopers who mopped up, securing the great air force victory.

My naval friends saw, in their dreams, destroyers and frigates flushing out ballistic missile submarines, aided, to be sure by carefully targeted long range air patrol sorties and supported, always, by fighters flying CAP, up above.   Or they imagined stately amphibious flotillas sailing towards a beach where, after suitable naval preparation troops were put ashore â “ more mopping up.

Most soldiers, like Colonel Stogran, have similarly myopic views: joint usually means something like â ?all the others are there to support me, Me, ME!â ? ... not surprising, really.

For a variety of good and valid reasons we, Canada, do not have to consider the whole range of military power: strategic, operational, tactical.   We have only one service with anything like a strategic capability.   Our navy, like all blue water navies can project power wherever we can send it, for as long as we can sustain it.   The power we project can be enhanced if the naval force has organic (to a joint task force) air and even land forces ... but even a fully joint force is only strategic if it is based on a naval force â “ neither the army nor the air force can project power in the proper sense of that term because neither can stand to on anything like a full time basis without being on the ground, at which time the power is no longer being projected, it has already been applied.   The situation is no longer strategic. it has devolved through the operational 'down' to the tactical level.

If we, Canada, want a strategic voice in the world â “ and I have argued that we, Canada, as one of the world's 'top ten' countries, now, and destined to remain in the top 10% throughout the next century, must have a such a strategic presence - then we must have a navy: a real, blue water navy.   To argue that the army's temporary problems must be solved by shelving the only service which 'works' right now is militarily irresponsible â “ which means it's about par for the course in Ottawa.

That doesn't mean that the army's problems are not serious, nor does it mean that the army should not be accorded some priority for whatever 'new' funding might materialize; it does mean that we must, at the very least, maintain the navy and prevent further erosion of the air force while we try to rebuild the army.

We need joint forces â “ almost everything above ship, battalion/regiment and squadron can, indeed should be joint â “ which means that all elements must be able to provide their components.

Robbing Peter to pay Paul is poor theology, worse economics and unsound military planning.   I hope that's not what Colonel Stogran advocated ... if he did then he is wrong.

The problem is that in the new "Liberal Party of Canada" reality, we don't have enough money to pay Peter and Paul and therefore have to decide which one provides us with the greatest ROI and be realistic about reducing one of their hours.   'Unsound' is trying to provide $24 billion worth of military services with a $12 billion budget.   We've already tried that experiment for the last XXX years and it's not working.   You cut back to a set of equipment and responsibilities you can manage and maintain within your budget, then if the government wants you to do something else, you cost it out and bill them for it.

I would add, if Bill Graham only does one thing, he needs to pull the costs for foreign operations out of the Defence Budget and put them into the Foreign Affairs Budget and guarantee specific funding for regular operation (including sovereignty patrols), training and procurement at known levels.   The fact that planners need to figure out what procurement plans are going to have to be deferred this year because the government has decided to send troops overseas is about the most absurd thing I can possibly imagine.



Matthew.    :salute:
 
Cdn Blackshirt said:
I would add, if Bill Graham only does one thing, he needs to pull the costs for foreign operations out of the Defence Budget and put them into the Foreign Affairs Budget and guarantee specific funding for regular operation (including sovereignty patrols), training and procurement at known levels.   The fact that planners need to figure out what procurement plans are going to have to be deferred this year because the government has decided to send troops overseas is about the most absurd thing I can possibly imagine.



Matthew.    :salute:

Here Here, procurement already takes way to long without additional delays due to operations.

E45

Chimo!
 
Rusty Old Joint said:
For a variety of good and valid reasons we, Canada, do not have to consider the whole range of military power: strategic, operational, tactical.   We have only one service with anything like a strategic capability.   Our navy, like all blue water navies can project power wherever we can send it, for as long as we can sustain it.   The power we project can be enhanced if the naval force has organic (to a joint task force) air and even land forces ... but even a fully joint force is only strategic if it is based on a naval force â “ neither the army nor the air force can project power in the proper sense of that term because neither can stand to on anything like a full time basis without being on the ground, at which time the power is no longer being projected, it has already been applied.   The situation is no longer strategic. it has devolved through the operational 'down' to the tactical level.

The flip side of projection is protection - which is something that the Army and Air Force do well.  We need to be able to do both - to have the jab and a good guard - and some day, we will develop a roundhouse.

Dave
 
PPCLI Guy,

I know I'm getting a little off the topic of this thread, but can you elaborate on what you mean by the CF developing "a roundhouse." I'm intrigued...
 
He is refering to punching and kicking power.  Ie. punch, jab, kick.  Unless of course your looking for his idea as to what a roundhouse kick would be in the CF ie armour.
 
Hey, just cus I like analogies, doesn't mean I have to be good at them!

I was thinking that projection gets you in the ring, and protection stops you from being knocked out - so then you need something to knock the other fella out - hence the roundhouse.  That would be power, be it hard or soft (and most likely hard).  A roundhouse could vary from a good ol stonking to a deliberate attack, from a sniper round to a deliberate action, from "sanctions" to a negotiated termination of the conflict.

Dave
 
PPCLI Guy said:
Hey, just cus I like analogies, doesn't mean I have to be good at them!

I was thinking that projection gets you in the ring, and protection stops you from being knocked out - so then you need something to knock the other fella out - hence the roundhouse.   That would be power, be it hard or soft (and most likely hard).   A roundhouse could vary from a good ol stonking to a deliberate attack, from a sniper round to a deliberate action, from "sanctions" to a negotiated termination of the conflict.

Dave

The roundhouse could be both tactical and stratigic...

Slim
 
Thanks for the clarification guys.....I was thinking of that building where the Railroad parked its locomotives.

GW
 
George Wallace said:
Thanks for the clarification guys.....I was thinking of that building where the Railroad parked its locomotives.

<Dave shakes head, and wanders off muttering "how come no one gets my little analogies"...>
 
Don't worry boss some of us have the requisite background in controlled violence to "get" the analogies

Out for now.
 
LOL. Oh man...

That was funny. Good one PPCLI/GW.

I'll agree with all that the Col. is a stand up guy for his comments. What his future could look like regardless of whether he is "golden" or not is still up for question. Gen. Mackenzie was "golden" at one point.

As per this topic. I will say again I agree with all of you in that the MGS is a bad idea. I'll let GW go wild from that point as he has done a great job of screaming it from the mountain tops thoughout this web site.

LONG LIVE TRACK!
 
the Big problem is not what is going to work or what is needid but the fact that the MGS. is more P.C. then a Tank will ever be
the pitcher of a army which is without track is more PC to the people who really mater (the ones in power)
they seem less threatening and kinder and so on
thats the big problem
 
Well if a battlegroup comes home in body bags because we lack the sificiant firepower to stop a bunch of rebels what do you think the PC meter will read.  Tanks have proven themselves in both the standard battle arena (see wide open spaces) and the urban war (see rolling pill boxes).
 
you know that and I know that and most of the CF know that but do you thing some pencil pusher in ottowa knows that?
 
When was the last time we deployed tanks into an operation.....
anyone...... Kosovo, u say?, just for vehicle check points no?

Why should we keep something that we never use?  Now as we pretty much all agree the MGS doesn't really help does it?  First hit capability is somewhere below 50% (I think) The armour is pretty much non-existent on a modern battlefield, my LAV is no better.  Are we going in to a place like Fallujah tomorrow?  Ever?  No, we WILL NEVER see the combat that the American's see.  It's sad but true.  We could not sustain any type of engagement like what happens in Iraq.  We have a couple die in the last 3 years and the reaction from the public is huge.  Imagine sending a company's worth home?  My point, as I strayed, is why should we keep armour if we are never going to use it?  Would that not constitute a big waste of money?  Popular idea in Ottawa, yes, howeverwhy not spend it on training, kit GOOD equipment etc.  Just my .02$ ;D
 
What kind of attitude is that?

If I don't fight for a 'strong' Army, I will see it disintergrate.   If I held your attitude, I'd just as well roll over and die.   Where will this all stop?

Let the public say that we don't need Tanks and M109's and Badgers and such.   Next, if we aren't going to do any fighting, as you say, let's take all the rifles away from our Infantry.   They won't need them, because they won't have to do any fighting in places like the Americans.   We can save a Hell of a lot of money.   We can send them on Peacekeeping Missions dressed just like they were on a ceremonial parade....Give 'em empty holsters, no one will know the difference.

Right!

GW
 
Any shit hole can turn into a Falluja at the drop of the hat.  If your not ready equipment wise, tactic wise, and training wise we are dead.
 
CFL said:
Any shit hole can turn into a Falluja at the drop of the hat.   If your not ready equipment wise, tactic wise, and training wise we are dead.

Words that ring loud,clear and true!!!
 
Quote from: CFL on Today at 11:33:35
Any crap hole can turn into a Falluja at the drop of the hat.  If your not ready equipment wise, tactic wise, and training wise we are dead.


Words that ring loud,clear and true!!!

Which is why I think the idea of niche roles for the CF is dangerous as well.
 
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