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COMMENTARY: Canada’s military procurement legacy somehow gets even stupider

Log Offr said:
There are hundreds of projects in the pipeline across all the Level 1's. New equipment is constantly being delivered. I'm not pimping for our procurement system but although it is painfully slow and insanely intricate, it does constantly deliver new equipment. All we ever read about is the negative aspects of procurement, told through the story of a half dozen major projects.  Personally I pin that to an ill-informed media and even a media that is strongly anti-military. The storyline about failed procurement is merely one of a half-dozen or so storylines that each represent micro attacks against DND and the CAF. Is YOUR day to day experience as awful as the media makes it out to be?

Anyhow, they tell us about the big ticket items that go wrong, but we never read about the big ticket items that go right, or the medium and small programs that go extremely well (extremely well within the context of a ponderous, byzantine government procurement system). The link below provides only a small snapshot of some of the current initiatives that you've probably never heard of. If you want to know more, find someone in DLR or DAR or DMR or CJOC Force Development and just ask them for a list of what projects are in the hopper. Or, find your way on DWAN to the Capability Investment Database (CID - it is somewhere in the VCDS' pages), and you will be able to read in horrifying detail, the hundreds of current projects - the official ones that have registration numbers and everything - for equipment as well as infrastructure.

But this site will probably be interesting enough reading for you. The link here is public; it is where DND directs industry to turn when it wants a quick summary of what we are buying, projects that should spend money in the next 5 years or so, give or take (lol).

http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-capabilities-blueprint/index.asp
BTW it's DNR (Naval vice Maritime) now.
For those on the DWAN here is the link to the CID page:
http://cid-bic.forces.mil.ca/cid/intro_e.asp

(there is supposed to be a replacement coming due to the database not being supported anymore but I don't know when)
 
Log Offr said:
There are hundreds of projects in the pipeline across all the Level 1's. New equipment is constantly being delivered. I'm not pimping for our procurement system but although it is painfully slow and insanely intricate, it does constantly deliver new equipment. All we ever read about is the negative aspects of procurement, told through the story of a half dozen major projects.  Personally I pin that to an ill-informed media and even a media that is strongly anti-military. The storyline about failed procurement is merely one of a half-dozen or so storylines that each represent micro attacks against DND and the CAF. Is YOUR day to day experience as awful as the media makes it out to be?

Anyhow, they tell us about the big ticket items that go wrong, but we never read about the big ticket items that go right, or the medium and small programs that go extremely well (extremely well within the context of a ponderous, byzantine government procurement system). The link below provides only a small snapshot of some of the current initiatives that you've probably never heard of. If you want to know more, find someone in DLR or DAR or DMR or CJOC Force Development and just ask them for a list of what projects are in the hopper. Or, find your way on DWAN to the Capability Investment Database (CID - it is somewhere in the VCDS' pages), and you will be able to read in horrifying detail, the hundreds of current projects - the official ones that have registration numbers and everything - for equipment as well as infrastructure.

But this site will probably be interesting enough reading for you. The link here is public; it is where DND directs industry to turn when it wants a quick summary of what we are buying, projects that should spend money in the next 5 years or so, give or take (lol).

http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-capabilities-blueprint/index.asp

The 'system' only gets so much of a pat on the ass for doing its job and fulfilling its basic function. Major foulups are still major foulups, and absurdities are still absurdities. There is nothing so inherently complex about a pistol that even under our bureaucracy of buying it should take a number of years to replace it. If we struggle to replace one of our simplest and most rudimentary small arms - something armies and police services do by the droves every year across the western world - then something is wrong, and I suspect there is a profound lack of 'ownership' of this program by whoever's it is to own.
 
Good to know that the RPAS program (formerly JUSTAS) is looking at only being about 15 years late, and that I'll retire before the Aurora replacement is expected to come online. 

I mean, the 'Kings lasted 55 years; surely the Auroras can do it as well.  :whistle:
 
Log Offr said:
Anyhow, they tell us about the big ticket items that go wrong, but we never read about the big ticket items that go right, or the medium and small programs that go extremely well (extremely well within the context of a ponderous, byzantine government procurement system).

The ponderous, and byzantine system is what the fuss is about. That a procurement system usually happens to eventually deliver things isn't something to be proud of.

Ships, aircraft, tanks, etc. people expect to be long procurement processes(not generations long though). Buying boots, and pistols shouldn't be a decades long processes, and the media is rightly pointing that out.
 
There are no shortages of examples in these pages suggesting that it's not a "media is picking on us" problem;  these are troops making these statements (you know, serving members -- 'our best assets; we love them' TM ). 

Yes, I'm well aware that troops bitch, but perhaps their perspective just isn't as sunny as in some cubicles.  But I guess working with equipment older than their parents, sometimes they lose focus on the excel/powerpoint.


Edit: typo

 
Journeyman said:
There are no shortages of examples in these pages suggesting that it's not a "media is picking on us" problem;  these are troops making these statements (you know, serving members -- 'our best assets; we love them' TM ). 

Yes, I'm well aware that troops bitch, but perhaps their perspective just isn't as sunny as in some cubicles.  But I guess working with equipment older than their parents grandparents, sometimes they lose focused on the excel/powerpoint.

FTFY, at least for the Sea King.  That's not even an unrealistic concept if people had kids in their mid-20s. 

Honest question:  Do people in DAR/DLR/DNR see the workarounds/minor miracles being performed so that said equipment is at least serviceable 50% of the time, or the amount of deferred defects or operational restrictions that are imposed to keep those things working?  The amount of spares that we (don't) have?  Or is it purely "we have x out of y things serviceable", not "we have x out of y things serviceable, but z out of x can't do 70% of the stuff we need to b/c q things are missing or robbed to keep another thing working"?  At what point do we just put our foot down and say that despite our "can do attitude", which I'm surprised hasn't bit us in the ass fatally in the past few decades, we just can't anymore?
 
Lets be honest about this, this pistol project is probably far less complicated than boots.  The CAF could go out and buy 25,000 Glock 17s or something similar with some spare parts and be just fine for many years to come.  All the churn and grunt over this study and that study and this test and that test is completely wasted effort.  But that is why it takes ten years to have a sidearm replaced.     
 
The last time a Browning High Power pistol was manufactured for the Canadian Armed Forces at the John Inglis Plant in Toronto was 1945.

Those pistols are all at least 73 years old.  Any magazine that is stamped with "JI" on the base is also 73 years old. 

There is not a single currently serving member of the Canadian Armed Forces who was born when the last of those pistols was manufactured. 

The pistol replacement project was originally scheduled to see a new pistol in the hands of our troops in 2015.  https://army.ca/forums/threads/102435.0.html

The thread there (dating from 2011) describes some of the criteria for pistol selection:

I've been doing some research on NATO member pistols, and I think there are a few likely candidates, but they all seem to be disqualified on a few minor points.
GSP Requirements (condensed):
1. Full Size, DAO Trigger
2. Current NATO Service + 2 years
3. 9mm
4. Magazine >13rds, >15rds is better
5. Unloaded weight + empty magazine must be < 950g
6. Barrel must be 102mm or longer
7. Trigger pull must be between 4-8 lbs
8. Ambidextrous magazine release
9. Must not need to pull the trigger to disassemble
10. No magazine safety
11. No safety devices to manipulate
12. Must have an M1913 accessory rail
13. Trigger pull weight must be consistent every time

Kevin Boland submitted the following evaluation of available pistols that would meet the selection criteria: https://army.ca/forums/threads/102435/post-1177165.html#msg1177165

Color me confused but I don't actually see a pistol that meets the criteria anywhere?
Several Federal Entities down here issue Glock's and Smith&Wesson M&P guns - but in either .40S&W or .45ACP.
Hk seems to have the only truly ambo mag release - with their dual lever.  But the USP is a brick, and a poor contender to their new designs.

28 NATO Countries use the following

Albania - M9/Beretta 92
Belgium - Hi-Power and FN 5.7
Bulgaria - Sig Pro 2022
Canada - No2 Mk1* (Browning Hi-Power) and Sig P225
Croatia - HS2000 / Springfield XD
Czech Republic - CZ-75
Denmark - Glock 17
Estonia - Hk USP
France - Hk USP and Glock 17
Germany - Hk USP
Greece - Glock 17
Hungary - Hk USP
Iceland - Glock 17
Italy - Beretta
Latvia - Glock 19 and Glock 17
Lithuania - Glock 17
Luxembourg - Mk1 Browning Hi-Power
Netherlands - Glock 17
Norway - Glock 17
Poland - well GROM uses the Hk USP
Portugal - Glock 19 (replaced the Hk USP in 2009)
Romania - appears to still be their version of the Tokarev
Slovakia - appears to still be their version of the Makarov
Slovenia - I cannot locate any info
Spain - Hk USP
Turkey - Zignana C45 - a .45 ACP gun
United Kingdom - BHP and Sig P226
United States - M9 Beretta, Glock 19, and 1911

Okay so the current Browning Hi-Power is out, as is the SigP225.

Leaving the remaining 9mm guns as:

Sig P226R -
Sig P228R -
Sig Pro 2022 -
Glock 17 - squeeze trigger on disassembly
Glock 19 - squeeze trigger on disassembly
HS2000/Springfield XD - pretty poor performance in any US LE entity testing.
Beretta M-9 - Not DOA in issue configuration - and too big/heavy
CZ 75 B - not DOA
CZ PO1 - to small
HK USP – expensive and no 1913 rail

Based on the above I believe that the spec has been written for the Sig Pro 2022 exclusively to justify a sole source award.

The long, drawn out process that failed in 2011 to deliver a pistol by 2015 is now going to be drawn out for another 8 years...to 2026...?  So, now we'll have had this pistol replacement project on the go for 15 years.

Seems pretty silly to me.  On the other hand, one of my comments in the other thread I've referenced details the comparison to the JSS ship replacement...which will be going on 15 years as well soon...soooooo....not too far off.

Personal opinion - having owned or fired many of the above pistols over the years.  Buy 15,000 Glock 17's, issue them, call it done. 

But what do I know...this is just another example of our broken supply chain.  LogOffr, I will politely disagree with you.

NS
 
Sounds like a Centenary replacement of the HP is looming. Think of all the spin for the PR people when the replacement is announced in Quebec City.
 
QV said:
Lets be honest about this, this pistol project is probably far less complicated than boots.  The CAF could go out and buy 25,000 Glock 17s or something similar with some spare parts and be just fine for many years to come.  All the churn and grunt over this study and that study and this test and that test is completely wasted effort.  But that is why it takes ten years to have a sidearm replaced.   

Its also because we want to own have the IP rights signed over to Canadian industry, something most big arms manufacturers balk at.  Especially considering the relatively low amounts we are buying.  We need to get our heads out of our asses and buy things like that off the shelf and not worry about propping up a non-exsistent home industry.
 
And the problem isn't just confined to centrally managed projects. I know of one local procurement project that is worth a max of $50k that has failed three years in a row, and on the road to the fourth, simply because of the amount of time and effort it takes to get stuff through the system and onto the Buy and Sell site. This year a single number was changed in the SOW and although the process was started back in April, it still took 7 months to get it up on the site. The last word from the contracting office was that even though there were no compliant bidders the first time around and the SOW needed to be "tweaked" again, they were happy with the progress this year because they were two months ahead of last year in getting it up on the site for the first time...
 
Or, alternately, Canadians could build novel things that other people want to buy.

Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland and the Netherlands are not designing solely to meet their own requirements.  In fact, often there is no domestic requirement beyond what would classified as a pilot scale launch.
 
garb811 said:
And the problem isn't just confined to centrally managed projects. I know of one local procurement project that is worth a max of $50k that has failed three years in a row, and on the road to the fourth, simply because of the amount of time and effort it takes to get stuff through the system and onto the Buy and Sell site. This year a single number was changed in the SOW and although the process was started back in April, it still took 7 months to get it up on the site. The last word from the contracting office was that even though there were no compliant bidders the first time around and the SOW needed to be "tweaked" again, they were happy with the progress this year because they were two months ahead of last year in getting it up on the site for the first time...

I find that is often the timeline issue a misunderstanding of who is responsible for what than anything else.  In the case of uncompliant bidders we are usually the problem in that we are asking for unicorn, or have in some way slanted the SOW in a way that industry can't fulfill.  Not saying that is the case here, but have worked in and around that low-level procurement for a number of years and the process isn't that difficult.  Once we walk technical authorities through the process and assist in the development of SOW/SOR to meet PSPC and industry guidelines they are generally successful.  Now if your procurement office on base/wing is useless and not helping it slows down the process and usually makes PSPC not want to work with them.

Not saying the process is not the issue but my general experience is that if you understand the process, timelines and who is resp for what, small buys (up to $250K) are relatively simple.  Even higher under $2M for certain things are not an issue if you engage the right people.
 
or renovating an armoury and not budgeting for the communication systems within, then blocking the tenants from coming back in as there is no funds to do the comms stuff.
 
garb811 said:
And the problem isn't just confined to centrally managed projects. I know of one local procurement project that is worth a max of $50k that has failed three years in a row, and on the road to the fourth, simply because of the amount of time and effort it takes to get stuff through the system and onto the Buy and Sell site. This year a single number was changed in the SOW and although the process was started back in April, it still took 7 months to get it up on the site. The last word from the contracting office was that even though there were no compliant bidders the first time around and the SOW needed to be "tweaked" again, they were happy with the progress this year because they were two months ahead of last year in getting it up on the site for the first time...

On the flip side, I was involved in a project to replace all the generators on the frigates, and provide 20 years of in service support (maintenance, spares and training). Took about three years to get the industry engagement done, do up the RFP, bid eval and contract award. That was with a delay to implement the new 'Value Proposition' during the pilot phase, and installations are rolling through the fleet.

Took a lot of dedicated effort from team (I was only tagged in for a year around the end of the RFP/contract award, so take no real credit), but basically rolled through all the approval gates and other reviews as per the ideal case.  Kind of an outlier for a project at that dollar value, but normally if you have people that know how the system works that have capacity to push it, you can easily do that with low dollar value procurements.  If you don't know what you are doing, or don't have time to do it, really can't blame the system.
 
One of the problems with the concept of the pistol project being 'made in Canada' is the relatively tiny market that the CAF is, and with the government's generally negative attitude towards civilian firearms ownership, the likelihood of civilian market sales is small.  So, the only buyer will effectively be the CAF, and our market share is smaller than many police departments in the USA...

We should accept that, buy off the shelf, and go from there. 

NS
 
That would require PSPC and TB to have just a small amount of common sense in their rules.
 
Navy_Pete said:
... normally if you have people that know how the system works that have capacity to push it, you can easily do that with low dollar value procurements.  If you don't know what you are doing, or don't have time to do it, really can't blame the system.

This may be part of the problem???

It's a common heard thing from log, admin, and IT people in DND.  You need to understand how the "system" works.  If everyone knew that the system would respond (sort of).

In a project I worked on not only did I need to understand tactics and tasks, plus the software that enabled them, and then the (flight rated) hardware they ran on.  And then to get any of the parts I needed I needed to understand the procurement rules and how to use them to get what was needed.  Then I had to understand the IT rules in order to share required information.

The point is we seem to be putting all of the burden of implementing change on the tactical edge; if they don't take the time to understand everything that must be done then it couldn't have been important enough in the first place.  This doesn't include the major programs, but all of them suffer from BRUF (big requirement up front, it's not a good thing).

In some cases this results in motivated people finding it so hard to accomplish anything they either give up trying or go to an organization where that type of motivation is supported.
 
Baz said:
This may be part of the problem???

It's a common heard thing from log, admin, and IT people in DND.  You need to understand how the "system" works.  If everyone knew that the system would respond (sort of).

In a project I worked on not only did I need to understand tactics and tasks, plus the software that enabled them, and then the (flight rated) hardware they ran on.  And then to get any of the parts I needed I needed to understand the procurement rules and how to use them to get what was needed.  Then I had to understand the IT rules in order to share required information.

The point is we seem to be putting all of the burden of implementing change on the tactical edge; if they don't take the time to understand everything that must be done then it couldn't have been important enough in the first place.  This doesn't include the major programs, but all of them suffer from BRUF (big requirement up front, it's not a good thing).

In some cases this results in motivated people finding it so hard to accomplish anything they either give up trying or go to an organization where that type of motivation is supported.

I have been more involved in infrastructure projects than procurement projects over my career and the "system" we (the Govt of Canada- not just limited to DND) have is truly awful. I have seen antiquated domestic water systems that regularly expose CF members and their families to boil water advisories go unreplaced because it didnt seem important enough to the battalions of decisionmakers, all the way up to Ottawa, who are all empowered to say no, but nobody is allowed to say yes. I have considerable sympathy for any First Nation trying to navigate the same system. I have seen major and expensive stocks of materiel exposed to dangerous levels of degradation, because bureaucrats argued against spending a comparative pitance of the value of the stock on proper storage facilities.  I have seen lowest bidder contracters being awarded contracts by Ottawa bid evaluation "experts" even in the face of objections of the local SMEs who warned the work would be sub-standard and would cost DND more in long run to fix (we were right, every single time).

This is the result we are getting with our current system that is (supposedly) designed to prevent all of these bad things from happening, but does not. I would say the problem is the system- not the people in the system
 
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