Cormorant Down-July 13/ 2006

[Zoomie]

I don't know where you got your information from Scoobs - but your facts on the -149 are way out to lunch. 

The Cormorant's tail rotor half hub (TRHH) have been a cause for concern since the downing of a RAF Merlin and our discovery of significant micro-fissures near the cut-outs on the TRHH.  Last year the fleet was restricted to 2 hours of flight time before a visual inspection was mandated to be made of the TRHH.  This could be done by the FE on the road.  Just recently the CAD has allowed that visual inspection cycle to be every 3 hours. 
Every 50 hours the entire tail rotor assembly must be torn down, inspected and then returned to service.  The IMP crews usually take care of this on the night shift and it is usually a non-event.  If there are no cracks or wear discovered (which there hasn't been for quite a while now) the TRHH is returned to service - not replaced.

Believe it or not - DFS has offically ruled that the -149 did not suffer any mechanical problems, environmental and human factors are now being investigated.

 

[Scoobs]

Zoomie,

my facts about a tail rotor assembly having to be replaced came straight from the Major-General at 1 Cdn Air Div as I was on my FS course.  Notice that I spoke of what I knew last year and in fact stated that I hoped that changes had been made.  I did not refer to what was happening this year as I do not have current info on the Cormorant.  As I've read numerous articles on this accident, one quoted a mil person that the tail rotor assembly is replaced every 100 hrs.  As we all know that the media isn't exactly accurate, I'm glad that you corrected this if this is not the case.  I just noticed that I used the words, "If this is true..."  Therefore, I qualified my statement, so you shouldn't jump down my throat but instead should have simply corrected my statement.  Also, I'm glad that the tail rotor is no longer considered to be an issue.  However, the info about the CAS being briefed by the personnel from Augusta-Westland is accurate as once again, the Maj-Gen told us this.

As to whether or not DFS has ruled out that the 149 did not suffer any mech probs, I will wait for the final report.  My point at the end of my response was that we should all wait for DFS to finish their investigation before jumping to any conclusions.  The rumour mill is rampant when accidents happen and we saw what can happen when rumours are taken as fact by the media (read the UK pilot offering his opinion on this crash).

 

[Loachman]

Having been the Wing Flight Safety Officer (WFSO) for a short time, I was amazed at the speed the investigation team said that no mechanical failure caused the crash. 

I think that that was just ignorance on the part of the press. The first report that I saw in the media stated that the half-hub problem had been ruled out. That should be a very simple thing to do - and one of, if not the first, things that the team would have looked at given the history of that problem.

CVRs and FDRs are invaluable, but can't tell the whole story.

The only way that mechanical failure could possibly be ruled out so soon is if one of the crew stated that he did something that caused or led to the crash - and even then, it may not be cut and dried.

I know Ron too, albeit not well.

Lots of experience on that crew, but stuff still happens.

 

[Loachman]

This was e-mailed out on the DIN on Friday and I just got it this morning:

Update on CH149914

On July 13th, a tragic Cormorant accident occurred and three airmen lost their lives.  As with all Canadian Forces (CF) aircraft accidents, a Flight Safety investigation (FSI) was initiated.  The Director of Flight Safety, as the delegated Airworthiness Investigation Authority, tasked an investigation team lead by an Investigator In Charge (IIC), to determine the causes of the CH149914 crash and identify effective preventive measures which will either prevent or reduce the risk of a similar occurrence.  The appointed FSI IIC is Major Michel Pilon, a seasoned helicopter pilot and experienced investigator.  I would like to point out up front that the FSI has not and will not assign blame.

The field portion of this investigation comprised of the collection of data and evidence is nearly complete.  Interviews have been conducted with the surviving aircrew and witnesses.  The CVR/FDR was recovered and sent to the Flight Recorder Playback Centre at the National Research Center in Ottawa.  The data was returned to the investigation team.  All documentation concerning the aircraft's maintenance and inspections, prevailing weather, the aircrew's training and qualifications, air traffic services and applicable orders and procedures have been gathered.  Given the known crack problems with the tail rotor half-hubs (TRHH) of the Cormorant fleet, this component was a high priority item to be examined by the Quality Engineering Test Establishment investigation team members.  Although not entirely ruled out, the TRHH does not seem to be a factor in this accident.  In fact, at this time, the IIC has not found anything that would warrant a recommendation that CH149 operations be further restricted.  The Investigation Team is organizing a full simulation on the UK Merlin Flight Simulator using FDR data recovered from the crash site.

The analysis and study of the mass of information obtained is in its initial stages and the investigation is far from finalized.  Before completing the investigation, the IIC will have explored all possibilities and determined the most probable causes or combination of factors which lead or could have lead to the accident; be it technical, physiological, operational or human.  For the human factors analysis of the accident, the IIC would identify the omissions, errors or unsafe acts which could have directly contributed to the accident and more importantly determine the latent factors involved in the accident be it the preconditions under which the crew were operating, any supervisory issues and/or organizational problems present.

Regrettably, on 20 Jul 06, a CF member was either misunderstood or misquoted by a journalist who published an article, which received national exposure, indicating that investigators had ruled out mechanical problems as the cause of this accident.  This information was not released by any member of the investigation team or DFS.  These news items have created anguish for those people close to the tragedy, implied that the Investigation Team released information prematurely and, as a result, has had a negative effect within the Air Force.

I wish to emphasize that DFS has not ruled out or assigned any cause factors yet.  DFS will publish a synopsis of the accident, From the Investigator, containing factual information and the direction the investigation is taking, within the next 30 days.  DFS aims to publish the Final report within a year of the accident.  Given that some of the information related to this investigation is considered Privileged, all media requests shall be coordinated through the Directorate of Air Public Affairs.  Please forward all media queries to Capt Jim Hutcheson at ***-***-****.

A.D. Hunter
Col
DFS

 

[Scoobs]

Loachman,

thanks for posting that email. 

Others,

This proves exactly what I said, wait for the final investigation results and don't trust media when they print something.

 

[big bad john]

http://thechronicleherald.ca/Front/521202.html

Ceremony to be held at helicopter crash site

By JIM MacDONALD
ADVERTISEMENT
 


Three military men who died last month when their search and rescue helicopter crashed into the ocean near Canso will be remembered this weekend near the site of the tragedy.

A wreath will be placed Sunday at a monument just outside town for Sgt. Duane Brazil of Gander, N.L., Master Cpl. Kirk Noel of St. Anthony, N.L., and Cpl. Trevor McDavid of Sudbury, Ont., during the annual Seamen’s Memorial Service.

The ceremony, now in its 30th year, is traditionally a tribute to local fishermen who died at sea.

But in light of the accident that happened July 13 during a routine training exercise, Canso Mayor Ray White said it’s only fitting to pay homage to those who would come to the aid of fishermen in trouble.

"The community felt it was only appropriate that during this service we should also remember these three airmen who were lost at sea trying to protect our fishermen," he said Thursday. "That was the whole nature of that training exercise."

Seven representatives from 14 Wing Greenwood, the downed Cormorant’s home base, will be in attendance, but Mr. White said their invitation to the service was made before the crash, which also injured four crewmen.

The ceremony takes place on two consecutive Sundays, starting this weekend with church services in the surrounding area.

Then a procession will move to a monument in Hazel Hill that was built to replicate the skeleton of an overturned boat.

Imprinted on the structure is a list of names of local fishermen who died on the job. After their names are read, a second rollcall will be made for those who were longtime fishermen but who died of other causes.

Wreaths that are laid at the site during the service will be dropped into the sea on the following Sunday.

One of the eight new names that will be read from the second list will be that of former Canso Trawlermen’s Co-op leader Pat Fougere, who died of a heart attack a few hours after the service ended last year. He was 51.

Mr. Fougere was important to the service each year, Mr. White said, as he was on the committee that researched the history of each person who was being honoured.

Mr. Fougere became a strong voice for local fishermen, often criticizing government policies that he said robbed fishermen of access to fish stocks.

While the mayor anticipates there will be references at the service to Mr. Fougere’s life and work, he expects they won’t overshadow the ceremony.

"Knowing Pat as well as I did, he would want the service to focus on its true meaning," he said.

( [email protected])

 

[C/10]

RIP 

 

[The Bread Guy]

The latest, from CF Directorate of Flight Safety
http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/dfs/docs/Fti/CH149914_e.asp

Aircraft Occurrence Summary
Type: CH149914 Cormorant
Date: 13 July 2006
Location: Chedabucto Bay, near Canso, NS

The accident involved a Cormorant Search and Rescue helicopter with a crew of seven. The crew had assumed SAR standby duties and was authorized to conduct a training mission to practice night boat hoists from the fishing vessel Four Sisters No.1, a member of the Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary. The cockpit crew consisted of a co-pilot in the left pilot seat, a pilot acting as Aircraft Commander (AAC) in the right pilot seat and a pilot who was the actual Aircraft Commander (AC) seated in the cockpit jump seat. The remainder of the crew occupied the cabin area. They comprised of a Flight Engineer (FE), a Flight Engineer under training (FEUT), a SAR Tech Team Lead (SAR Tech TL) and a SAR Tech Team Member (SAR Tech TM).

The crew departed Greenwood, NS at 2120L hrs and completed an uneventful transit to the Port Hawkesbury, NS airport, where they stopped to conduct a required tail-rotor inspection. While on the ground in Port Hawkesbury, the crew contacted Four Sisters No. 1 to confirm that the weather in the area was suitable for the training scenario. The Captain of the Four Sisters No. 1 stated that the weather was clear, visibility was good and the water was calm.

The aircraft departed Port Hawkesbury just before midnight on 12 July 2006 to rendezvous with the Four Sisters No. 1 at approximately 2 nautical miles (NM) north of Canso, NS on Chedabucto Bay. After locating the ship, the helicopter used the "Over Water Transition Down" procedure and proceeded to the "rest" position, which is 100 ft above the water and a safe distance from the ship just off the hoisting position from which the crew would start the boat hoisting procedure.

At this point, the helicopter descended to 60 feet and the AC directed the flying pilot to go-around. The pilot acknowledged the go-around command and initiated the go-around procedure. During the overshoot attempt, the helicopter entered a nose-low attitude and seconds later the aircraft impacted the water at approx 30 to 50 knots in an 18 degree nose-down attitude with maximum torque being developed by the main rotor. Upon water impact, the front portion of the aircraft was destroyed while the cabin area aft of the forward part of the cargo door remained relatively intact; the aircraft immediately filled with water and rolled inverted. The crew of Four Sisters No. 1 made a "Mayday" call at approximately 0030L hrs 13 July 2006. The aircraft sustained "A" category damage.

The three pilots and the SAR Tech TL were injured but survived the crash. The two flight engineers and the SAR Tech TM were unable to egress the aircraft and did not survive.

No pertinent technical deficiencies have been discovered to date and the investigation is focussing on environmental and human factors. Several human factors need to be further examined including: proficiency, crew resource management, situational awareness, crew pairing, use of night vision goggles and organizational issues such as currency and training. Additionally, several Aviation Life Support Equipment and egress issues will be investigated.
###

And how MSM handled this, shared in accordance with the "fair dealing" provisions, Section 29, of the Copyright Act - http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/info/act-e.html#rid-33409

Cormorant crash investigation focuses on human error: flight report
Murray Brewster, Canadian Press, 11 Sept 06
http://www.canada.com/components/print.aspx?id=03f9a6b4-97ac-41cb-aeea-05657ffd47e1&k=84619

Military investigators focused Monday on human error as the possible cause of the crash of a Cormorant search-and-rescue helicopter that killed three airmen off eastern Nova Scotia in July.

An interim flight safety report, which formally ruled out mechanical trouble, said “several human factors” will need further investigation, including the fact that one of the pilots at the controls was being trained when the helicopter plunged into the ocean off Canso, N.S. during a night exercise.

The crash claimed the lives of Sgt. Duane Brazil, 39; Master Cpl. Kirk Noel, 33; and Cpl. Trevor McDavid, 31. Four other crew members, including the pilot and co-pilot, were treated in hospital for serious but non-life-threatening injuries.

At the time, the co-pilot was in the pilot’s seat.

“The whole purpose of (the flight) was to conduct training for this individual in order to upgrade him to full aircraft commander status,” Maj. Michel Pilon, the lead investigator, said in an interview following the release of the interim report.

“You had a co-pilot on the left seat and you had an acting aircraft commander on the right seat (and) the aircraft commander seated in the jump seat,” said Pilon.

“This is an aspect we need to further examine in order to determine whether it’s really a good way to pair a crew together.”

The investigation is far from complete, Pilon cautioned and no conclusions have been drawn.

No mechanical troubles were noted with the 15-tonne aircraft, even though the Cormorant fleet has a history of cracked tail rotors.

Weather conditions were also good at the time.

Experts in flight crew training are examining the piloting issue, as well as the proficiency of the aircrew. They are expected to report to the accident investigation team by the fall.

Another aspect under review is the fact that some of the flight crew were wearing night vision goggles at the time of the accident.

“It’s a factor,” Pilon conceded, “but its importance needs to be assessed and evaluated. We’re not really prepared to say anything more about night-vision goggles at this time.”

The CH-149 Cormorant from 413 Transport and Rescue Squadron was creeping up on the stern of a coast guard auxiliary ship just after midnight on July 13. It was practising what aircrew call one of their “bread and butter” training exercises; lowering a search-and-rescue technician to the deck of a ship. The helicopter suddenly veered to the side and plowed nose-first into the water.

The interim report revealed Monday that the aircraft commander directed the pilot at the controls to veer off and make a second pass at the ship.

“The pilot acknowledged the go-around command and initiated the go-around procedure,” said the three-page document.

At that point, that the aircraft went down, striking the water at roughly 50 knots. The impact sheared off the cockpit from the rest of the helicopter.

The cabin area remained relatively intact as the chopper rolled over and filled with water.

Brazil, Noel and McDavid did not get out of the rear cabin. The preliminary report did not say whether they were killed on impact or drowned.

Witnesses on the reserve coast guard ship say the crash happened so fast no one had a chance to say anything.

 

[Bruce Monkhouse]

http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Canada/2007/08/06/4397798-cp.html

By MICHAEL TUTTON
   
HALIFAX (CP) - For John Noel, waiting more than a year for answers on how his nephew died in a helicopter crash off Nova Scotia's coast is often more than he can bear.
The 58-year-old electrician wipes away a tear as he talks of his frustration with a military safety inquiry into the crash that killed his 33-year-old nephew, Master Cpl. Kirk Noel of St. Anthony, N.L., on July 13, 2006.

"We've had nothing but misinformation, innuendo, whatever you want to call it," Noel said in an interview. "We don't know anything now more than we did when it started."

Noel was one of three men who died when the Cormorant rescue helicopter plunged nose-first into the Atlantic Ocean just east of Canso during a nighttime rescue exercise.
Search and rescue technicians Sgt. Paul (Duane) Brazil, 39, and Cpl. Trevor Sterling McDavid, 31, also died inside the rear cabin of the helicopter. The three pilots and a search and rescue technician survived.

Officers from the Air Force's Directorate of Flight Safety say they're legally prohibited from revealing what they've found so far. 
But for Noel, that silence creates a painful wait, partly because he'd always felt a sense of responsibility for his adventurous nephew, who had just completed his training as a rescuer.
He described their relationship as being like brothers because Kirk grew up in his house in St. Anthony and was cared for by his parents.

"When my father died three years ago, the last thing he said as I was sitting by his side, was, 'Look, John, look after Kirk.' I said, 'Father, don't worry about that. I'll look after him,' " Noel recalled.
"But it was more promise than I could keep."
He and his wife Hazel note that the helicopter's flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder were recovered, providing detailed information in the crucial minutes before the crash.
The four surviving airmen were also able to give testimony.

However, the only public release on the crash, issued last September, gives only a broad view of the findings.
One line in particular from that report stands out for Noel. It says: "Additionally, several aviation life support equipment and egress issues will be investigated."
That has led Noel to ask whether the rescue technicians managed to release themselves from the safety harnesses that attached them to the aircraft, claiming he received inaccurate information from the military in the early months on this issue.

"We were told the men managed to get their safety harnesses off," he said.
Since then, other members of the military have told him some of the crew who died hadn't managed to remove the "monkey-tail" harnesses, which go around the arms, legs and torso, and have a line at the back that connects them to the helicopter.
Noel said he no longer has contact with any military liaison officers to discuss the harnesses.
"I don't know who to call. We don't know anymore," he said.

Col. Chris Shelley, director of flight safety, said in an interview he can't discuss the harnesses because of the ongoing investigation.
Shelley said he understands the family's frustration and hopes changes to federal legislation will allow more information to be released to grieving families in the future.
He noted that Bill C-6, currently before Parliament, would allow crash investigators to pass more information to next-of-kin, with the legal requirement they not tell others what they learn.

"I find it difficult because the families want to know, more than anything, they want to know what happened to their loved ones, and they want to know how the investigation is going," he said.
"Moreover, it does happen that they get information from other sources, and quite often it's wrongheaded. And so they spend a period of time with a false perception of where the investigation is going."

A draft of the final report was completed in late April and has been in circulation among "persons of direct interest," including aircraft manufacturers, the air crew and officers involved in the accident.
The directorate often states it aims to release the reports approximately one year after an accident.
However, Shelley said in this case "some agencies took longer than anticipated to provide their comments," while a new investigator has been brought into the case and has had other crash investigations to deal with.

Noel said he believes he must keep up the pressure for more information.
"I wonder if changes are being made, or are they operating under the same rules," he said.

 

[ark]

Military to release final report into fatal military chopper crash off N.S.
5 hours ago

HALIFAX — Almost two years after a military helicopter nosedived into the dark waters off Nova Scotia, killing three men, military investigators were to release their final report into the incident Tuesday.

A draft report into the July 13, 2006 crash, obtained earlier by The Canadian Press, found the chopper's pilot was "not qualified" to be at the controls of the CH149 Cormorant as seven crew members prepared to practise a nighttime hoist from a fishing boat off Canso.

The search and rescue helicopter, based at Canadian Forces Base Greenwood in Nova Scotia's Annapolis Valley, crashed into the ocean at 120 kilometres per hour, ripping the aircraft apart.

The draft report, completed last April by the military's Directorate of Flight Safety, was circulated for comment to the manufacturer of the helicopter, the maintenance company and surviving crew members. It was subject to revisions by the air force's senior command.

A spokesman for the safety agency has said investigators would not comment until the final report was released. Surviving crew members also declined comment.

The report said the pilot hadn't fulfilled retraining requirements following a 90-day leave, and he overrode an autopilot system that might have allowed the aircraft to gain altitude prior to the crash.

It also suggests the pilot didn't know he was breaking the rules when it came to retraining.

In addition, the report said the attention of the co-pilot was split between finding switches and looking at the ocean below, rather than monitoring his flying instruments.

The report recommended more details on the co-pilot's duties be included in the chopper's flying manual.

There had been a steady deterioration in pilot training in the months leading up the crash, the report said, and "the overall proficiency of the CH149 crews was degraded" due to restrictions on training times.

In recent years, the shortage of training time had worsened because of problems with parts supplies and increased maintenance of the rear rotor hubs.

The report also found that Cormorant training materials, partially based on a previous generation of Labrador helicopters, neglected the autopilot capabilities of the new aircraft.

The draft report recommended pilots to pay closer attention to the "automatic flight control system," and to increase use of a flight simulator in England.

As well, the report called for the development of easier-to-release harnesses. The report said a ban has been placed on the type of survival suits worn by a search and rescue technician on the night of the crash.

The agency's investigators concluded every member of the crew survived the initial impact, but three crewmen - Sgt. Duane Brazil, 39, Master Cpl. Trevor McDavid, 31, and Cpl. Kirk Noel, 31 - died after they were unable to escape from the submerged aircraft.

http://canadianpress.google.com/article/ALeqM5jChxZAU6fu-Sv7Ae1dVB38aYGWEg

Bump

 

[Yrys]

another article on same subject :

Inadequate training behind Cormorant crash - CTV.ca News Staff

Human error and inadequate training were the primary causes of a fatal 2006 Cormorant military helicopter crash off Canso, N.S., the military has found.

Three of seven crew members died of drowning on July 13, 2006, after the search and rescue helicopter nosedived into the Atlantic Ocean while out on a night-time
training exercise, breaking the helicopter in two. Crew members survived the initial impact, but some were unable to escape because of blocked emergency exits,
according to a final report on the incident released Tuesday. They also couldn't reach emergency breathing equipment, and seat harnesses were difficult to release.
The accident itself occurred because of the pilot's flying technique and the flight crew's "misperception" of their aircraft's flight path.

CTV Atlantic's Rick Grant said that the pilot hadn't been behind the controls for roughly 90 days, had very little Cormorant experience, had no over-water experience
and hadn't fulfilled retraining requirements. The pilot "had overridden the autopilot and was trying to carry out manoeuvres on his own," he said. Grant said the pilot
was also vainly trying to gain a visual reference from the water.

The helicopter was attempting to carry out a night-time hoist from a fishing boat, something that Cormorant pilots consider among the most difficult maneouvres
they have to carry out, Grant said. The report found the crew's monitoring of its flight instruments was "inadequate." It said the helicopter was in good mechanical
shape and weather was not a factor.

Training an issue

Training flights were restricted and limited to only a couple of hours because of persistent cracks in the aircraft's tail rotor hubs, according to the report. The impact
of that was "underestimated and inadequately addressed," it said. The report also noted: "The crews could maintain currency by achieving the minimum requirements,
but as time progressed, repeatedly meeting just these minimum requirements was not enough to keep their skills at a level where the . . . crews felt safe."

A senior officer with 1 Canadian Air Division says that restrictions have been lifted. Brig.-Gen. Yvan Blondin says flights have been increased to five hours and proficiency
is now at "satisfactory levels." Cormorant crews told a January 2006 survey that they were concerned about their declining skills.

British instructors who operate flight simulators had noted that Canadian crews shown lower than expected levels of proficiency. However, the military never formally
studied the issue.

Grant said the report makes 26 recommendations for improvements, with the military saying 21 have already been implemented. More than 60 changes in total have
been implemented in the Air Force in response to issues arising from this crash. The interior layout of the Cormorant has also been changed so that crew members
could escape more easily in the event of another crash, he said.

Article on link

 

[Richie]

Another article re this tragic incident: <a href="http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080311.wchopper0311/BNStory/National/home">Link to Globe and Mail Article</a>.

Quote from article:
"The primary causes of a fatal military helicopter crash off Canso, N.S., nearly two years ago were the pilot's inappropriate flying technique and the flight crew's misreading of the flight path, investigators say in a final report issued Tuesday."

Let's hope that this doesn't become another "let's blame the pilot" story. Perhaps we should blame the Liberals for cutting funds to the military and thus reducing training.

Just my view from the civvy world,
Richie

 

[benny88]

Let's hope that this doesn't become another "let's blame the pilot" story. Perhaps we should blame the Liberals for cutting funds to the military and thus reducing training.

  I think that may be a bit of a stretch Richie. In the article you quoted it says that this WAS a training flight, with an instructor in the back. I agree that we shouldn't be quick to blame the pilot for every incident, but pilot error does happen, and experts evaluated this for 2 years before coming to this conclusion.

 

[observor 69]

   I think that may be a bit of a stretch Richie. In the article you quoted it says that this WAS a training flight, with an instructor in the back. I agree that we shouldn't be quick to blame the pilot for every incident, but pilot error does happen, and experts evaluated this for 2 years before coming to this conclusion.

Yes it was a training flight but the article says :

[ "Among the “latent” factors cited in the report is the restriction on the number of training flights imposed as the result of persistent cracks in the Cormorant's tail rotor hubs.

The impact on training was “underestimated and inadequately addressed,” the report says." ]

 

[Richie]

  I think that may be a bit of a stretch Richie. In the article you quoted it says that this WAS a training flight, with an instructor in the back. I agree that we shouldn't be quick to blame the pilot for every incident, but pilot error does happen, and experts evaluated this for 2 years before coming to this conclusion.

Benny, sorry for not replying earlier, "life" got in the way of the Internet

The intent of my post was to point out that cutbacks in military spending have resulted in problems with training for CF personnel (at least that's what it looks like from the outside). As the article states: "British instructors who operate flight simulators had noted that Canadian crews shown lower than expected levels of proficiency. However, the military never formally studied the issue."

Obviously pilot error does happen in both the military and the civilian aviation fields; but I really just hope that the higher-ups in the military are not whitewashing this tragic incident. On the contrary, they should be aiming the spotlight on it as an example of how underfunding of the military can lead to the loss of more than just an expensive helicopter.

Richie

 

[dapaterson]

I don't think the issue here was a lack of funding, rather a lack of spares and an onerous (but necessary) verification routine for certain critical, failure-prone systems - which then manifested itself in reduced training and skill levels.

 

[Strike]

Benny, sorry for not replying earlier, "life" got in the way of the Internet

The intent of my post was to point out that cutbacks in military spending have resulted in problems with training for CF personnel (at least that's what it looks like from the outside). As the article states: "British instructors who operate flight simulators had noted that Canadian crews shown lower than expected levels of proficiency. However, the military never formally studied the issue."

Obviously pilot error does happen in both the military and the civilian aviation fields; but I really just hope that the higher-ups in the military are not whitewashing this tragic incident. On the contrary, they should be aiming the spotlight on it as an example of how underfunding of the military can lead to the loss of more than just an expensive helicopter.

Richie

Please go to the following site http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/dfs/reports-rapports/I/reports-rapports-eng.asp and read the whole report, not just the epilogue.  Cost did not come into factor.  In fact, it was a lag in training, which has affected the fleet as a whole from switching from an antiquated machine to a technological wonder, that was partly responsible for the events.  The problems in training were not because of lack of funding, but the corporate knowledge from a previous aircraft.  Add to that the 2-hr training flight limitation because of the tail rotor hub (which has nothing to do with funding and everything to do with a design flaw), the issues discussed in previous articles about the lack of currency of one pilot and the lack of profficiency of the student pilot (because he was in training after all) and many other factor, and all the holes in the swiss cheese line up (I'm sure we've all seen that model) and cause the accident.

(Yes, I rock at run-on sentences.)

 

[Richie]

Thanks for the link, I'll read the report. The opinion that I had originally expressed was based in part on my own feelings (bad I know, feelings not facts) about the continuing underfunding of our military and what I had read in the MSM. I'll be happy to read something more substantial.

 

[Strike]

Richie,

No worries.

It's a good read, albeit a long one.

One of the pilots involved is a good friend and I know he did his best to turn a negative experience into something positive, especially when it came to the personal safety gear we wear.  He was instrumental in testing it all in various adverse conditions after the fact.

Unfortunately we can't plan for all situations, but luckily our flight safety system is a great tool, and serves to prevent events like this from happening again in the future.

 

[AirCanuck]

hmm, I specifically remember this one and what I was doing when I found out... I was on IAP and our MCpl came in and told us during  our first class.

sad day.