Counterinsurgency/COIN Literature & Discussion (merged)

[geo]

Are our troops conducting house-to-house searches for weapons as well?

Ummm.... yeah - what do you think VP does while in theatre?

 

[zipperhead_cop]

So Teddy, to get this straight:  Because the people in a given country have a poor image of the occupying force, the onus is on that force to change their SOP's and get killed at the same rate as the indigent population in order to win the "hearts and minds".  Hope the only time you spend at NDHQ is polishing the floors. 
If we are to take the "parable" at face value, you are going to be the one who is the "sheriff", so you are saying that you PERSONALLY are in favor of reduced personal security for your platoon and yourself, so that soldiers getting killed leaves a favourable impression on the locals?  You don't happen to be wearing a green headband right now, are you?  ???
Besides, in A'stan aren't we there in order to allow the local force to get it's own collective shyte together so they can take over?  How extended should soldiers be into harms way to achieve their goals?  Ambushes and IED's are one thing, but at such time as the procedures start to appear easily attacked, I think we will see a much higher mortality rate.

 

[m410]

Teddy never said the Americans should "seek out more casualties in order to win hearts and minds".

He said, basically, "be more accessible in order to win hearts and minds."  The byproduct of this is increased vulnerability.  The paradox of this approach is that it (may) actually decrease your vulnerability because it denies the enemy his support network.

 

[zipperhead_cop]

Six of one...
Maybe one of the guys that has been on one of these ops can explain why it is so important to have the locals in love with you.  There are obvious reasons, less aggravation, less stress etc.  But is it really necessary in order to secure the area?  If it is just Intel that is needed, my experience (all in Canada) has been that the rats will seek you out and give info regardless of what else is going on for their own gain.  Isn't that what the HumInt guys are there for?  Aren't the uniformed soldiers there for area security and aggressive patrols?  I stand to be put back in my lane, but I would like to know one way or the other.  If we are just there in order to help the Afghan police/soldiers get their act together, then why must we be so chummy?  I bet Lt. Trevor Greene would have a different opinion on relaxing on personal safety in the interest of "looking like a nice guy". 

Smile, hand out candy and water bottles, watch your ass, get back here with all yer parts. 

 

[devil39]

Zipperhead_cop,

Some insight that I would recommend on the subject of counter-insurgency in the links below.  Most counterinsurgency doctrines and experience suggests that you cannot win an insurgency by brute military force.  One must be concerned with winning "hearts and minds", separating the insurgent from the population, legitimacy, and a whole host of other issues.

Steven Metz
http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/metz1.pdf

Lind and 4th Generation War (4GW)
http://www.d-n-i.net/lind/4gw_manual_draft_3_revised_10_june_05.doc

This quote from Andrew Krepinevich in his article "How to Win In Iraq" from Foreign Affairs Sep/Oct 2005 pretty much sums up the need to win the hearts and minds of the local population in a counterinsurgency war.  It is all about centres of gravity.  http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050901faessay84508-p0/andrew-f-krepinevich-jr/how-to-win-in-iraq.html

CENTERS OF GRAVITY

In conventional warfare, the enemy's military forces and capital city are often considered its centers of gravity, meaning that losing either would spell defeat. In the Iraq war, for example, the coalition concentrated on destroying Saddam's Republican Guard and capturing Baghdad. But the centers of gravity in counterinsurgency warfare are completely different, and focusing efforts on defeating the enemy's military forces through traditional forms of combat is a mistake.

The current fight has three centers of gravity: the Iraqi people, the American people, and the American soldier. The insurgents have recognized this, making them their primary targets. For the United States, the key to securing each one is winning "hearts and minds." The Iraqi people must believe that their government offers them a better life than the insurgents do, and they must think that the government will prevail. If they have doubts on either score, they will withhold their support. The American people must believe that the war is worth the sacrifice, in lives and treasure, and think that progress is being made. If the insurgents manage to erode their will, Washington will be forced to abandon the infant regime in Baghdad before it is capable of standing on its own. Finally, the American soldier must believe that the war is worth the sacrifice and think that there is progress toward victory. Unlike in Vietnam, the United States is waging war with an all-volunteer military, which gives the American soldier (or marine) a "vote" in the conflict. With over 150,000 troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, soldiers must rotate back into those war zones at a high rate. If confidence in the war wanes, veterans will vote with their feet by refusing to reenlist and prospective new recruits will avoid signing up in the first place. If this occurs, the United States will be unable to sustain anything approaching its current effort in Iraq. A precipitous reduction in U.S. forces could further undermine the resolve of both the American and the Iraqi people. At present, U.S. Army and Marine Corps reenlistment rates are strong. Army recruiting, however, is down substantially.

The insurgents have a clear advantage when it comes to this fight: they only need to win one of the centers of gravity to succeed, whereas the United States must secure all three. Making matters even more complicated for the coalition, a Catch-22 governs the fight against the insurgency: efforts designed to secure one center of gravity may undermine the prospects of securing the others. For example, increased U.S. troop deployments to Iraq -- which require that greater resources be spent and troops be rotated in and out more frequently -- might increase security for the Iraqi people but erode support for the war among the U.S. public and the military. This risk is especially great given the nature of the current U.S. operations against the insurgents. They put too great an emphasis on destroying insurgent forces and minimizing U.S. casualties and too little on providing enduring security to the Iraqi people; too much effort into sweeping maneuvers with no enduring presence and too little into the effective coordination of security and reconstruction efforts; and too high a priority on quickly fielding large numbers of Iraqi security forces and too low a priority on ensuring their effectiveness.

The key to securing the centers of gravity in the current war is to recognize that U.S. forces have overwhelming advantages in terms of combat power and mobility but a key disadvantage in terms of intelligence. If they know who the insurgents are and where they are, they can quickly suppress the insurgency. The Iraqi people are the best source of this intelligence. But U.S. forces and their allies can only gain this knowledge by winning locals' hearts and minds -- that is, by convincing them that the insurgents' defeat is in their interest and that they can share intelligence about them without fear of insurgent reprisals.

 

[GO!!!]

teddy49,

First, the hypocrisy of someone who makes his living off of the Force Protection policies of the US military and civilians in Iraq criticisng those same policies is not lost on me.

Second, this is not WWII. Doddering Generals are no longer permitted to feed thousands into the meat grinders in pursuit of victory. Casualties are not something that should be "sucked up" or seen as acceptable. The idea that the US should accept "much higher" casualty rates in any term is ludicrous. No commander in his right mind would even consider it, and rightly so. More casualties will sour the voting public against this war even more than it already is, and hamper the effort by reducing the amount of resources available.

Third, Comparing the US mission in Iraq to the Canadian mission in Afghanistan is a big stretch. At last count, the US mission to Iraq is fifty times the size, and has a far greater urban component, as well as accessibility to the foreigners who have been proven to be doing (at least) a large portion of the fighting, and most of the funding.

Fourth, as has been alluded to here, the most effective tool in the box right now is intelligence. If the bad guys can be fixed, they can be killed, and nothing provides a disincentive to fight against us like watching terrorists be dragged out of houses in the middle of the night for a long trip to Cuba. Keep the number of troops high, train up the IP and Iraqi Army, and act decisively on reliable int, while paying handsomely for more.

 

[pbi]

zipperhead cop: Having spent six months in the HQ of the US forces running OEF, and having had the great privelege to  travel out to the Bde AOs to speak at length to a number of the USA/USMC Inf junior leaders who were actually out on the ground making OEF happen, I can only second devil39's post. (And devil 39 has led fighting troops on the ground in that country, as part of OEF, so he has far more credibility than I do...)The US forces, at all levels, understood very clearly, the importance of a good relationship with the people amongst whom they were operating. They were divided on the idea of "winnning hearts and minds", but they were unanimous on the need to win trust. HUMINT is a very big key to success in these types of ops, just as I suspect it is in police work. The amount and quality of HUMINT, and the willingness of people to give it, is IMHO (and I think, not just IMHO...) directly related to the quality of the relationship you enjoy with the locals. I have a hard time imagining any real success by a force that cuts itself off from the people.

I would be very cautious about trying to draw too close a parallel between operations in Afghanistan and your experience as a municipal police officer, or even the collective experience of your entire PD. Police agencies in this country start out much further ahead than the Coalition does: police are the recognized, legitimate and (more or less) trusted agents of a public order that most of us have agreed to and support. There is a long-standing belief amongst most people (most, I said...) that there is a reasonable chance that if you turn to the police, you will receive fair and effective response. And, with the exception of a relatively small group of hard core sh*tbirds, most citizens do not believe that they will be killed or their homes destroyed if they call 911.

Still, with all of those advantages, IMHO progressive police services in Canada place a high premium on their good relations with the community, their communty presence, and the willingness of all citizens, not just scumbags, to come forward with info. Isn't there great value in the old traditional foot patrol that works a neighbourhood over a long period, gets to know and trust the people, and can hear/see/smell/check all kinds of things that some guy rolling by in a cruiser (once in eight hours) with the windows up and the radio on will never even notice? Don't police services in Canada express great frustration that certain communities do not trust them, and will not share information with them?

IMHO if you can't win the trust, you can't win the fight.

Cheers

 

[teddy49]

Ok where to start?

Zipperhead_Cop.  I gather from you're profile that you are a member of Windsor's finest.  Perhaps I'm mistaken.  Allow me to stretch the analogy a little further.  Would you like to roll through the streets of Windsor in a no smaller than 3 vehicle convoy, armed with C-7s and C-8s and C-9s, while tucked behind armour with a gunner on top with a fifty or C-6 mounted?  Would you like patrolling to mean that you never got out of the vehicle between leaving the police station and returning to it unless there was some kind of drama, like one of your vehicles was blown up?  Would you like the situation in Windsor to degrade to the point where you had too?  Or would you rather be able to stop at Timmy's for lunch and a Double Double and be able to talk to the citizens you meet in a courteous and professional manner.  Or conduct a traffic stop instead of a VBIED Magnet...I mean Vehicle Control Point.  Would you like all the hotels and government buildings in Windsor to be surrounded by 3 meter concrete blast walls, razor wire, and armed guys who make 3-4 times what you do?  How would you feel about having another group of guys, who work for a private company, but are contracted to the Mayor's office running around with C-6s, C-8s, C-9s, up armoured suburbans, who were above the law.  They could shoot anyone they thought was a threat, or who got inside their bubble, and you had to deal with the aftermath.  Would you like Windsor to be a place where you launched 3 or 4 rounds at citizen's vehicles, because they were in your way and even though you didn't have an emergency to go to, if you'd slowed down anymore, you'd be vulnerable to attack?  Would you like the media both locally and worldwide, to complain about everything that you did in Windsor and accuse you of things you didn't do.  This is life in Bagdad, today.  Put yourself in a citizen's shoes.  If this was life in Windsor, why would they possibly have anything at all to do with you.

So Teddy, to get this straight:  Because the people in a given country have a poor image of the occupying force, the onus is on that force to change their SOP's and get killed at the same rate as the indigent population in order to win the "hearts and minds".

To answer this go here and scroll down to number 184

http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2066rank.html

Then scroll up and take a look at the countries that are above #184.  The US mil would love to have their death rate go this low.

Six of one...
Maybe one of the guys that has been on one of these ops can explain why it is so important to have the locals in love with you.  There are obvious reasons, less aggravation, less stress etc.  But is it really necessary in order to secure the area?  If it is just Intel that is needed, my experience (all in Canada) has been that the rats will seek you out and give info regardless of what else is going on for their own gain.  Isn't that what the HumInt guys are there for?  Aren't the uniformed soldiers there for area security and aggressive patrols?  I stand to be put back in my lane, but I would like to know one way or the other. 

I think your mistake here, comparing profit motivated common criminal behaviour, with personally motivated political behaviour.  And I will be the first to admit that here in Iraq, there's a significant amount of overlap.  But while the snitch will sell out his buddies to avoid jail or for a payout,  my experience (all in Iraq) is that it takes a lot more for an insurgent to sell out his.  For him to do that, voluntarily, he needs to believe that you're the good guys.  Otherwise why would he talk to you in the first place.  Sure maybe you could get some info out of him with threats of sodomy sessions with his new cell mate Abu Bakr, but with jails that are full of insurgents already, as well as a not insignificant number of wrongly accused people who provide a significant population of recruits for the villains, threatening suspects with prison, likely means that you will just reunite them with their friends.  Threatening them with death, when they were likely planning to be martyrs anyway is similarly unfruitful.  So the question remains, how do you get them to talk to you if at best they think they'll get killed if they try to talk to you and at worst think of you as infidel occupiers.  If you have an answer, other than a hearts and minds campaign, please I'd be very keen to hear it.  As well when thinking about the greed motive, keep in mind the money that's on Bin Laden's and Zarqawi's heads.  Last time I checked, no one had turned them in.

Now the, GO!!!  Firstly I don't see the hypocrisy that you speak of.  But I'm not going to get into a pissing match about who has the moral high ground in the GWOT.  Secondly, if it's hypocritical of me to do what I do and protect the people I protect, while understanding and publicly acknowledging that I don't think it has to be this way then I guess the shoe fits.  Sorry for thinking that my presence here, might actually help these people and do some small part to help them forge better lives for themselves.  I didn't realize that was hypocritical.  I'll be honest I don't think that's going to happen in Iraq anymore, for the reason's I stated in my first post.  Perhaps, then I should quit my job.  Would that mean I wasn't a hypocrite anymore.  The clients I work for, (an NGO, not the army)would still be here, and would still believe in their mission, but because I think there's a better way for Uncle Sugar to be doing their part of the mission, I'm a hypocrite.  Sorry, I said earlier that I wasn't going to get into a pissing match about moral high ground.  I guess I'm a liar too.

For your second point, I understand that this isn't WWII.  And I don't think Iraq is a meat grinder either.  Remember the total number of casualties here is still lower than the first 20 minutes of D-day.  In fact I would argue that the way they are doing things now is analogous to Haig's solution to the western front.  Where as troop dispersal and force decentralization might be a more Curry-like way of looking at things.  Perhaps you disagree.  Hindsight is 20/20 and I don't want to rag on the Yanks to much, but if they'd tried a lower key approach from the beginning, perhaps they wouldn't be in the boat they're in now.  Where to switch tactics would definitely lead to higher casualties.

For your third point, I never mentioned word one in my post about Afghanistan.  The sum total of my experience with insurgency is in Iraq.  Perhaps I should have stated that I was only speaking to my firsthand knowledge of Iraq.  The challenges I feel that face our guys in Afghanistan, of which again, I have no first hand knowledge, would be the subject of another post, if not another thread.  But suffice to say, I don't think that has nearly as much to do with Coalition tactics as it does with the intransigence and independent spirit of the Afghan people.  But this post was strictly from my experience in Iraq and I think only applies to Iraq.

To your forth point, I think that's what my entire first post was about.  The best way to gather intelligence.  Always menacing every local you see, isn't going to help you win the intel war, when the locals are the only source of it.  I don't care how many satellites, camera equipped predators, or Coyote recce vehicles you have.

Now in Iraq, the battle for hearts and minds is complicated by the competition.  With so many different factions, Shia, Sunni, Kurd, Secular Shia's and Sunni's, all vying for power, in what they see as a vacuum, while simultaneously preparing for the civil war, that many are convinced is now inevitable, it means it's an uphill battle for anyone.  There are no simple answers to the situation, but what is for certain, is that in Iraq, the current solution, isn't working.

 

[DG-41]

I would be very cautious about trying to draw too close a parallel between operations in Afghanistan and your experience as a municipal police officer, or even the collective experience of your entire PD. Police agencies in this country start out much further ahead than the Coalition does: police are the recognized, legitimate and (more or less) trusted agents of a public order that most of us have agreed to and support. There is a long-standing belief amongst most people (most, I said...) that there is a reasonable chance that if you turn to the police, you will receive fair and effective response. And, with the exception of a relatively small group of hard core sh*tbirds, most citizens do not believe that they will be killed or their homes destroyed if they call 911.

Zulu Charlie,

The RCR RSS Sgt with the Scottish spent time in Haiti working alongside the local constabulary. He has been acting as the urban warfare SME for unit training, and his observations about Haiti have been very useful and amplify what pbi is saying here.

Once your paperwork is done, I'm sure you'll have a chance to talk with him.

DG

 

[GAP]

the battle for hearts and minds is complicated by the competition

In Iraq and AStan there is literally a thousand years of previous, sometimes successful competition. I am not qualified to speak from personal experience about either, but (but that won't stop me from forming an opinion) it seems that Afghan people have seen so much strife in the past 30 years, they are more willing to adopt a "wait & see" attitude. It would seem IMHO that the previous regime there did much of the work of distancing the people, that they are more inclined to give this approach a look-see.

Probably, AStan will be more of a generational thing.  The Kabul government needs to keep a steady, even hand on its' governance for a long time, while expanding into the rest of the countryside. There's going to be some real battles there, some physical, but most political. These warlords are not going to give up their turf easily, and they are not without influence.

 

[Journeyman]

Probably, AStan will be more of a generational thing.  

At the risk of being lumped in with the "stating the obvious" herd.....traditionally, any major changes of the sort contemplated in A'stan and Iraq will take a generation change to take hold. Even when change is dramatically imposed upon a society, the familiarity with the old way, and "memories" (whether true or merely wistful thinking) will hang on for quite some time.

The thing for Canadian society, and indeed amongst all nations of the "coalitions of the willing," is to truly take this on-board, with all its ramifications, rather than have it be merely a news sound-bite

 

[zipperhead_cop]

Ok where to start?

Zipperhead_Cop.  I gather from you're profile that you are a member of Windsor's finest.  Perhaps I'm mistaken.  Allow me to stretch the analogy a little further.  Would you like to roll through the streets of Windsor in a no smaller than 3 vehicle convoy, armed with C-7s and C-8s and C-9s, while tucked behind armour with a gunner on top with a fifty or C-6 mounted?  Would you like patrolling to mean that you never got out of the vehicle between leaving the police station and returning to it unless there was some kind of drama, like one of your vehicles was blown up?  Would you like the situation in Windsor to degrade to the point where you had too?  Or would you rather be able to stop at Timmy's for lunch and a Double Double and be able to talk to the citizens you meet in a courteous and professional manner.  Or conduct a traffic stop instead of a VBIED Magnet...I mean Vehicle Control Point.  Would you like all the hotels and government buildings in Windsor to be surrounded by 3 meter concrete blast walls, razor wire, and armed guys who make 3-4 times what you do?  How would you feel about having another group of guys, who work for a private company, but are contracted to the Mayor's office running around with C-6s, C-8s, C-9s, up armoured suburbans, who were above the law.  They could shoot anyone they thought was a threat, or who got inside their bubble, and you had to deal with the aftermath.  Would you like Windsor to be a place where you launched 3 or 4 rounds at citizen's vehicles, because they were in your way and even though you didn't have an emergency to go to, if you'd slowed down anymore, you'd be vulnerable to attack?  Would you like the media both locally and worldwide, to complain about everything that you did in Windsor and accuse you of things you didn't do.  This is life in Bagdad, today.  Put yourself in a citizen's shoes.  If this was life in Windsor, why would they possibly have anything at all to do with you.

I think that would be a laugh riot, except I would be one of the Mayors guys.  Unlimited 20 mm down Drouillard Road until it's a parking lot.  Meadowbrook next.  10-8, no report. :

Okay, if it seemed like I wanted soldiers to be faceless death machines, it was inadvertent.  I realize that contact with the public is necessary.  I just wanted to hear if increased contact which will certainly lead to more deaths will be WORTH it for what is gained back.  And I wasn't comparing policing to being in theater.  I know that is not even worth comparing.  My comparison was with people who are coming forward with info for some sort of gain.  If everyone is motivated by a desire to help their community, then great.  But is there a chance that little Jimmy Jihad is ratting out the house with the weapons cache because he works for a competing faction, and that is taking a player out of the game?  Sure, there are a bunch of weapons gone, but have you made some other goon more powerful?  Again, I am not criticizing what anyone does.  I am asking for more info. 
I have every belief that Iraq is a total cluster hump.  However, it isn't our cluster hump, and I am speaking specifically to A'stan.  Since it looks like we may be there for a bit, then maybe it is a good idea to get chummy and take some risks.  But if the population are a bunch of two faced MOFO's, who will take whatever handouts they can get, then sucker you into an ambush first chance, then maybe we should play our cards a little closer.  I support the mission in Afghanistan, and think it has an excellent chance of success.  It just scares me to hear people making judgements that could lead to great "suggestions" like soldiers should go have sleep overs in villages, or have "Lend your webbing and vest to a kid Day".  Risk is necessary.  Granted.  But how much is needed to be effective?

Isn't there great value in the old traditional foot patrol that works a neighbourhood over a long period, gets to know and trust the people, and can hear/see/smell/check all kinds of things that some guy rolling by in a cruiser (once in eight hours) with the windows up and the radio on will never even notice? Don't police services in Canada express great frustration that certain communities do not trust them, and will not share information with them?

Not looking to create a police hijack, however when you work a district long enough, you get to know it.  Yes, you are in a car, and are still effective.  Police car windows amazingly can be rolled down too.  Foot patrol is great when the bad guys are.......on foot.  Foot patrol vs car, foot patrol vs bike, foot patrol vs roller blades gets tedious pretty fast.  We use it in the downtown core mostly.  I'm not sure what you are referring to about "certain communities", but if you are referring to the GTA, those "communities" made their bed and now are getting to sleep in them.  Frustration only stems from still caring.  I believe TPS got over that several years ago. 
I reiterate:  Not comparing police vs soldiers.  Comparing police informants vs terrorist informants.

To answer this go here and scroll down to number 184

http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2066rank.html

Then scroll up and take a look at the countries that are above #184.  The US mil would love to have their death rate go this low.

Okay, I am kind of stupid with numbers.  I don't get what you are saying with this.  ???

 

[pbi]

Zipperheadcop:

I just wanted to hear if increased contact which will certainly lead to more deaths will be WORTH it for what is gained bac

In the long run, lack of increased contact IMHO will lead to even more deaths because it will contribute to inability to influence the situation, loss of initiative, and thus make life much easier for the enemy to do whatever he feels like. AFAIK, if we don't embrace some risk in the short term, we may not have a long term to worry about. And I am saying that with the full knowledge that those soldiers taking that risk are from my Regt, led by people some of whom I know very well. I do not want them to be hurt or killed, but I believe they all understand that risk is part of the fight.

Comparing police informants vs terrorist informants.

I think your emphasis on "informants" may be a bit misplaced: it is not just those types we need to influence: it is also all those other villagers, townspeople, farmers, etc who see and hear all kinds of things, and who can provide shelter and support to AQ/TB/HiG and friends. They will not make any decision that places their own lives at risk unless they see a very good reason to do so, and trust that someboy has their interest at heart. Otherwise why would they bother?

I'm not sure what you are referring to about "certain communities", but if you are referring to the GTA, those "communities" made their bed and now are getting to sleep in them.  Frustration only stems from still caring.  I believe TPS got over that several years ago

And I won't delve further into the policing discussion, either, except to say that, no, I am not just talking about TPS: I include Calgary and Winnipeg, both of whom have faced similar issues while I lived in those cities. If, as you say, TPS stopped caring about its relationship with parts of the community, then perhaps that is actually TPS own problem, not the community. But, whatever.

Cheers

 

[teddy49]

Okay, I am kind of stupid with numbers.  I don't get what you are saying with this.   ???

In you're earlier post, you talked about having the American's dying at the same rate that Iraqi's are.  That link is to the CIA world factbook ranking of countries gross death rate per 1000 people.  The lower your countries death rate, the higher it's number.  Iraq is 184th with 5.37 deaths/1000.  Canada is 119th with 7.80 deaths/1000.  Sierra Leone, which hasn't been in the news lately, is 6th with 23.03 deaths/1000 people.  The United States is 107th with 8.26 deaths/1000.  So for American soldiers to be dying at the rate of the Iraqi people, would actually mean that they were safer than in their own country.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I figure that you have to focus on the population.  An insurgency comes from the population and is supported (willingly or unwillingly) by that population, even if there is foreign content or influence in the enemy forces.  You must win the population over or each year you will face a new crop of insurgents.  As pbi mentions, this entails some risk, but I think you have to take these risks.  An effective counter-insugency campaign might be one that kills or captures very few insurgents, but at the same time prevents the creation of new ones while isolating the rest from the population (morally if not physically).  Better yet would be insurgents deciding to go back to their previous lives because they see the original cause of their greivance removed or reduced to the level that they no longer wish to risk their lives for its sake.

Cheers,

2B

 

[zipperhead_cop]

Okay, I get it.  Well, not the death rate thing, that still doesn't make sense.  Thanks to all for the int gathering chat.  There was no intention to suggest that I felt that people were not doing a good job, or that Humint wasn't important.  I just don't like unnecessary death, as I'm sure is the case with all of us.  Good luck and Godspeed for all the guys who are actually doing it. 

 

[GO!!!]

Now the, GO!!!  Firstly I don't see the hypocrisy that you speak of.  But I'm not going to get into a pissing match about who has the moral high ground in the GWOT.  Secondly, if it's hypocritical of me to do what I do and protect the people I protect, while understanding and publicly acknowledging that I don't think it has to be this way then I guess the shoe fits.  Sorry for thinking that my presence here, might actually help these people and do some small part to help them forge better lives for themselves.  I didn't realize that was hypocritical.  I'll be honest I don't think that's going to happen in Iraq anymore, for the reason's I stated in my first post.  Perhaps, then I should quit my job.  Would that mean I wasn't a hypocrite anymore.  The clients I work for, (an NGO, not the army)would still be here, and would still believe in their mission, but because I think there's a better way for Uncle Sugar to be doing their part of the mission, I'm a hypocrite.  Sorry, I said earlier that I wasn't going to get into a pissing match about moral high ground.  I guess I'm a liar too.

Right, you're a selfless martyr working for minimum wage to help both the Iraqi people and your NGO staff.  Point made.  :

I said it is hypocritical for someone to bash force protection policies and participate in one at the same time. Are you expecting me to believe that you do not use similar ROE in protecting your customers to US troops also in the same geographical area?

For your second point, I understand that this isn't WWII.  And I don't think Iraq is a meat grinder either.  Remember the total number of casualties here is still lower than the first 20 minutes of D-day.  In fact I would argue that the way they are doing things now is analogous to Haig's solution to the western front.  Where as troop dispersal and force decentralization might be a more Curry-like way of looking at things.  Perhaps you disagree.  Hindsight is 20/20 and I don't want to rag on the Yanks to much, but if they'd tried a lower key approach from the beginning, perhaps they wouldn't be in the boat they're in now.  Where to switch tactics would definitely lead to higher casualties.

You stated in your earlier post that this switch in tactics would "definitely" lead to "much" higher casualties, now you are defending the existing body count in comparison to WWII. While I realise that military operations are inherently dangerous, your implication that the US should accept even higher numbers of casualties in order to make the Iraqi people like them more is ludicrous. Force Protection is job one, hearts and minds is job two.

For your third point, I never mentioned word one in my post about Afghanistan.  The sum total of my experience with insurgency is in Iraq.  Perhaps I should have stated that I was only speaking to my firsthand knowledge of Iraq.  The challenges I feel that face our guys in Afghanistan, of which again, I have no first hand knowledge, would be the subject of another post, if not another thread.  But suffice to say, I don't think that has nearly as much to do with Coalition tactics as it does with the intransigence and independent spirit of the Afghan people.  But this post was strictly from my experience in Iraq and I think only applies to Iraq.

I was wrong on this one, thinking you were suggesting that the Coy bases that Canada is using in Afghanistan are the way to go - and they may well be in rural areas to start.

 

[teddy49]

Are you expecting me to believe that you do not use similar ROE in protecting your customers to US troops also in the same geographical area?

Well in a word yes.  Without breaking any opsec rules, our guys in Baghdad run lo-profile.  That means drive vehicles that don't stick out.  Use local drivers.  Blend in with traffic, not trying to maintain a 100 meter bubble.  Don't drive in  any recognizable formation.  Keep your weapons out of sight.  Cover up all the Junior Commando gear with normal looking clothing.  In short try not to stick out.  So no, we don't point weapons at every person we think may be a threat.

Second, PSD's in Iraq, with the exception of American's on the WPPS contracts because they have diplomatic passports and work for the US State Department, operate under a vastly more restrictive set of ROEs than the Army.  Cause the army has immunity from everyone but the army.  We don't.  The weapons we can use are restricted by the Iraqi Government.  If the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, thinks that we had a bad shoot, at best we can expelled from the country, at worst we could be meeting our 400 new cell mates.  Most of whom would be excused for bearing us some animosity.

Part of my problem I guess is that I have a hard time getting across the level of the disconnect of the Army from the people.  For example, in our compound we have a number of different clients and security companies.  We have almost 2 rifle companies worth of people with guns here.  But the Army unit in charge patrolling this section of Baghdad, doesn't even know we're here.  You'd think we'd at least be a point of interest on their maps.  It's that bad.

I'm not gonna toot our horn, but our neighbors both inside and outside our fort are generally happy to have us here.  We provide security for the neighborhood, constant power to people who would otherwise only get a couple hours a day, if the powerlines in our neighborhood actually transmitted power.  It's not all sunshine and roses, we certainly have challenges maintaining our relations with the locals, but our dealings with them are generally positive.

As it stands, I don't think it's just semantics to say that I don't participate in a force protection policy, I participate in a client protection policy.  There is a difference.  My job is to protect my client in the most effective manner I can, that allows them to still conduct their operations effectively.  This includes forfeiture of my own life.  That's an acknowledgement I made when I signed on the dotted line.  It's also and acknowlegement I made when I joined the CF 12 years ago, too.  I'm not looking to throw my life away, but the deal I made means that the client's life is more important than mine.  I'm not trying to sound noble, but for me there may come a time where death or dismemberment may not only be a risk, but an obligation.  I don't get a pension from this gig, even if I do 20 years here.  I'm not paid when I'm not working.  I don't have a military medical system waiting to provide long term rehabilitative care, should I be injured or maimed.  I don't have a QRF that includes Apaches, Abrams, and Bradleys.  I don't think it's out of line to ask or receive a lucrative pay check for the risks I do take.

You stated in your earlier post that this switch in tactics would "definitely" lead to "much" higher casualties, now you are defending the existing body count in comparison to WWII. While I realise that military operations are inherently dangerous, your implication that the US should accept even higher numbers of casualties in order to make the Iraqi people like them more is ludicrous.

How the US would win this war without the Iraqi people liking them, is certainly beyond me.  If you can show me how to bring the full combat power of the US military te bear against an enemy that refuses to be fixed and await their destruction, please educate me.  Short of "Kill them all and let God sort 'em out" I can't think of anything.  And since I think that's impossible anyway, I stand by my earlier statements.

Force Protection is job one, hearts and minds is job two.

Unfortunately I feel that if this attitude is shared by too many of your collegues, then the war is already lost.

My apologies for turning this into a "PSDs are People Too" post.

Edited for clarity.

 

[zipperhead_cop]

In my world, PSD means Police Service Dog. 

 

[Centurian1985]

It is mind-boggling how these threads jump around;  we start with devil39 talking about how counter-insurgency and country-building can work at cross-purposes (which I have seen in the past), progress to personal security teams and end up with a police dog...

I hate to attempt a hijack but Id like to hear more about the life in the compounds that the US troops are apparently unaware of... is that about protecting Canadian or US VIPs, or is it people from some other country?

Can you start that as a new thread, teddy49?