CSS "Hard Points" & "Firebases" the future way of operating?

[a_majoor]

Latest thinking I have heard through the grapevine is very "anti-cavalry" and even anti manoeuvre in concept: CSS "Hard Points"

Unless I was hallucinating during the discussion where this came up, the idea is now for "F" ech units to ferry themselves back to CSS "Hard Points" for supply and service, rather than CSS going to the units in the field. This seems to be a throwback to the middle ages where everyone operated out of castles, or the "firebase" concept of the Viet Nam war era.

If this is true, then operations will be in the form of circles centred on the CSS "Hard Point", with the radius being 1/2 your unrefueled driving range.

Someone needs to confirm or deny this.

 

[Matt_Fisher]

What phase of operations are we looking at here?

I cannot imagine a CSS hardpoint concept working well in the offence.  It does seem to make more sense for security and stabilization/peace support/occupation tye operations though.

 

[KevinB]

I think that is our believed requirment of the luxury of a fixed camp, and the reliance of non CF service support.

 

[TCBF]

Well, there you go.   Our loggies in the Army have finally succumbed to the RCAF base mentality of "launch and receive missions" while having a book burning party of anything written by Sun Tzu, Napoleon, Slim or Boyd.    "Institutional Bunkeritis" is the new principle of war, and DPs will now be conducted out of a 2006 Hesko-Bastioned version of Firebase Gloria, with each tour submitting a 25mm ammo can of citations for "Bravely insisting the manoeuvre elements abort the mission and return to camp for "Harbour Routine", thus avoiding having the CSS elements   perform "Logistic BTS L4101 C/D DEFEND" and freeing up the CSS types to complain about how the Smelly Crewmen and Thuggy Grunts are jamming up the Internet Cafe whenever they come to camp to do the sentry duties the CSS types feel are beneath them.

No doubt caused by the guy in Kabul who broke into tears telling the Ombudsman how they not only had to Work from 10 to 2 during the day, but do a sentry shift at night as well.

He would have loved being in the Army in the Seventies, when we spent six months a year in the field, on a course, or teaching a course.   Back then, we had Loggies who were proud to SOLDIER, and quickly ate their weakest men, so they would not contaminate the rest.

Tom

 

[Infanteer]

I don't like bases - they tend to attract rockets, mortars, and locals selling pirated CD's.

Our base should be our rucks.

 

[TCBF]

"Our base should be our rucks."

Yup.  Until it is empty.

We need log facillities, but they must be responsive to the commander's intent, and not artificially paint us into a corner.  In other words they should add capability, not siphon away assets.  If 4 Svc Bn could protect itself, why can't ... etc.

Tom

 

[Infanteer]

Exactly.  Unfortunately for us, bases have seen guns and butter replaced by hot showers, DVD library, and internet access.

 

[Canadian Sig]

Well, there you go.   Our loggies in the Army have finally succumbed to the RCAF base mentality of "launch and receive missions" while having a book burning party of anything written by Sun Tzu, Napoleon, Slim or Boyd.    "Institutional Bunkeritis" is the new principle of war, and DPs will now be conducted out of a 2006 Hesko-Bastioned version of Firebase Gloria, with each tour submitting a 25mm ammo can of citations for "Bravely insisting the manoeuvre elements abort the mission and return to camp for "Harbour Routine", thus avoiding having the CSS elements   perform "Logistic BTS L4101 C/D DEFEND" and freeing up the CSS types to complain about how the Smelly Crewmen and Thuggy Grunts are jamming up the Internet Cafe whenever they come to camp to do the sentry duties the CSS types feel are beneath them.

No doubt caused by the guy in Kabul who broke into tears telling the Ombudsman how they not only had to Work from 10 to 2 during the day, but do a sentry shift at night as well.

He would have loved being in the Army in the Seventies, when we spent six months a year in the field, on a course, or teaching a course.   Back then, we had Loggies who were proud to SOLDIER, and quickly ate their weakest men, so they would not contaminate the rest.

Tom

I hope you dont lump all CSS into one catagory because my trade is CSS and I never heard a single sig complain on roto 0 about tower duty(no matter what time), patting down locals at the gate, or going out on dispatch rider runs each day (in a Nissan Tarrano). We pride ourselves on the support we give and how close we work to the sharp end. We are one big "radiating" bulls-eye out there attracting all manner of bad crap on our position.

 

[TCBF]

Yes, I know, I have worked with lots of great CSS types in and out of Armd Regts.  My rant above was a broad brush response to the post that started this thread, and the stories brought back from Kabul by the last Roto.  I have no doubt most CSS types would love to get out past "The Wire" and do their job on Ops.  Unfortunately, those who don't cause the stories and rants.

Buy hey, we have guys like that in the combat arms, too.

Tom

 

[Canadian Sig]

Unfortunatly "they" dont seem to be in short supply anywhere.  :rage:

 

[McG]

Realistically, the CSS support should be taylored to the operation.  Under some stability/reconstruction operations it may be appropriate for fdly forces to return to a defended CSS location for sustainment.  Howerver, there must always be the ability to force project.  A BG should be able to detach a Coy/Sqn on its own for 48 - 72 hrs.  There should also be the ability to sustain that sub-unit in place with resupply.

I'd tend to think this restrictive CSS arragnment should be the exception, and not the rule.

 

[a_majoor]

Realistically, the CSS support should be taylored to the operation.  Under some stability/reconstruction operations it may be appropriate for fdly forces to return to a defended CSS location for sustainment.  Howerver, there must always be the ability to force project.  A BG should be able to detach a Coy/Sqn on its own for 48 - 72 hrs.  There should also be the ability to sustain that sub-unit in place with resupply.

I'd tend to think this restrictive CSS arragnment should be the exception, and not the rule.

I hope this is true as well. The discussion which launched this was actually a side note during a SG05 briefing. There was some talk about changing the training plan to reflect the "Three block war" scenario, and "CSS Hard Points" came up as the "new and improved" idea to operate in that environment. I suppose this might work if the "blocks" are very small, but considering that a city like Grozny covers over 100 Km2, you would either need hundreds of "hard points", or risk leaving large sections of the city to the enemy.

I am also concerned that this sort of mentality will spread, leaving ideas like fast moving and wide ranging light Infantry and Armoured Cavalry stillborn.

 

[a23trucker]

It warms my heart to hear that I'm not the only one who is skeptical about this new concept.
IMHO this new method seems to have it's roots in peace keeping where it was acceptable administratively,operationally and politically to work fixed points rather than the mobile concept that was employed when we were training for warfighting in the coldwar.
We seem to have forgotten the reason why we had arrived at all those old methods.
(could it be we lost the corporate knowledge with FRP??)
Yes; we have to change to suit the new realities but lets look at how and why the old methods were developed before we throw the baby out with the bath water.

(PS. Hope we have a chance to talk this weekend Sgt Majoor.)

Cheers
AM

 

[TCBF]

Some good points there, a23trucker, and FRP did us a lot of damage.  

One thing about these hardpoints - how will our supplies get from one hard point to another?  

Yep.   Convoys.   WOO HOO!   The truckers are now back in business.  Bring back 138 Tpt Coy, RCASC.

 

[tomahawk6]

Sounds like a KBR job. Civilian contractors on the battlefield, I wouldnt have believed it 20 years ago.

 

[TCBF]

Just before leaving for Kandahar three years ago, we were given a set of briefings, one of which touched on the air supply situation.  I asked that - if conditions proved favourable - supplies would eventually be trucked up from the port of Karachi.  I was basically called an idiot.  Four months later.....

 

[mudtrucker]

Hmmm, I would find the concept of hard-point static CSS points as the sole solution to deployed operations support as very bizarre unless part of a larger operational support concept, especially considering the spectrum of operations that we train for and are employed within.   Having said that, I can see certain operational missions and environments where a static CSS capability would make sense, especially where it marries up GS type functions with civilian-contractor functions in a low-threat environment in a mature and stable theatre.

However, as the Army gets more expeditionary-focussed and the change to a more mobile and manoeuvrist approach to operations becomes more accepted and set within the Army, static hard points become more and more dangerous, especially as we face growing asymmetrical threats.

Having been in the Army CSS world for some time, both in the ranks and as an officer leading everything from a truck to a Truck Company, I would have to say that while hard points have their place, it is not a doctrinal concept that should dominate CSS planning.   The greatest defences for a CSS unit are camouflage and concealment and movement.   And let's be honest here â “ we do not have the combat power to defend any such hard points in a high threat environment, not at least without restricting our manoeuvrist doctrine.   And so we take CSS soldiers to defend a fixed position when they should be out pushing supplies forward.   Not a good idea.   And like someone said previously in this forum, static sites tend to attract nasty things like mortars, rockets and car bombs (can anyone say Beirut Marine Barracks?).

I am pretty sure that it's only one tool in the tool bag and not a doctrinal precept that will be our template for all types of missions in all types of theatres of operations.   And keep in mind that Army field force CSS capabilities are extremely finite, so where we can get away with this type of support concept (e.g. fixed or semi-fixed installations with military and contracted civilian capabilities inter-mixed), based on threat, risk and CSS capability requirements, we really do not have much choice.   The cupboards are rather bare.

MudTrucker