Cutting the CF/DND HQ bloat - Excess CF Sr Leadership, Public Servants and Contractors

[Teeps74]

Since everyone is "bloody -minded" the only approach which would work, would be to throw the baby out with the bath water, and start again. From scratch. Eliminate all the environments completely, none of this passive aggressive crap, get rid of them. The three environments do frequently work AGAINST each other, and frequently do not like doing joint things, where by necessity another environment is their commander.

Follow the Marine Corps model. Everyone fights, throw the rest out. Only one environment.

Think of it, three entire HQs eliminated, and reduced to one HQ (the vision of Unification).

Our current model of warfare, big and small DEMANDS joint operations. Rolling back the clock ten years, and well... There was a reason why Transformation was foisted upon us.

 

[armyvern]

At LFWA when the new COS arrived in 2010, he apparently took one look at the structure of the HQ and decided that it was too large and too cumbersome.  He did not have to hire consultants to reorganize the HQ.  He convened a meeting of 10-12 pers from across all rank levels in the HQ and included two of the main formations (customer reps if you will) and sat over a few pitchers of beer and a whiteboard, and re-designed the HQ from the bottom up.
...

All at the COS' personal cost of both money and time (to drink) of a couple of pitchers of beer?

Someone, quick --- clone this COS and propagate him throughout the CF hierarchy; we need much more of this interjection of common sense.

 

[Infanteer]

Ugh.  Before we add one more PY to the schools, it is time to review the sheer volume of Individual Training that we have imposed on ourselves.  If i was Boss for a day, I would take available PYS and:

• give back the 100 PYs taken from the 3 Light battalions
• buy back the two Armoured Recce Squadrons we cashed in over the last two years
• Flesh out the combat support platoons (Pioneers first)
• Establish an anti-armour capability again
• Create an additional FSG in each of the Service Battalions (325ish PYs each

I would NOT establish 144 man ASICs.  I would NOT increase the size of Bde HQ.  I would NOT invest PYs in Individual training.

The Field Force is on its knees.  Time to look after it.

Hey, did you look at my crib sheet!  :nod:

 

[Infanteer]

Since everyone is "bloody -minded" the only approach which would work, would be to throw the baby out with the bath water, and start again. From scratch. Eliminate all the environments completely, none of this passive aggressive crap, get rid of them. The three environments do frequently work AGAINST each other, and frequently do not like doing joint things, where by necessity another environment is their commander.

Follow the Marine Corps model. Everyone fights, throw the rest out. Only one environment.

Think of it, three entire HQs eliminated, and reduced to one HQ (the vision of Unification).

Our current model of warfare, big and small DEMANDS joint operations. Rolling back the clock ten years, and well... There was a reason why Transformation was foisted upon us.

We saw that attempt in the 60s, it was called Unification.

Something like this was also similar to what General Hillier's original Transformation proposal entailed.

Between the bureaucracy and some entrenched cultural interests, they never survived first contact.

 

[Edward Campbell]

It's not my problem and I never thought I was smart enough to tell the VCDS of my day how to do it, but ... some principles:

1. The fleet and field forces are top priority ~ we have to have good ones, adequately if not always fully staffed and adequately equipped. They need enough of the right people;

2. Logistics support and training come second, tied for second. Schools need the best people and postings to schools ought to be stepping stones to promotion; and

3. Command and control is fourth on the list. For officers, especially, postings to HQs ought to be an honour and hideously hard work ought to be the norm, because those in the HQ know that those in the logistics support, training and combat units need and deserve the best from the staff.

We ought to have a clear, simple organization that is economical and efficient in peace and for low intensity operations and which can grow, as necessary, without reinventing the entire system. It is the 21st century and joint operations are the norm ... it's time the CF joined the party. While single service ships, battalions and squadrons are simple and great for special to service and part of service training - we don't need sailors to manage and train RCAF squadrons and we probably don't need fighter jocks to manage and train Air Transport squadrons, etc - formations should be easy to make joint and higher formations ought to be inherently joint and the whole thing should be managed by a joint staff in Ottawa.

DND and the CF, once it gets its own house in order, ought to challenge the government, itself, especially the PCO, to manage more efficiently and effectively because some if the problems that plague DND, and that create much of the unnecessary sturm und drang that seems to demand more people in more HQs doing "busy work" for no useful purpose, originate with the cabinet and the PCO.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

I would remove everyone from training that does not have at least 1 tour in the trade core functions.

I have no idea what this means...

 

[PPCLI Guy]

Hey, did you look at my crib sheet!  :nod:

Meh - you work, I take the credit.

It is the natural order of things... :-*

 

[McG]

I could agree with topping up the national schools with with experienced staffers; this would increase the level of training.

I don't know that growth is required.  Resource leveling across the Army training system might go just as far (or farther) toward meeting needs.

 

[Infanteer]

If manning levels were stabilized between the field units and the schools, then we could dismantle the tasking empire that has been built over the last decade.  There are staff solely dedicated to pushing around electronic tasks to different units to be filled - these fill inordinate amounts of G3 time and cause headaches with "no fills" and last minute scrambles.  What would we do if a school had the resources it needed to teach the courses it needed to teach and the units were left alone to do their training?  :blotto:

A good step is the outsourcing/distributed courses that are being conducted now.

 

[Old Sweat]

The challenge is peak periods such as the summer. If a school was staffed to handle it, then staff could be under employed for the rest of the year.

The tasking empire was created by LGen Stan Waters when he was the DCDS because everybody and her brother were sending orders to subordinate formations and units to provide people for various taskings, some legit and many not. Stan, who had a notoriously short fuze, went nuts in late October 72 when D Ceremonial presented himself to complain that 2 Brigade had turned down direction from him to provide a guard of honour for Rememberance Day in Ottawa. It had escaped the Director, who was a civvy, that he had jumped well down the chain of command, and did not have the authority to direct anybody to do anything, except for his flunkies. Stan the Man, explained the facts of life to him in words he had probably learned in the FSSF and 1 Can Para, along with a reminder that there were umpteen troops in NDHQ who could go on parade.

The tasking world was created shortly later. It also probably requires a review.

 

[OldSolduer]

Someone, quick --- clone this COS and propagate him throughout the CF hierarchy; we need much more of this interjection of common sense.

Common sense? SACRILEGE!

 

[fraserdw]

I have no idea what this means...

What I mean is people who did their tour in their trade not in a HQ.  There are folks walking around claiming tour experience who never met a Afghan who did not have a broom in his hands.  What we need is combat experienced trainers and trades trainers who applied their trade outside of KAF.  We need to develop a whole new way of business, do away with the managers who lead by requiring SORs and CONOPs and 5 years of project development to develop a new train device.  We are becoming immobile administratively to the point that chaos and careerists are the only thing still moving.

 

[Infanteer]

What I mean is people who did their tour in their trade not in a HQ.  There are folks walking around claiming tour experience who never met a Afghan who did not have a broom in his hands.  What we need is combat experienced trainers and trades trainers who applied their trade outside of KAF.  We need to develop a whole new way of business, do away with the managers who lead by requiring SORs and CONOPs and 5 years of project development to develop a new train device.  We are becoming immobile administratively to the point that chaos and careerists are the only thing still moving.

Any proof that we are in dire need "combat experienced trainers" or that we are "immobile administratively to the point that chaos and careerists are the only thing still moving"?

 

[Pusser]

What I mean is people who did their tour in their trade not in a HQ.  There are folks walking around claiming tour experience who never met a Afghan who did not have a broom in his hands.  What we need is combat experienced trainers and trades trainers who applied their trade outside of KAF.  We need to develop a whole new way of business, do away with the managers who lead by requiring SORs and CONOPs and 5 years of project development to develop a new train device.  We are becoming immobile administratively to the point that chaos and careerists are the only thing still moving.

HQ experience IS experience and just as important to the whole process and as useful in the training system as experience on patrol.

 

[OldSolduer]

HQ experience IS experience and just as important to the whole process and as useful in the training system as experience on patrol.

One of our great failings is our inability to produce officers who can command at higher levels.....ie Corps and up. We have some great tactical and operational commanders.....

 

[Edward Campbell]

Historically it was always our weak point: Currie, aside, our 1914/18 era generals were a good, solid but hardly inspired lot. The performance of our Army's generals in 1939/45 can be described, charitably, as pedestrian, in my opinion. Several historians including Jack Granatstein and Jack English have offered explanations; I tend to favour a combination of:

1. A career that neither attracted nor rewarded the sort of officer who might become a brilliant corps commander;

2. Political indifference, in the 1920s, and budget crises, in the 1930s, that denied our officers training and operational experience with the British Army; and

3. An institutional predisposition towards caution and careerism.

The RCAF had, in my opinion, better officers - perhaps it was the nature of the service. They had no opportunity, however, to exercise higher command in battle because we fielded first Canadian squadrons, then some wings and finally (a) group(s) (was it more than one?). But RCAF officers showed great skill and ability in planning, implementing and managing the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan which was, arguably, a major Canadian contribution to the war.

The Navy were, I think, better yet. Officers like Harry Lay exercised senior command of Canadian and allied flotillas with skill and effectiveness.

Only one Canadian officer had a major allied (theatre) command in 1939/45: Rear Admiral Leonard W Murray who became Commander-in-Chief, Canadian Northwest Atlantic. He was an exceptionally able officer and a determined commander. But, I'm afraid he would not fit our modern conception of a military leader; it is hard for me to imagine a senior officer less like Rick Hillier or Walt Natynczyk, he was austere, remote and forbidding - perhaps (only said partially tongue in cheek) that's why he was so bloody good and today's generals are not so bloody good.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Private sector focused, but some good ideas in here about putting the HQ in its place (e.g., not meddling at the operational level). And I like the name of the consulting company that wrote it: it 'speaks' to me  ;D

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[Edward Campbell]

OK, so lets imagine that I am the VCDS for a while  : 

The MND calls me to his office; there I meet with him, that DM and the CDS and a few hangers on.

"Ladies and gentlemen," says the Minister, "the Department seems, to cabinet anyway, to be, as our American friends say, 'all hat and no cattle'. There is a perception that we are badly organized and that we founder about because we have too much bureaucracy and not enough at the sharp end. I don't mind telling you that we received a lot of mail in the wake of the Leslie report, almost all of it demanding that I force deep cuts in the HQ superstructure and staff. When the CDS declined to follow through I got even more critical mail.There is a perception, in cabinet and in the public, that we, you, actually, have too many people in too many HQs doing so much busy work that you and I lose sight of the aim; it appears that we don't talk to one another, here in DND, and that, consequently, the Associate Minister and I and, indeed, even the PM are embarrassed as events unfold for which we are unprepared."

"On the other hand," he went on, "Canadians, the media and the government remain mightily proud of the work our men and women in the fleet and the regiments, battalions and squadrons do whenever there is a crisis. So, we appear to have two militaries: one in ships, armoured vehicles and airplanes that works hard and well; and one that sits behind desks and works neither hard enough nor well enough."

"I want the command and control and management of DND and the CF overhauled. VCDS I am appointing you to lead this work - reporting directly to me if you run into problems, which I am confident will be few and far between. Some principles and contraints:

1. There are some sensible limits to what you can do to the Departmental staff, per se. The Deputy still must have ADMs for e.g. policy, finance, human resources and so on in order to fill his, and my, constitutional and legal mandates;

2. You are not going to make major changes to the National Defence Act - the CF will remain a unified force, there must still be a Judge Advocate General and so on;

3. CSEC is off limits to you. It's mandate, operations and reporting relationships will remain unchanged;

3. While I expect some savings in PYs and dollars that is not the primary aim. The aim is to ensure that I, through the Deputy and the Chief, receive the best possible advice and information so that I can persuade cabinet to do what is best for Canada and that cabinet can, with confidence, make strategic decisions and send the CF into battle whenever and wherever necessary. But I hope that we will be able to recycle several hundred people out of HQs and into ships and units. Of course we understand that ships and units are not in need of 50 year old lieutenant commanders and warrant officers so, once your reorganization plan is complete the government will approve a "buy out"plan to allow us to move quite a few people into early retirement and then hire new, young people to fill the slots in the fleet and the field force;

4. I expect the organization to be clear and simple - I want every sailor, soldier and RCAF member to understand, clearly, how tha chain of command works and I want everyone to know how they get their orders and support;

5. The CF is to be a joint force, able to plan and conduct joint and combined operations on short notice; and

6. Although you may not, of course, direct any changes that go beyond DND we, cabinet, will listen to recommendations re: e.g. defence procurement and staffing."

I went back to my office and told my EA to arrange a conference call to most of the high priced help in Ottawa and to the commanders in the field. Meanwhile I took a blank piece of paper and began to doodle.

A few hours later I told the assembled (in a 13th floor conference room and on the video conference unit) multitude:

1. In brief, what the MND had told me earlier this morning; and

2. That I intended to disband the "dot coms," retore NDHQ as one, big, central HQ and replace the existing commands with four, geographically based joint or unified commands plus a Special Operations Group, controlled from NDHQ and an Expeditionary Force Group consisting of a HQ, with signals support and some support elements. The new joint commands would be responsible for fleets, brigades, wings and bases which would remain, largely, unchanged. Three service chiefs - professional heads of service - in Ottawa would manage single service doctrine, equipment requirements and training, including schools. But the schools would be part of their geographic joint commands. There would be a single, unified military personnel centre in Ottawa that would manage recruiting, education and some, common to all services, individual training. ADM(Mat), a civilian, would manage the third and fourth line military support functions.

I then named a "tiger team" of five navy captains and army/RCAF colonels,* and two senior civil servants, all hand picked by me, who would be posted, ASAP, to Ottawa and who would, in a matter of weeks (12, at the most) produce an outline plan for the MND's approval. I estimated that the MND would need several days, maybe even a couple of weeks to consult with his cabinet colleagues before approving something very near to what I had proposed. I then proposed to name the new commanders and principle staff branch heads in NDHQ (to an absolute maximum of 15 commanders, staff branch heads and ADMs) and my "tiger team" woud then work, for 12 more weeks, with similar teams named by each of them to design and staff the various HQs down to commander/lieutenant colonel and civilian equivalent level. After that six month planning period we would "fire the shot heard 'round DND and the CF" and implement the new structure.

I gave a few new principles:

1. Initially I was not overly concernbed about the size of HQs, except that -

a. I expected an overall savings of many hundred, possibly even a few thousand PYs - which would be converted into new PYs for ships, units and bases; and

b. I wanted a significant downranking in all HQs - specifically I told them that the new joint commanders and major branch heads in Ottawa would be read admirals/major generals and the new rank of military "directors," in Ottawa, equivalent to the first level of executive in the civil service, would drop from captain(RCN)/colonel to commander/lieutenant colonel. I told them I expected the "tiger teams" to build appropriate HQs around these general. I told them that I had assurances from the minister that he would fight hard to readjust the CF pay scales to ensure that compensation matched responsibilites;

2. I wanted coherent organizations - I was prepared to accept that we needed more people in logistics and support units in order to allow them to be properly aligned with the combat organizations they serve; and

3. Despite the huge battles ahead, I intended to use this as an excuse to rationalize the army's reserve structure.

Finally, I handed out/E-mailed a quick, hand drawn sketch (see below) of where I was headed and explained that this was not final because I was quite prepared to be argued away from it by my hand picked "tiger team."


Edit to add: I have also attached a sketch of my CF outline organization showing the four regional joint commands and, in two of them, the basic internal breakdown. There are also two other field organizations, a Special Operations Group and an Expeditionary Support Group (A HQ with supporting Signal and Logistic elements). One issue with my CF organization is that I do not separate force generation from force employment. I believe that each commander can do both, except for major overseas operations where the Expeditionary Force HQ will be deployed and units will be assigned to it.

_____
* There was considerable moaning and groaning as senior military commanders and ADMs told me that I was, case by case, taking away their very best people. I knew that, that's why I picked them!

 

[Remius]

Only one problem with your scenario.

Your first para about the Public thinking/perceiving that we have too many people in HQ jobs.

Most people in the public think that when we say we have 60 000 people in that all of them are either pilots, grunts or sailors.  Most can barely name any trades outside of those core ones.  I really think that this issue is more of an internal one, ie we are the only ones that care and /or are interested.

The rest is good,  ;D

 

[Edward Campbell]

Only one problem with your scenario.

Your first para about the Public thinking/perceiving that we have too many people in HQ jobs.

Most people in the public think that when we say we have 60 000 people in that all of them are either pilots, grunts or sailors.  Most can barely name any trades outside of those core ones.  I really think that this issue is more of an internal one, ie we are the only ones that care and /or are interested.

The rest is good,  ;D

Actually, the Leslie report did get a fair bit of media attention, albeit briefly ... sadly there are, relative to, say, the UK and USA, very few informed journalists focused on military matters. It takes time to change minds, but I'm guessing that MND Peter Mackay got a fair amount of mail re: Leslie's report and later re: the CDS' decisions to not cut some HQ bloat. I suspect he is getting more mail, right now, re: F-35 costs and re: DND reportedly misleading parliament. Those are the sorts of things that might stir a minister into action - there is nothing quite like embarrassing the cabinet to provoke a reorganization.